Supreme Court of California Rules That Trial Court Lacking Subject Matter Jurisdiction May Properly Grant Anti-SLAPP Motion on That Basis, and Award Attorney’s Fees
January 19, 2017 —
David W. Evans & Stephen J. Squillario - Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Barry v. The State Bar of California (No. S214058 – 1/5/2017), the California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of the State Bar of California’s (“State Bar”) underlying anti-SLAPP motion (Code of Civil Procedure §425.16) on the grounds that plaintiff Patricia Barry (“Barry”), an attorney, had failed to show a probability of prevailing because, among other reasons, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Barry’s claims. The Court confirmed that the absence of subject matter jurisdiction did not prevent a trial court from basing a decision to grant an anti-SLAPP motion on that ground, or to award the prevailing defendant its attorney’s fees.
Reprinted courtesy of
David W. Evans, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Stephen J. Squillario, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Evans may be contacted at devans@hbblaw.com
Mr. Squillario may be contacted at ssquillario@hbblaw.com
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California Appeals Court Remands Fine in Late Completion Case
November 18, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFThe California Court of Appeals in Stanislaus County has reversed the decision of the lower court in Greg Opinski Construction Inc. v. City of Oakdale. The earlier court had awarded the city of judgment of $54,000 for late completion, $3,266 for repair of construction defects and interest, and $97,775 in attorneys’ fees. The late completion of the project was due to actions by the City of Oakdale, however, the court rejected Opinski’s argument that the California Supreme Court decision in Kiewit did not allow this, as his contract with the city established a procedure for claiming extensions.
The appeals court noted that the Kiewit decision has been “criticized as an unwarranted interference in the power of contracting parties to shift the risk of delays caused by one party onto the other party by forcing the second party to give the first notice of any intention to claim an extension of time based on delays caused by first.” They cited Sweet, a professor at Boalt Hall, UC Berkeley’s law school, that Kiewit “gutted” the “provision that conditions the contractor’s right to claim an extension of time for delays beyond his control.”
Further changes in California law in response to the Kiewit decision lead to the current situation which the court characterized as “if the contractor wished to claim it needed an extension of time because of delays caused by the city, the contractor was required to obtain a written change order by mutual consent or submit a claim in writing requesting a formal decision by the engineer.”
Opinski also argued that the lower court misinterpreted the contract. The Appeals court replied that “Opinski is mistaken.” He cited parts of the contract regarding the increase of time, but the court rejected these, noting that “an inability to agree is not the same as an express rejection.”
The court also rejects Opinski’s appeal that “the evidence the project was complete earlier than September 30, 2005, is weightier than the evidence to the contrary,” which they describe as “not a winning appellate argument.” The court points out that the role of an appeals court is not to reweigh the evidence, but to determine “whether the record contains substantial evidence in support of the judgment.”
The court did side with Opinski on one question of the escrow account. They rejected most of his arguments, repeating the line “Opinski is mistaken” several times. They decided that he was mistaken on the timing of the setoff decision and on whether the city was the prevailing party. However, the appeals court did find that Opinski was not liable for interest on the judgment.
The appeals court rejected the awarding of prejudgment interest to the city as the funds from which the judgment was drawn was held in an escrow account. The court noted that the city had access to the funds and could “access the funds when it determined that Opinski had breached the contract.” The appeals court noted that the judgment exhausted the escrow balance and remanded the case to the lower court to determine the amount own to Opinski.
Read the court’s decision…
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The Families First Coronavirus Response Act: What Every Employer Should Know
April 06, 2020 —
Donald A. Velez, Karissa L. Fox & Sarah K. Carpenter - Smith CurrieSmith Currie provides this update regarding the Families First Coronavirus Response Act as part of its continuing effort to monitor developments concerning the Coronavirus disease (“COVID-19”) and provide guidance as to potential issues that may arise in businesses across the United States.
On March 18, 2020, President Trump signed into law the Families First Coronavirus Response Act (the “Act”), which contains provisions requiring certain private employers to provide paid leave to employees who cannot work because of Coronavirus, expanding Family and Medical Leave Act coverage, providing for federal tax credits to affected employers, and providing eligible states the ability to further fund their unemployment trust fund accounts. The Act is effective as of April 2, 2020 and will remain in place through December 31, 2020.
Below, we provide a summary of the Act and several of its key components, including the Emergency Family and Medical Leave Expansion Act (“EFMLEA”), the Emergency Paid Sick Leave Act, and the Emergency Unemployment Insurance Stabilization and Access Act.
Reprinted courtesy of Smith Currie attorneys
Donald A. Velez,
Karissa L. Fox and
Sarah K. Carpenter
Mr. Velez may be contacted at davelez@smithcurrie.com
Ms. Fox may be contacted at klfox@smithcurrie.com
Ms. Carpenter may be contacted at skcarpenter@smithcurrie.com
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CGL Insurer’s Duty to Defend Insured During Pre-Suit 558 Process: Maybe?
December 20, 2017 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesIn earlier postings, I discussed the issue of whether Florida Statutes Chapter 558′s pre-suit construction defects process triggers a CGL insurer’s duty to defend. The issue was whether Florida’s 558 pre-suit notice of a construction defect and repair process met the definition of “suit” within a standard CGL policy.
A standard CGL policy defines the term “suit” as:
“Suit” means a civil proceeding in which damages because of “bodily injury,” “property damage” or “personal and advertising injury” to which this insurance applies are alleged. “Suit” includes:
a. An arbitration proceeding in which such damages are claimed and to which the insured must submit or does submit with our consent; or
b. Any other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in which such damages are claimed and to which the insured submits with our consent.
