Court Exclaims “Enough!” To Homeowner Who Kept Raising Wrongful Foreclosure Claims
April 01, 2015 —
Krsto Mijanovic and Annette F. Mijanovic – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP“There are no free houses,” began the decision issued by the Court of Appeal on March 23, 2015 in Boyce v. T.D. Service Company (B255958). Examining three years of litigation in bankruptcy court, unlawful detainer court, and the superior court, and each of their respective appellate courts, the Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff’s wrongful foreclosure claims were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel.
Plaintiff was a borrower who purchased a home subject to a deed of trust. After plaintiff defaulted on the loan, nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings were initiated. To avoid foreclosure, plaintiff engaged in a series of stall tactics, including filing an emergency bankruptcy petition, appealing the bankruptcy court’s decision to grant the trustee relief of stay, refusing to leave the property following the trustee’s sale thereby causing an unlawful detainer action to be filed, and appealing the granting of summary judgment in favor of the defendants in the unlawful detainer action. Once evicted, plaintiff sued all the entities involved in the foreclosure process for wrongful foreclosure, declaratory relief, violation of Unfair Practices Act, and quiet title. When the trial court sustained the defendants’ demurrers on the grounds of res judicata/collateral estoppel, plaintiff naturally appealed.
Reprinted courtesy of
Krsto Mijanovic, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Annette F. Mijanovic, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Mijanovic may be contacted at kmijanovic@hbblaw.com
Ms. Mijanovic may be contacted at amijanovic@hbblaw.com
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2015-2016 California Labor & Employment Laws Affecting Construction Industry
October 28, 2015 —
Steven M. Cvitanovic, David A. Harris, & Kristen Lee Price – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPEarlier this month, California Governor Jerry Brown signed dozens of bills that affect employers. Many of these bills have special significance to the construction industry. Here is a brief review:
Assembly Bill 219 – Prevailing Wages for Concrete Delivery on Public Projects
AB 219 continues California’s aggressive expansion of prevailing wages. This bill expands the definition of “public works” for purposes of state prevailing wage law to include the hauling or delivery of ready-mixed concrete for a public works project.
Previously, delivery drivers hired by a material supplier were exempted from the prevailing wage. Before AB 219, labor law made a distinction between “suppliers” and “contractors.” Thus, ready-mixed concrete was held to be a finished product, and treated differently from a product that was assembled on site. The new law eliminates this distinction.
Reprinted courtesy of Haight Brown & Bonesteel attorneys
Steven M. Cvitanovic,
David A. Harris and
Kristen Lee Price
Mr. Cvitanovic may be contacted at scvitanovic@hbblaw.com
Mr. Harris may be contacted at dharris@hbblaw.com
Ms. Price may be contacted at kprice@hbblaw.com
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Design and Construction Defects Not a Breach of Contract
February 14, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFThe California Court of Appeals tossed out a breach of contract award in Altman v. John Mourier Construction. The decision, which was issued on January 10, 2013, sent the construction defect case back to a lower court to calculate damages based on the conclusions of the appeals court.
The case involved both design issues and construction issues. According to the plaintiffs’ expert, the design plans did not make the buildings sufficiently stiff to resist the wind, and that the framing was improperly constructed, further weakening the structures, and leading to the stucco cracking. Additionally, it was alleged that the roofs were improperly installed, leading to water intrusion. The contractor’s expert “agreed the roofs needed repair, but disputed what needed to be done to repair the roofs and the cost.”
The jury rejected the plaintiffs’ claims of product liability and breach of warranty, but found in their favor on the claims of breach of contract and negligence. The plaintiffs were awarded differing amounts based on the jury’s conclusions about their particular properties.
Both sides sought new trials. JMC, the contractor, claimed that the jury’s verdicts were “inconsistent in that the relieved JMC of liability for strict products liability and breach of warranty, but found JMC liable for breach of contract and negligence.” The plaintiffs “opposed the setoff motion on the ground that the jury heard evidence only of damages not covered by the settlements.” Both motions were denied. After this, the plaintiffs sought and received investigative costs as damages. JMC appealed this amended judgment.
The appeals court rejected JMC’s claims that evidence was improperly excluded. JMC sought to introduce evidence concerning errors made by the stucco subcontractor. Earlier in the trial, JMC had insisted that the plaintiffs not be allowed to present evidence concerning the stucco, as that had been separately settled. When they wished to introduce it themselves, they noted that the settlement only precluded the plaintiffs from introducing stucco evidence, but the trial court did not find this persuasive, and the appeals court upheld the actions of the trial court. Nor did the appeals court find grounds for reversal based on claims that the jury saw excluded evidence, as JMC did not establish that the evidence went into the jury room. Further, this did not reach, according to the court, a “miscarriage of justice.”
The court rejected two more of JMC’s arguments, concluding that the negligence award did not violate the economic loss rule. The court also noted that JMC failed to prove its contention that the plaintiffs were awarded damages for items that were covered in settlements with the subcontractors.
