Seattle Washington Building Expert Directory

A Court-Side Seat: Flint Failures, Missed Deadlines, Toad Work and a Game of Chicken

October 05, 2020 — Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2Gavel
The last few weeks have yielded a number of interesting developments in the Federal courts. FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEAL In re Flint Water Cases Several local and State of Michigan officials, including the former governor, requested dismissal from the civil litigation seeking damages for the massive failure of Flint, Michigan’s public drinking water system. On August 5, 2020, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed that the plaintiffs, residents of Flint, have successfully pled a case that the conduct of the defendants so “shocked the conscience” that a claim for a violation of their substantive due process rights was appropriately alleged. The defendants, including the former governor, argued that they were entitled to a qualified immunity defense. The court rejected this argument on the basis of the earlier decisions made by the court in this matter. Judge Sutton concurred because he was bound by this precedent, but remarked that the evidence for the governor’s culpability was very thin; he was not intimately connected to the extraordinary error in judgment. The majority was very upset with this concurrence as indicted by their own opinion. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Anthony B. Cavender, Pillsbury
Mr. Cavender may be contacted at anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com

The Independent Tort Doctrine (And Its Importance)

October 24, 2022 — David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates
A non-construction raises an important legal principle. Here it is because it applies to construction disputes. It actually applies to many business-type disputes. It is based on what is widely referred to as the independent tort doctrine: Florida law does not allow a party damaged by a breach of contract to recover exactly the same contract damages via a tort claim. “It is a fundamental, long-standing common law principle that a plaintiff may not recover in tort for a contract dispute unless the tort is independent of any breach of contract. A plaintiff bringing both a breach of contract and a tort claim must allege, in addition to the breach of contract, “some other conduct amounting to an independent tort.” Bedoyan v. Samra, 47 Fla.L.Weekly D1955a (Fla. 3d 2022) (internal citations omitted). Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dma@kirwinnorris.com

Virginia Decision Emphasizes Importance of Naming All Necessary Parties

June 17, 2015 — Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFF
Nate Budde on the Construction Payment Blog, discussed the potential of mechanics liens, and the pitfalls that occur when not all necessary parties are named. Budde analyzed the case Johnson Controls Inc. v. Norair Eng’g Corp. that involved a “claimant’s failure to name all the necessary parties in his claim against a bond,” resulting “in the claimant losing his claim against the bond, and with it, an opportunity to get paid.” Budde concluded, “Unfortunately, as was the case here, when the bond claim is not handled correctly procedurally, a party can be left with no recourse for payment. It’s important to understand which of the parties involved should be named in both mechanics lien claims and bond claims.” Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

United States Supreme Court Backtracks on Recent Trajectory Away from Assertions of General Jurisdiction in Mallory v. Norfolk Southern

August 01, 2023 — Charles S. Anderson - Lewis Brisbois
Washington, D.C. (June 28, 2023) – On June 27, 2023, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a sharply divided opinion that appears to backtrack on the Court’s steady trajectory away from assertions of general jurisdiction in recent years, e.g. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011), Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014), BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, 2017, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017). Relying on a case from 1917, Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U. S. 93 (1917), Justice Gorsuch, writing on behalf of the plurality, (Justices Gorsuch, Thomas, Sotomayor, and Jackson) (Justice Alito concurring) found that Norfolk Southern “consented” to jurisdiction in Mallory via 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §5301(a)(2)(i),(b) by registering to do business in Pennsylvania. This statute, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §5301, specifically permits jurisdiction over a corporation “incorporat[ed] under or qualifi[ed]as a foreign corporation under the laws of this Commonwealth … for any cause of action that may asserted against him, whether or not arising from acts enumerated in this section.” In Pennsylvania Fire, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution in connection with a Missouri law that required an out-of-state insurance company desiring to transact any business in the state to file paperwork agreeing to (1) appoint a state official to serve as the company’s agent for service of process and (2) accept service on that official as valid in any suit. After more than a decade of complying with the law, Pennsylvania Fire was served with process and argued that the Missouri law violated due process. The Court unanimously found that there was “no doubt” that Pennsylvania Fire could be sued in Missouri because it had agreed to accept service of process in Missouri on any suit as a condition of doing business there. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Charles S. Anderson, Lewis Brisbois
Mr. Anderson may be contacted at Charles.Anderson@lewisbrisbois.com

