One Word Makes All The Difference – The Distinction Between “Pay If Paid” and “Pay When Paid” Clauses
April 06, 2016 —
David A. Harris – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPPayment clauses in California construction contracts are often complex and multi-layered. This is especially true in contracts between general contractors and their subcontractors. The general does not want to pay the subs until it receives funding from the owners. The subs, of course, want their progress and final payments as soon as possible.
Up until 1997, two different payment provisions were used in California contracts to manage payments by a general to its subcontractors. The first was called a “pay if paid” clause, and provided a contractor did not have to pay its subcontractors for work performed unless the subcontractor was first paid by the owner of the project. The second was the “pay when paid clause.” It required subcontractors to be paid for their work after the general was paid by the owner, or within “a reasonable time” after the subcontractors finished their work if the owner did not pay the general.
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David A. Harris, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPMr. Harris may be contacted at
dharris@hbblaw.com
The Proposed House Green New Deal Resolution
February 27, 2019 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelA Resolution has been proposed to the House for consideration that would recognize the Federal Government’s duty “to create a Green New Deal.” It sets forth a very ambitious 10-year program to mobilize and transform every aspect of American life to combat the threats of climate change by transitioning to an economy based upon 100% clean and renewable energy.
In doing so, millions of new jobs would be created, and everyone who wants a job would be guaranteed a job. The sponsors’ talking points declare that there is no time to lose, that Americans love a challenge, and “this is our moonshot.” The obvious goal is to eliminate the generation and use of fossil fuel and nuclear energy—they are simply not part of the solution.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
D.C. Decision Finding No “Direct Physical Loss” for COVID-19 Closures Is Not Without Severe Limitations
August 24, 2020 —
Michael S. Levine & Michael L. Huggins - Hunton Andrews KurthOn August 6, 2020, in Rose’s 1 LLC, et al. v. Erie Insurance Exchange, Civ. Case No. 2020 CA 002424 B, a District of Columbia trial court found in favor of an insurer on cross motions for summary judgment on the issue of whether COVID-19 closure orders constitute a “direct physical loss” under a commercial property policy.
At its core, the decision ignores key arguments raised in the summary judgment briefing and is narrowly premised on certain dictionary definitions of the terms, “direct,” “physical,” and “loss.” Relying almost entirely on those definitions – each supplied by the insureds in their opening brief – the court set the stage for its ultimate conclusion by finding “direct” to mean “without intervening persons, conditions, or agencies; immediate”; and “physical” to mean “of or pertaining to matter ….” The court then apparently accepted the policy’s circular definition of “loss” as meaning “direct and accidental loss of or damage to covered property.” Importantly, however, despite recognizing the fundamental rule of insurance policy construction that the court “must interpret the contract ‘as a whole, giving reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all its terms, and ascertaining the meaning in light of all the circumstances surrounding the parties at the time the contract was made,’” the court apparently ignored the insureds’ argument that the term “property damage” is specifically defined in the policy to include “loss of use” without any specific reference to physical or tangible damage.
Reprinted courtesy of
Michael S. Levine, Hunton Andrews Kurth and
Michael L. Huggins, Hunton Andrews Kurth
Mr. Levine may be contacted at mlevine@HuntonAK.com
Mr. Huggins may be contacted at mhuggins@HuntonAK.com
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Contractor Changes Contract After Signed, Then Sues Older Woman for Breaking It
September 03, 2015 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFChannel 13 Who TV reported, in Winterset, Iowa, Mary Gregory allegedly signed an estimate for hail damage repair to her home, and was later told by the contractor that it was a contract. When a crew showed up to her home to perform the work, she turned them away. Then, Gregory received a letter from an attorney demanding eight thousand dollars for breach of contract.
It turns out that the contractor altered the estimate Gregory signed and submitted it to the insurance company. According to Who TV, the altered estimate “contained work that Gregory says she didn’t authorize and a price tag of $32,134.” Jim Nelle, the contractor, admitted that he added to the contract after it was signed. He claims he was only trying to help her.
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Let’s Talk About a Statutory First-Party Bad Faith Claim Against an Insurer
February 19, 2024 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesLet’s talk about a statutory first-party bad faith claim against an insurer under Florida law. A recent opinion, discussed below, does a nice job providing a synopsis of a first-party statutory bad faith claim against an insurer:
The Florida Legislature created the first-party bad faith cause of action by enacting section 624.155, Florida Statutes, which imposes a duty on insurers to settle their policyholders’ claims in good faith. The statutory obligation on the insurer is to timely evaluate and pay benefits owed under the insurance policy. The damages recoverable by the insured in a bad faith action are those amounts that are the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the insurer’s bad faith in resolving a claim, which include consequential damages.
“[A] statutory bad faith claim under section 624.155 is ripe for litigation when there has been (1) a determination of the insurer’s liability for coverage; (2) a determination of the extent of the insured’s damages; and (3) the required [civil remedy] notice is filed pursuant to section 624.155(3)(a).”
