Attorney's Erroneous Conclusion that Limitations Period Had Not Expired Was Not Grounds For Relief Under C.C.P. § 473(b)
February 27, 2019 —
David W. Evans & Stephen J. SquillarioIn Jackson v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Inc. (2/8/19 No. A150833), the First District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of a motion for relief from a voluntary dismissal, without prejudice, filed by the plaintiff based on the erroneous conclusion of an attorney who she had consulted (but who had not yet appeared as counsel in her case) that the applicable statute of limitations had not yet expired. In reality, the limitations period had expired on the same date plaintiff had filed her complaint in propria persona. The plaintiff later retained the attorney on a limited basis to present the motion for relief pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 473(b) based on the attorney’s affidavit of fault. Therein, the attorney testified that he had advised the plaintiff to dismiss her action voluntarily based on a misinterpretation of the applicable limitations period, which the attorney characterized as having been based on his “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.”
Section 473 provides two distinct provisions for relief from default or dismissal – one is discretionary, while the other is mandatory. Discretionary relief is available in the case of an attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. In contrast, mandatory relief is available where the resulting dismissal was caused by an attorney’s mistake, whether or not excusable. In denying the plaintiff’s motion, the trial court reasoned that the plaintiff could not rely upon Section 473(b) because (1) the attorney did not represent the plaintiff at the time and (2) this provision did not apply to the voluntary dismissal of an action without prejudice.
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David W. Evans, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Stephen J. Squillario, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Evans may be contacted at devans@hbblaw.com
Mr. Squillario may be contacted at ssquillario@hbblaw.com
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Haight Lawyers Recognized in The Best Lawyers in America© 2019
September 04, 2018 —
William G. Baumgaertner & Denis J. Moriarty - Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPPartner Denis Moriarty and Of Counsel William Baumgaertner were selected by their peers for inclusion in The Best Lawyers in America© 2019. Mr. Moriarty has been listed for his work in insurance law, and Mr. Baumgaertner has been listed for his defendants’ and plaintiffs’ work in personal injury and product liability litigation.
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William G. Baumgaertner, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Denis J. Moriarty, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Baumgaertner may be contacted at wbaum@hbblaw.com
Mr. Moriarty may be contacted at dmoriarty@hbblaw.com
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Damron Agreement Questioned in Colorado Casualty Insurance v Safety Control Company, et al.
February 10, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFSafety Control and EMC appealed the judgment in Colorado Casualty Insurance Company versus Safety Control Company, Inc., et al. (Ariz. App., 2012). The Superior Court in Maricopa County addressed “the validity and effect of a Damron agreement a contractor and its excess insurer entered into that assigned their rights to sue the primary insurer.” Judge Johnsen stated, “We hold the agreement is enforceable but remand for a determination of whether the stipulated judgment falls within the primary insurer’s policy.”
The Opinion provides some facts and procedural history regarding the claim. “The Arizona Department of Transportation (“ADOT”) hired DBA Construction Company (“DBA”) to perform a road-improvement project on the Loop 101 freeway. Safety Control Company, Inc. was one of DBA’s subcontractors. As required by the subcontract, Safety Control purchased from Employer’s Mutual Casualty Company (“EMC”) a certificate of insurance identifying DBA as an additional insured on a policy providing primary coverage for liability arising out of Safety Control’s work.”
A collision occurred on site, injuring Hugo Roman. Roman then sued ADT and DBA for damages. “Colorado Casualty tendered DBA’s defense to the subcontractors, including Safety Control. Safety Control and EMC rejected the tender. Roman eventually settled his claims against DBA and ADOT. DBA and ADOT stipulated with Roman for entry of judgment of $750,000; Roman received $75,000 from DBA (paid by Colorado Casualty) and $20,000 from ADOT, and agreed not to execute on the stipulated judgment. Finally, DBA, ADOT and Colorado Casualty assigned to Roman their rights against the subcontractors and other insurers.”
Colorado Casualty attempted to recover what “it had paid to defend DBA and ADOT and settle with Roman. However, Roman intervened, and argued that “Colorado Casualty had assigned its subrogation rights to him as part of the settlement agreement.” The suit was not dismissed, but the Superior Court allowed Roman to intervene. “Roman then filed a counterclaim against Colorado Casualty and a cross-claim against the subcontractors.”
All claims were settled against all of the defendants except Safety Control and EMC. “The superior court ruled on summary judgment that EMC breached a duty to defend DBA and that as a result, ‘DBA was entitled to settle with Roman without EMC’s consent as long as the settlement was not collusive or fraudulent.’ After more briefing, the court held the stipulated judgment was neither collusive nor procured by fraud and that EMC therefore was liable to Roman on the stipulated judgment and for his attorney’s fees. The court also held Safety Control breached its subcontract with DBA by failing to procure completed-operations insurance coverage and would be liable for damages to the extent that EMC did not satisfy what remained (after the other settlements) of the stipulated judgment and awards of attorney’s fees.” Safety Control and EMC appealed the judgment.
Four reasons were given for the decision of the ruling. First, “the disagreement between Roman and Colorado Casualty does not preclude them from pursuing their claims against EMC and Safety Control.” Second, “the settlement agreement is not otherwise invalid.” Third, “issues of fact remain about whether the judgment falls within the EMC policy.” Finally, “Safety Control breached the subcontract by failing to procure ‘Completed Operations’ coverage for DBA.”