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David Adelstein, Florida Construction Legal UpdatesMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dadelstein@gmail.com
Federal Judge Issues Preliminary Injunction Blocking State's Enforcement of New Law Banning Mandatory Employee Arbitration Agreements
February 24, 2020 —
Amy R. Patton, Jeffrey K. Brown & Tyler B. Runge - Payne & FearsOn January 31, 2020, Judge Kimberly Mueller issued a preliminary injunction "in full" preventing the State of California from enforcing AB 51, the state's new law effectively banning mandatory employee arbitration agreements.
As we previously reported, AB 51 adds section 432.6 to the Labor Code and section 12953 to the Government Code, which together prohibit employers from requiring an employee, as a condition of employment, continued employment, or receipt of employment-related benefits, to waive any right, forum, or procedure to pursue a claim under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act or the Labor Code. In other words, AB 51 bans mandatory employment arbitration agreements for employment-related claims.
In early December 2019, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and a coalition of business organizations sued the state of California in federal court in a bid to have AB 51 declared preempted --- and therefore unenforceable --- by the Federal Arbitration Act. The case is Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Becerra, Case No. 2:19-cv-2456 KJM DB (E.D. Cal.).
On December 30, 2019, Judge Mueller issued a temporary restraining order preventing the state from enforcing AB 51 pending the resolution of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. You can read our report
here.
Reprinted courtesy of Payne & Fears attorneys
Amy R. Patton,
Jeffrey K. Brown and
Tyler B. Runge
Ms. Patton may be contacted at arp@paynefears.com
Mr. Brown may be contacted at kb@paynefears.com
Mr. Runge may be contacted at tbr@paynefears.com
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Kahana Feld Partner Jeff Miragliotta and Senior Associate Rachael Marvin Obtain Early Dismissal of Commercial Litigation Cases in New York and New Jersey
August 26, 2024 —
Rachael Marvin - Kahana FeldKF attorneys Jeff Miragliotta and Rachael Marvin recently secured early dismissal for a commercial real estate client on pre-answer motions to dismiss for two cases involving disputes over commercial properties in Union County, New Jersey and Suffolk County, New York.
Plaintiff argued it was entitled to damages in excess of 50 million dollars, including punitive damages, for claims involving trade libel, defamation, conspiracy, and tortious interference with contract and prospective economic advantage for reports that were prepared in connection with the use of a commercial building in Union County, New Jersey. KF attorneys successfully argued that the statute of limitations had run for each of plaintiff’s claims by utilizing a decision from the Supreme Court of New Jersey in an underlying case filed against Union County.
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Rachel Marvin, Kahana FeldMs. Marvin may be contacted at
rmarvin@kahanafeld.com
Building a Case: Document Management for Construction Litigation
October 07, 2019 —
Robert A. Gallagher, Jane Fox Lehman, & Michael I. Frankel, Pepper Hamilton LLP - ConsensusDocsSuccess in construction litigation often turns less on counsel’s ability to craft legal arguments and more on counsel’s ability to gather, master and present the often complex set of facts underlying the case. In construction matters, most of the key facts are found in documents: contract documents, drawings, plans and specifications, schedules, submittals, progress reports, daily logs, change orders, invoices and payment records. Nowadays, these documents will almost certainly be created, exchanged and stored electronically; many will never exist in hard copy. As such, timely collection, organization and analysis of electronically stored information (ESI) is crucially important in construction litigation.
The construction industry has always involved a large quantity of records. Today, the majority of those records exist only as ESI: Design professionals use computer-aided design (CAD) software to create construction plans. Construction managers use Primavera or similar software to create schedules and workflows. Estimators use job cost control programs. Innovative firms capture digital photos of the project, from mobilization through the punch process.
Because ESI is created and exchanged at a higher rate than hard-copy documents, ESI has facilitated a dramatic increase in the volume of records associated with construction projects. Further compounding the increase is the proliferation of mobile devices. With a smartphone in every pocket, ESI creation has moved out of the home office and the site trailer and onto the site itself. As the volume of ESI expands, so too does the time and expense associated with storing, processing, reviewing and producing these records. This article will cover strategies for balancing time and expense with the requirements of the rules and the needs of the case.
Reprinted courtesy of Pepper Hamilton LLP attorneys
Robert A. Gallagher,
Jane Fox Lehman and
Michael I. Frankel
Mr. Gallagher may be contacted at gallagherr@pepperlaw.com
Ms. Lehman may be contacted at lehmanj@pepperlaw.com
Mr. Frankel may be contacted at frankelm@pepperlaw.com
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California Supreme Court Finds that When it Comes to Intentional Interference Claims, Public Works Projects are Just Different, Special Even
November 21, 2017 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogOriginally published by CDJ on April 20, 2017
Earlier, we reported on a California Court of Appeals decision – Roy Allan Slurry Seal, Inc. v. American Asphalt South, Inc. – which held for the first time that a second-place bidder on a public works contract could sue a winning bidder who failed to pay its workers prevailing wages, under the business tort of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage.
Fast forward nearly two years, several amicus briefs, and “one doghouse”* later and the California Supreme Court has . . . reversed.
The Roy Allan Slurry Seal Case
To catch you up, or rather, refresh your recollection . . .
Between 2009 and 2012, American Asphalt South, Inc. was awarded 23 public works contracts totaling more than $14.6 million throughout Los Angeles, Orange, San Bernardino and San Diego counties. Two of the losing bidders on those projects – Roy Allan Slurry Seal, Inc. and Doug Martin Contracting, Inc. – sued American in each of these counties for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage as well as under the Unfair Practices Act (“UPA”) (Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17000 et seq.) and the Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) (Bus. & Prof. Code §17200).
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Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
