Why You Make A Better Wall Than A Window: Why Policyholders Can Rest Assured That Insurers Should Pay Legal Bills for Claims with Potential Coverage
March 14, 2018 —
Alan Packer and Graham Mills - Newmeyer & Dillion, LLPUnfortunately, policyholders, such as manufacturers and contractors, routinely face the unnecessary challenge of how to access all of the insurance coverage which they have purchased. Frequently, the most pressing need is to get the insurance company to pay the legal bills when the policyholders have been sued. The recent Iowa federal district court opinion in
Pella Corporation v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company should help a policyholder in a dispute to require its insurance company to pay those legal bills sooner rather than later by highlighting that the duty to defend arises from the potential for coverage, and the insurer may not force the policyholder to prove the damage to obtain a defense.
In
Pella, a window manufacturer purchased several years of insurance coverage from Liberty Mutual. Similar to many companies, Pella had many “layers” of insurance coverage in any given year. These layers collectively function like a tower. The general idea is that each layer provides a certain amount of coverage after the insurance policy below it had paid its money. The Liberty Mutual insurance policies provided excess coverage.
After the
Pella window manufacturer made and sold its windows, it was sued in numerous lawsuits alleging that its windows were defective and that those defective windows caused a wide variety of damage to the structures in which they were installed. The window manufacturer tendered those lawsuits to its insurance companies in its tower of coverage, asking that the insurance companies pay its legal bills incurred in its defense. As to Liberty Mutual, the window manufacturer argued that the Liberty Mutual insurance policies were triggered, and so obligated to reimburse it, if a window was installed during the years that those policies provided coverage or if there was a mere allegation that a window was installed during the years that those policies provided coverage. Liberty Mutual opposed, arguing that the date of installation of the windows was insufficient to trigger the policies, and that the manufacturer was required to demonstrate the date that damage actually occurred to trigger a defense.
The key issue before the
Pella Court in this decision was a simple one: which insurance policies, if any, issued by Liberty Mutual had an obligation to pay the window manufacturer’s legal bills? The answer to that question is critical and financially significant. Getting an insurance company to honor its obligations and start paying the legal bills as soon as possible is very important for a policyholder because of the cost of defending oneself in a lawsuit; often the key reason why an insurance policy is even purchased is to provide the policyholder with the right to call upon the insurance company’s financial resources to defend it should it be sued.
In a ruling that will be welcomed by policyholders, the
Pella Court held that Liberty Mutual’s multiple insurance policies were triggered, and so obligated to pay for the window manufacturer’s defense, if one of two events occurred during the years in which those insurance policies provided coverage: (1) a window was actually installed during a year when the insurance policy provided coverage or (2) the window was alleged to be installed in the year that the insurance policy provided coverage. The Court agreed with the policyholder that once the windows were installed, property damage was alleged and “may
potentially have occurred” from that point on, thus the policies on the risk from that point forward. The practical effect of this ruling meant that Liberty Mutual had to reimburse the window manufacturer for the defense fees and costs that it had paid.
While
Pella was decided under Iowa law, the principles upon which it relied are similar to those applied under California law. Importantly, both California and Iowa law hold that an insurance company must provide a defense in response to a claim that is, or could be, covered by the insurance policy. The mere potential that the claim might be covered is enough for the insurance company to be obligated to pay for policyholder’s legal fees and costs.
Establishing that an insurance company must pay legal fees and costs as soon as possible allows a policyholder to save its own money. Why should a policyholder pay legal bills when it purchased an insurance policy as protection to ensure that it did not have to pay those bills? The answer is that a policyholder should not and, under
Pella, the policyholder does not have to. Rather, the insurance company must start paying for that defense from a very early date. Pella confirms for policyholders the position that their insurance companies should pay legal bills earlier rather than later.
Alan Packer is a partner in the Walnut Creek office for Newmeyer & Dillion, LLP, representing homebuilders, property owners, and business clients on a broad range of legal matters, including risk management, insurance matters, wrap consultation and documentation, efforts to counter solicitation of homeowners, subcontract documentation, as well as complex litigation matters. Alan can be reached at alan.packer@ndlf.com.
Graham Mills is a partner in the Walnut Creek offce of Newmeyer & Dillion, LLP, representing clients in the area of complex insurance law with an emphasis on insurance recovery, construction litigation, real estate litigation, and business litigation. He regularly examines and analyzes a wide variety of insurance policies. Graham can be reached at graham.mills@ndlf.com.
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Court Finds that Subcontractor Lacks Standing to Appeal Summary Judgment Order Simply Because Subcontractor “Might” Lose at Trial Due to Order
May 03, 2021 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogCases sometimes take unanticipated twists and turns. Atlas Construction Supply, Inc. v. Swinerton Builders, Case No. D076426 (January 26,2021), involving a tragic construction accident, a motion for summary judgment, a motion for good faith settlement, and a stipulated dismissal, is one of those cases.
