Can I Record a Lis Pendens in Arizona if the Lawsuit is filed Another Jurisdiction?
September 26, 2022 —
Ben Reeves - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogRecent research I did on a case led me to the conclusion that Arizona law recognizes foreign litigation (i.e., a lawsuit filed outside of Arizona) as a justification for the recording of a lis pendens against real property located within Arizona. See
TWE Retirement Fund Trust v. Ream, 198 Ariz. 268 (Ct. App. 2000). Apparently, there’s some debate about whether foreign litigation can support a local lis pendens. See
Boca Petroco, Inc. v. Petroleum Realty II, 285 Ga. 487 (Ga. 2009). As noted in the TWE case, Arizona’s lis pendens statute
(A.R.S. 12-1191) does not discriminate between local or foreign “actions.” As such, if litigation is pending anywhere that affects Arizona real property, a lis pendens can (and probably should) be filed.
Reprinted courtesy of
Ben Reeves, Snell & Wilmer
Mr. Reeves may be contacted at breeves@swlaw.com
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"Decay" Found Ambiguous in Collapse Case
August 31, 2020 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe federal district court granted, in part, the insured's motion for summary judgment seeking coverage for a collapse of a church's ceiling. Derbyshire Baptist Church v. Church Mut. Ins. Co., 2020 U.S. Distl LEXIS 113346 (E.D. Va. June 29, 2020).
A large portion of the sanctuary ceiling of the insured's church collapsed. A claim was filed with the insurer. The insurer hired a forensic engineer who found the collapse was caused by the disconnection of wire support hangers from the wood roof beams. Further, "the redistribution of load on the hangers resulted in a progressive failure of the hangers and their supported components." Based on these findings, the insurer denied coverage.
The policy excluded coverage for collapse, but in the Additional Coverage portion of the policy, collapse caused by "decay that is hidden from view" was covered. The court pondered the meaning of "decay," which was not defined in the policy.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
COVID-19 Is Not Direct Physical Loss Or Damage
April 13, 2020 —
Joseph Blyskal, Dennis Brown & Michelle Bernard - Gordon & Rees Insurance Coverage Law BlogIs a cash register that is not being used damaged property? When you need to wash a table, a chair, or a section of flooring with readily available cleaning products to make them safe and useable, are you repairing damaged property? Is a spilled cup of coffee waiting to be wiped up actual damage to the premises? If your customers stay home to help stop the spread of a virus, has there been a physical loss inside your shuttered store or restaurant?
The insuring agreements typically found in commercial property insurance policies require “direct physical loss of or damage to” covered property as the triggering event. Without establishing direct physical loss or damage a policyholder cannot meet its burden to trigger coverage for a purely economic loss of business income resulting from shuttering its business due to concerns over exposure to—or even the actual presence of—COVID-19. Despite this well-understood policy language, it is already beyond question that insurers will confront creative—albeit strained—arguments from policyholder firms attempting to trigger coverage for pure economic loss. The scope of the human and economic tragedy we all face will be matched by the scope of the effort to force the financial harm onto insurance companies.
The plaintiffs in what appears to be the first-filed case seeking a declaratory judgment in the context of first-party insurance coverage rely on the assertion that “contamination of the insured premises by the Coronavirus would be a direct physical loss needing remediation to clean the surfaces” of its establishment, a New Orleans restaurant, to trigger coverage for business interruption.[1] See Cajun Conti, LLC, et. al. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, et. al. Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana. The complaint alleges that the property is insured under an “all risk policy” defining “covered causes of loss” as “direct physical loss.” The plaintiffs rely on the alleged presence of the virus on “the surface of objects” in certain conditions and the need to clean those surfaces. They go so far as to claim that “[a]ny effort by [the insurer] to deny the reality that the virus causes physical damage and loss would constitute a false and potentially fraudulent misrepresentation. . . .”
Reprinted courtesy of Gordon & Rees attorneys
Joseph Blyskal,
Dennis Brown and
Michelle Bernard
Mr. Blyskal may be contacted at tblatchley@grsm.com
Mr. Brown may be contacted at dbrown@grsm.com
Ms. Bernard may be contacted at mbernard@grsm.com
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From Both Sides Now: Looking at Contracts Through a Post-Pandemic Lens
August 03, 2020 —
Lori S. Smith - White and WilliamsA little over a year ago, I wrote a blog post about the danger of relying on precedent. Now, more than ever, clients and their advisors need to revisit contract forms on which they may have been relying for years. While many of us have lived through times that required certain adjustments in how we viewed contractual obligations — recessions, wars, oil embargoes, natural disasters, 9/11 — none of these events had the widespread and long-lasting impact that the current COVID-19 pandemic is having. None of these events shut down the U.S. economy and impacted global supply chains across every industry in the manner we are now experiencing.
