CAMBRIDGE MASSACHUSETTS BUILDING EXPERT
DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

When Business is Personal: Negligent and Intentional Interference Claims

October 24, 2023 — Kathryne Baldwin & Jose L. Parra - Wilke Fleury
The nature of business is personal. Changes in personnel, project outlines, or business models cost businesses time and money to bring about, ward against, or stop. Any individual involved in business will likely have seen claims for interference with relationships, either prospective or contractual. But, what do those claims really mean and how viable are they in a capitalist society where free markets are held in such high esteem? Defendants in lawsuits will typically see these claims pleaded as one of three major categories: intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, intentional interference with contractual relations or contract, or negligent interference with prospective economic advantage. As the name would suggest, the first two are more concrete and require a showing that the bad actor was aware of the existence of a contract or relationship and took affirmative steps to interfere with that relationship. The latter is more nebulous and looks at business relationships that were likely to occur and are based on a “should have known” standard. Reprinted courtesy of Kathryne E. Baldwin, Wilke Fleury and José L. Parra, Wilke Fleury Ms. Baldwin may be contacted at kbaldwin@wilkefleury.com Mr. Parra may be contacted at jparra@wilkefleury.com Read the court decision
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Governmental Action Exclusion Bars Claim for Damage to Insured's Building

November 27, 2023 — Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii
The lower court's decision finding no coverage based upon the governmental action exclusion was affirmed by the Appellate Court of Illinois. McCann Plumbing, Heating & Cooling v. Pekin Ins. Co., 2023 Ill.App. LEXIS 300 (Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 23, 2023). McCann purchased a building to use for its heating, ventilation, and air conditioning business. The building was surrounded by two unihhabited properties which often flooded. The city determined that a building on the adjacent property had to be demolished. In the course of destruction, the McCann's building was damaged, leaving a portion of their building open to the elements. McCann sought coverage from Pekin for damage incurred in the demolition. The policy provided coverage for "direct physical loss of or damage to" the covered property. Pekin denied coverage under the policy's governmental action exclusion, which provided,

We will not pay for loss or damage caused directly or indirectly by any of the following: . . . c. Governmental Action Seizure or destruction of property by order of governmental authority . . .

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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

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Recession Graduates’ Six-Year Gap in Homeownership

October 15, 2014 — Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFF
According to Zillow Real Estate Research, “Five years after completing their degree, young adults who graduate into a recession still have a lower homeownership rate than peers graduating into normal economic times. But at six years this gap disappears.” Zillow’s research demonstrated “that graduating into a recession has a lasting adverse effect on young adults’ employment and earning, a phenomenon known as labor market ‘scarring.’” Furthermore, “Homeownership is closely tied to the labor market, particularly among young adults, and some preliminary evidence suggests that a similar ‘scarring’ effect occurs with respect to the homeownership rate among young adults who graduate into a weak economy.” Read the court decision
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New Jersey Appellate Decision Reminds Bid Protestors to Take Caution When Determining Where to File an Action

March 13, 2023 — Brian Glicos & Nicholas J. Zaita - Peckar & Abramson, P.C.
On February 21, 2023, the New Jersey Appellate Division held that University Hospital is not a “state administrative agency” and, therefore, the Appellate Division does not have original jurisdiction to determine the merits of an action commenced by an unsuccessful bidder to challenge the award of a contract. In re Protest of Contract for Retail Pharmacy Design, Constr., Start-up & Operation, Request for Proposal No. UH-P20-006, A-1667-20, 2023 WL 2125002 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 21, 2023). Pursuant to Rule 2:2-3(a)(2) of New Jersey’s Rules of Court, final decisions or actions of any state administrative agency or officer may be appealed directly to the Appellate Division as of right. Accordingly, where an unsuccessful bidder chooses to challenge the award of a contract issued by, for example, the New Jersey Department of Transportation, the unsuccessful bidder must file its action directly with the Appellate Division. On the other hand, where an unsuccessful bidder wishes to challenge a contract award made by a local municipality (among a slew of other public entities), the Superior Court Law Division maintains original jurisdiction over the dispute. Reprinted courtesy of Brian Glicos, Peckar & Abramson, P.C. and Nicholas J. Zaita, Peckar & Abramson, P.C. Mr. Glicos may be contacted at bglicos@pecklaw.com Mr. Zaita may be contacted at nzaita@pecklaw.com Read the court decision
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The Private Works: Preliminary Notice | Are You Using the Correct Form?

August 20, 2019 — William L. Porter, Esq. - Porter Law Group
The Private Works – Preliminary Notice form which contractors, subcontractors and suppliers had become accustomed to using for many years changed in 2004. Despite this change in law, many in the construction industry have still not started using the correct new form. Changes in the law, championed by the American Subcontractors’ Association, gave a significant new benefit to subcontractors and suppliers by giving the subcontractor or supplier some expectation of actually receiving notice of when a Notice of Completion or a Notice of Cessation has been recorded on many private works projects. The law also changed the language of the California Preliminary Notice that subcontractors and suppliers must use to protect their mechanics’ lien, bond claim and stop payment notice rights. If Owners do not send out the Notice of Completion as required by law they incur a diminishing of the protections afforded to them when they record a Notice of Completion or Notice of Cessation on many private works projects. The revised law requires private project owners to notify all subcontractors and suppliers within 10 days after recording a Notice of Completion or Notice of Cessation that a Notice of Completion or a Notice of Cessation has actually been recorded. In order to receive such notice, the subcontractor or supplier must properly serve the new form of Preliminary Notice. If this properly occurs and the private project owner provides the required notice, then the subcontractor or supplier will have 30 days to record a Mechanics’ Lien. However, if an owner under such circumstances fails to properly notify a subcontractor or supplier within 10 days after recording a Notice of Completion or Notice of Cessation, then the Subcontractor or supplier will have 90 days to record a Mechanics’ Lien. The details of the law can be found in California Civil Code sections 8190, 8414 and 8416. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of William L. Porter, Esq., Porter Law Group
Mr. Porter may be contacted at bporter@porterlaw.com

