Unravel the Facts Before Asserting FDUTPA and Tortious Interference Claims
September 05, 2022 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesCMR Construction and Roofing, LLC v. UCMS, LLC, 2022 WL 3012298 (11th Cir. 2022) is an interesting opinion where a contractor asserted a Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (known by its acronym “FDUTPA”) claim and tortious interference claims (with a contract and with an advantageous business relationship) against another contractor, i.e., a competitor, that were dismissed from the get-go. It is an opinion worthy of interest based on the claims asserted against a competitor. Throwing around FDUTPA and tortious interference may sound good from an intimidation standpoint, but pleading and then proving these claims are a lot different than loosely throwing around these claims. Before filing a lawsuit for FDUTPA and tortious interference, spend time unraveling the facts and the chronology. Do not rely on conclusory allegations simply to check the box regarding required elements to plead while ignoring the actual facts that support the allegations. These are fact-based claims and it is imperative the facts are fully known from on the onset so that they can be strategically pled and pursued.
In this matter, a contractor, the plaintiff, was hired by a condominium association around April 2018 to repair damage caused by a hurricane which included roofing work. The association was going to have its insurer pay its contractor. In May 2020, the association hired a new contractor to perform the same work (the “new contractor”). The association then directed the plaintiff to cease work since it hired the new contractor.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Top Developments March 2024
April 22, 2024 —
Complex Insurance Coverage ReporterCLAIMS-MADE COVERAGE
Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Syngenta Crop Prot. LLC, 2024 Del. LEXIS 68 (Del. Feb. 26, 2024)
Delaware Supreme Court concludes that a letter from a lawyer informing an insured of possible lawsuits without identifying potential plaintiffs or demanding payment is not a “claim for damages” within the meaning of claims-made CGL and umbrella liability policies. Citing case law from Delaware and other jurisdictions, it reasoned that, in the ordinary sense, a “claim for damages” (which the policies did not define) is “a demand or request for monetary relief by or on behalf of an identifiable claimant.” According to the court, the letter in question did not meet this definition because it did not identify any claimants “except in the vaguest terms” or request monetary relief on any claimant’s behalf, but rather communicated only a threat of future litigation. As a result, the letter was not a claim made before the policy periods at issue.
POLLUTION EXCLUSION
Wesco Ins. Co. v. Brad Ingram Constr., 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 1488 (9th Cir. Jan. 23, 2024)
A divided Ninth Circuit panel, applying California law, holds that a pollution exclusion* in a CGL policy does not preclude a duty to defend an underlying suit alleging physical injury from exposure to “clouds of toxic dust” deposited in the environment by a wildfire and released during clean up efforts. Citing MacKinnon v. Truck Ins. Exch., 73 P.3d 1205 (Cal. 2003), the majority explained that determining whether a “pollution event” (i.e., “environmental pollution”) resulting in excluded injury has occurred involves consideration of “the character of the injurious substance” and whether the exposure resulted from a “mechanism specified in the policy.” It concluded that a potential for coverage (and, therefore, a defense obligation) existed because, although wildfire debris may be considered a “pollutant” in certain circumstances, the mechanism alleged in the underlying complaint – “expos[ure] . . . to clouds of toxic dust during the loading and unloading of [the underlying plaintiff’s] truck” – did not clearly constitute an “event commonly thought of as pollution.”
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White and Williams LLP
Force Majeure Under the Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic
March 29, 2021 —
Lindsay T. Watkins - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCAs COVID-19 disrupts work and life as we know it, the question many contractors have is what protections are available against the inevitable project impacts and delays? Generally, construction contracts require a contractor to timely perform work until project completion or potentially face damages (liquidated or actual) and possible termination. When events occur, however, that are beyond our control (such as a national pandemic), it is important to review and understand what contract provisions or avenues are available for potential relief.
- Review Your Contract For A Force Majeure Provision.
A “force majeure” contract provision is commonly included in construction contracts, service agreements, purchase orders, etc. It typically covers events or conditions that can be neither anticipated nor controlled. These provisions, however, will vary greatly from contract to contract and may not include the language “force majeure” but rather may be included in general delay or impact clauses. For example, some common provisions include:
- Washington State Department of Transportation Clause (2018 Standard Specifications for Road, Bridge and Municipal Construction): The Contractor shall rebuild, repair, restore, and make good all damages to any portion of the permanent or temporary Work occurring before the Physical Completion Date and shall bear all the expense to do so, except damage to the permanent Work caused by: (a) acts of God, such as earthquake, floods, or other cataclysmic phenomenon of nature, or (b) acts of the public enemy or of governmental authorities; or (c) slides in cases where Section 2-03.3(11) is applicable; Provided, however, that these exceptions shall not apply should damages result from the Contractor’s failure to take reasonable precautions or to exercise sound engineering and construction practices in conducting the Work.
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Lindsay T. Watkins, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCMs. Watkins may be contacted at
Lindsay.Watkins@acslawyers.com
They Say Nothing Lasts Forever, but What If Decommissioning Does?
June 10, 2019 —
Stella Pulman - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law BlogThe looming decommissioning liabilities of offshore energy producers have been a focus of the federal government in recent years. One recent case out of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, Taylor Energy v. United States, highlights the tension between the federal government’s desire to maintain financial security for decommissioning activities, and that of an operator whose security is tied up indefinitely while the government awaits technological advances to allow for safe decommissioning.