In conclusion, the Superior Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded . “Although, as stated above, we have affirmed several rulings of the superior court, we reverse the judgment against EMC and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion to determine whether the stipulated judgment was a liability that arose out of Safety Control’s operations. In addition, we affirm the superior court’s declaratory judgment against Safety Control but remand so that the court may clarify the circumstances under which Safety Control may be liable for damages and may conduct whatever further proceedings it deems appropriate to ascertain the amount of those damages. We decline all parties’ requests for attorney’s fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01 without prejudice to a request for fees incurred in this appeal to be filed by the prevailing party on remand before the superior court.”
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General Contractors Have Expansive Common Law and Statutory Duties To Provide a Safe Workplace
February 18, 2020 —
Paul R. Cressman Jr. - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCOn November 21, 2019, the Washington Supreme Court handed down its decision in Vargas v. Inland Washington, LLC.[1]
At the time of the incident in May 2013, Mr. Vargas, the plaintiff, was helping pour the concrete walls for what would become a parking garage for an apartment building. He was employed by Hilltop Concrete Construction. Inland Washington was the general contractor, and subcontracted with Hilltop to pour concrete. Hilltop, in turn, entered into agreements with Ralph’s Concrete Pumping and Miles Sand & Gravel to provide a pump truck, certified pump operator, and supply concrete.
A rubber hose carrying concrete whipped Mr. Vargas in the head. It knocked him unconscious and caused a traumatic brain injury.
Vargas, through his guardian ad litem, along with his wife and children, sued Inland Washington, Ralph’s, and Miles.
The trial court initially dismissed on summary judgment Vargas’ claims that Inland Washington was vicariously liable for the acts of Hilltop, Ralph’s, and Miles. Later, the trial court also granted Inland Washington’s motion for summary judgment that it was not directly liable as a matter of law.
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Paul R. Cressman Jr., Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCMr. Cressman may be contacted at
paul.cressman@acslawyers.com
Georgia Supreme Court Determines Damage to "Other Property" Not Necessary for Finding Occurrence
July 31, 2013 —
Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiThe Georgia Supreme Court has determined that an "occurrence" may arise under a CGL policy even if "other property" is not damaged. Taylor Morrison Servs. v. HDI-Gerling Am. Ins. Co., 2013 Ga. LEXIS 618 (Ga. July 12, 2013).
Taylor Morrison, the insured, was a homebuilder. It was sued in a class action by more than 400 homeowners in California alleging that the concrete foundations of their homes were improperly constructed. This led to water intrusion, cracks in the floors and driveways, and warped and buckled flooring.
At first, HDI-Gerling defended under a reservation of rights. Subsequently, however, HDI-Gerling sued Taylor Morrison in federal district court in Georgia, seeking a declaratory judgment that there was no coverage. The district court granted summary judgment to HDI-Gerling after determining that there was no "occurrence" when the only "property damage" alleged was damage to work of the insured. Georgia law was applied to the dispute.
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Tred EyerlyTred Eyerly can be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Asserting Non-Disclosure Claim Involving Residential Real Property and Whether Facts Are “Readily Observable”
September 29, 2021 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesUnder Florida law, there is a claim dealing with the purchase and sale of residential real property known as a Johnson v. Davis or a non-disclosure claim: “[W]here the seller of a home knows of facts materially affecting the value of the property which are not readily observable and are not known to the buyer, the seller is under a duty to disclose them to the buyer.” Lorber v. Passick, 46 Fla.L.Weekly D1952a (Fla. 4th DCA 2021). A seller’s duty to disclose extends to a seller’s real estate agent/broker. Id.
A non-disclosure claim is asserted by the buyer of residential real property when the buyer discovers defects or damages with the real property that he believes materially affects the value of the property. While there may be the sentiment these are easy claims to prove, they are not.
Remember, a non-disclosure claim deals with facts that materially affect the value of residential real property and are NOT readily observable. The use of the language “readily observable” has been found to mean:
“[I]nformation [that] is within the diligent attention of any buyer. To exercise diligent attention…a buyer would be required to investigate any information furnished by the seller that a reasonable person in the buyer’s position would investigate and take reasonable steps to ascertain the material facts relating to the property and to discovery them—if, of course, they are reasonably ascertainable.”
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Statutes of Limitations May be the Colorado Contractors’ Friend
April 18, 2011 —
Beverley BevenFlorez CDJ STAFFAlbert Wolf, a principal in Wolf Slatkin & Madison P. C., has written an interesting article on statutes of limitations in construction defect claims in Colorado. While Wolf states that in most cases, “construction defect claims against construction industry participants (contractors, subcontractors, architects, engineers, etc.) requires that suits be started within two years after construction defects have been or should have been—in the exercise of reasonable diligence (care)—discovered,” if a project used the AIA General Conditions (AIA Document A2010) before the 2007 edition, the “statutes of limitations begin to run (accrue) at either substantial completion or breach by the contractor (installation of defective work), depending on the circumstances.”
“That’s a huge difference,” Wolf writes in his article. “For example, if the structural defect caused by faulty foundation work is not discovered or discoverable until walls begin to exhibit cracking more than two years after the building is completed, the owner’s claim against the contractor may be barred if the AIA provision is applied.”
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Construction Defects Uncertain Role in Coverage in Pennsylvania
February 04, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFDouglas E. Cameron, Jay M. Levin, and Traci S. Rea look at the implications of a pair of Pennsylvania court decisions from 2012. The judge in both cases, Judge Wettick of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas held that comprehensive general liability policies do not cover any claims that arise from faulty workmanship.
The three conclude that "these holdings may preclude coverage for any tort claims asserted against your company if the allegations involve construction defects, even if you are sued for property damage or personal injury by a third party to your construction contract." They note that both decisions have been appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.
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