$109-Million Renovation Begins on LA's Willowbrook/Rosa Parks Station
October 02, 2018 —
Greg Aragon - Engineering News-RecordThe Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (Metro), along with the Los Angeles office of Stantec, recently began work on the $109-million Willowbrook/Rosa Parks Station Improvement Project in Los Angeles.
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Greg Aragon, ENRENR may be contacted at
ENR.com@bnpmedia.com
Construction Case Alert: Appellate Court Confirms Engineer’s Duty to Defend Developer Arises Upon Tender of Indemnity Claim
January 27, 2010 —
Steven M. CvitanovicIn the recent case of UDC-Universal Development, L.P. v. CH2M Hill, 2010 Cal.App.LEXIS 47 (filed January 15, 2010), the Sixth District Court of Appeal provided a stunning illustration of the far-reaching effects of the California Supreme Court’s holding in Crawford v. Weather Shield Manufacturing Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541. In Crawford, the Court held the duty to defend under an indemnity agreement arose upon the mere tender of defense of a claim covered by the indemnity.
In the UDC case, CH2M Hill provided engineering and environmental planning services to developer UDC on a project that ultimately wound up in a construction defect lawsuit by the homeowners association ( HOA ). UDC tendered its defense to CH2M Hill, the tender was rejected, and UDC filed a cross-complaint for negligence, breach of contract and indemnity against CH2M Hill and others. After the HOA’s construction defect claims were settled, UDC proceeded to trial against CH2M Hill. The jury found in favor of CH2M Hill on the claims for negligence and breach of contract. At the request of the parties prior to trial, the trial court ruled on the application of the indemnity agreement in light of Crawford and, in so doing, found that the defense obligation arose upon the tender and that CH2M Hill breached that duty despite the jury finding in favor of CH2M Hill.
The Court of Appeal affirmed, noting that the defense obligation arose as soon as the defense was tendered and did not depend on the outcome of the litigation, and that the HOA’s general description of the defects along with an allegation that Doe engineers were negligent triggered the duty to defend.
Although this case did not expand the crushing impact of Crawford’s holding, it is
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Subcontractor Not Estopped from Enforcing Lien Not Listed In Bankruptcy Petition
March 01, 2017 —
Chadd Reynolds – Autry, Hanrahan, Hall & Cook, LLPIn Stock Building Supply, Inc. v. Platte River Insurance Co.,[1] the Court of Appeals dealt with issues of judicial estoppel, bankruptcy, retroactive application of statutory lien amendments, and the full payment defense.
The owner, Madison Retail-Suwanee, LLC (“Madison”) hired Cannon/Estapa General Contractors, Inc. (“Cannon”) to be the general contractor for the construction of a shopping center (“the Project”). Cannon subcontracted with Stock Building Supply (“Stock”) to supply labor, materials, and services for the Project. Cannon failed to complete the project and Madison had yet to pay Cannon the full contract price. In 2007, Stock timely filed a lien on the Project and obtained a judgment against Cannon for the amount due under the subcontract. Platte River Insurance Company (“Platte”), the surety, issued a bond to discharge Stock’s lien. Consequently, Stock pursued an action against Platte to collect the judgment in the amount of $93,865.27.
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Chadd Reynolds, Autry, Hanrahan, Hall & Cook, LLPMr. Reynolds may be contacted at
reynolds@ahclaw.com
New Law Raises Standard for Defense Experts as to Medical Causation
September 05, 2023 —
Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPOn July 17, 2023, California Governor Gavin Newsom signed Senate Bill (SB) No. 652, adding Section 801.1 to the California Evidence Code. This section provides additional requirements for expert opinions relating to medical causation. In particular, it allows a party not bearing the burden of proof to offer a contrary expert in response to an expert proffered by a party bearing the burden of proof as to medical causation who is required to opine that causation exists to a reasonable medical probability. The contrary expert may only be proffered, however, if he or she is able to opine that an alternative medical causation is one that exists to a reasonable medical probability. Section 801.1, however, does not preclude an expert witness from testifying that a specific matter cannot meet a reasonable degree of probability in the applicable field.
With respect to medical causation, a “reasonable degree of probability” means that the expert is testifying that a particular event or source was more likely than not the cause of a person’s injuries.
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Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Open & Known Hazards Under the Kinsman Exception to Privette
February 15, 2018 —
Frances Ma & Lawrence S. Zucker II – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP Publications & InsightsGonzalez v. Mathis, 2018 WL 718528 confirms the difficulties a defendant will face when trying to overcome the Kinsman exception to the
Privette doctrine on a dispositive motion when dealing with an open and obvious hazard. There, a professional window washer fell off a roof while walking along a parapet wall constructed by the owner of a home.
The window washer filed suit against the homeowner and alleged three dangerous conditions on the roof: (1) the parapet wall forced those who needed to access a skylight to walk along an exposed two-foot ledge that lacked a safety railing; (2) dilapidated and slippery roof shingles; and (3) the lack of tie off points that would allow maintenance workers to secure themselves with ropes or harnesses. The homeowner filed a motion for summary judgment under
Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689 and its progeny which prohibits an independent contractor from suing his or her hirer for workplace injuries (
“Privette doctrine”).
There are two exceptions to the
Privette doctrine. First, a hirer cannot avoid liability when he or she exercises control over the manner and means in which a contractor does his or her work and that control contributes to the injuries sustained – known as the
“Hooker exception” (premised on the holding of
Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198). Second, a hirer may be found liable if he or she fails to warn the contractor of a concealed hazard on the premises – known as the
“Kinsman exception” (premised on the holding of
Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005)).
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Frances Ma, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Lawrence S. Zucker II, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Ms. Ma may be contacted at fma@hbblaw.com
Mr. Zucker may be contacted at lzucker@hbblaw.com
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Pensacola Bridge Halted Due to Alleged Construction Defects
July 21, 2018 —
David Suggs – Bert L. Howe & Associates, Inc.The Pensacola News Journal reported that cracks were discovered again in the Pensacola Bay Bridge, which caused construction of said bridge to be halted once more: “Cracks found in a portion of the concrete in the Pensacola Bay Bridge project have twice halted construction in the last several months, raising concerns about oversight and disclosure from the state, particularly in light of the Miami bridge collapse earlier this year.”
The Florida Department of Transportation stated “that the cracks were found during a routine visual inspection of newly placed concrete in March,” according to the Pensacola News Journal. The $400 million project began in 2017 and was scheduled to be completed by 2020.
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CDJ’s #5 Topic of the Year: Beacon Residential Community Association v. Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, et al.
December 31, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFSteven M. Cvitanovic and Whitney L. Stefko of Haight Brown & Bonesteel analyzed the Beacon decision, and discussed how it affects developers and general contractors: “On July 3, 2014, the California Supreme Court (the “Court”) came out with its decision in Beacon Residential Community Association v. Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, et al. The Beacon decision settled a long-standing dispute in California about whether design professionals such as architects and engineers owe a duty to non-client third parties. In finding that the plaintiffs in Beacon could state a claim against the architects of the Beacon project, the Court also sowed the seeds of change in the way contracts are structured between developers, architects, engineers, and even general contractors.”
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United States Supreme Court Backtracks on Recent Trajectory Away from Assertions of General Jurisdiction in Mallory v. Norfolk Southern
August 01, 2023 —
Charles S. Anderson - Lewis BrisboisWashington, D.C. (June 28, 2023) – On June 27, 2023, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a sharply divided opinion that appears to backtrack on the Court’s steady trajectory away from assertions of general jurisdiction in recent years, e.g. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011), Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014), BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, 2017, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017). Relying on a case from 1917, Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U. S. 93 (1917), Justice Gorsuch, writing on behalf of the plurality, (Justices Gorsuch, Thomas, Sotomayor, and Jackson) (Justice Alito concurring) found that Norfolk Southern “consented” to jurisdiction in Mallory via 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §5301(a)(2)(i),(b) by registering to do business in Pennsylvania. This statute, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §5301, specifically permits jurisdiction over a corporation “incorporat[ed] under or qualifi[ed]as a foreign corporation under the laws of this Commonwealth … for any cause of action that may asserted against him, whether or not arising from acts enumerated in this section.”
In Pennsylvania Fire, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution in connection with a Missouri law that required an out-of-state insurance company desiring to transact any business in the state to file paperwork agreeing to (1) appoint a state official to serve as the company’s agent for service of process and (2) accept service on that official as valid in any suit. After more than a decade of complying with the law, Pennsylvania Fire was served with process and argued that the Missouri law violated due process. The Court unanimously found that there was “no doubt” that Pennsylvania Fire could be sued in Missouri because it had agreed to accept service of process in Missouri on any suit as a condition of doing business there.
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Charles S. Anderson, Lewis BrisboisMr. Anderson may be contacted at
Charles.Anderson@lewisbrisbois.com