Allen, TX Board of Trustees Expected to Approve Stadium Repair Plans
July 30, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFConstruction plans to fix the $60 million high school football stadium in Allen, Texas, which has been closed due to cracks discovered in the structure, is expected to be approved by the Allen School Board of Trustees, reported KHOU.
The construction company and architectural firm both stated “they will cover the costs to fix everything -- which could run between $600,000 and $1 million.”
The school board plans on using “$2 million in bonds for the construction, renovation, acquisition and equipment of school facilities,” and will then seek to recover the amount of repairs “from the parties responsible for defects and/or construction problems and failures.”
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Insurer’s Duty to Defend: When is it Triggered? When is it Not?
February 18, 2015 —
Zach McLeroy – Colorado Construction LitigationIn Colorado it is well recognized that an insurer has a broad duty to defend its policyholder against pending claims. An insurer’s duty to defend is triggered when the underlying complaint against the insured alleges any set of facts that might fall within the coverage policy. Greystone Construction, Inc. v. National Fire & Marine Insurance, Co., 661 F.3d 1272, 1284 (10th Cir. 2011). Even if the insurer’s duty to defend is not clear from the pleadings filed against the insured, the insurer’s duty to defend is triggered if the claim is potentially or arguably within the policy coverage. Id. If there is any doubt as to whether a theory of recovery falls within the policy coverage, such doubt is decided in favor of the insured and the insurer’s duty to defend is triggered. Id. In order to avoid this duty to defend, an insurer must show that an exemption to the policy applies and that no other basis exists for coverage under the policy.
In Cornella Brothers, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 2014 WL 321335 (D. Colo. Jan. 29, 2015), the Court was to determine whether Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company (“Liberty Mutual”) had a duty to defend a lawsuit filed against its insured, Cornella Brothers, Inc. (“Cornella”). The underlying lawsuit alleged construction defects at a recharging facility. Upon being named a party to the underlying litigation, Cornella provided notice to Liberty Mutual and demanded that Liberty Mutual defend Cornella.
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Zach McLeroy, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCMr. McLeroy may be contacted at
mcleroy@hhmrlaw.com
South Carolina Clarifies the Accrual Date for Its Statute of Repose
March 18, 2019 —
William L. Doerler - The Subrogation StrategistIn Lawrence v. General Panel Corp., 2019 S.C. LEXIS 1, No. 27856 (S.C. Jan. 1, 2019), the Supreme Court of South Carolina answered a certified question related to South Carolina’s statute of repose, S.C. Code § 15-3-640,[1] to wit, whether the date of “substantial completion of the improvement” is always measured from the date on which the certificate of occupancy is issued. The court held that a 2005 amendment to § 15-3-640 did not change South Carolina law with respect to the date of substantial completion. Thus, under the revised version of § 15-3-640, “the statute of repose begins to run at the latest on the date of the certificate of occupancy, even if there is ongoing work on any particular part of the project.” A brief review of prior case law may assist with understanding the court’s ruling in Lawrence.
In Ocean Winds Corp. of Johns Island v. Lane, 556 S.E.2d 377 (S.C. 2001), the Supreme Court of South Carolina addressed the question of whether § 15-3-640 ran from substantial completion of the installation of the windows at issue or on substantial completion of the building as a whole. Citing § 15-3-630(b),[2] the court found that the windows “were ‘a specified area or portion’ of the larger condominium project” and, upon their incorporation into the larger project they could be used for the purpose for which they were intended. Thus, the court held that “the statute of repose began running when installation of the windows was complete.”
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William L. Doerler, White and WilliamsMr. Doerler may be contacted at
doerlerw@whiteandwilliams.com
Considerations in Obtaining a Mechanic’s Lien in Maryland (Don’t try this at home)
February 23, 2016 —
Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law MusingsFor this week’s Guest Post Friday at Construction Law Musings I welcome Matthew Evans. Matt is the owner of
Law Offices of Matthew S. Evans, III, LLC located in Annapolis, Maryland. He has practiced construction, real estate and land use law in Maryland and D.C. for thirteen years. Prior to opening his own firm in May 2011, Mr. Evans was a partner at a mid-sized firm in Anne Arundel County, Maryland. Mr. Evans lives in Historic Annapolis (only three short blocks from his office) with his wife Margaret, and three children, Matthew (5), Bo (4) and Peyton (2).
Some of the most common calls I get are from irate contractor or subcontractor clients who have not been paid demanding that I “lien the property”. Many times after calming the client down, I determine, to their dismay, that they are not entitled to a mechanic’s lien. In Maryland, the mechanic’s lien law is driven by statute, which contains specific requirements which must be met before the client is entitled to a lien.
The first question is whether the contractor or subcontractor is entitled to a lien for the work performed. Under Maryland law, “every building erected and every building repaired, rebuilt, or improved to the extent of 15 percent of its value is subject to establishment of a lien…for the payment of all debts.” It’s easy when dealing with new construction. No matter how small your portion of the work, the property is subject to the establishment of a lien. It is more difficult to determine entitlement when there is either a total or partial renovation or other work. The question becomes how do you determine the value of the building, and whether it has been improved “to the extent of 15 percent of its value.” Believe me, I have seen creative and some not so creative methods of calculation used by counsel to prove that certain work does or does not meet the requirement.
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Christopher G. Hill, Law Office of Christopher G. Hill, PCMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Congratulations to BWB&O’s Newport Beach Team for Prevailing on a Highly Contested Motion to Quash!
January 08, 2024 —
Dolores Montoya - Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara LLPCongratulations to Newport Partners Tyler Offenhauser and Jonathan Cothran, and Associate Anisha Kohli, who recently prevailed on behalf of BWB&O’s client before the Orange County Superior Court on a highly contested Motion to Quash Service based on Plaintiff’s failure to timely file and serve a DOE Amendment, naming our client.
BWB&O’s client was the owner of a building where Plaintiff, a licensed electrician, was electrocuted while performing an upgrade to the building’s electrical infrastructure. Plaintiff’s original lawsuit named only the building’s tenant, who was also represented by BWB&O. BWB&O was successful earlier this year on a Motion for Summary Judgment under the Privette Doctrine and won judgment on behalf of the client/tenant. While that MSJ was pending, Plaintiff surreptitiously added the building’s owner to the suit with a DOE Amendment, after several months earlier learning the owner and then tenant were entities operated by the same individual. However, Plaintiff never informed counsel or any other party of the filing. Moreover, after the MSJ was granted, Plaintiff then waited several more months to serve the building’s owner.
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Dolores Montoya, Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara LLP
ASBCA Validates New Type of Claim Related to Unfavorable CPARS Review [i]
May 03, 2017 —
John P. Ahlers - Ahlers & Cressman PLLCFor government contractors, an unfavorable performance rating review posted to the Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (“CPARS”) can be extremely costly. Many of the government-negotiated solicitations include past performance as an important, and sometimes even primary, evaluation factor for contract award. An unfavorable CPARS review on a past contract can cause the contractor to incur substantial extra costs in addressing the unfavorable review with contracting officers on future solicitations, and, in some instances, the contractor saddled with an unfair or inaccurate CPARS may have to challenge the review and recover some of these costs.
Both the Federal Court of Claims and the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (“ASBCA”) have held that they have jurisdiction to hear Contract Dispute Act claims regarding unfair and/or inaccurate CPARS review. The relief available to contractors until this year was a declaration from the Court of Claims or Board that an unfair or inaccurate CPARS review was arbitrary and capricious. Neither the Board nor the Court had the authority or power to order the contracting officer to change the unfavorable review. The contractor who received a declaration from the Court or the Board regarding an unfavorable CPARS review may use it in the future to explain the unfavorable review when bidding new government work; however, the unfavorable review remains in the CPARS system and shows up on all future solicitations, the Board or Court decision notwithstanding.
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John P. Ahlers, Ahlers & Cressman PLLCMr. Ahlers may be contacted at
jahlers@ac-lawyers.com
Congratulations to Woodland Hills Partner Patrick Au and Senior Associate Ava Vahdat on Their Successful Motion for Summary Judgment!
February 14, 2023 —
Dolores Montoya - Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara LLPCongratulations to Woodland Hills Partner Patrick Au and Senior Associate Ava Vahdat on their successful Motion for Summary Judgment in Los Angeles Superior Court!
BWB&O’s client was a concrete contractor hired by a government entity for a limited sidewalk repair project many years ago. The Plaintiff, who was confined to a wheelchair, filed suit against BWB&O’s client alleging Negligence and Premises Liability after an alleged fall injury on a public sidewalk. Plaintiff’s primary alleged theory of liability against BWB&O’s client was that it either worked on or was supposed to work on that subject sidewalk and in doing so, or failure to do so, caused Plaintiff’s fall and subsequent alleged injuries/damages. Plaintiff claimed in excess of $1 million in damages.
After extensive discovery, Mr. Au and Ms. Vahdat gathered enough evidence to prove that BWB&O’s client neither worked on the subject area nor was required to do so. Accordingly, they prepared a successful Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis that no duty was owed to Plaintiff thereby refuting the negligence cause of action. The dispositive motion also proved that the subject sidewalk was not owned, controlled, or maintained by BWB&O’s client thereby negating the premises liability cause of action.
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Dolores Montoya, Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara LLP
Nevada Senate Bill 435 is Now in Effect
February 24, 2020 —
Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara LLPATTENTION: Nevada liability departments and auto insurance carriers! Nevada Senate Bill No. 435 was recently signed into law and there are two key points to be aware of: Disclosure of Policy Limits Demand and Voiding Releases. These both deal with pre-litigation situations.
1) Nevada law now requires a motor vehicle insurer to disclose the limits of the policy if the claimant provides a HIPAA authorization which allows the carrier to “receive all medical reports, records and bills related to the claim from the providers of health care.” This is a change from the previous Nevada statute which required the disclosure of policy limits only after litigation was commenced.
However, it appears from the language of the statute that there are limits to this new mandate. Section 4 of the new law is written in such a way to allow the argument that the new law applies only to accidents that occurred after 10/1/19, and that the insurance company has to request the HIPAA waiver from the claimant in order for the disclosure requirement to apply.
The plaintiff’s bar is already attempting to address this language in the legislature. As written, subsection (4) is governed by subsection (1) which states that the insurance company “may require the claimant … to provide … a written authorization.” The following subparts all appear to be triggered only by the act of the insurance company requesting a HIPAA waiver. The plaintiff’s bar is pushing for clarifying language that would make it clear that once the claimant sent a HIPAA waiver, irrespective of whether the document was requested by the insurance company or not, the insurance company is required to disclose policy limits. This is not how the law reads on its face, and the change would make a significant difference from a practical perspective.
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Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara LLP
