Vallagio v. Metropolitan Homes: Colorado Supreme Court Upholds Declarant Consent Provision to Amend Arbitration Out of Declarations
June 15, 2017 —
Jean Meyer - Colorado Construction LitigationOn June 5, 2017, the Colorado Supreme Court announced the Vallagio at Inverness Residential Con. Ass’n v. Metro. Homes, Inc., No. 15SC508, 2017 CO 69 (Colo. June 5, 2017) decision. In short, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld the validity of declarant “consent-to-amend” provisions and expressly held that claims under the Colorado Consumer Protection Act are arbitrable.
By way of background, the Vallagio at Inverness Residential Condominiums were developed by Metro Inverness, LLC, (“Declarant”) which also served as the declarant for its homeowners association. Metropolitan Homes was Metro Inverness’ manager and the general contractor on the project. Greg Krause and Peter Kudla served as declarant-appointed members of the Association’s board during the period of declarant control.
When it set up the Association, the Declarant included within the Association’s declaration a mandatory arbitration provision specifically for construction defect claims. This provision stated that it “shall not ever be amended without the written consent of Declarant and without regard to whether Declarant owns any portion of the Real Estate at the time of the amendment.”
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Jean Meyer, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCMr. Meyer may be contacted at
meyer@hhmrlaw.com
Nine ACS Lawyers Recognized as Super Lawyers – Including One Top 10 and Three Top 100 Washington Attorneys
August 14, 2023 —
Travis Colburn - Ahlers Cressman & SleightOur blog articles usually cover construction-related issues, but Ahlers Cressman & Sleight, PLLC – once again – is honored to announce nine members of our firm were awarded the distinction of being a “Super Lawyer” in Washington.
To become a Super Lawyer, only the top attorneys are nominated by their peers. Once nominated, candidates are researched and evaluated by an independent third-party across twelve key categories, such as experience, honors/awards, verdicts/settlements, and others. Next potential Super Lawyers are evaluated by a highly-credentialed “Blue Ribbon Panel” of peers before final selection. The process is extremely competitive and only 5 percent of the total lawyers in Washington are nominated as Super Lawyers. The following – including one Top 10 and three Top 100 attorneys – are Ahlers Cressman & Sleight, PLLC’s Super Lawyers:
John P. Ahlers, one of the firm’s founding partners, was again recognized as a Top 10 Super Lawyer in Washington State for 2023 – this is his seventh year in a row in the Top 10. A founding member of Ahlers Cressman & Sleight, PLLC, he has been named a Super Lawyer in Construction Litigation since 2001—23 years in a row. To read Mr. Ahlers’ full profile, click
here.
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Travis Colburn, Ahlers Cressman & SleightMr. Colburn may be contacted at
travis.colburn@acslawyers.com
New York Court Rejects Owner’s Bid for Additional Insured Coverage
September 06, 2021 —
Eric D. Suben - Traub LiebermanTenders for additional insured coverage in construction accidents are frequently litigated in New York courts. Although the past few years have seen changes in the law regarding the causal nexus between the named insured’s work and coverage for the purported additional insured, courts often find there is at least a duty to defend the additional insured where there are allegations of the employer/subcontractor’s presence at the site.
An exception is the recent decision in Gemini Insurance Company v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, Index No. 652669/20 in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York (Lebovits, J.). In that case, Gemini insured the owner and general contractor of a construction project, and Lloyd’s insured the injured claimant’s employer under a policy endorsed to provide additional insured coverage to entities who “have agreed in writing in a contract or agreement” with the named insured that they must be “added as additional insured.” Although the court found that the contracts here satisfied this requirement for additional insured coverage, the court’s analysis did not end there.
Noting that even where such contract exists, the Lloyd’s policy would not provide additional insured coverage “in all circumstances” (emphasis in original), the court next considered whether the underlying injury was “caused in whole or in part by: 1. [The named insured’s] acts or omissions, or 2. The acts or omissions of those acting on [the named insured’s] behalf,” as required under the endorsement’s wording.
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Eric D. Suben, Traub LiebermanMr. Suben may be contacted at
esuben@tlsslaw.com
Civil RICO Case Against Johnny Doc Is Challenging
October 20, 2016 —
Wally Zimolong – Supplemental ConditionsNews that a non-union contractor had filed a Lawsuit against IBEW Local 98 and its leader, John Dougherty, made headlines this week. While making fodder for local media, the plaintiffs must bound several legal hurdles before IBEW Local 98 and “Johnny Doc” face any threat of liability.
Background on RICO
The lawsuit was filed under a set of laws known as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). I have written about RICO’s impact on labor unions on this blog before and predicted that recent federal court cases made RICO claims against more viable. RICO is a Nixon era set of laws that were originally passed to combat organized crime. There is both a civil and criminal component to RICO. (Interestingly, the RICO act remained relatively dormant until then U.S. Attorney Rudy Giuliani began effectively using it to prosecute the mob in the 1980’s.) Although recent decisions have made RICO claims against unions more viable, any RICO claim is still challenging. Indeed, some courts require a plaintiff in civil RICO cases to file a separate RICO case statement detailing its allegations. RICO claims are powerful. Some have called RICO claims a “thermonuclear” litigation device because the law permits the award of trebel (triple) damages and attorneys fees.