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
New York Appellate Court Restores Insurer’s Right to Seek Pro Rata Allocation of Settlements Between Insured and Uninsured Periods
March 28, 2022 —
Patricia B. Santelle & Frank J. Perch, III - White and Williams LLPIn Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jenkins Bros., 2022 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1846 (App.Div. 1st Dept. March 22, 2022), the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, issued a ruling reversing the trial court and holding that an insurer was entitled to allocate a portion of asbestos claim settlements it negotiated to time periods when its dissolved insured was without coverage.
The decision overturns a trial court ruling that the insurer was barred from denying liability for the full amount of the settlements because the insurer had become the “real party in interest” as a result of a prior court order directing it to accept service of process on behalf of a dissolved insured. The trial court held that the insurer stood in the shoes of the insured for all purposes by accepting service and negotiating settlements, and was therefore estopped from denying liability for the full amount of the settlements.
Reprinted courtesy of
Patricia B. Santelle, White and Williams LLP and
Frank J. Perch, III, White and Williams LLP
Ms. Santelle may be contacted at santellep@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Perch may be contacted at perchf@whiteandwilliams.com
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Canada’s Largest Homebuilder Sets U.S. Growth Plan
April 01, 2015 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFAccording to Builder magazine, after conquering the Canadian market, Mattamy Homes seeks to build more homes in the U.S. Mattamy’s Jim Leiferman had been asked to promote the company in the Orlando-area, however, “he went above and beyond that mission, growing the company’s footprint well beyond the metro area.”
Brian Johnson, COO of Mattamy, told Builder, “[Jim Leiferman] was promotable, like any division president, but Jim proved to really, in a very short period of time, have a very strong in understanding of the business. He’s thoughtful and goes beyond our expectations.”
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Wait! Don’t Sign Yet: Reviewing Contract Protections During the COVID Pandemic
April 13, 2020 —
Danielle S. Ward - Balestreri Potocki & HolmesAs the circumstances of the COVID pandemic change day by day, and we all rush to keep business moving where and when we can, companies should consider hitting the “pause button” before renewing or executing any new contracts. Developing contracts often takes considerable time and expense, and companies are not in the habit of reworking them often. A change in law may prompt a company to revisit their contract terms, but otherwise business is often carried out with a standard form contract for a period of years. With the COVID pandemic affecting nearly every business and industry, life is not business as usual, and companies should make sure their contracts consider what previously seemed like an unforeseeable event.
Force Majeure clauses are included in many contracts to excuse contract performance when made impossible by some unforeseen circumstance. These clauses typically fall under two categories: general and specific. General force majeure clauses excuse performance if performance is prevented by circumstances outside the parties’ control. By contrast, specific force majeure clauses detail the exhaustive list of circumstances (acts of god, extreme weather, war, riot, terrorism, embargoes) which would excuse contract performance. Force majeure clauses are typically interpreted narrowly. If your contract has a specific clause and pandemic or virus is not one of the listed circumstances it may not apply. Whether a particular existing contract covers the ongoing COVID pandemic will vary depending on the language of the contract.
Force majeure clauses previously made headlines when the great economic recession hit in 2008. A number of courts held that simple economic hardship was not enough to invoke force majeure. The inability to pay or lack of desire to pay for the contracted goods or services did not qualify as force majeure. In California, impossibility turns on the nature of the contractual performance, and not in the inability of the obligor to do it. (Kennedy v. Reece (1964) 225 Cal. App. 2d 717, 725.) In other words, the task is objectively impossible not merely impossible or more burdensome to the specific contracting party.
California has codified “force majeure” protection where the parties haven’t included any language or the circumstances in the clause don’t apply to the situation at hand. Civil Code section 1511 excuses performance when “prevented or delayed by an irresistible, superhuman cause, or by the act of public enemies of this state or of the United States, unless the parties have expressly agreed to the contrary.” (Civ. Code § 1511.) What qualifies as a “superhuman cause”? In California, the test is whether under the particular circumstances there was such an insuperable interference occurring without the party's intervention as could not have been prevented by the exercise of prudence, diligence and care. (Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v. C. S. T., Ltd. (1946) 29 Cal.2d 228, 238.)
If you find yourself in an existing contract without a force majeure clause, or the statute does not apply, you may consider the doctrine of frustration of purpose. This doctrine is applied narrowly where performance remains possible, but the fundamental reason the parties entered into the contract has been severely or substantially frustrated by an unanticipated supervening circumstance, thus destroying substantially the value of the contract. (Cutter Laboratories, Inc. v. Twining (1963) 221 Cal. App. 2d 302, 314-15.) In other words, performance is still possible but valueless. Note this defense is not likely to apply where the contract has simply become less profitable for one party.
Now that COVID is no longer an unforeseeable event, but rather a current and grave reality, a party executing a contract today without adequate protections may have a difficult time proving unforeseeability. Scientists are not sure whether warm weather will suppress the spread of the virus, as it does with the seasonal flu, but to the extent we get a reprieve during the summer we may see a resurgence of cases this Fall or Winter. Companies should take care in reviewing force majeure clauses, and other clauses tied to timely performance such as delay and liquidated damages before renewing or executing new contracts.
Your contract scenario may vary from the summary provided above. Please contact legal counsel before making any decisions. During this critical time, BPH’s attorneys can be reached via email to answer your questions.
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Danielle S. Ward, Balestreri Potocki & HolmesMs. Ward may be contacted at
dward@bph-law.com