The Accident
Swinerton Builders was the general contractor on a residential construction project in San Diego, California. Swinerton contracted with J.R. Construction, Inc. to perform concrete work and with Brewer Crane & Rigging, Inc. to perform crane work on the project. J.R. Construction in turn rented a concrete column formwork approximately 10 feet tall and weighing 300 to 400 pounds from Atlas Construction Supply, Inc.
One day on the construction project, Marcus Develasco, Sr. and another co-worker, employees of J.R. Construction, climbed to the top of the formwork to adjust its size. The formwork, which had been positioned on the site by Brewer, was upright but unsupported by braces. When the co-worker stepped off the formwork, Develasco’s weight caused the unsecured formwork to topple over, killing Develasco in the process.
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Garret Murai, Nomos LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@nomosllp.com
The Economic Loss Rule and the Disclosure of Latent Defects: In re the Estate of Carol S. Gattis
January 15, 2014 —
Brady Iandiorio - Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCIn a recent case of first impression, the Colorado Court of Appeals determined that the economic loss rule does not bar a nondisclosure tort claim against a seller of a home, built on expansive soils which caused damage to the house after the sale. The case of In re the Estate of Carol S. Gattis represents a new decision regarding the economic loss rule. Because it is a case of first impression, we must wait to see whether the Colorado Supreme Court grants a petition for certiorari.
Until then, we will analyze the decision handed down on November 7, 2013. The sellers of the home sold it to an entity they controlled for the purpose of repairing and reselling the home. Before that purchase, Sellers obtained engineering reports including discussion of structural problems resulting from expansive soils. A structural repair entity, also controlled by Sellers, oversaw the needed repair work. After the repair work was completed, Sellers obtained title to the residence and listed it for sale.
Sellers had no direct contact with Gattis, who purchased the residence from Sellers. The purchase was executed through a standard-form real estate contract, approved by the Colorado Real Estate Commission: Contract to Buy and Sell Real Estate, to which no changes were made. Several years after taking title to the residence, Gattis commenced action, pleading several tort claims alleging only economic losses based on damage to the residence resulting from expansive soils.
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Brady Iandiorio, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCMr. Iandiorio may be contacted at
iandiorio@hhmrlaw.com
Nevada Assembly Passes Construction Defect Bill
October 30, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFThe Nevada Speaker says that AB401 gives contractors what they want, but a contractors’ group has asked a Senate committee to kill the bill. Supporters of AB 401 say that it clarifies what qualifies as a construction defect and shortens the statute of limitations.
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Court Rules on a Long List of Motions in Illinois National Insurance Co v Nordic PCL
May 10, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFThe case Illinois National Insurance Co. v Nordic PCL, et al. “involves a dispute about whether insurance benefits are available to a general contractor who built structures that allegedly have construction defects. Plaintiffs Illinois National Insurance Company (‘Illinois National’) and National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA (‘National Union’) (collectively, the ‘Insurers’), commenced this action for declaratory relief against Defendant Nordic PCL Construction, Inc., f/k/a Nordic Construction, Ltd. ("Nordic"), on August 23, 2011.”
The court was asked to rule on a long list of motions: “Counterclaim Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Their (1) Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim and (2) Motion to Strike Portions of the Counterclaim, ECF No. 16 (‘Request for Judicial Notice’); Counterclaim Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim Filed October 24, 2011, ECF No. 14 (‘Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim’); Counterclaim Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of the Counterclaim Filed October 24, 2011, ECF No. 15 (‘Motion to Strike’); Third-Party Defendant Marsh USA, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Stay Proceedings in Favor of Pending State Action, ECF No. 33 (‘Marsh’s Motion To Dismiss Or Stay’); Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Nordic PCL Construction, Inc., f/k/a Nordic Construction Ltd.’s Substantive Joinder to Third-Party Defendant Marsh USA Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Stay Proceedings in Favor of Pending State Action, ECF No. 36 (‘Nordic’s Joinder’); and Third-Party Defendant Marsh USA, Inc.’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Counts V and VI of Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Nordic PCL Construction, Inc.’s Third-Party Complaint, ECF No. 29 (‘Marsh’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings’).”
In result, the court reached the following decisions: “The court GRANTS IN RELEVANT PART the Insurers’ Request for Judicial Notice to the extent it covers matters relevant to these motions; GRANTS IN PART the Insurers’ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim, but gives Nordic leave to amend the Counterclaim in certain respects; DENIES the Insurers’ Motion to Strike; DENIES Marsh’s Motion To Dismiss Or Stay and Nordic’s Joinder; and GRANTS Marsh’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.”
The court provides a bit of background on the case: “This action arises out of alleged construction defects involving two projects on which Nordic acted as the general contractor. Nordic is a defendant in a pending state court action with respect to one of the projects and says it spent more than $400,000 on repairs with respect to the other project. Nordic tendered the defense of the pending state court action to the Insurers and sought reimbursement of the cost of repairs already performed. The Insurers responded by filing this action to determine their rights under the insurance policies issued to Nordic.”
