Liability Policy’s Arbitration Endorsement Applies to Third Party Beneficiaries, Including Additional Insureds
May 11, 2020 —
Christopher Kendrick & Valerie A. Moore – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co. v. SMG Holdings, Inc. (No. C082841; filed 12/31/19, ord. pub. 1/28/20), a California appeals court held that a binding arbitration clause in an insurance policy extends to a third party, such as an additional insured.
In Philadelphia v. SMG, Philadelphia issued a general liability policy to a youth organization, Future Farmers of America (FFA), that had contracted to use the Fresno Convention Center for its annual convention. The contract required FFA to obtain liability insurance and to name the property manager, SMG, and the City of Fresno, as additional insureds. Philadelphia issued FFA a commercial lines CGL policy with an endorsement affording coverage to “managers, landlords, or lessors of premises” for “liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of that part of the premises leased or rented” to the named insured. It also covered “any person or organization where required by a written contract executed prior to the occurrence” but only for liability arising from the named insured’s negligence.
Reprinted courtesy of
Christopher Kendrick, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Valerie A. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Kendrick may be contacted at ckendrick@hbblaw.com
Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com
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Analysis of the “owned property exclusion” under Panico v. State Farm
March 08, 2011 —
Colorado Construction LitigationThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently concluded that the “owned property exclusion” applied to bar coverage for claims of property damage. See Panico v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 2011 WL 322830 (10th Cir. 2011). In Panico, the plaintiffs sold property in Aspen, Colorado to the Taylors, who sued the Panicos upon discovering the property was not as represented. After refusing to defend, the Panicos sued State Farm for breach of contract. The district court concluded that the Taylors’ claims were not covered under the Panicos insurance policies and granted summary judgment in State Farm’s favor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
Mr. Panico built the house on the property as well as several additions to the house. As the Taylors lived in Florida, they primarily relied on their real estate agent and an inspector to ensure the property was acceptable. According to their complaint, the Taylors discovered that the house was “virtually uninhabitable due to serious design and construction defects, mold, rodents, and drainage problems.” Id. at *1. In their complaint, the Taylors asserted three claims for relief against the Panicos based upon misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment about the condition of the property.
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Reprinted courtesy of Heather M. Anderson of Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLP. Ms Anderson can be contacted at anderson@hhmrlaw.com
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Boston Water Main Break Floods Trench and Kills Two Workers
October 27, 2016 —
Justin Rice – Engineering News-RecordTwo workers died in Boston on Friday afternoon after a water main break flooded the trench where they were working, according to the Boston Fire Dept.
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Justin Rice, Engineering News-RecordMr. Rice may be contacted at
enrmidatlanticeditor@enr.com
Insurer’s “Failure to Cooperate” Defense
November 14, 2018 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesThe “failure to cooperate” defense is a defense an insurer may raise when its insured fails to cooperate with it in the defense of the claim against the insured. If an insurer takes this position, it will typically be denying both defense and indemnification obligations, meaning the insured could be forfeiting coverage that otherwise exists through his/her/its failure to cooperate with the insurer. This defense by the insurer is not absolute as recently explained by the Fourth District in Barthelemy v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Illinois, 43 Fla.L.Weekly D2379a (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) discussing the elements of this failure to cooperate defense.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin NorrisMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Why A.I. Isn’t Going to Replace Lawyers Anytime Soon
April 18, 2023 —
Amir Kahana - Kahana FeldIn a recent article entitled, “A.I. Is Coming for Lawyers, Again” the New York Times explored the longstanding idea that the legal profession is most at risk of being disrupted by A.I. The article claimed that: “There are warnings that ChatGPT-style software, with its humanlike language fluency, could take over much of legal work.” And that: “Law is seen as the lucrative profession perhaps most at risk from the recent advance in A.I. because lawyers are essentially word merchants.”
The problem with these predictions is that they are based on a fundamental misunderstanding of what lawyers do, which is primarily to provide sound advice and formulate sophisticated strategy. All the wordsmithing in the world won’t make a bad case good, or vice versa. Lawyers do not have a Jedi mind trick. We analyze the facts, we make the best arguments possible under the circumstances, we advise our clients on their prospects, and we come up with a strategy for an optimal outcome, which almost always includes a path towards settlement. We are strategists and trusted advisors. Not wordsmithers.
