Payment Bond Claim Notice Requires More than Mailing
August 04, 2015 —
Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law MusingsIt’s been a while since I posted something new relating to Virginia’s “Little Miller Act” and its various notice requirements for a subcontractor to make a payment bond claim.
I have posted on the basics of a Virginia payment bond claim previously here at Musings. One of these basics is the 90 day notice requirement for suppliers or second tier subcontractors with no direct contractual relationship to the general contractor. A recent case from the Norfolk, Virginia Circuit Court examined when notice is “given” under the Little Miller Act.
In R T Atkinson Building Corp v Archer Western Construction, LLC the Court looked at the question of whether mailing of the notice of claim is enough to constitute notice being “given” in a manner that would satisfy the statutory requirements. In that case, the supplier mailed the notice within the 90 day window, but the defendant argued on summary judgment that it did not receive the notice until 2 days after the 90 day window had closed. In support of this contention, the defendant provided tracking information showing delivery by the USPS on the non-compliant date.
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Christopher G. Hill, Law Office of Christopher G. Hill, PCMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Nomos LLP Partner Garret Murai Recognized by Super Lawyers
September 05, 2023 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogNomos LLP Partner Garret Murai has been selected to the 2023 Northern California Super Lawyers list in the area of Construction Litigation. This is the tenth consecutive year that he has been recognized by Super Lawyers.
Garret was also also featured in this year’s Northern California Super Lawyer’s magazine’s 20th anniversary cover story “Built Different” where he talks a bit about his practice and changes he has seen over the past 20 years as a construction lawyer. The following is an excerpt from the article:
“The New Reality of Work”
Garret Murai, whose father was an architect, is a founding partner of Nomos LLP, an Oakland-based construction law firm. Concentrating in both commercial and public works, Murai’s clients run the gamut from contractors and subcontractors to owners and developers.
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Garret Murai, Nomos LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@nomosllp.com
Residential Interior Decorator Was Entitled to Lien and Was Not Engaging in Unlicensed Contracting
August 04, 2021 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesResidential construction disputes can sometimes take nasty turns. This is not attributed to one specific reason, but a variety of factors. Sometimes, there are not sophisticated contracts (or contracts at all). Sometimes, relationships and roles get blurred. Sometimes, parties try to skirt licensure requirements. Sometimes, a party is just unreasonable as to their expectations. And, sometimes, a party tries to leverage a construction lien to get what they want. In all disputes, a party would certainly be best suited to work with construction counsel that has experience navigating construction disputes.
An example of a construction dispute that took a nasty turn involving an interior decorator is SG 2901, LLC v. Complimenti, Inc., 2021 WL 2672295 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021). In this case, a condominium unit owner wanted to renovate his apartment. He hired an interior decorator to assist. As his renovation plans became more expansive, the interior decorator told him he would need to hire a licensed contractor and architect. The interior decorator arranged a meeting with those professionals and, at that meeting, they were hired by the owner and told to deal directly with the interior decorator, almost in an owner’s representative capacity since the owner traveled a lot. The interior decorator e-mailed the owner about status and requested certain authorizations, as one would expect an owner’s representative to do. At the completion of the renovation job, the owner did not pay the interior decorator because he was unhappy with certain renovations. The interior decorator recorded a construction lien and sued the owner which included a lien foreclosure claim. There was no discussion of the contracts in this case because, presumably, contracts were based on proposals, were bare-boned, or were oral.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Revisiting OSHA’s Controlling Employer Policy
December 21, 2017 —
Wally Zimolong - Zimolong LLCThe United States Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit has been asked to review OSHA’s twenty year old “controlling employer” policy. As many contractors are surprised to learn, under OSHA’s controlling employer policy, you can be given an OSHA citation even when your own employee is not exposed to the alleged hazard.
A. The Controlling Employer Policy
OSHA’s current controlling employer policy has been effective since 1999. That policy applies to multi-employer worksites, which means virtually all construction sites. Under the policy, OSHA can cite the creating, exposing, correcting, or controlling employer. A creating employer is one who creates the hazard to which workers are exposed. The exposing employer is one who permits his employees to be exposed to the hazard, whether it created the hazard or not. The correcting employer is one who is responsible with correcting known hazards. Finally, the controlling employer is one “who has general supervisory authority over the worksite, including the power to correct safety and health violations itself or require others to correct them.” Most general contractors and CM’s are controlling employers.
Under OSHA’s policy, a contractor’s OSHA safety obligations hinges on whether it is a creating, exposing, correcting, or controlling employer. The creating, exposing, and correcting contractors obligations are fairly straightforward. However, the controlling contractors obligations are more nuisanced.
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Wally Zimolong, Zimolong LLCMr. Zimolong may be contacted at
wally@zimolonglaw.com
San Francisco Sues Over Sinking Millennium Tower
November 17, 2016 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFDennis Herrera, San Francisco’s city attorney, filed a lawsuit against the developer of the Millennium Tower, “for failing to inform buyers that it was sinking ‘much faster than expected,’” reported the New York Times. Mission Street Development sold more than 400 units in the skyscraper.
“They went ahead and sold condominiums for a handsome profit without telling the buyers about the situation,” Mr. Herrera told the New York Times. “This is every homeowner’s worst nightmare.”
The spokesman for the development, P.J. Johnson, stated that “the allegations by the city attorney had ‘no merit,’ and that the “building had sunk within ‘predicted, safe ranges’ during the entire sales process,” according to the New York Times. Furthermore, Johnson asserted that the problem derived from the nearby railroad station removing water from the ground, which “had caused the building to ‘settle beyond the 12 inches it was predicted to settle.’”
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Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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U.S. State Adoption of the National Electrical Code
August 24, 2017 —
David R. Cook Jr. - Autry, Hanrahan, Hall & Cook, LLPWhat is the National Electrical Code?
Did you know that as of 2017, there have been 15 revisions of The National Electrical Code since 1975, the year the average American home was built?
The National Electrical Code codifies the minimum requirements for the safe electrical installations in a single, standardized source. While the NEC is not itself a law, the NEC is commonly mandated by state or local law. Where the NEC is adopted, anything less than the standards set by the NEC are illegal. The NEC revision is an open process that produces a new code every three years. The process includes:
- Public Input
- Public Commentary
- NFPA Technical Session
- Standards Council Action – Appeals and Issuance of the NEC
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David R. Cook, Autry, Hanrahan, Hall & Cook, LLPMr. Cook may be contacted at
cook@ahclaw.com
Are Millennials Finally Moving Out On Their Own?
July 16, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFBrad Hunter of Big Builder reported that there is “some evidence that young people who had moved in with their parents or relatives are now finding the means and the motivation to move out and get their own place.”
According to the 2013 Current Population Survey (as quoted by Big Builder), there was “a drop in the percentage of twenty-somethings living with parents. This was the first decline since 2005, back when the speculative foundations of the housing market started to crumble.” However, a study by the Harvard Joint Center on Housing found that “2.1 million more people between in their 20's lived with their parents than would have typically been the case based on normal headship rates.” This demonstrates that demand for housing should increase as this group gets older and decides to break out on their own.
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