The appeals court did accept JMC’s argument that the award for breach of contract was not supported by evidence. As the ruling notes, “plaintiffs did not submit the contracts into evidence or justify their absence; nor did plaintiffs provide any evidence regarding contract terms allegedly breached.”
The court also did not allow the plaintiffs to claim the full amount of the investigative costs. Noting that the trial court had rational grounds for its decision, the appeals court noted that “the jury rejected most of the damages claimed by plaintiffs, and the trial court found that more than $86,000 of the costs itemized in plaintiffs’ invoices ‘appear questionable’ as ‘investigation’ costs/damages and appeared to the trial court to be litigation costs nonrecoverable under section 1033.5.”
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Ninth Circuit Finds No Coverage for Construction Defects Under California Law
April 05, 2017 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe Ninth Circuit, applying California law, affirmed the district court's decision finding there was no coverage for construction defects. Archer W. Contractors v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 3796 (9th Cir. March 2, 2017).
Archer Western Contractors (AWC) was the general contractor for the San Diego County Water Authority's emergency water storage project. The pump house and turbine generators suffered property damage. The damage flowed from AWC's allegedly defective work on the property.
After settling a construction defect lawsuit brought against it by the Water Authority, AWC filed this case against National Union for failing to indemnity portions of the settlement agreement.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Back to Basics: What is a Changes Clause?
July 18, 2018 —
J. Cole Phillips – Smith CurrieThe Changes Clause is one of the most important, perhaps the most important, provision in any construction contract. Project designs are rarely perfect. A Changes Clause provides a mechanism for dealing with such imperfections as well as allowing project owners the flexibility to update a project’s design as the project progresses. A good Changes Clause specifies when an owner can change the original scope of the contract, how the parties should resolve the value of the changed scope and when payment should be made to the contractor or a credit given to the owner. A good Changes Clause will also provide a mechanism for the contractor to notify the owner when it believes a change order is due and specify the time within which such notice must be given. For the contractor, failure to pay attention to the requirements of the Changes Clause can lead to forfeiture of the right to seek an adjustment to the contract value or contract completion date. For an Owner, failure to pay attention to and enforce the requirements of the Changes Clause can result in unnecessary payments to the Contractor.
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J. Cole Phillips, Smith CurrieMr. Phillips may be contacted at
jcphillips@smithcurrie.com
It Pays to Review the ‘Review the Contract Documents’ Clause Before You Sign the Contract
March 11, 2024 —
Alan Winkler - ConsensusDocsIt is fairly common for a construction contract to include a provision requiring the contractor to perform some level of review of the plans and specifications and perhaps other contract documents as part of their responsibilities. Typically, this provision is found in a section of the contract on the contractor’s responsibilities, although it can be anywhere. Owners and contractors are, with reason, focused on three main issues in reviewing contracts: (1) price, costs, and payments, (2) time and scheduling, and (3) scope of the work. Eyes may glaze over the contractor’s responsibilities section. Not only does it seem to be boilerplate, but industry professionals know what a contractor is supposed to do; in a nutshell, build the project.
An old school type of contractor may regard this role as strictly following the plans and specifications, no matter what they provide. That could lead to a situation where construction comes to a complete stop because, for example, two elements are totally incompatible with each other. If that happens, the contractor would then turn to the owner and architect to ask for a corrective plan and instructions on how to proceed. That may also be accompanied by a request for more time and money while the problem is resolved. The ‘review the contract documents’ clause is designed to avoid this. It is intended to address an understanding that everyone makes mistakes, even architects and engineers whose job it is to design a buildable, functional project. The clause also addresses the understanding that a contractor is more than a rote implementer of plans and specifications because its expertise in building necessarily means the contractor has expertise in understanding the documents that define the construction and how things are put together.
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Alan Winkler, Peckar & Abramson, P.C.Mr. Winkler may be contacted at
awinkler@pecklaw.com
What is a Subordination Agreement?
May 06, 2019 —
Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara LLPPut simply, a subordination agreement is a legal agreement which establishes one debt as ranking behind another debt in the priority for collecting repayment from a debtor. It is an arrangement that alters the lien position. Without a subordination clause, loans take chronological priority which means that a deed of trust recorded first will be considered senior to all deeds of trusts recorded after. As such, the oldest loan becomes the primary loan, with first call on any proceeds from a sale of a property. However, a subordination agreement acknowledges that one party’s claim or interest is inferior to that of another party in the event that the borrowing entity liquidates its assets. Further, shareholders are subordinate to all creditors.
The junior debt is referred to as a “subordinated debt”, and the debt which has a higher claim to any assets is the senior debt. Often, the borrower does not have enough funds to pay all debts, and lower priority debts may receive little or no repayment. For example, if a business has $400,000 in senior debt, $100,000 in subordinated debt, and a total asset value of $420,000, upon liquidation of the company, only the senior debtholder will be paid in full. The remaining $20,000 will be distributed among the subordinated debtholders. Subordinated debts are, therefore, riskier and lenders will require a higher interest rate as compensation.
