North Dakota Universities Crumble as Oil Cash Pours In
August 27, 2014 —
Jennifer Oldham – BloombergNorth Dakota is struggling to finance deteriorating public universities even as it experiences the biggest energy boom in its history, raising concern that less prosperous states will face more serious funding challenges.
Students returning this week will attend classes in buildings without adequate ventilation or fire detection systems and in historic landmarks with buckling foundations. A space crunch is making it difficult for researchers to obtain grants and putting the accreditation of several programs at risk, administrators say.
“It’s embarrassing,” said North Dakota state Representative Kathy Hawken, a Republican from Fargo who sits on the higher education funding and budget committees. “We have a divided legislature on higher ed: Some think we put too much money into it and some think we don’t put enough. Buildings aren’t people, so we don’t put dollars there.”
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Jennifer Oldham, BloombergMs. Oldham may be contacted at
joldham1@bloomberg.net
California Supreme Court Addresses “Good Faith” Construction Disputes Under Prompt Payment Laws
June 06, 2018 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogIt’s been a rollercoaster. But the ride appears to be over.
In United Riggers & Erectors, Inc. v. Coast Iron & Steel Co., Case No. S231549 (May 14, 2018), the California Supreme Court addressed whether a direct contractor can withhold payment from a subcontractor based on the “good faith dispute” exception of the state’s prompt payment laws if the “dispute” concerns any dispute between the parties or whether the dispute must be directly relevant to the specific payment that would otherwise be due.
California’s Prompt Payment Laws
California has a number of construction-related prompt payment laws scattered throughout the state’s Civil Code, Public Contracts Code and Business and Professions Code. Their application depends on the type of construction involved, whether public or private; the type of payment involved, whether a progress payment or retention; and who is paying, whether it’s a private owner, public entity, direct contractor, or subcontractor.
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Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
Fraud and Construction Contracts- Like Oil and Water?
December 31, 2014 —
Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law MusingsWe have discussed the interaction of fraud and breach of contract actions on occasion here at Construction Law Musings. In most cases the two do not mix. Between the economic loss rule and the general desire of Virginia courts to keep contract actions and tort actions separate, most of the time it is impossible to make a fraud action relating to a contract stick in a construction context.
The Virginia Supreme Court recently confirmed this fraud/contract distinction. As discussed in the Virginia Real Estate Land Use & Construction Law blog (Thanks Heidi!), Station No. 2, LLC v. Lynch, et. al. strongly re-states the Virginia courts’ strong reluctance to allow a breach of contract turn into a claim for fraud. Without re-iterating the great discussion of the facts of the case found in the post by Heidi Meizner, suffice it to say that certain contractual promises between and among the parties were not fulfilled much to Station 2, LLC’s detriment.
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Christopher G. Hill, Law Office of Christopher G. Hill, PCMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Discussion of History of Construction Defect Litigation in California
September 10, 2014 —
William M. Kaufman – Construction Lawyers BlogCalifornia literally wrote the book on construction defect litigation. Construction defects began to surface after World War II due to cheap track homes being constructed haphazardly on a large scale. Throughout the 1960s, developers began utilizing the services of subcontractors to build massive developments. Rather than having their own employees perform the work, developers began relying more heavily on the specialty subcontractors to perform quality control functions. In 1969, the California Supreme Court expanded liability for developers with respect to residential housing through the concept of strict liability for mass produced homes. Strict liability defendants in construction defect cases may include builders of mass-produced homes, building site developers, component part manufacturers, and material suppliers. Courts have noted that there is little distinction between the “mass production and sale of homes and the mass production and sale of automobiles, and the pertinent overriding policy considerations are the same.” Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc. (1969) 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 227 (1969). Accordingly, developers of mass-produced tract homes may be held strictly liable whether or not there is privity of contract. Ibid. Courts have held, however, that there is no strict liability against contractors or sub-contractors. See Ranchwood Communities v. Jim Beat Construction (1996) 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 386; La Jolla Village Homeowners’ Assn., Inc. v. Superior Court (1989) 261 Cal.Rptr. 146. Within ten years, attorneys in California were using strict liability theories to seek compensation for homeowners. The initial strict liability lawsuits in California in the 70s and 80s generally applied to condominium projects. The Construction defect “industry” began to take off in the 1980s due to the housing boom and the enforcement of strict liability claims by the courts.
Reprinted courtesy of
William M. Kaufman, Lockhart Park LP
Mr. Kaufman may be contacted at wkaufman@lockhartpark.com, and you may visit the firm's website at www.lockhartpark.com
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Accounting for Payments on Projects Became Even More Crucial This Year
September 21, 2020 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsI discussed
several of the statutory changes affecting the construction industry here at Construction Law Musings in the run-up to July 1, 2020. One of those changes, an amendment to
Virginia Code Section 43-13, may add another arrow to the collection quiver of subcontractors and suppliers. As part of the previously-linked rundown, I highlighted one of the big additions in 2020, namely the amendment making those pesky clauses that let those up the payment chain from you hold money on “this or any other project” void as against public policy.
