Green Buildings Could Lead to Liabilities
March 28, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFAttempts to build “green,” reducing energy costs and increasing the use of sustainable building materials, may lead to more lawsuits, according to a report issued by the British Columbia Construction Association. The report warned those who were going to build green look into the implications. The report looked at the result of green building practices and requirements adopted in the United States.
The report warns that “the use of novel, less harmful building material or new construction techniques may give rise to liability due to: contractor inexperience with installation; lack of long-term evaluation of green materials; lack of understanding of how new building materials may impact existing traditional building systems; or warranties provided unintentionally about the durability or effectiveness of unproven materials or techniques.”
Manley McLachlan, president of the BCAA noted that they are aware of “legal action around the performance of the buildings,” noting that while fast-growing trees help toward LEED certification, their wood is more prone to mold. He also felt that low-VOC paints needed more testing to prove their durability as exterior finishes.
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Quick Note: Do Your Homework When it Comes to Selecting Your Arbitrator
July 26, 2017 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesMany construction contracts contain arbitration provisions. Instead of litigating a dispute arising out of the contract, the parties will arbitrate the dispute per the arbitration provision. There are advantages to arbitration and certain disputes bode well for arbitration. The key is you want to make sure you select the RIGHT arbitrator or arbitrators. Do your homework regarding the arbitrator list presented to you by, say, the American Arbitration Association. Strike out those on the list that either do not have the requisite experience you need to decide the dispute or you believe they are not going to be impartial. For instance, if you want an arbitrator that you think will specifically follow the letter of the law or the precise terms of a contract, select those on the list that meet this requirement; strike out others that do not. The same philosophy would apply if you want an arbitrator to have specific factual knowledge or a factual understanding regarding a driving issue in the dispute. Do not neglect the homework required to select –or try to select — the arbitrator you believe is the most qualified to understand the issues.
Now, why is this important? It is important because you need to arbitrate a dispute with the understanding that the arbitrator’s award (decision) is FINAL. There are no appellate rights. None. Vacating an arbitrator’s award is very challenging and the bases to vacate an award are limited and, most of the time, will NOT apply.
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David Adelstein, Florida Construction Legal UpdatesMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
Dadelstein@gmail.com
NY Court Holds Excess Liability Coverage Could Never be Triggered Where Employers’ Liability Policy Provided Unlimited Insurance Coverage
February 28, 2018 —
Theresa A. Guertin and Samantha M. Martino - SDV Blog In a potentially significant development in New York insurance law, a recent appellate level decision held that an excess liability policy was not obligated to provide coverage where the underlying employer’s liability policy provided unlimited coverage pursuant to New York regulations.
The
Arthur Vincent & Sons Construction, Inc. v. Century Surety Insurance Co.1 case arose out of an underlying wrongful death claim. Fordham University hired Arthur Vincent and Sons Construction, Inc. (“AVSC”) to install a new roof on its Lewis Calder Center. As is typical of most construction contracts, AVSC agreed to indemnify the University against any claims arising out of its negligence, and to name the University as an additional insured on its commercial general liability policy. AVSC was insured by three policies: (1) a worker’s compensation and employer’s liability policy issued by Commerce and Industry Insur¬ance Company (“CIIC”); (2) a primary CGL policy issued by Century Surety Insurance Company (“Century”); and (3) an excess liability policy issued by Admiral Insurance Company (“Admiral”).
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Theresa A. Guertin, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C. and
Samantha M. Martino, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.
Ms. Guertin may be contacted at tag@sdvlaw.com
Ms. Martino may be contacted at smm@sdvlaw.com
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Report: Construction Firms Could Better Protect Workers From Noise Hazards
April 17, 2019 —
Joanna Masterson - Construction ExecutiveGiven that about three-quarters of construction workers are exposed to noise levels above the recommended limit, 83 percent of the 237 contractors surveyed for a new Dodge Data & Analytics SmartMarket Brief say they’ve purchased quieter equipment, yet well over half of those firms report their company could do better.
Additionally, 85 percent of contractors report using hearing protection onsite more than 50 percent of the time, yet less than half say they always use it, suggesting a significant opportunity for improvement in the industry. Digging deeper, the survey determined small companies lag behind large and midsize ones in the use of hearing protection. Also, half of general contractors report always using hearing protection, compared to about one-third of trade contractors.
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Joanna Masterson, Construction Executive, a publication of Associated Builders and Contractors. All rights reserved.
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Insurer’s “Failure to Cooperate” Defense
November 14, 2018 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesThe “failure to cooperate” defense is a defense an insurer may raise when its insured fails to cooperate with it in the defense of the claim against the insured. If an insurer takes this position, it will typically be denying both defense and indemnification obligations, meaning the insured could be forfeiting coverage that otherwise exists through his/her/its failure to cooperate with the insurer. This defense by the insurer is not absolute as recently explained by the Fourth District in Barthelemy v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Illinois, 43 Fla.L.Weekly D2379a (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) discussing the elements of this failure to cooperate defense.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin NorrisMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
New Addition To New Jersey Court Rules Impacts More Than Trial Practice
November 16, 2020 —
Thomas Regan & Karley Kamaris - Lewis Brisbois NewsroomOn September 1, 2020, New Jersey adopted a brand-new rule of procedure, Rule 4:25-8, which properly defines motions in limine. On its face, the new rule prohibits, broadly, filing motions in limine that may have a dispositive effect on the case. Most notably, the rule expressly eliminates the ability to move, on motion in limine, to bar expert testimony in matters in which such experts are required to sustain a party’s burden of proof. This effectively makes the summary judgment phase of litigation the last chance to bar experts from a jury trial or take any other dispositive action
The new rule comes at a time in which the evidentiary standard for experts is shifting in New Jersey. In October 2018, the New Jersey Supreme Court reconciled the framework for analyzing the reliability of expert testimony under N.J.R.E. 702 and 703 in In re: Accutane Litigation. Significantly, New Jersey, a traditional Frye jurisdiction, incorporated certain federal Daubert factors for expert “use by our courts” but, overall, fell short of adopting the Daubert standard as a whole. In applying the relevant Daubert factors, the trial court in Accutane held that the subject experts’ methodologies were unsound due to the failure to apply fundamentals of the scientific method of the medical-evidence hierarchy. The decision resulted in the dismissal of over 3,000 claims.
Reprinted courtesy of
Thomas Regan, Lewis Brisbois and
Karley Kamaris, Lewis Brisbois
Mr. Regan may be contacted at Thomas.Regan@lewisbrisbois.com
Ms. Kamaris may be contacted at Karley.Kamaris@lewisbrisbois.com
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Rams Owner Stan Kroenke Debuts His $5.5 Billion Dream Stadium
September 14, 2020 —
Christopher Palmeri - BloombergThe first thing you notice that’s different about SoFi Stadium is that you can walk from the parking lot almost directly into the fifth level of the arena.
There’s no passing through gate after gate or ascending endless circular walkways. Construction workers dug up over 7 million cubic yards of dirt to build an arena that sits 100 feet (30 meters) below grade.
It’s one of the many features that make SoFi, the National Football League’s biggest stadium, surprisingly visitor-friendly. Not that fans will be able to experience it just yet. When the stadium debuts Sunday with the first game of the Los Angeles Rams’ season, it will be spectator-free -- the result of pandemic-spurred restrictions on gatherings. But it will still be a spectacle.
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Christopher Palmeri, Bloomberg
Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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