Fairfield Connecticut Building Expert Directory

Congratulations to San Diego Partner Johnpaul Salem and Senior Associate Scott Hoy for Obtaining a Complete Defense Verdict!

November 13, 2023 — Dolores Montoya - Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara LLP
Partner Johnpaul Salem and Senior Associate Scott Hoy just concluded a 4-week trial defending a local renowned hotel in San Diego. Plaintiff alleged premises liability against BWB&O’s client arguing plaintiff was injured while riding in an elevator due to alleged negligent maintenance and inspection. Plaintiff brought in a “hired gun” elevator expert from Missouri and sought $25 million in damages for two fractured ankles, a compound tibia fracture, and lifelong CRPS/PTDS/anxiety. BWB&O argued any injuries sustained were a direct result of Plaintiff’s actions. After a passionate and powerful closing argument by Mr. Salem, attacking the foundation of Plaintiff’s expert’s opinions and presenting vigilance of the hotel in the safety of its guests, the jury unanimously ruled in BWB&O’s client’s favor. Reprinted courtesy of Dolores Montoya, Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara LLP Read the full story... Read the court decision
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Industry Standard and Sole Negligence Defenses Can’t Fix a Defect

June 14, 2021 — Lian Skaf - The Subrogation Strategist
Strict products liability cases have been the subject of much fluctuation in the Pennsylvania courts over the last few years. Utilizing hope created by the courts in recent strict liability cases, defendants have tried to revive defenses based on meeting industry standards and the plaintiff’s contributory negligence. Recently, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania tempered that hope with limitations of how far strict liability defenses can extend. In Sullivan v. Werner Co., No. 3086 EDA 2019, 2021 Pa. Super. LEXIS 210, an appellate panel of the Superior Court reviewed the lower court’s decision to exclude evidence of industry standards and of the plaintiff’s negligence in a trial that resulted in a $2.5 million verdict for the plaintiff. Upholding the decision of the lower court, the court found that the proffered evidence was within the discretion of the court to exclude. In Sullivan, Michael Sullivan (Sullivan) was working as a union carpenter at a renovation project for a local school. He and his apprentice were installing exterior sheathing to the outdoor walls. In order to install the sheathing, Sullivan had to use a scaffold. He put together a new SRS-72 scaffold manufactured by Werner Company (Werner) that his foreman bought at Lowe’s Companies, Inc. (Lowe’s) and used the scaffold during the course of his work. While on the scaffold, Sullivan fell through and crashed to the ground. He suffered permanent injuries as a result of the incident. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Lian Skaf, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Skaf may be contacted at skafl@whiteandwilliams.com

Construction Problem Halts Wind Power Park

November 13, 2013 — CDJ STAFF
Engineers have yet to determine why a blade on a wind turbine broke at a wind power plant in Michigan, but as part of their investigation they are halting work on the final 10 turbines. The already completed 60 turbines have been taken out of operation. As a result, the Echo Wind Park is no longer generating power. Scott Simons, a spokesperson for the project, said “we’re not going to put anyone or anything at risk until we get to the bottom of this.” However, Dennis Buda, the project manager, attributed the broken blade to a manufacturing defect. Construction was planned to end in November. Read the court decision
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Not Everything is a Pollutant: A Summary of Recent Cases Supporting a Common Sense and Narrow Interpretation of the CGL's Pollution Exclusion

October 26, 2020 — Philip B. Wilusz & Jeffrey J. Vita - Saxe Doernberger & Vita
Those of us who suffered through law school are familiar with the argument that there are fundamental rules applicable to contract interpretation and that a certain contract language interpretation would “swallow the rule.” However, insurance companies have long advocated for an interpretation of the CGL policy’s pollution exclusion that would “swallow the coverage” that the insureds thought they were purchasing. Insurers have successfully argued in several states that the pollution exclusion’s definition of “pollutant” should be read literally, and be applied to any “solid, liquid, gaseous, or thermal irritant or contaminant including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals, and waste.” As anyone with children can attest to, the range of items and substances that can be considered an “irritant” is limitless. The logical extent of the insurer’s interpretation brings to mind the high school student who, for his science fair project, convinced his fellow students to ban “dihydrogen monoxide.”1 Citing evidence such as the fact that everyone who has ever died was found to have consumed “dihydrogen monoxide,” he convinced them of the dangers of . . . water. Similarly, an overly expansive reading of the definition of “pollutant” could lead to the absurd result of even applying it to ubiquitous harmless substances such as water. The pollution exclusion, therefore, has run amok in many states and has allowed insurers to avoid liability for otherwise covered claims. Fortunately, insureds in many states have successfully argued that the pollution exclusion is subject to a more limited interpretation based on several different theories. For example, some courts have agreed that the pollution exclusion, as initially introduced by the insurance industry, should be limited to instances of traditional environmental pollution. Others have held that the exclusion is ambiguous as to its interpretation. The reasonable expectations of the insureds do not support a broad reading of the defined term “pollutant.” Below, this article addresses a number of recent decisions that have adopted a pro policyholder interpretation of the pollution exclusion. As with most insurance coverage issues, choice of law clearly matters. Reprinted courtesy of Philip B. Wilusz, Saxe Doernberger & Vita and Jeffrey J. Vita, Saxe Doernberger & Vita Mr. Wilusz may be contacted at pbw@sdvlaw.com Mr. Vita may be contacted at jjv@sdvlaw.com Read the court decision
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Construction Litigation—Battles on Many Fronts