The other big addition to 43-13 is the change that adds a possible civil cause of action for downstream and unpaid subcontractors and suppliers in the event that funds paid to a general contractor or subcontractor are not first used to pay their downstream contractors and suppliers. Prior to July 1, 2020, this statute provided criminal penalties for such behavior but did not contain the possibility of a civil penalty. The operative language for the change is as follows:
The use by any such contractor or subcontractor or any officer, director, or employee of such contractor or subcontractor of any moneys paid under the contract before paying all amounts due or to become due for labor performed or material furnished for such building or structure for any other purpose than paying such amounts due on the project shall be prima facie evidence of intent to defraud. Any breach or violation of this section may give rise to a civil cause of action for a party in contract with the general contractor or subcontractor, as appropriate; however, this right does not affect a contractor’s or subcontractor’s right to withhold payment for failure to properly perform labor or furnish materials on the project.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Jury Trials and Mediation in Philadelphia County: Virtually in Person
July 27, 2020 —
Andrew F. Susko, Robert G. Devine & Daniel J. Ferhat - White and Williams LLPWhen will the trial court in Philadelphia County be open for jury trials in civil actions? While a precise prediction, given the current state of our trial courts in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic, is difficult to make, what is known is that the use of virtual technology is likely permanently changing the landscape of civil litigation, including depositions, mediation, and other forms of alternative dispute resolution. Even civil jury trials, at least in the near term and during the pandemic, are being conducted virtually, either by private agreement, or through the courts, as is occurring in Texas and most recently in Florida with its pilot virtual trial program in five of its trial courts. While it is necessary at present for the parties to consent to a virtual trial, courts may ultimately compel the parties’ participation. Regardless, litigants and their counsel are well advised to understand the complexities and manner of a virtual trial.
Seasoned trial attorneys have long experienced and are comfortable with virtual depositions bringing distant counsel, parties and witnesses together through technology to present testimony. The use of virtual technology as a means for court arguments and hearings, mediation, and alternative dispute resolution, while novel and emerging as the new normal, is territory where a comfort level can be achieved. And while distinctions most assuredly exist, recent experience has demonstrated that court arguments, mediations and depositions can be conducted effectively remotely and virtually. Legal issues certainly do remain in the context of the deposition of parties to a civil action regarding whether a lawyer’s physical presence in the same room with a party-witness can be demanded, and whether courts would compel a virtual deposition during the COVID-19 pandemic where such physical presence of a party and their attorney could not be achieved. Undoubtedly these issues will be resolved, likely sooner than later, given the scope of the pandemic in certain areas.
Reprinted courtesy of White and Williams LLP attorneys
Andrew F. Susko,
Robert G. Devine and
Daniel J. Ferhat
Mr. Susko may be contacted at suskoa@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Devine may be contacted at deviner@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Ferhat may be contacted at ferhatd@whiteandwilliams.com
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Partner Jonathan R. Harwood Obtained Summary Judgment in a Case Involving a Wedding Guest Injured in a Fall
December 30, 2019 —
Jonathan R. Harwood - Traub Lieberman PerspectivesOn September 30, 2019, Traub Lieberman partner Jonathan Harwood obtained summary judgment in an action involving a guest injured in a fall at a wedding. Traub Lieberman’s client owned the property where the fall occurred. Plaintiff fell while exiting a row of seats after the bridal party had recessed down the aisle. Plaintiff claimed that she tripped over the raised side of a paper runner that had been placed in the aisle at the property. Plaintiff brought an action against Traub Lieberman’s client (the owner of the building) and the florist that had provided the runner. The owner had provided the bridal party with access to the property but did not assist in the set up for the wedding or have any employees present during the ceremony. The florist had supplied the runner for the wedding. The florist commenced a third-party action against the bride, whose wedding party had actually placed the runner in the aisle. Plaintiff asserted that the runner had become bunched and crumpled during the ceremony, creating a dangerous condition. She further asserted that the owner was responsible for her injuries since the dangerous condition existed on its property and it should have an employee present to insure no dangerous conditions existed.
During the course of discovery, Mr. Harwood established that no one representing the owner was present during the wedding, had any involvement in the placement of the runner or had received any complaints about the runner. In support of the motion for summary judgment Mr. Harwood introduced pictures showing, in conjunction with deposition testimony, that there were no problems with the runner minutes before plaintiff’s fall. Mr. Harwood also argued that the alleged defect did not involve the property itself, absolving the owner of any obligation to plaintiff. In granting the motion for summary judgment, the court held that evidence and testimony showed that the owner neither created the condition nor had actual or constructive notice that any dangerous condition existed. The court also held that there the owner did not have any duty to have a representative present during the wedding since the property itself was not dangerous or defective. Finally, the court held that the condition of the runner was open and obvious and not inherently dangerous.
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Jonathan R. Harwood, Traub LiebermanMr. Harwood may be contacted at
jharwood@tlsslaw.com
Ordinary Use of Term In Insurance Policy Prevailed
June 08, 2020 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesThere are cases where you feel for the plaintiff, but understand why they did not prevail, despite the creative efforts of their counsel. The case of Robinson v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 958 F.3d 1137 (11th Cir. 2020) is one of these cases.
In Robinson, the plaintiff moved into a home that turned out to be infested with a highly venomous spider. Efforts to eradicate the spider proved unsuccessful and the spider apparently infested the entire home. The plaintiff made a claim under their homeowner’s property insurance policy arguing that their home suffered a physical loss caused by the spider infestation as the spider presented an irreparable condition that rendered the home unsafe for occupancy. (It probably did!). The property insurer denied coverage because the policy had an insurance exclusion for loss caused by birds, vermin, rodents, or insects.
The insurer claimed the spider is an insect or vermin and, therefore, there is no coverage based on the exclusion. The insured creatively argued that “scientifically speaking” a spider is an arachnid and not an insect. Neither the trial court nor the Eleventh Circuit found this argument persuasive.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