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A Termination for Convenience Is Not a Termination for Default

April 22, 2024 — David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates
A termination for convenience is NOT a termination for default. They are NOT the same. They should NOT be treated as the same. I am a huge proponent of termination for convenience provisions because sometimes a party needs to be able to exercise a termination for convenience, but the termination is not one that rises to a basis for default. However, exercising a termination for convenience does not mean you get to go back in time and convert the termination for convenience into a termination for default. It does not work like that. Nor should it. An opinion out of the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals – Williams Building Company, Inc. v. Department of State, CBCA 7147, 2024 WL 1099788 (CBCA 2024 – demonstrates a fundamental distinction between a termination for convenience and a termination for default, i.e., that you don’t get to conjure up defaults when you exercise a termination for convenience:

Because a termination for convenience essentially turns a fixed-price construction contract into a cost-reimbursement contract, allowing the contractor to recover its incurred performance costs, the resolution of this appeal will involve identifying the total costs that [Contractor] incurred in performing this contract before [Government] terminated it for convenience. Since [Government] terminated the contract for convenience rather than for default, it no longer matters whether, in the past,[Contractor] acted intentionally in overstating the amount of its incurred costs or committed a contract breach. Ultimately, as permitted in response to a termination for convenience, [Contractor] will recover those allowable costs that [Contractor]establishes it incurred in performing the contract.

Williams Building Company, supra.

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Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dma@kirwinnorris.com

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Court Calls Lease-Leaseback Project What it is: A Design-Bid-Build Project

August 19, 2015 — Garret Murai – California Construction Law Blog
First there was “Prince.” Then there was “The Artist Formerly Known as Prince.” Then there was “The Artist Formerly Known as Prince (Because he Changed His Name to a Symbol), But Then Realized That No One Could Pronounce the Symbol (and What Good is a Symbol if Everyone Has to Wave Their Hands Wildly at You to Get Your Attention or Scream ‘Hey You!’), and So Changed His Name Back to Prince Again.” Whatever name (or symbol) he was going by, everyone knew him as the guy who told us to party like it was 1999 (when 1999 still seemed like the distant future), who sang about a girl with a “pocket full of horses” (which totally flew past my junior high school brain at the time), and gave us such great metaphors as “if the elevator tries to bring you down, go crazy, punch a higher floor!” Like Prince or his symbol, sometimes it doesn’t matter what label you put on something when everyone knows what that something is. In law, we call it looking at the “substance” rather than its “form.” And, in the next case, Davis v. Fresno Unified School District, the California Court of Appeals for the Fifth District made quick work of a purported “lease-leaseback” project – a project delivery method available to school districts whereby a school district leases property it owns to a developer for a minimum of $1, who in turns builds a school facility on the site and leases the facility and the site back to the school district, who in turn takes ownership of the facility and site at the end of the lease – and called it for what it was: a run-of-the-mill “design-bid-build” project. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLP
Mr. Murai may be contacted at gmurai@wendel.com

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The Colorado Supreme Court holds that loans made to a construction company are not subject to the Mechanic’s Lien Trust Fund Statute

February 21, 2013 — W. Berkeley Mann, Jr. — Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
In a prior blog post, we summarized the Court of Appeals decision in the case of AC Excavating, Inc. v. Yale, ___ P. 3d. ___, 2010 WL 3432219 (Colo. App. Sept. 2, 2010) which provided an interpretation of the Colorado Mechanic’s Lien Trust Fund Statute, C.R.S. § 38-22-127 (hereafter “the Trust Fund Statute”). A divided Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, and held that capital loans infused into a limited liability company which performed construction could be subject to the provisions of the Trust Fund Statute. The Court of Appeals reasoned that this determination was necessary because the statute was considered applicable to “all funds disbursed on a construction project.” Additionally, the Court of Appeals held that the intent of the provider of funds was not relevant, and that the statute applied “irrespective of the [originator of the funds]’s intended use of the funds.” This decision was reviewed by the Colorado Supreme Court in an opinion released on February 4, 2013, and it reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision. See, Yale v. AC Excavating, Inc., ___ P. 3d. ___, 2013 WL 441895 (Colo. Feb. 4, 2013). The Supreme Court strongly disagreed that loaned or infused capital funds which were obtained by the general contractor entity were “funds disbursed on a construction project,” simply because some of the infused monies were used for operational purposes to pay down specific project obligations. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of W. Berkeley Mann, Jr.
mann@hlmrlaw.com

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