Furthermore, the court presented a brief procedural history: “The Insurers commenced this declaratory action in this court on August 23, 2011. The Complaint asserts two claims, one seeking a declaration that the Insurers have no duty to provide a defense or indemnification regarding the Safeway Action, the other seeking such a declaration regarding the Moanalua Claims. Along with its Answer, Nordic filed a Counterclaim against the Insurers. The Counterclaim asserts breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, misrepresentations and omissions of material fact, and bad faith, and seeks declaratory relief against the Insurers.”
The procedural history continues: “Nordic also filed a Third-Party Complaint against Marsh, the broker that had procured the Policies from the Insurers for Nordic. Nordic alleges that it reasonably believed that the Policies would provide completed operations insurance coverage for the types of construction defects alleged in the Safeway Action and Moanalua Claims. The Third-Party Complaint asserts breach of contract, negligence, promissory estoppel, breach of fiduciary duties, implied indemnity, and contribution and equitable subrogation.”
In conclusion, “The court GRANTS IN RELEVANT PART the Insurers’ Request for Judicial Notice. With regard to the Insurers’ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim, the court GRANTS the motion as to Count I (breach of contract), Count II (duty of good faith and fair dealing), Count III (fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation), the portion of Count IV (bad faith) premised on fraud, and Count IV (declaratory relief). The court DENIES the motion as to Count IV (bad faith) that is not premised on fraud. Except with respect to the "occurrence" issue, which the court disposes of here on the merits, and Count V, which concerns only a form of relief, Nordic is given leave to amend its Counterclaim within three weeks of the date of this order. The court DENIES the Insurers’ Motion to Strike, DENIES Marsh’s Motion to Dismiss or Stay and Nordic’s Joinder, and GRANTS Marsh’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings with respect to Counts V and VI of the Third-Party Complaint.”
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Making Construction Innovation Stick
February 22, 2018 —
Tom Sawyer, Jeff Rubenstone, and Scott Lewis – ENRIntegrating innovations into construction workflows—rather than serially testing, piloting and discarding them—is a definition of success. Yet few innovations—even ones that shine in trials—are absorbed into practice. Many just quietly go away, sending the work of vetting and testing them down the drain. That leaves some firms wondering if most construction technology innovation efforts are a waste of time.
Reprinted courtesy of Engineering News-Record authors
Tom Sawyer,
Jeff Rubenstone and
Scott Lewis
Mr. Sawyer may be contacted at sawyert@enr.com
Mr. Rubenstone may be contacted at rubenstonej@enr.com
Mr. Lewis may be contacted at lewisw@enr.com
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Forget Backyard Pools, Build a Swimming Pond Instead
June 17, 2015 —
Mark Ellwood – BloombergNo self-respecting Californian can let the summer pass without a dip in the backyard—pools are as much a part of culture as the 49ers, Schwarzenegger, and dire earthquake warnings.
Now, though, there’s something unseemly about pooling so much water for the occasional swim—enough, in fact, to generate its own hashstag, #droughtshaming. There’s one surefire way to mitigate opprobrium: Build a natural swimming pond that’s specifically designed to minimize environmental impacts (or the cash premiums required to keep it up).
Typical is one example in Sonoma County, where the the water seems to leak down from the rock perched on the ridge. Like a natural spring, it trickles and tumbles, pooling into water features as it falls; one feature is full of aquatic plants and flowers, while another is a swimming hole—clear, cool and inviting. It was built by Dave Whitney, chief executive officer of Eco Solutions, a pioneer in engineering such eco swimming ponds. These dipping pools use natural filtration instead of chlorine pellets to keep the water clean.
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Mark Ellwood, Bloomberg
Impact of Lis Pendens on Unrecorded Interests / Liens
September 15, 2016 —
David Adelstein – Florida Construction Legal UpdatesIn a previous article, I discussed the importance of recording a lis pendens in a construction lien foreclosure action.
There is another noteworthy point relating to the impact of lis pendens that can provide quite a bit of consternation.
Florida Statute 48.23(1)(d) provides:
Except for the interest of persons in possession or easements of use, the recording of such notice of lis pendens, provided that during the pendency of the proceeding it has not expired pursuant to subsection (2) or been withdrawn or discharged, constitutes a bar to the enforcement against the property described in the notice of all interests and liens, including, but not limited to, federal tax liens and levies, unrecorded at the time of recording the notice unless the holder of any such unrecorded interest or lien intervenes in such proceedings within 30 days after the recording of the notice. If the holder of any such unrecorded interest or lien does not intervene in the proceedings and if such proceedings are prosecuted to a judicial sale of the property described in the notice, the property shall be forever discharged from all such unrecorded interests and liens. If the notice of lis pendens expires or is withdrawn or discharged, the expiration, withdrawal, or discharge of the notice does not affect the validity of any unrecorded interest or lien.
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David M. Adelstein, Kirwin NorrisMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