No Duty to Defend Suit That Is Threatened Under Strict Liability Statute

July 09, 2014 — Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law Hawaii
The Washington Court of Appeals found there was no duty to defend the insured under a strict liability statute for alleged contamination when no action was threatened by the agency. Gull Indus., Inc. v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 2014 Wash. App. LEXIS 1338 (Wa. Ct. App. June 2, 2014). Gull leased a gas station to the Johnsons from 1972 to 1980. In 2005, Gull notified the Department of Ecology (DOE) that there had be a release of petroleum product at the station. DOE sent a letter acknowledging Gull's notice of suspected contamination. In 2009, Gull tendered its defense to its insurer, Transamerica Insurance Group. Gull also tendered its claims as an additional insured to the Johnson's insurer, State Farm. Neither insurer accepted the tenders. Gull then sued the insurers, arguing they had a duty to defend. Gull contended that because the state statute imposed strict liability, the duty to defend arose whether or not an agency had sent any communications about the statute or cleanup obligations. The insurers moved for partial summary judgment. The trial court ruled in favor of the insurers. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

Endorsements Preclude Coverage for Alleged Faulty Workmanship

December 30, 2019 — Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii
The court found coverage for alleged faulty workmanship was barred by the Combination Construction Related Endorsement and Roofing Endorsement. Evanston Ins. Co. v. A&S Roofing, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142828 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 22, 2019). In 2010, A&S entered into a subcontract with the contractor to replace roofs on three buildings owned by Oklahoma Property Investors (OPI). Eagle was a subcontractor of A&S that installed the roofing. After the roofs were replaced, OPI filed suit against A&S, alleging that A&S provided 15-year warranties for the roofing work performed on the three buildings and that A&S breached each warranty by performing the work in a poor manner, resulting in failures to each of the roofs. OPI sought monetary relief including damages to its properties, of its tenants, and costs of repairs to its properties. A&S's insurer, Evanston, denied coverage. Evanston pointed to the"legally obligated to pay" language of the CGL policy and argued coverage only extended to tort-based claims. Evanston argued the OPI lawsuit did not allege any tort claims, only warranty claims arising from contract. Second, Evanston contended the alleged "poor craftsmanship" giving rise to the claims in the OPI lawsuit that did not constitute an "occurrence" under the policy. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

Washington School District Sues Construction Company Over Water Pipe Damage

August 27, 2014 — Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFF
The Yakima Herald reported that “[t]he Toppenish School District is suing a local construction company over a breach of contract that allegedly led to defective water pipes at one of its elementary schools, according to a complaint filed with the Yakima County Superior Court earlier this week.” According to the complaint (as reported by the Yakima Herald), Toppenish officials alleged that the Huylar Construction Co. failed to install calcium silicate seals during the pipe installation. Furthermore, the complaint stated that last November, the school district discovered “’[e]xtensive corrosion and deterioration’ of the pipes.” Toppenish argued that failure to install the seals is a breach of contract. Toppenish is suing for about $120,000. The Yakima Herald stated that a Huylar representative “could not be reached for comment.” Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Adopts New Rule in Breach-of-the-Consent-to-Settle-Clause Cases

August 19, 2015 — Sean Mahoney – White and Williams LLP
In Babcock & Wilcox Company, et al. v. America Nuclear Insurers, et al., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently held that where a liability insurer has agreed to provide a defense to its insured in an underlying tort action subject to a reservation of rights but refuses to consent to a settlement in that action, the insured may nevertheless accept the settlement over the insurer’s objection where the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and non-collusive” from the perspective of a reasonably prudent person in the insured’s position in light of the totality of the circumstances and is covered. Babcock & Wilcox Company v. America Nuclear Insurers, No. 2 WAP 2014, 2015 WL 4430352 (Pa. Jul. 21, 2015). This decision fills an important gap in Pennsylvania precedent addressing the rules applicable when an insurer refuses to consent to an insured’s settlement of a lawsuit. In Babcock, the underlying plaintiffs sued Babcock & Wilcox Company and Atlantic Richfield Company (“the Insureds”) alleging that the Insured’s nuclear facilities caused bodily injury and property damage. The Insureds’ liability insurers agreed to defend the Insureds subject to a reservation of rights. The insurers later refused to consent to an offer to settle the underlying action for a total of $80 million because they believed the Insureds were likely to succeed on the merits. Nevertheless, in 2009, the Insureds accepted that offer and settled the underlying action for $80 million, notwithstanding the insurer’s refusal. The Insureds then sought reimbursement of the $80 million settlement from their insurers, who rejected that request on the ground that the Insureds had breached the consent-to-settlement/cooperation provisions of the implicated policies. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Sean Mahoney, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Mahoney may be contacted at mahoneys@whiteandwilliams.com

SEATTLE WASHINGTON BUILDING EXPERT DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES