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DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

Utah’s Highest Court Holds That Plaintiffs Must Properly Commence an Action to Rely on the Relation-Back Doctrine to Overcome the Statute of Repose

August 20, 2018 — Shannon M. Warren - The Subrogation Strategist
Earlier this summer, in Gables & Villas at River Oaks Homeowners Ass’n v. Castlewood Builders LLC, 2018 UT 28, the Supreme Court of Utah addressed the question of whether the plaintiff’s construction defects claims against the general contractor for a construction project were timely-filed, or barred by the statute of repose. In Utah, the statute of repose requires that an action be “commenced within six years of the date of completion.” The plaintiff alleged that its 2014 amended complaint naming the general contractor as a defendant was timely-commenced because, before the date on which Utah’s statute of repose ran, a defendant filed a motion to amend its third-party complaint to name the general contractor as a defendant, and the defendant subsequently assigned its claims to the plaintiff. The plaintiff argued that the filing of its 2014 amended complaint related back[1] to the date of its original complaint. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that an action is “commenced” by filing a complaint and that a motion for leave to amend does not count as “commencing” an action. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Shannon M. Warren, White and Williams LLP
Ms. Warren may be contacted at warrens@whiteandwilliams.com

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Professional Liability Alert: California Appellate Courts In Conflict Regarding Statute of Limitations for Malicious Prosecution Suits Against Attorneys

April 28, 2014 — David W. Evans & Stephen J. Squillario – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
In conflict with an earlier decision by a different division within the same District, and with a prior decision of another District which followed the earlier case, Division Three of the Second Appellate District has concluded, contrary to established precedent, that the general two-year limitations period set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1 (“Section 335.1”) applies to malicious prosecution claims against attorneys, rather than the specific one-year statute of limitations for claims against attorneys codified in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6 (“Section 340.6”). In Roger Cleveland Golf Co., Inc. v. Krane & Smith, APC (filed April 15, 2014, Case No. B237424, consolidated with Case No. B239375), Roger Cleveland Golf Co., Inc. (“Cleveland Golf”), filed a malicious prosecution action against Krane & Smith (“the Attorneys”), who had unsuccessfully prosecuted the underlying breach of contract matter for their client against Cleveland Golf. In that action, on April 26, 2010, the trial court entered its order granting a motion for nonsuit and dismissing the complaint in favor of Cleveland Golf. On May 24, 2011, or approximately 13 months after the trial court had dismissed the underlying complaint, Cleveland Golf commenced a malicious prosecution action against the Attorneys. In the interim, the Attorneys initiated an appeal of the underlying judgment, which was eventually dismissed approximately seven months later. In response to the complaint, the Attorneys filed a special motion to strike, commonly referred to as an anti-SLAPP motion, which included the argument that the malicious prosecution claim was time-barred under the one-year limitations period of Section 340.6. The trial court granted the Attorneys’ motion based on the statute of limitations (and Cleveland Golf’s failure to demonstrate a probability of success on the merits) and dismissed the case. Cleveland Golf’s appeal followed. Reprinted courtesy of David W. Evans, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and Stephen J. Squillario, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP Mr. Evans may be contacted at devans@hbblaw.com, Mr. Squillario may be contacted at ssquillario@hbblaw.com Read the court decision
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Miller Act Claim for Unsigned Change Orders

June 30, 2016 — David Adelstein – Florida Construction Legal Updates
Contracts and subcontracts often contain language that requires change orders to be in writing and that no change order work shall be performed unless agreed to in advance in a signed change order. Oftentimes change order work is performed but the parties have not complied with the strict requirements of the contract by having this work signed off by the parties in a change order prior to the commencement of the work. Well, can such requirements be waived? If so, can such change orders form the basis of a Miller Act claim? The answer is generally yes provided the party arguing waiver can support the waiver with evidence (that the other party voluntarily relinquished the requirements through its course of conduct / actions). Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of David M. Adelstein, Kirwin Norris
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dma@kirwinnorris.com

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No Escape: California Court of Appeals Gives a Primary CGL Insurer’s “Other Insurance” Clause Two Thumbs Down

December 02, 2015 — Yas Omidi – California Construction Law Blog
“No Escape” is a 2015 action movie starring Pierce Brosnan and Owen Wilson (that’s right, Owen Wilson) and which the folks at rogerebert.com described as “a dreadful…would-be thriller” and “low-grade trash.” It’s also, in short, the California Court of Appeal’s answer to a primary insurer’s recent bid to escape its duty to defend pursuant to an “other insurance” clause in a CGL policy in Underwriters of Interest Subscribing to Policy No. A15274001 v. ProBuilders Specialty Ins. Co., Case No. D066615, California Court of Appeals for the Fourth District (October 23, 2015). Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Yas Omidi, California Construction Law Blog
Ms. Omidi may be contacted at yomidi@wendel.com

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No Coverage For Construction Defects When Complaint Alleges Contractual Damages

September 01, 2011 — Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii

The underlying plaintiff’s allegations contended the contractor was in breach of contract for construction defects caused in building her home. Accordingly, the court found no coverage.See Nat’l Builders and Contractors Ins. Co. v. Slocum, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81694 (S.D. Miss. July 26, 2011).