The case relates to a trust agreement between Taylor Energy and the United States, established to secure Taylor’s decommissioning liabilities for 28 wells in the Gulf of Mexico. Taylor completed certain decommissioning work for which it was reimbursed by the trust. However, with over $400 million remaining in the trust, Taylor and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) concluded that the ecological benefits of further decommissioning would be outweighed by the ecological risks. But despite recognizing that the limitations of current technology made the environmental impacts of further decommissioning work unjustifiable, the BSEE declined to release Taylor from its decommissioning obligations and instead decided to await “changes in technology and a better understanding of the undersea environment.” Because Taylor’s decommissioning obligations remained in place, the U.S. refused to release the remaining funds in the trust.
Taylor claimed that the United States should release the remaining funds in the trust because “decommissioning the remaining wells is not ‘currently technologically feasible.’” Taylor asserted that Louisiana law applied to the trust agreement, and that under Louisiana law every contract must be completed within an ascertainable term. By holding the trust funds until decommissioning was complete, Taylor argued that the government was essentially holding the funds in perpetuity given the technological infeasibility of completing decommissioning. Taylor also asserted that the agreement was premised on an impossibility (the full decommissioning of the wells), and/or a mutual mistake of the parties (that the wells could be decommissioned).
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Stella Pulman, PillsburyMs. Pulman may be contacted at
stella.pulman@pillsburylaw.com
DC Circuit Issues Two Important Clean Air Act and Administrative Law Decisions
December 16, 2019 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelThe U.S. Court of Appeals or the District of Columbia has recently issued two important rulings on the Clean Air Act in particular and administrative law in general: California Communities Against Toxics, et al., v. EPA and Murray Energy Corporation v. EPA.
The Battle of the Memos: Seitz Makes Way for Wehrum
In the California Communities case, decided on August 20, 2019, the court held, in a 2 to 1 decision, that a petition to review a change in EPA policy announced in an agency memorandum which reversed an agency policy announced nearly 25 years ago in another agency memo must be rejected because the memo at issue was not a “final agency action” subject to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). In 1995, the “Seitz Memo,” which interpreted Section 112 of the Clean Air Act and addresses the regulation and control of hazardous air pollutants from stationary sources, stated that once a source of toxic emissions is classified as “major,” the facility remains subject to regulation as a major source even if the facility makes changes to the facility to limit its potential to emit such toxics below the major source threshold. Then, in 2018 under a new administration, the “Wehrum Memorandum” was issued which reversed this policy and its interpretation of the law. (Both memos were issued without any kind of advance notice or opportunity to comment.) If a source takes steps to limit its potential to emit, then it may be regulated as an area source, and subject to less rigid regulation. The court majority held that the Wehrum Memo was not a final agency action and was not subject to judicial review when it was measured against both prongs of the “finality test” devised by the Supreme Court in the cases of Bennet v. Spear, 520 US 154 (1997) and US Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016). While the memo undoubtedly represented the consummation of the agency’s decision-making process, the memo had no direct and appreciable legal consequences, and not therefore being a final action, the case must be dismissed. Judge Rogers filed a strong dissenting opinion.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
Bally's Secures Funding for $1.7B Chicago Casino and Hotel Project
August 12, 2024 —
Annemarie Mannion - Engineering News-RecordPlans for a $1.7-billion casino and adjacent 34-story hotel are advancing in Chicago as the gaming operator reports it has secured $940 million to complete funding for the project and has set demolition for a printing press building now occupying the site for this summer.
Reprinted courtesy of
Annemarie Mannion, Engineering News-Record
Ms. Mannion may be contacted at manniona@enr.com
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Reasonable Expectations – Pennsylvania’s Case by Case Approach to the Sutton Rule
February 12, 2024 —
Melissa Kenney - The Subrogation StrategistIn Mutual Benefit Ins. Co. a/s/o Michael Sacks v. Koser, No. 1340 MDA 2023, 2023 Pa. Super. LEXIS 574, 2023 PA Super 252 (Mutual Benefit), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania discussed whether a landlord’s property insurer could file a subrogation action against tenants that had negligently damaged the landlord’s property. Despite there being more than one clause in the lease holding the tenants liable for the damages, the court held that because there was a provision requiring the landlord, not the tenants, to insure the leased building, the insurer could not subrogate against the tenants.
In Pennsylvania, a tenant’s liability for damage to a leased premises in a subrogation action brought by a landlord’s insurer is determined by the reasonable expectation of the parties to the lease agreement. Under this approach, to determine if subrogation is permitted, the court considers the circumstances of the case and examines the terms of the lease agreement.
In Mutual Benefit, the tenants leased and resided in a residential home pursuant to a lease agreement. The lease specifically addressed insurance, stating that landlord was responsible for obtaining insurance on the dwelling and the landlord’s personal property, and tenants were encouraged to procure separate insurance for their personal property. The lease also addressed liability for damage to the leased property, stating generally that the tenants were responsible for damage caused by the tenants’ negligence.
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Melissa Kenney, White and WilliamsMs. Kenney may be contacted at
kenneyme@whiteandwilliams.com
Remand of Bad Faith Claim Evidences Split Among Florida District Courts
September 04, 2018 —
Michael S. Levine & Daniel Hentschel - Hunton Insurance Recovery BlogWhether an insurance bad faith claim, joined by amendment to an underlying insurance coverage action, may be removed more than a year after the original action was begun has divided federal judges in the state of Florida but has not yet been considered by the Eleventh Circuit. Now, a new opinion out of the Middle District of Florida (Jacksonville Division) has added to the debate.
Reprinted courtesy of
Michael S. Levine, Hunton Andrews Kurth and
Daniel Hentschel, Hunton Andrews Kurth
Mr. Levine may be contacted at mlevine@HuntonAK.com
Mr. Hentschel may be contacted at dhentschel@HuntonAK.com
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