With this in mind, there is a need to figure out what the “new normal” will look like for contract negotiations in a post-pandemic world. Business professionals need to now anticipate more widespread disruption than we could have ever before imagined. It isn’t just force majeure clauses or material adverse effect provisions, as these will likely add pandemics and government shutdowns to their ever-growing list of contemplated risks, if they were not already expressly covered. And it is not clear, at least in the near-term, whether a resurgence or mutation of COVID-19 or the emergence of another virus can truly be seen as unforeseeable in a post-COVID world. The issues are much more fundamental to the approach that parties may take in negotiating contracts. Commercial contracts between purchasers, vendors, distributors, licensors and licensees will need to evaluate allocation of risk from both sides and come to a new happy medium that all can live with in an ever-evolving world. While parties should review their standard contracts in their entirety, some key provisions to think about include:
- Length of the contract and exclusivity. Depending on which side you are on, you may want to reconsider a long-term arrangement that ties your company to a particular vendor or distributor. Supply chain disruption can have a seriously detrimental impact on your business. Are requirements contracts where a particular supplier is required to make available all of your needs for a certain good or service really the best arrangement for your business? What about take or pay arrangements where you are obligated to which are common in certain industries pay a minimum amount or a penalty to a supplier whether or not you actually purchase the contemplated volume of goods ? Do you really want to be tied up in an exclusive arrangement, or do you need flexibility to maintain secondary or tertiary sources of supply? Do you want to provide a licensee with an exclusive right to your technology (even within a limited field of use or industry sector)?
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Lori S. Smith, White and WilliamsMs. Smith may be contacted at
smithl@whiteandwilliams.com
After Breaching Its Duty to Defend, Insurer Must Pay Market Rates for Defense Counsel
October 30, 2023 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiAfter breaching its duty to defend, the insurer could not take advantage of a California statute allowing insurers to establish rates for defense counsel. S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151695 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 2023).
Edison was an additional insured under a policy issued by Greenwich Insurance Company to Utility Tree Service, Inc. (UTS). UTS contracted with Edison to provide vegetation management services near Edison's transmission lines. The Greenwich policy provided additional insured coverage to third parties to the extent of UTS's obligations under the contract.
Edison was sued in numerous lawsuits for property damage caused by the Bobcat wildfire in the Angeles National Forest (Bobcat Wildfire lawsuits). Edison tendered the defense in each lawsuit to Greenwich. Coverage was denied, however, based on a lack of underlying allegations or extrinsic evidence that Edison's liability resulted from UTS's negligent actions.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Florida Appellate Court Holds Four-Year Statute of Limitations Applicable Irrespective of Contractor Licensure
June 22, 2016 —
Clay Whittaker – Florida Construction Law UpdateIn Brock v. Garner Window & Door Sales, Inc.,[1] Florida’s Fifth District Court of Appeal rejected a novel attempt to circumvent Florida’s well-established four-year statute of limitations for all actions founded on the construction of an improvement to real property. Plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging breach of contract as a result of water intrusion damage following the installation of windows.[2] It was undisputed that Plaintiff commenced the litigation more than four years following the discovery of the allegedly latent defect in the window installation.[3] Plaintiff’s counsel argued that the window contractor could not rely on the four-year statute of limitations because the window subcontractor was not a licensed contractor and, therefore, the five-year statute of limitations for actions founded on written contracts should apply.
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Clay Whittaker, Cole, Scott, & Kissane, P.A.Mr. Whittaker may be contacted at
clay.whittaker@csklegal.com
Montrose III: Vertical Exhaustion Applies in Upper Layers of Excess Coverage
May 18, 2020 —
Christopher Kendrick & Valerie A. Moore – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Montrose Chemical Corp. of Cal. v. Superior Court (No. S244737, filed 4/6/20) (Montrose III), the California Supreme Court held that, as between excess insurers at differing levels of coverage, a rule of “vertical exhaustion” or “elective stacking” applies, whereby the insured may access any excess policy once it has exhausted other excess policies with lower attachment points in the same policy period. The Court limited the rule to excess insurance, stating that “[b]ecause the question is not presented here, we do not decide when or whether an insured may access excess policies before all primary insurance covering all relevant policy periods has been exhausted.”
Montrose manufactured the insecticide DDT in Torrance from 1947 to 1982. In 1990, the state and federal governments sued Montrose for environmental contamination and Montrose entered into partial consent decrees agreeing to pay for cleanup. Montrose claimed to have expended in excess of $100 million doing so, and asserted that its future liability could exceed that amount.
Reprinted courtesy of
Christopher Kendrick, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Valerie A. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Kendrick may be contacted at ckendrick@hbblaw.com
Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com
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Pollution Exclusion Bars Coverage for Inverse Condemnation Action
June 02, 2016 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe South Carolina Court of Appeals found there was no coverage for an inverse condemnation action based upon the policy's pollution exclusion. South Carolina Ins. Reserve Fund v. E. Richland County Public Service District, 2016 S. C. App. LEXIS 32 (S.C. Ct. App. March 23, 2016).
In 2010, Coley Brown filed a complaint against the East Richland County Public Service District ("District") for inverse condemnation, trespass, and negligence. The complaint alleged that the District had installed a sewage force main line and an air relief valve on Brown's street, and the valve released offensive odors on his property many times a day. The stench caused Brown to buy a new piece of property and move, but he was unable to sell the old property. The district tendered the complaint to the South Carolina Insurance Reserve Fund ("Fund"), but coverage was denied.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com