Another Reason to Love Construction Mediation (Read: Why Mediation Works)
December 02, 2015 —
Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law MusingsI’ll bet you’re thinking by now that I have beaten the mediation drum to death and that I wouldn’t have any more praise for the process than I have heaped upon it here at this corner of the construction law “blawgosphere.” Well, just about every time I am involved with the process, whether acting in my capacity as a Virginia Supreme Court certified mediator, or as counsel to a client seeking to resolve a matter and move on with the business of making money, I become more convinced that mediation can work in even the most contentious of situations.
What do I mean by “work?” The obvious answer is that mediation “works” when the parties come up with a solution to their problem. In most instances, the solution involves money changing hands. After all, it is money that is usually the tangible and outwardly driving force behind a dispute. Money is also what a court or arbitrator (in most cases) will be awarding to one side or the other at the end of what is likely to be an expensive process.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Christopher G. Hill, Law Office of Christopher G. Hill, PCMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Liquidated Damages Clause Not Enforced
October 02, 2023 —
David R. Cook Jr. - Autry, Hall & Cook, LLPA liquidated-damages clause was not enforced in a recent case before the Georgia Court of Appeals. The clause did not contain standard provisions that would normally allow a trial court to enforce the clause as written. As a result, the trial court looked beyond the contract to determine whether the City satisfied the requirements for enforcement of the liquidated-damages clause. Below are the relevant excerpts.
City of Brookhaven v. Multiplex, LLC, A23A0843, 2023 WL 4779591 (Ga. Ct. App. July 27, 2023)
Here, the Contract provides for “Liquidated Damages at the rate of $1,000.00 per calendar day” in the last paragraph of the Scope of Work addendum. The Contract lacks, however, any language indicating that the liquidated damages were not intended to be a penalty. See Fuqua Const. Co. v. Pillar Dev., Inc., 293 Ga. App. 462, 466, 667 S.E.2d 633 (2008) (rejecting use of parol evidence where the parties “explicitly agreed” in “unambiguous contract language” that the liquidated damages were not a penalty). Absent such language, the court can look to parol evidence in the record to determine the effect the provision was intended to have. See J.P. Carey Enterprises, 361 Ga. App. at 391-392 (1) (b), 864 S.E.2d 588 (looking to “extrinsic evidence” such as emails, documents, and deposition testimony to determine whether the damages provision at issue was a penalty); see also Gwinnett Clinic, Ltd. v. Boaten, 340 Ga. App. 598, 602-603, 798 S.E.2d 110 (2017) (“Shah’s testimony also suggested that one purpose of the liquidated damages provision was to deter employees from breaching the agreement”).
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
David R. Cook Jr., Autry, Hall & Cook, LLPMr. Cook may be contacted at
cook@ahclaw.com
Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Balestreri, Potocki, & Holmes
Harlem Developers Reach Deal with Attorney General
February 25, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFJoseph Scarpinito and Shiraz Sanjana, developers of the Mirada condominium in Harlem, New York can avoid a contempt charge from state Attorney General Eric Schneiderman, “if they make the required repairs and obtain a permanent certificate of occupancy at the property,” according to The Real Deal.
Scarpinito and Sanjana “agreed to deposit $200,000 into an escrow account and make repairs to stop flooding and other defects at the 161 East 110th Street condo, which are required to obtain a certificate of occupancy from the city Department of Buildings.”
Last December, the Attorney General “filed suit against the developers, alleging they submitted false filings to his office in claiming that Scarpinito’s 83-year-old mother was the actual developer of the 68-unit condo.” Furthermore, the condo board lawyers submitted a complaint to Schneiderman “detailing extensive defects in the building, including water leaks entering the building from the roof and façade.”
The developers have been ordered “to submit weekly reports to the AG’s office detailing progress on the repairs and obtaining the certificate of occupancy.”
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Sinking S.F. Tower Prompts More Lawsuits
January 19, 2017 —
JT Long - Engineering News-RecordHomeowners on Jan. 6 added another lawsuit to the list pending against Millennium Partners, developer of the 645-ft-tall Millennium Tower, located in San Francisco’s South-of-Market district. The suit alleges that, as early as 2009, the developers knew the $350-million condo building was sinking faster than expected.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
JT Long, ENRENR may be contacted at
ENR.com@bnpmedia.com
Newmeyer Dillion Attorneys Named to 2020 Southern California Rising Stars List
June 22, 2020 —
Newmeyer DillionProminent business and real estate law firm Newmeyer Dillion is pleased to announce that partner Eric Rollins and associates Jason Moberly Caruso and Richard Protzmann have been selected to the 2020 Southern California Rising Stars list by Super Lawyers. Each year, no more than 2.5 percent of the lawyers in the state are selected to receive this honor. The attorneys will be recognized in the June 2020 issues of Super Lawyers Magazine, Los Angeles Magazine and Orange Coast Magazine.