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Wally Zimolong, Zimolong LLCMr. Zimolong may be contacted at
wally@zimolonglaw.com
South Carolina “occurrence” and allocation
September 01, 2011 —
CDCoverage.comIn Crossman Communities of North Carolina, Inc. v. Harleysville Mutual Insurance Co., No. 26909 (S.C. Aug. 22, 2011), insured Crossman was the developer and general contractor of several condominium projects constructed by Crossman’s subcontractors over multiple years. After completion, Crossman was sued by homeowners alleging negligent construction of exterior components resulting in moisture penetration property damage to non-defective components occurring during multiple years. Crossman settled the underlying lawsuit and then filed suit against its CGL insurers to recover the settlement amount. Crossman settled with all of the insurers except for Harleysville. Crossman and Harleysville stipulated that the only coverage issue was whether there was an “occurrence.” The trial court subsequently entered judgment in favor of Crossman, determining that there was an “occurrence.” The trial court also ruled that Harleysville was liable for the entire settlement amount without offset for the amounts paid by the other insurers.
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
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Not Everything is a Pollutant: A Summary of Recent Cases Supporting a Common Sense and Narrow Interpretation of the CGL's Pollution Exclusion
October 26, 2020 —
Philip B. Wilusz & Jeffrey J. Vita - Saxe Doernberger & VitaThose of us who suffered through law school are familiar with the argument that there are fundamental rules applicable to contract interpretation and that a certain contract language interpretation would “swallow the rule.” However, insurance companies have long advocated for an interpretation of the CGL policy’s pollution exclusion that would “swallow the coverage” that the insureds thought they were purchasing. Insurers have successfully argued in several states that the pollution exclusion’s definition of “pollutant” should be read literally, and be applied to any “solid, liquid, gaseous, or thermal irritant or contaminant including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals, and waste.” As anyone with children can attest to, the range of items and substances that can be considered an “irritant” is limitless. The logical extent of the insurer’s interpretation brings to mind the high school student who, for his science fair project, convinced his fellow students to ban “dihydrogen monoxide.”1 Citing evidence such as the fact that everyone who has ever died was found to have consumed “dihydrogen monoxide,” he convinced them of the dangers of . . . water. Similarly, an overly expansive reading of the definition of “pollutant” could lead to the absurd result of even applying it to ubiquitous harmless substances such as water. The pollution exclusion, therefore, has run amok in many states and has allowed insurers to avoid liability for otherwise covered claims.
Fortunately, insureds in many states have successfully argued that the pollution exclusion is subject to a more limited interpretation based on several different theories. For example, some courts have agreed that the pollution exclusion, as initially introduced by the insurance industry, should be limited to instances of traditional environmental pollution. Others have held that the exclusion is ambiguous as to its interpretation. The reasonable expectations of the insureds do not support a broad reading of the defined term “pollutant.” Below, this article addresses a number of recent decisions that have adopted a pro policyholder interpretation of the pollution exclusion. As with most insurance coverage issues, choice of law clearly matters.
Reprinted courtesy of
Philip B. Wilusz, Saxe Doernberger & Vita and
Jeffrey J. Vita, Saxe Doernberger & Vita
Mr. Wilusz may be contacted at pbw@sdvlaw.com
Mr. Vita may be contacted at jjv@sdvlaw.com
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Excess Policy Triggered Once Retention Paid, Even if Loss Not Covered By Excess
July 23, 2014 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe Fifth Circuit determined that the Umbrella policies took effect once the primary insurance was exhausted by claims not covered by the Umbrella policies. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. W&T Offshore, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 11775 (5th Cir. June 23, 2014).
W&T had primary and Umbrella/Excess coverage to protect its offshore oil rigs from hurricane damage. The primary policies covered property damage and third party claims. The Umbrella policies only covered third-party claims. All policies covered Removal of Debris (ROD).
In September 2008, Hurricane Ike caused damage to 150 offshore platforms in which W&T had an interest. W&T submitted over $150 million in claims for property damage to the primary carriers. The primary policies had a $10 million self-insured retention (SIR). The primary policies covered $150 million in coverage over the $10 million SIR. Anticipating that W&T would submit all of its ROD claims, which were estimated to exceed $50 million, the Umbrella carriers filed suit for a declaratory judgment.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Indemnity Clauses—What do they mean, and what should you be looking for?
May 07, 2015 —
Craig Martin – Construction Contractor AdvisorIt seems that every construction contract now-a-days, contains an indemnity clause. Contractors should be reviewing these indemnity clauses very carefully to understand the potential scope of an indemnity obligation and your opportunity to negotiate changes.
What is an indemnity Clause?
An indemnity clause transfers risk from one party to another. When a contractor signs an indemnity agreement, it is agreeing to pay for damages for which another party could be liable.
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Craig Martin, Lamson, Dugan and Murray, LLPMr. Martin may be contacted at
cmartin@ldmlaw.com
