Texas Supreme Court Holds Anadarko’s $100M Deepwater Horizon Defense Costs Are Not Subject To Joint Venture Liability Limits
February 27, 2019 —
Sergio F. Oehninger & Michael S. Levine - Hunton Andrews KurthReversing a Texas Court of Appeals decision that allowed Anadarko’s Lloyd’s of London excess insurers to escape coverage for more than $100 million in defense costs incurred in connection with claims from the Deepwater Horizon well blowout, the Supreme Court of Texas held that the insurers’ obligations to pay defense costs under an “energy package” liability policy are not capped by a joint venture coverage limit for “liability” insured. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. et al. v. Houston Casualty Co. et al., No. 16-1013 (Tex. Jan. 25, 2019).
While the Lloyd’s of London insurers had agreed to pay Anadarko $37.5 million for damages, they declined to cover $100 million-plus in defense fees, arguing that both Anadarko’s liability and defense expenses are subject to the $37.5 million joint venture limit for “liability” insured. Anadarko asserted that only amounts paid as damages to third parties are subject to that limit. Defense costs, however, are not amounts paid as damages to a third party and, thus, are not a “liability.” Those amounts, therefore, are not subject to the joint venture limit and are instead subject to the policy’s $150 million coverage limit.
Reprinted courtesy of
Sergio F. Oehninger, Hunton Andrews Kurth and
Michael S. Levine, Hunton Andrews Kurth
Mr. Oehninger may be contacted at soehninger@HuntonAK.com
Mr. Levine may be contacted at mlevine@HuntonAK.com
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Maximizing Contractual Indemnity Rights: Components of an Effective Provision
December 02, 2015 —
William Kennedy – White and Williams LLPTort law is aimed at providing compensation to the victims of negligence. Tort law encourages plaintiffs to cast a wide net, pursuing claims or suits against not only those whose fault seems manifestly primary, but also against defendants whose causal exposure is minimal, against those whose exposure is purely by operation of law. As discussed in the first installment of this series, "Maximizing Contractual Indemnity: Problems with Common Law," three common law principles – vicarious liability, joint and several liability, and common law indemnity – cause some parties to pay in excess of their actual degree of causal fault. Contractual indemnity can remedy that harsh result.
Part Two: Components of an Effective Provision
Properly composed, “broad form” contractual indemnity provisions permit an Indemnitee to shift the full range of financial consequences from tort exposure, including civil damages, defense fees, expert fees, and litigation expenses. Such contracts permit indemnity even where the underlying damage was incurred due to a degree of negligence or fault on the part of the Indemnitee. Such contracts can also allow an Indemnitee to shift to the Indemnitor the risk of loss for someone from whom the Indemnitor would otherwise be immune from suit (e.g., the Indemnitor’s employees). A well-written contract can even convert an entity which is an Indemnitor as to one party (e.g., a general contractor which has to indemnify a property owner) into an Indemnitee as to another party (e.g., a subcontractor) for the very same risk.
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William Kennedy, White and Williams LLPMr. Kennedy may be contacted at
kennedyw@whiteandwilliams.com
Judge Dismisses Suit to Block Construction of Obama Center
April 04, 2022 —
The Associated Press - BloombergChicago (AP) -- A federal judge has dismissed a lawsuit that sought to prevent the construction of the Obama Presidential Center in a park on Chicago's South Side.
In a ruling issued Tuesday, U.S. District Judge Robert Blakey rejected the contention by the group Protect Our Parks that the city's park district improperly gave control of the land in Jackson Park to former President Barack Obama's foundation in violation of the public trust.
The city, Blakey wrote, “did not abdicate control or ownership of the OPC site to the Obama Foundation.”
Citing the state law that governs museums, the judge wrote that the Obama Center will ”confer a public benefit because they ’serve valuable public purposes, including ... furthering human knowledge and understanding, educating and inspiring the public, and expanding recreational and cultural resources and opportunities.”
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Bloomberg
The Fourth Circuit Applies a Consequential Damages Exclusionary Clause and the Economic Loss Doctrine to Bar Claims by a Subrogating Insurer Seeking to Recover Over $19 Million in Damages
February 23, 2016 —
William L. Doerler – White and Williams LLPIn Severn Peanut Company, Inc. v. Industrial Fumigant Company, 807 F.3d 88 (4th Cir. (N.C.) 2015), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Fourth Circuit), applying North Carolina law, considered whether a consequential damages clause in a contract between the Severn Peanut Company, Inc. (Severn) and Industrial Fumigant Company (IFC) barred Severn and its subrogating insurer, Travelers Property Casualty Company of America (Travelers), from recovering over $19 million in damages that Severn suffered as the result of a fire and explosion at its Severn, North Carolina plant. The Fourth Circuit, rejecting Severn’s unconscionability and public policy arguments related to the consequential damages clause and finding that the economic loss doctrine barred Severn from pursuing negligence claims, affirmed the trial court’s judgment granting summary judgment in IFC’s favor.