Eric Rollins, a partner in the Newport Beach office, provides legal counsel in a diverse array of practice areas with a focus on business, real estate, construction, insurance, and entertainment law. In his more than ten years at the firm, Eric has litigated and resolved hundreds of matters in both state and federal court through negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and trial. This is his third year as a Rising Star honoree.
Jason Moberly Caruso is an associate in the Newport Beach office. Jason's practice focuses on various aspects of "contaminated sites" environmental legal work, complex litigation, and appellate matters. This is the fifth consecutive year Jason has been honored.
Richard Protzmann is an associate in the Newport Beach office. Richard's practice focuses on focuses his practice on areas of business litigation, eminent domain, environmental law, zoning and land use, and general real estate litigation. This is the first year Richard has been selected.
Super Lawyers is a rating service of outstanding lawyers from more than 70 practice areas who have attained a high degree of peer recognition and professional achievement. The patented selection process evaluates candidates on 12 indicators of peer recognition and professional achievement, resulting in a comprehensive, credible and diverse listing of exceptional attorneys. The Rising Stars list is developed using the same selection process except candidates must be either 40 years old or younger, or have been in practice for 10 years or less.
About Newmeyer Dillion
For 35 years, Newmeyer Dillion has delivered creative and outstanding legal solutions and trial results that achieve client objectives in diverse industries. With over 70 attorneys working as a cohesive team to represent clients in all aspects of business, employment, real estate, environmental/land use, privacy & data security and insurance law, Newmeyer Dillion delivers holistic and integrated legal services tailored to propel each client's operations, growth, and profits. Headquartered in Newport Beach, California, with offices in Walnut Creek, California and Las Vegas, Nevada, Newmeyer Dillion attorneys are recognized by The Best Lawyers in America©, and Super Lawyers as top tier and some of the best lawyers in California and Nevada, and have been given Martindale-Hubbell Peer Review's AV Preeminent® highest rating. For additional information, call 949.854.7000 or visit www.newmeyerdillion.com.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
The DOL Claims Most Independent Contractors Are Employees
August 04, 2015 —
Craig Martin – Construction Contract AdvisorOn July 15, 2015, the Department of Labor issued an Administrator’s Interpretation asserting that most independent contractors are actually employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The DOL claims that the FLSA’s broad definition of employment and “suffer to work” standard under the FLSA requires that most workers be treated as employees. The certainly appears to be the DOL’s warning shot over the bow and companies using independent contractors should take heed.
The most startling aspect of the Administrative Interpretation is the application of the economic realities test in concluding that workers who are economically dependent on the company, regardless of skill level, are employees under the FLSA’s broad definition of employee.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Craig Martin, Lamson, Dugan and Murray, LLPMr. Martin may be contacted at
cmartin@ldmlaw.com
Ambiguity in Insurance Policy will be Interpreted in Favor of Insurance Coverage
July 19, 2017 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesAn ambiguity in an insurance policy–after reading and interpreting the policy as a whole–will be construed against an insurer. This means an ambiguity will be construed in favor of insurance coverage (for the benefit of the insured) as opposed to against insurance coverage. This does not mean that every insurance policy contains an ambiguity. This also does not mean a court will interpret plain and ordinary words contrary to their conventional meaning or definition. But, as we all know, insurance policies are not the easiest of documents to decipher and ambiguities do exist relating to a particular issue or circumstance to the benefit of an insured. An insured that is dealing with specific insurance coverage issues should make sure they are working with counsel that looks to maximize insurance coverage, even if that means exploring ambiguities that will benefit an insured based on a particular issue or circumstance.
An example of an ambiguity in an insurance policy relating to a particular issue that benefitted an insured can be found in the Florida Supreme Court decision of Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Macedo, 42 Fla. L. Weekly S731a (Fla. 2017). This case involved an automobile accident and the interpretation of an automobile liability policy.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
David Adelstein, Florida Construction Legal UpdatesMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
Dadelstein@gmail.com