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Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara LLP
Gillotti v. Stewart (2017) 2017 WL 1488711 Rejects Liberty Mutual, Holding Once Again that the Right to Repair Act is the Exclusive Remedy for Construction Defect Claims
June 05, 2017 —
Richard H. Glucksman, Esq. & Chelsea L. Zwart, Esq. - Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger BulletinBackground
In Gillotti v. Stewart (April 26, 2017) 2017 WL 1488711, which was ordered to be published on May 18, 2017, the defendant grading subcontractor added soil over tree roots to level the driveway on the plaintiff homeowner’s sloped lot. The homeowner sued the grading subcontractor under the California Right to Repair Act (Civil Code §§ 895, et seq.) claiming that the subcontractor’s work damaged the trees.
After the jury found the subcontractor was not negligent, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the subcontractor. The homeowner appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly construed the Right to Repair Act as barring a common law negligence theory against the subcontractor and erred in failing to follow Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 98. The Third District Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the subcontractor.
Impact
This is the second time the Third District Court of Appeal has held that Liberty Mutual (discussed below) was wrongly decided and held that the Right to Repair Act is the exclusive remedy for construction defect claims. The decision follows its holding in Elliott Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court (Hicks) (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 333, in which the Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act’s pre-litigation procedures apply when homeowners plead construction defect claims based on common law causes of action, as opposed to violations of the building standards set forth in the Right to Repair Act. Elliott is currently on hold at the California Supreme Court, pending the decision in McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1132, wherein Liberty Mutual was rejected for the first time by the Fifth District. CGDRB continues to follow developments regarding the much anticipated McMillin decision closely, as well as all related matters.
Discussion
The Right to Repair Act makes contractors and subcontractors not involved in home sales liable for construction defects only if the homeowner proves they negligently cause the violation in whole or part (Civil Code §§ 911(b), 936). As such, the trial court in Gillotti instructed the jury on negligence with respect to the grading subcontractor. The jury found that while the construction did violate some of the Right to Repair’s building standards alleged by the homeowner, the subcontractor was not negligent in anyway. After the jury verdict, the trial court found in favor of the grading subcontractor.
The homeowner moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial on the grounds that the trial court improperly barred a common law negligence theory against the grading subcontractor. The trial court denied the motions on the grounds that “[t]he Right to Repair Act specifically provides that no other causes of action are allowed. See Civil Code § 943.” The trial court specifically noted that its decision conflicted with Liberty Mutual, in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act does not eliminate common law rights and remedies where actual damage has occurred, stating that Liberty Mutual was wrongly decided and that the Liberty Mutual court was naïve in its assumptions regarding the legislative history of the Right to Repair Act.
In Gillotti, the Third District Court of Appeal stated that the Liberty Mutual court failed to analyze the language of Civil Code § 896, which “clearly and unequivocally expresses the legislative intent that the Act apply to all action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, residential construction, except as specifically set forth in the Act. The Act does not specifically except actions arising from actual damages. To the contrary, it authorizes recovery of damages, e.g., for ‘the reasonable cost of repairing and rectifying any damages resulting from the failure of the home to meet the standards....’ ([Civil Code] § 944).”
The Court also disagreed with Liberty Mutual’s view that because Civil Code §§ 931 and 943 acknowledge exceptions to the Right to Repair Act’s statutory remedies, the Act does not preclude common law claims for damages due to defects identified in the Act. The Court stated: “Neither list of exceptions, in section 943 or in section 931, includes common law causes of action such as negligence. If the Legislature had intended to make such a wide-ranging exception to the restrictive language of the first sentence of section 943, we would have expected it to do so expressly.”
Additionally, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that Civil Code § 897 preserves a common law negligence claims for violation of standards not listed in Civil Code § 986. It explained that the section of Civil Code § 897, which provides, “The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure,” expresses the legislative intent that the Right to Repair Act be all-encompassing. Anything inadvertently omitted is actionable under the Act if it causes damage. Any exceptions to the Act are made expressly through Civil Code §§ 931 and 934. The Court concluded in no uncertain terms that the Right to Repair Act precludes common law claims in cases for damages covered by the Act.
The homeowner further argued that she was not precluded from bringing a common law claim because a tree is not a “structure,” and therefore the alleged tree damage did not fall within the realm of the Right to Repair. The Court of Appeal also rejected this argument, holding that while the tree damage itself was not expressly covered, the act of adding soil to make the driveway level (which caused the damage) implicated the standards covered by the Right to Repair Act. The Court explained that since under the Act a “structure” includes “improvement located upon a lot or within a common area” (Civil Code § 895(a)), as the driveway was an improvement upon the lot, the claim was within the purview of the Right to Repair Act. As the soil, a component of the driveway, caused damage (to the trees), it was actionable under the Act.
Reprinted courtesy of
Richard H. Glucksman, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger and
Chelsea L. Zwart, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger
Mr. Glucksman may be contacted at rglucksman@cgdrblaw.com
Ms. Zwart may be contacted at czwart@cgdrblaw.com
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