May 07, 2015 — Craig Martin – Construction Contractor Advisor
When you are involved in construction litigation, you have battles on several fronts, including those against subcontractors, owners, insurers and the court. Shoring up your defenses on each of these fronts is imperative, or you may lose the battle or, worse yet, the war. A recent opinion out of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals (overseeing federal courts in Alabama, Florida and Georgia) Carithers v. Mid-Continent Casualty Company, illustrates the various battle fronts involved in a construction case. In this case, the Carithers (Home Owner) sued their homebuilder, Cronk Duch Miller & Associates (Contractor) in state court after discovering multiple defects with their home. Battle Front #1—Claim Against Contractor The Contractor and Home Owner entered into a consent judgment for approximately $90,000.00 and the Contractor assigned its claim against its insurer to the Home Owner. It is unlikely that the Contractor paid the $90,000.00 judgment. The Home Owner likely agreed not to collect on the $90,000.00 in exchange for the chance to pursue the Contractor’s claim against its insurer. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Craig Martin, Lamson, Dugan and Murray, LLP
Mr. Martin may be contacted at cmartin@ldmlaw.com

Quick Note: Subcontractor Payment Bond = Common Law Payment Bond

February 16, 2017 — David Adelstein – Florida Construction Legal Updates
What is a common law payment bond? A common law payment bond is a bond not required or governed by a statute. For example, if a prime contractor provides the owner a payment bond, that bond will be a statutory payment bond. On the other hand, if a subcontractor provides the general contractor with a payment bond, that bond will be a common law payment bond. Why? Because there is not a statute that specifically governs the requirements of a subcontractor’s payment bond given to a general contractor. The subcontractor’s payment bond is aimed at protecting the general contractor (and the general contractor’s payment bond) in the event the subcontractor fails to pay its own subcontractors and suppliers. The subcontractor’s payment bond will generally identify that claimants, as defined by the bond, are those subcontractors and suppliers the subcontractor has failed to pay. This common law payment bond is not recorded in the public records so sometimes it can be challenging for a claimant (anyone unpaid working under the subcontractor that furnished the bond) to obtain a copy of the bond. With that said, an unpaid claimant should consider pursuing a copy of this bond in certain situations, particularly if it may not have preserved a claim against the general contractor’s statutory payment bond. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Florida Construction Legal Updates
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dadelstein@gmail.com

Fatal Crane Collapse in Seattle Prompts Questions About Disassembly Procedures

July 09, 2019 — Jeff Rubenstone - Engineering News-Record
A tower crane being dismantled collapsed Saturday, April 27 in Seattle, killing four people, including two ironworkers on the crane and two bystanders on the street below. The jobsite, located in a Google office development in Seattle's bustling South Lake Union neighborhood, is adjacent to a busy intersection where traffic had not been blocked off during the crane’s disassembly. It is the first fatal crane accident in the Puget Sound region since a crane collapse in Bellevue, Wash., in 2006 that killed one person. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Jeff Rubenstone, ENR
Mr. Rubenstone may be contacted at rubenstonej@enr.com

In Colorado, Primary Insurers are Necessary Parties in Declaratory Judgment Actions

December 09, 2011 — Heather M. Anderson, Colorado Construction Litigation

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado recently ruled that primary insurers are necessary parties, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, in a declaratory judgment action being pursued by an excess carrier. See Insurance Co. of State of Pennsylvania v. LNC Communities II, LLC, 2011 WL 5548955 (D. Colo. 2011). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 is almost identical to Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 19 and pertains to the joinder of persons needed for “just adjudication.” The Insurance Co. of the State of Pennsylvania (“ICSOP”) sought a declaratory judgment that it did not have a duty to defend or indemnify the defendants (collectively referred to as “Lennar Companies”) with regard to the underlying lawsuit brought by The Falls at Legend Trail Owners Association, Inc. (the “HOA”). Id. at *2. In its lawsuit, the HOA alleged Lennar Companies were liable for construction defects at The Falls at Legend Trail residential development.

Lennar Companies held two primary insurance policies, one issued by OneBeacon Insurance Company f/k/a General Accident Insurance Company (“General Accident”) and the other issued by American Safety Risk Retention Group, Inc. (“American Safety”). Lennar Companies also carried excess policies issued by ICSOP and Ohio Casualty Insurance Company (“Ohio Casualty”).

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Reprinted courtesy of Heather M. Anderson of Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLP. Ms Anderson can be contacted at anderson@hhmrlaw.com

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FAIRFIELD CONNECTICUT BUILDING EXPERT DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES