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Arizona Supreme Court Clarifies Area Variance Standard; Property Owners May Obtain an Area Variance When Special Circumstances Existed at Purchase

October 19, 2017 — Nick Wood, Adam Lang, Noel Griemsmann, & Brianna Long – Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation Blog
In Pawn 1st v. City of Phoenix, the Arizona Supreme Court rejected a Court of Appeals rule that would have unduly restrained alienation of property in Arizona. The Court of Appeals found that the City of Phoenix Board of Adjustment acted beyond its authority when it granted an area variance to a pawn shop where the special circumstances causing a need for the variance existed before the pawn shop purchased the property. Under Arizona law, boards of adjustment cannot grant an area variance where the special circumstances requiring the variance are self-imposed. The Court of Appeals adopted a rule that knowledge of special circumstances at the time of purchase made the special circumstances self-imposed, foreclosing the purchaser’s ability to obtain a variance. This rule would have severely restricted property purchasers’ ability to obtain area variances in Arizona and by extension likely strained property transactions. The underlying case involved a pawn shop that was proposed in southeast Phoenix. After the property purchaser obtained approval for a required use permit (for a pawn shop) and a variance (for a 500 foot residential setback) from the City of Phoenix Board of Adjustment, a competing pawn shop filed a special action arguing that the variance was a use variance, not an area variance, beyond the board of adjustment’s authority. Reprinted courtesy of Snell & Wilmer attorneys Nick Wood, Adam Lang, Noel Griemsmann and Brianna Long Mr. Wood may be contacted at nwood@swlaw.com Mr. Lang may be contacted at alang@swlaw.com Mr. Noel may be contacted at ngriemsmann@swlaw.com Ms. Brianna may be contacted at bllong@swlaw.com Read the court decision
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Hurricane Laura: Implications for Insurers in Louisiana

October 19, 2020 — Jennifer Michel & Tabitha Durbin - Lewis Brisbois
Just two days before the 15th Anniversary of Hurricane Katrina, Category 4 Hurricane Laura made landfall near Cameron, Louisiana. Although the “unsurvivable” 20-foot storm surge, which had been predicted ahead of the storm, thankfully was significantly less, the impact of Laura on the Southwest Coast of Louisiana and Southeast Coast of Texas and its neighboring parishes and counties, most notably Cameron Parish, was quite severe. Lake Charles, Louisiana suffered widespread flooding and sustained catastrophic wind damage. Although the storm moved quickly, it retained its strength longer than expected such that even areas well inland sustained considerable damage. Preliminary estimates for insured losses from storm surge, flooding, and winds range from $8 to $12 billion for residential and commercial properties. Insurers providing residential or commercial property insurance in Louisiana should keep the following statutory claims handling requirements in mind. Louisiana Statutory Provisions Under Louisiana law, an insurer is expected to comply with certain statutory requirements in investigating and handling claims submitted by its insureds and third-party claimants. The majority of these requirements, and the consequences of their violation, are codified by La. R.S. 22:1892, which governs the payment and adjustment of claims, and La. R.S. 22:1973, which delineates an insurer’s duty of good faith. Together, the statutes impose three requirements on insurers: timely initiation of loss adjustment, timely payment of claims, and a duty of good faith and fairness in the adjustment and payment of said claims. Reprinted courtesy of Jennifer Michel, Lewis Brisbois and Tabitha Durbin, Lewis Brisbois Ms. Michel may be contacted at Jenny.Michel@lewisbrisbois.com Ms. Durbin may be contacted at Tabitha.Durbin@lewisbrisbois.com Read the court decision
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Washington High Court Holds Insurers Bound by Representations in Agent’s Certificates of Insurance

March 16, 2020 — Michael S. Levine & Michelle M. Spatz - Hunton Insurance Recovery Blog
In responding to a certified question from the Ninth Circuit in T-Mobile USA Inc. v. Selective Insurance Company of America, the Washington Supreme Court has held that an insurer is bound by representations regarding a party’s additional insured status contained in a certificate of insurance issued by the insurer’s authorized agent, even where the certificate contains language disclaiming any effect on coverage. To hold otherwise, the court noted, would render meaningless representations made on the insurer’s behalf and enable the insurer to mislead parties without consequence. The certified question and ruling stem from T-Mobile USA’s appeal of the district court’s summary judgment ruling in favor of Selective Insurance Company on T-Mobile USA’s breach of contract and declaratory judgment claims. Selective issued the insurance policy at issue to a contractor of T-Mobile Northeast, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of T-Mobile USA. Through endorsement, the policy extended “additional insured” status to T-Mobile NE because the contract between T-Mobile NE and the insured required that T-Mobile NE be added as an additional insured. Additional insured status was not, however, extended to T-Mobile USA, as T-Mobile USA had not entered a written contract with the insured. Reprinted courtesy of Michael S. Levine, Hunton Andrews Kurth and Michelle M. Spatz, Hunton Andrews Kurth Mr. Levine may be contacted at mlevine@HuntonAK.com Ms. Spatz may be contacted at mspatz@HuntonAK.com Read the court decision
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Judgment Proof: Reducing Litigation Exposure with Litigation Risk Insurance

March 04, 2024 — Latosha M. Ellis & Charlotte Leszinske - Hunton Insurance Recovery Blog
It is not just your imagination: verdicts are getting bigger. So-called “nuclear verdicts” have increased in size and frequency over the past decade, particularly after the COVID-19 pandemic. Litigation risk insurance is a little known, but highly effective, option meant to compliment traditional insurance products and provide additional protection for policyholders nervous about litigation exposure. Unfortunately, it is difficult to predict the exposure presented by any particular case. Between 2020 and 2022, the median verdict increased 95%—from $21.5 million to $41.1 million. In 2022, a jury handed down a verdict worth $7.3 billion for injury to a single plaintiff. Even if an injury or loss is minor, juries have shown that they are willing to penalize corporate defendants with punitive damages that significantly exceed the award of compensatory damages. With such uncertainty and millions (if not billions) at stake, companies can reduce risk with litigation risk insurance. Three key types of litigation risk insurance include: (1) punitive wrap insurance, (2) adverse judgment insurance, and (3) judgment preservation insurance. Reprinted courtesy of Latosha M. Ellis, Hunton Andrews Kurth and Charlotte Leszinske, Hunton Andrews Kurth Ms. Ellis may be contacted at lellis@HuntonAK.com Ms. Leszinske may be contacted at cleszinske@HuntonAK.com Read the court decision
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Pay-if-Paid Clauses, Nasty, but Enforceable

March 12, 2015 — Craig Martin – Construction Contractor Advisor
I am preparing for a presentation this week on Troublesome Contract Clauses to the Construction Specifications Institute (“CSI”), Nebraska Chapter. One of the clauses we will be discussing is the dreaded Pay-if-Paid clause, a particularly nasty provision that places the risk of owner’s solvency squarely on the subcontractor’s shoulders. While pay-if-paid clauses can create tremendous problems for subcontractors, they are enforceable. Pay-if-Paid clauses eliminate the obligation to pay the subcontractor until the general contractor is paid by the owner. Pay-if-paid clauses usually contain something akin to the following phrases:

payment to subcontractors are “expressly and unequivocally contingent upon receipt of payment from the Owner for the Subcontract Work.”
the subcontractor “expressly acknowledges that it relies on payment under the Subcontract on the creditworthiness of Owner, not that of the General Contractor.”
the owner’s acceptance of the work and payment to the General Contractor are “conditions precedent to any obligation of the General Contractor to pay the subcontractor.”

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Reprinted courtesy of Craig Martin, Lamson, Dugan and Murray, LLP
Mr. Martin may be contacted at cmartin@ldmlaw.com

Major Change to Residential Landlord Tenant Law

July 15, 2019 — Lawrence S. Glosser - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLC
Governor Inslee has just signed SB 5600 which results in major changes to the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act (RCW 59.18) regarding the eviction process of residential tenants. The changes do not apply to non-residential tenancies which are still governed by RCW 59.12. The new law includes additional protections for tenants and limits the ability of landlords to evict tenants or recover costs for legal proceedings. It also grants judges substantial discretion in eviction hearings whereas judges were previously bound by the express terms of the statute. The major changes to the law are listed below:

A landlord must provide a tenant 14 days’ notice instead of three days’ notice in order to cure default in the payment of overdue rent. The Attorney General’s Office will create a uniform 14-day notice to pay and vacate default form.
Landlords must first apply any payment by a tenant to the rent amount before applying it towards other charges, including fees or other costs.

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Reprinted courtesy of Lawrence S. Glosser, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLC
Mr. Glosser may be contacted at larry.glosser@acslawyers.com

New York Appellate Court Addresses “Trigger of Coverage” for Asbestos Claims and Other Coverage Issues

November 30, 2020 — Paul A. Briganti - Complex Insurance Coverage Reporter
On October 9, 2020, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, decided an appeal from a trial court’s 2018 summary judgment ruling on a number of coverage issues arising out of asbestos-related bodily injury claims against plaintiffs Carrier Corporation (Carrier) and Elliott Company (Elliott). See Carrier Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 396 CA 18-02292, Mem. & Order (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 4th Dep’t Oct. 9, 2020). The Fourth Department reversed the trial court’s ruling that, under New York’s “injury in fact trigger of coverage,” injury occurs from the first date of exposure to asbestos through death or the filing of suit as a matter of law. The parties agreed that, because the policy language at issue required personal injury to take place “during the policy period,” “the applicable test in determining what event constitutes personal injury sufficient to trigger coverage is injury-in-fact, ‘which rests on when the injury, sickness, disease or disability actually began.’” Id. at 3 (quoting Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Rapid-American Corp., 609 N.E.2d 506, 511 (N.Y. 1993)). The Fourth Department concluded that, in resolving the issue, the trial court erred by relying on inapposite decisions in other cases where: (1) the parties had stipulated or otherwise not disputed that first exposure triggered coverage[1]; or (2) the issue had not been resolved on summary judgment, but rather at trial based on expert medical evidence[2]. The Fourth Department further explained that, even if plaintiffs here had met their initial burden on summary judgment by submitting admissible evidence that asbestos-related injury actually begins upon first exposure, the defendant-insurer’s opposition – which included affidavits of medical experts contradicting that evidence and averring instead that “harm occurs only when a threshold level of asbestos fiber or particle burden is reached that overtakes the body’s defense mechanisms” – raised a triable issue of fact. Id. at 4. The Fourth Department also rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the defendant-insurer was collaterally estopped on the “trigger” issue by a California appellate court’s decision in Armstrong World Industries, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). The Fourth Department reasoned that the issues litigated in the two cases were not identical because, among other things, California and New York “apply different substantive law in determining when asbestos-related injury occurs.” Carrier, Mem. & Order at 4. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Paul A. Briganti, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Briganti may be contacted at brigantip@whiteandwilliams.com

Montreal Bridge Builders Sue Canada Over New Restrictions

April 13, 2017 — Scott Van Voorhis - Engineering News-Record
The consortium building the $3.2-billion Champlain Bridge in Montreal has sued Canada’s government for $93 million, claiming transportation officials gave it late notice of stricter load limits that could add to delay and make it liable for tens of millions of dollars in penalties, according to Canadian press reports and a stock analyst’s comments. A spokeswoman for the team’s lead firm, engineer-contractor SNC-Lavalin, confirms the March 28 filing in Quebec Superior Court but declined further comment. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Scott Van Voorhis, ENR
ENR may be contacted at ENR.com@bnpmedia.com

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