FAIRFIELD CONNECTICUT BUILDING EXPERT
DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

Insurer's Daubert Challenge to Insured's Expert Partially Successful

November 03, 2016 — Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law Hawaii
The insurer was partially successful in challenging two of the insureds' experts in a bad faith case. Estate of Arroyo v. Infinity Indem. Ins. Co., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115669 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2016). The Estate sought to qualify two experts, Lewis N. Jack and James P. Schratz. They were to opine on Infinity's handling of the Estate's insurance claims and the extent of damages warranted in the case. Jack was to testify on Infinity's duties to the insured, its investigation of the case, its reliance on Infinity's agents, and his belief that Infinity could have settled the case. Schratz's opinions mostly concerned Infinity's handling of its investigation. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

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What is the True Value of Rooftop Solar Panels?

April 15, 2014 — Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFF
In Colorado, regulators are questioning the true value of rooftop solar panels, reported the Denver Business Journal: “Minneapolis-based Xcel Energy Inc. (NYSE: XEL), the biggest utility in Colorado, has said it believes Colorado’s current ‘net metering’ policy means the utility is overpaying customers who have rooftop solar power systems.” Currently, “Xcel...credits customers at a rate of 10.5 cents per kilowatt hour of excess power produced.” However, the utility company believes that “the ‘true value’ of the rooftop solar electricity is about half what it’s paying—just 4.6 cents per kilowatt hour.” According to the Denver Business Journal, supporters argue that “Xcel has undervalued the electricity and hasn’t accounted for the systems’ environmental and economic attributes.” Read the court decision
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Accounting for Payments on Projects Became Even More Crucial This Year

September 21, 2020 — Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law Musings
I discussed several of the statutory changes affecting the construction industry here at Construction Law Musings in the run-up to July 1, 2020. One of those changes, an amendment to Virginia Code Section 43-13, may add another arrow to the collection quiver of subcontractors and suppliers. As part of the previously-linked rundown, I highlighted one of the big additions in 2020, namely the amendment making those pesky clauses that let those up the payment chain from you hold money on “this or any other project” void as against public policy. The other big addition to 43-13 is the change that adds a possible civil cause of action for downstream and unpaid subcontractors and suppliers in the event that funds paid to a general contractor or subcontractor are not first used to pay their downstream contractors and suppliers. Prior to July 1, 2020, this statute provided criminal penalties for such behavior but did not contain the possibility of a civil penalty. The operative language for the change is as follows:

The use by any such contractor or subcontractor or any officer, director, or employee of such contractor or subcontractor of any moneys paid under the contract before paying all amounts due or to become due for labor performed or material furnished for such building or structure for any other purpose than paying such amounts due on the project shall be prima facie evidence of intent to defraud. Any breach or violation of this section may give rise to a civil cause of action for a party in contract with the general contractor or subcontractor, as appropriate; however, this right does not affect a contractor’s or subcontractor’s right to withhold payment for failure to properly perform labor or furnish materials on the project.

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Reprinted courtesy of The Law Office of Christopher G. Hill
Mr. Hill may be contacted at chrisghill@constructionlawva.com

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Congratulations to Partner Vik Nagpal on his Nomination for West Coast Casualty’s Jerrold S. Oliver Award of Excellence!

March 27, 2023 — Dolores Montoya - Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara LLP
Bremer Whyte Brown & O’Meara, LLP is honored to share that Downtown San Diego and Encinitas Managing Partner Vik Nagpal is nominated for West Coast Casualty’s Jerrold S. Oliver Award of Excellence! Every year, West Coast Casualty recognizes an individual who is committed, trustworthy, and has contributed to the betterment of the construction defect community. The award is named after the late Judge Jerrold S. Oliver who is considered a “founding father” in the alternate resolution process in construction claims and litigation. Each year, members of the construction community are asked to nominate individuals who invoke the same spirit as Judge Oliver. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Dolores Montoya, Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara LLP

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Is The Enforceability Of A No-Damage-For-Delay Provision Inappropriate For Summary Judgment

February 24, 2020 — David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates
Is the enforceability of a no-damage-for-delay provision inappropriate for resolution on a summary judgment? The recent decision in U.S. f/u/b/o Kingston Environmental Services, Inc. v. David Boland, Inc., 2019 WL 6178676 (D. Hawaii 2019), dealing with Florida law, suggests that it is inappropriate for a summary judgment resolution, particularly when there is a right to a jury trial. In this case, a prime contractor was hired on a federal construction project in Hawaii. The prime contractor hired a subcontractor and the subcontractor sued the prime contractor and its surety under the Miller Act. Of interest, the subcontractor was seeking to recover for the costs it incurred due to construction delays. The prime contractor moved for summary judgment as to the no-damage-for-delay provision in the subcontract. The no-damages-for-delay provision read as follows (and it is a well-written no-damage-for-delay provision): The Subcontractor expressly agrees that the Contractor shall not be liable to the Subcontractor for any damages or additional costs, whether foreseeable or unforeseeable, resulting in whole or in part from a delay, hindrance, suspension, or acceleration of the commencement or execution of the Work, caused in whole or in part by the acts or omissions, whether negligent or not, of the Contractor including other subcontractors or material suppliers to the Project, its agents, employees, or third parties acting on behalf of the Contractor. The Subcontractor’s sole remedy for any such delay, hindrance, suspension, or acceleration shall be a noncompensable time extension. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dma@kirwinnorris.com

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Release Of “Unknown” Claim Does Not Bar Release Of “Unaccrued” Claim: Fair Or Unfair?