As noted in the Severn decision, the facts showed that Severn and IFC signed a Pesticide Application Agreement (PAA) requiring IFC to use phosphine, a pesticide, to fumigate Severn’s peanut storage dome and to apply the pesticide “in a manner consistent with instructions . . . and precautions set forth in [its] labeling.” With respect to damages, the PAA specified that IFC’s charge for its services, $8,604 plus applicable sales tax, was “based solely upon the value of the services provided” and was not “related to the value of [Severn’s] premises or the contents therein.” In addition, the PAA specified that the $8,604 sum to which the parties agreed was not “sufficient to warrant IFC assuming any risk of incidental or consequential damages” to Severn’s “property, product, equipment, downtime, or loss of business.”
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William L. Doerler, White and Williams LLPMr. Doerler may be contacted at
doerlerw@whiteandwilliams.com
Municipal Ordinances Create Additional Opportunities for the Defense of Construction Defect Claims in Colorado
August 22, 2022 —
Ricky Nolen - Colorado Construction Litigation BlogMunicipal ordinances may provide additional defenses for construction professionals where state law does not provide sufficient protection for Colorado’s builders. Colorado state law can be a minefield of potential liability for construction professionals. Even though the state legislature has stated that it must “recognize that Construction defect laws are an existing policy issue that many developers indicate adds to for-sale costs,” the legislature has remained hesitant to provide any meaningful protection from construction defect claims, resulting in almost unlimited exposure for Colorado’s construction professionals.
Given this background of state laws that do not go far enough in protecting Colorado’s construction professionals, it may be fruitful to review municipal ordinances for new defenses and to temper state law developments applicable to construction defect claims. This is an area of law that is only just developing in Colorado. In fact, the ordinances discussed in this article were only passed in the last two years with many cities only adopting the present versions of the ordinances in 2021. The two model ordinances discussed below are potentially helpful in three ways. The first model ordinance gives construction professionals a right to repair defects in the multi-family construction and in the common interest community context. The second model ordinance is helpful in two ways. First, it establishes that homeowners associations may not unilaterally circumvent ADR protections included in the original declarations for such communities.[1] Second, the ordinance reduces the risk that strict liability will be imposed on a construction professional where a building code is violated.
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Ricky Nolen, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCMr. Nolen may be contacted at
nolen@hhmrlaw.com
No Subrogation, Contribution Rights for Carrier Defending Construction Defect Claim
December 23, 2023 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe Court held that the insurer defending the additional insured general contractor had no right to equitable subrogation or equitable contribution from a separate carrier who also insured the general contractor as an additional insured. Old Republic Gen. Ins. Co. v. Amerisure Ins. Co., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170293 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 2023).
Tanger Grand Rapids, LLC hired Rockford Construction Company to build the Tanger Outlet Center. Rockford subcontracted with Kamminga & Roodvoeis, Inc. (K&R) to work on the pavement for the outlet mall. Under the subcontract, K&R agreed to maintain primary commercial general liability insurance for itself, with Rockford as an additionial insured. K&R obtained a policy from Amerisure. For additional paving work, Rockford subcontracted with Michigan Paving & Materials, CP. The subcontract also required Michigan Paving to maintain primary coverage, with Rockford as an additional insured. Michigan Paving obtained a policy from Liberty Mutual.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Delay In Noticing Insurer of Loss is Not Prejudicial
April 28, 2014 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe Tenth Circuit reversed a district court's determination that untimely notice of the loss was prejudicial, eliminating the insurer's coverage obligations. B.S.C. Holding, Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 4492 (10th Cir. March 11, 2014).
In January 2008, the insured's employees detected an inflow of water in a salt mine and feared dissolution of the salt or structural problems. The insured tried to devise a solution. Two and a half million dollars were spent to find the cause of the water inflow and to identify a solution. In April 2010, the insured determined the inflow was caused by an improperly sealed oil well. In July 2010, the insured notified Lexington of the water inflow. The ultimate proof of loss was for $7.5 million, which included remediation measures that the insured had performed before notifying Lexington.
Lexington's all-risk policy required the insured to notify the company in writing as soon as practicable.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