This is not anything ChatGPT or current A.I. can do, or even come close to doing. And how do I know that? Because in a recent Wall Street Journal article, experts on self-driving cars explain that A.I. is nowhere close to being able to drive a car autonomously. In an article entitled “When Will Cars Be Fully Self-Driving?” the experts explain that the main impediment to fully autonomous vehicles is how dumb A.I. is. As one of the leading experts explains, fully autonomous cars “would require human-level artificial intelligence, and there is no commonly accepted theory on how to get there. As long as there is no human-level AI, autonomous mobility will be limited.”
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Amir Kahana, Kahana FeldMr. Kahana may be contacted at
akahana@kahanafeld.com
Skipping Depositions does not Constitute Failure to Cooperate in New York
March 09, 2020 —
Ryan G. Nelson - Saxe Doernberger & VitaInsurance policies typically impose, on the insured, a duty to cooperate with the insurer during investigation and litigation of a claim. Non-cooperation can be grounds for denying coverage. This begs the question: what constitutes non-cooperation?
Recently, a New York appellate court affirmed a trial court’s decision that failure by an employee of the insured to show up for three court-ordered depositions did not rise to the level of “willful and avowed obstruction” and therefore, the insurer could not deny coverage on the basis of non-cooperation. See Foddrell v. Utica First Insurance Co., 178 A.D.3d 901 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019). In so holding, the Foddrell court applied the Thrasher test: “To effectively deny coverage based upon lack of cooperation, an insurance carrier must demonstrate (1) that it acted diligently in seeking to bring about the insured’s cooperation, (2) that the efforts employed by the insured were reasonably calculated to obtain the insured’s cooperation, and (3) that the attitude of the insured, after his or her cooperation was sought, was one of willful and avowed obstruction.” Id.; see Thrasher v. U. S. Liab. Ins. Co., 19 N.Y.2d 159, 167 (1967).
Thomas Foddrell’s suit against Utica First Insurance Company (“Utica First”) stemmed from his personal injury suit against Janey & Rana Construction Corporation (“J&R” (Utica First’s insured). During that lawsuit, J&R’s principal, Gardeep Singh, failed to appear for two court-ordered depositions. After his failure to appear at those depositions, Utica First sent an investigator to inform Singh that he was scheduled for a third deposition. Singh responded to the investigator that he would speak with J&R’s attorneys about the matter. Ultimately, Singh did not appear for the third court-ordered deposition. In response to Singh’s repeated failure to appear for the depositions, Utica First sent Singh a letter advising him that because of his lack of cooperation, Utica would no longer agree to indemnify J&R.
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Ryan G. Nelson, Saxe Doernberger & VitaMr. Nelson may be contacted at
rgn@sdvlaw.com
Construction Defect Coverage Barred Under Business Risk Exclusion in Colorado
February 14, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFA federal court in Colorado recently applied the business risk exclusion to a construction defect case. Aaron Mandel and Stevi Raab of Sedgwick Law discuss this in Construction Defect Coverage Quarterly. The court found that the business risk exclusion barred coverage for an underlying construction defect. In the construction defect case, the Creek Side at Parker homeowners association sued the developer and builder. One such alleged defect was that “the plumbing contractor’s faulty installation of sewer and water lines damaged the lines themselves, caused surrounding asphalt and concrete to crack and deteriorate, and resulted in water intrusion.”
The court concluded that this damage to non-defective work was an occurrence, but the exclusion in the contract covered only property damage that occurred “while the work is ongoing.” The court concluded that the business risk exclusion barred coverage.
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Florida Construction Defect Decision Part of Lengthy Evolution
August 05, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFLawyers are still working out all the implications of Florida Supreme Court’s ruling in Maronda Homes. Three members of the firm Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster, Kantor & Reed PA, Alexander Dobrev, Michael S. Provenzale, and Tara L. Tedrow on the firm’s web site. They characterize it as a “consumer-protection oriented decision,” quoting the court that the “house is the fondest dream and largest investment, both emotionally and financially, for Florida families.”
The court found that Section 553.835 of the Florida laws could not be applied to construction that occurred before the statute become effective in July, 2012. They describe the underlying issue as “the culmination of forty years of evolution to the implied warranty of habitability that is granted by the builder of a new home to the purchaser.” This lead to a 2010 District Court decision that expanded the area covered from “merely the structure itself, along with improvements ‘immediately supporting the residence’” but also those “which provide ‘essential services’ which support the home, make it habitable, or are necessary for living accommodations.”
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