July 15, 2019 — David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates
A general release of “unknown” claims through the effective date of the release does NOT bar “unaccrued” claims. This is especially important when it comes to fraud claims where the facts giving rise to the fraud may have occurred prior to the effective date in the release, but a party did not learn of the fraud until well after the effective date in the release. A recent opinion maintained that a general release that bars unknown claims does NOT mean a fraud claim will be barred since the last element to prove a fraud had not occurred, and thus, the fraud claim had not accrued until after the effective date in the release. See Falsetto v. Liss, Fla. L. Weekly D1340D (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (“The 2014 [Settlement] Agreement’s plain language released the parties only from “known or unknown” claims, not future or unaccrued claims. Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the fraud claim had accrued — that is, whether Falsetto [party to Settlement Agreement] knew or through the exercise of due diligence should have known about the alleged fraud at the time the 2014 Agreement was executed — the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on those fraud claims.”). Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dma@kirwinnorris.com

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New Addition To New Jersey Court Rules Impacts More Than Trial Practice

November 16, 2020 — Thomas Regan & Karley Kamaris - Lewis Brisbois Newsroom
On September 1, 2020, New Jersey adopted a brand-new rule of procedure, Rule 4:25-8, which properly defines motions in limine. On its face, the new rule prohibits, broadly, filing motions in limine that may have a dispositive effect on the case. Most notably, the rule expressly eliminates the ability to move, on motion in limine, to bar expert testimony in matters in which such experts are required to sustain a party’s burden of proof. This effectively makes the summary judgment phase of litigation the last chance to bar experts from a jury trial or take any other dispositive action The new rule comes at a time in which the evidentiary standard for experts is shifting in New Jersey. In October 2018, the New Jersey Supreme Court reconciled the framework for analyzing the reliability of expert testimony under N.J.R.E. 702 and 703 in In re: Accutane Litigation. Significantly, New Jersey, a traditional Frye jurisdiction, incorporated certain federal Daubert factors for expert “use by our courts” but, overall, fell short of adopting the Daubert standard as a whole. In applying the relevant Daubert factors, the trial court in Accutane held that the subject experts’ methodologies were unsound due to the failure to apply fundamentals of the scientific method of the medical-evidence hierarchy. The decision resulted in the dismissal of over 3,000 claims. Reprinted courtesy of Thomas Regan, Lewis Brisbois and Karley Kamaris, Lewis Brisbois Mr. Regan may be contacted at Thomas.Regan@lewisbrisbois.com Ms. Kamaris may be contacted at Karley.Kamaris@lewisbrisbois.com Read the court decision
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Insurer Doomed in Delaware by the Sutton Rule

September 12, 2023 — Katherine Dempsey - The Subrogation Strategist
In Donegal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thangavel, No. 379, 2022, 2023 Del. LEXIS 227, the Supreme Court of Delaware (Supreme Court) considered whether the Sutton Rule prevented the plaintiff from pursuing subrogation against the defendants. As applied in Delaware, the Sutton Rule explains that landlords and tenants are co-insureds under the landlord’s fire insurance policy unless a tenant’s lease clearly expresses an intent to the contrary. If the Sutton Rule applies, the landlord’s insurer cannot pursue the tenant for the landlord’s damages by way of subrogation. Here, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision that the Sutton Rule applied because the lease did not clearly express an intent to hold the tenants liable for the landlord’s damages. In Thangavel, the plaintiff, Donegal Mutual Insurance Company (Insurer), provided property insurance to Seaford Apartment Ventures, LLC (Landlord) for a residential property in Delaware. Sathiyaselvam Thangavel and Sasikala Muthusamy (Tenants) leased an apartment (the Premises) from Landlord and signed a lease. Insurer alleged that Tenants hit a sprinkler head while flying a drone inside the Premises which caused water to spray from the damaged sprinkler head, resulting in property damage to the Premises. Landlord filed an insurance claim with Insurer, who paid Landlord $77,704.06 to repair the damage. Insurer then sought to recover the repair costs from Tenants via subrogation. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Katherine Dempsey, White and Williams LLP
Ms. Dempsey may be contacted at dempseyk@whiteandwilliams.com

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