Slocum Construction LLC sold a home it built to Laura Peterson. Subsequently, Peterson filed suit, alleging a breach of the contract and seeking rescission and cancellation of the contract. Peterson further alleged at least thirty-three specific defects in the construction of the house.

Slocum tendered to its insurer, National Builders and Contractors Insurance Company (NBCI). NBCI filed suit for a declaratory judgment.

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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

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The Colorado Supreme Court affirms Woodbridge II’s “Adverse Use” Distinction

December 20, 2021 — Luke Mecklenburg - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation Blog
Last year, I posted regarding the Colorado Court of Appeals’ decision in Woodbridge II, which concluded that the “adverse use” element for prescriptive easement claims only requires the claimant to “show a nonpermissive or otherwise unauthorized use of property that interfered with the owner’s property interests.” Viento Blanco, LLC, 2020 COA 34 (Woodbridge II), ¶ 2. Thus, Woodbridge II concluded, the claimants acknowledgement or recognition of an owner’s title alone is insufficient to defeat “adverse use” in the prescriptive easement context. Id. That decision was up for review by the Colorado Supreme Court at the time of my prior post. It has now been affirmed, thereby settling an arguable appellate decision split created by Woodbridge II. See Lo Viento Blanco, LLC v. Woodbridge Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 2021 CO 56 (“Woodbridge”). “Like the division below, and for much the same reasons,” the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed in Woodbridge “that under Colorado law, a claimant’s acknowledgement or recognition of the owner’s title during the claimant’s asserted prescriptive period does not interrupt the prescriptive use or undermine the claimant’s adverse use.” Woodbridge, ¶ 2. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Gabriel’s opinion agreed with the Court of Appeals’ reasoning “that although Woodbridge recognized that it did not hold title, no evidence indicated that it had acted in subordination to the owner’s title.” Id. ¶ at 13. The Court further agreed with Woodbridge II’srejection of Lo Viento’s “permissive use” argument because “the permission offered … was conditional and Woodbridge never agreed to any of the conditions set forth therein.” Id. On that basis, Woodbridge confirmed that “a claimant seeking to establish a prescriptive easement need not show that it asserted exclusive ownership of the property during the prescriptive period,” but only “that its use was without permission or otherwise unauthorized and that it interfered with the owner’s property interests.” Id. at ¶ 23. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Luke Mecklenburg, Snell & Wilmer
Mr. Mecklenburg may be contacted at lmecklenburg@swlaw.com

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Hawaii Federal District Court Denies Title Insurer's Motion for Summary Judgment

February 01, 2022 — Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii
In a rare title insurance dispute before the federal district court in Hawaii, the court denied the insurer's motion for summary judgment while granting the insured's motion for summary judgment. First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. GS Industries, LLC, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 240601 (D. Haw. Dec. 16, 2021). GS Industries, LLC took ownership of a parcel of real property located fronting Waipa Lane in Honolulu. The property used four buildings and a parking area for 50 cars. GS obtained a title insurance policy from First American. The policy insured GS' fee simple interest in the property in the amount of $3,500,000. The policy insured GS "against loss or damage, not exceeding $3,500,000, sustained or incurred by GS by reason of . . . not right of access to and from the land,." The policy did not identify any issues with access to the property and did not define "access." A portion of Waipa Lane was owned by the City and County of Honolulu. Parcel 86 and Parcel 91 on Waipa Lane were privately owned. (Private Waipa Lane Parcels). Vehicular access to (ingress) and from (egress) the property was via Waipa Lane. Ingress was made via the publicly owned portion of Waipa Lane. Vehicular egress was made via the Private Waipa Lane Parcels. The City of Honolulu maintained the Private Waipa Lane Parcels and considered them to be pubic. None of the owners of Parcels 86 or 91 notified GS of their intent to block the use of Waipa Lane. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

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Wendel Rosen’s Construction Practice Group Receives First Tier Ranking

January 28, 2015 — Garret Murai – California Construction Law Blog
We try to limit our narcissism here at Wendel Rosen but every once in a while we toot our own horn. Lawyers are, after all, a rather sad, competitive, yet insecure bunch (i.e., we eat this stuff up). We’re proud to announce that Wendel Rosen’s Construction Practice Group has received a first tier ranking in U.S. News & World Reports’ Best Law Firms for 2015. This is the second year the Construction Practice Group has received a first tier ranking. Yay us! Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLP
Mr. Murai may be contacted at gmurai@wendel.com

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