Insurers Get “Floored” by Court of Appeals Regarding the Presumptive Measure of Damages in Consent Judgments
May 13, 2014 —
Mark Scheer and Brent Williams-Ruth – Scheer & Zehnder LLPCASE: Miller v. Kenny, 68594-5-I, 2014 WL 1672946 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2014).
Snapshot Synopsis: $21 million bad faith consent judgment verdict upheld. $4.15 million underlying stipulated consent judgment was the “floor,” and additional damages allowed.
ISSUES:
1. Can a jury award damages for an insurer’s bad faith in excess of the amount of the stipulated covenant judgment? YES
2. Can a trial court admit evidence of insurance liability reserves in a bad faith action? YES
3. *Note: Other evidentiary and procedural issues were addressed by the court in its decision but not analyzed in this summary*
FACTS: This appeal arose out of an automobile accident on August 23, 2000. Patrick Kenny was driving a 1994 Volkswagen Passat owned by one of the passengers, when he rear-ended a cement truck. The accident severely injured his three passengers: Ryan Miller, Ashley Bethards, and Cassandra Peterson. Kenny was covered for liability under the insurance policy issued to Peterson's parents by Safeco Insurance Company. Safeco defended Kenny without a reservation of rights.
Reprinted courtesy of
Mark Scheer, Scheer & Zehnder LLP and
Brent Williams-Ruth, Scheer & Zehnder LLP
Mr. Scheer may be contacted at mscheer@scheerlaw.com; Mr. Williams-Ruth may be contacted at bwilliamsruth@scheerlaw.com
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Tarriffs, a Pandemic and War: Construction Contracts Must Withstand the Unforeseeable
May 16, 2022 —
Brett Moritz, Adrian Bastianelli III & Adam Handfinger - Construction ExecutiveSince the tariffs on steel and the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, the construction industry has been reeling from the impact of material shortages and price increases, labor shortages, breakdowns in the supply chain and the inflationary effect of these issues. Unfortunately, the war in Ukraine has only exacerbated the situation.
International conflicts can constrain supply, resulting in delays and price increases for contractors, subcontractors and suppliers. The disruption caused by the war is expected to be particularly acute due to the role that Russia and Ukraine play in the world economy and the effect of the economic sanctions that have been imposed on Russia by the United States and other countries. Russia controls approximately 10% of the global copper reserves and is estimated to produce about 10% of the world’s nickel supply. It also provides at least 30% of Europe’s oil and natural gas. Ukraine is a significant source of raw materials, such as iron. Thus, the war will cause significant shortages and price increases to the global construction industry. There are already reports of delays and cost increases for commodities such as nickel, aluminum, copper and—most importantly—steel, which have resulted in impacts to construction costs and schedules. Suppliers are especially sensitive to the volatile markets caused by these conditions. Some are insisting on automatic price increases in their purchase orders.
All of this, not to mention the anticipation of what may come next, points to the necessity for a new paradigm to achieve a successful project. It is more important today than ever that owners, contractors, subcontractors and suppliers reasonably address the economic and time impacts of these unforeseeable events in preparing contracts for future work and in administering existing contracts. Otherwise, the risk of a default on more than one level may put projects in jeopardy, to no one’s benefit.
Reprinted courtesy of
Construction Executive, a publication of Associated Builders and Contractors. All rights reserved.
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Insurers' Motion to Determine Lack of Occurrence Fails
August 19, 2024 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe federal district court, interpreting Massachusetts law, found there were genuine issues of fact as to whether the insured's mixing of biodiesel with home heating fuel was an occurrence. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Peterson's Oil Serv., Inc., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106980 (D. Mass. June 17, 2024).
Homeowners sued Peterson's Oil Service, alleging that Peterson sold them fuel for home heating which contained more that 5% biodiesel. The homeowners further alleged that fuel containing more than 5% biodiesel did not meet industry standards and caued damage to their home heating equipment. Peterson allegedly did not fully disclose the presence of biodiesel in their fuel, despite knowing the risk posed by high-biodiesel blended fuel.
The insurers, United States Fire Insurance Company and The North River Insurance Company, defended Peterson under a reservation of rights. United States Fire issued priomary policies with limits of $1,000,000 per occurrence and $2,000,000 as a general aggregate limit. An endorsement titled "Limited Coverage - Failure to Supply" limited the amount covered for "property damage arising out of the failure of any insured to adequately supply gas, oil, water, electricty or steam" to $250,000. North River issued umbrella policies with additional coverage in the amount of $15,000,000 per occurrnce and in the aggregate if property damage was caused by an occurrence. The umbrella policies also contained a "Failure to Supply Exclusion" which excluded coverage for "property damage arising out of the failure of an insured to adequately supply gas, oil, water, electricty or steam."
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Meet Your Future Team Members: AI Agents
December 10, 2024 —
Aarni Heiskanen - AEC BusinessIf you’ve been following the discussion around AI, you’re familiar with the concept of AI agents.
AI agents can be understood as intelligent automation that operates independently, monitoring its environment and taking action without constant human input. Unlike traditional software requiring specific inputs to produce predictable outputs, AI agents can adapt to varying conditions and user needs.
AI agents can be based on various technologies, including Large Language Models. They can also be constructed using other AI technologies, such as rule-based systems, machine learning algorithms, and specialized models tailored to specific tasks.
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Aarni Heiskanen, AEC BusinessMr. Heiskanen may be contacted at
aec-business@aepartners.fi
SunCal Buys Oak Knoll Development for the Second Time
May 19, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFAccording to the San Francisco Business Times, “Irvine-based SunCal has now bought the same site twice: once in 2005 for $100.5 million and again last week from the Lehman Brothers estate.” Suncal’s original plan to develop the 167-acre Oakland Hills, California project “fell apart after Lehman declared bankruptcy in 2008.”
The San Francisco Business Times reported that the “former naval hospital site” has “the potential for more than 900 homes.” The former design included “960 homes, 82,000 square feet of commercial and retail space, and 50 acres of parks and open space.”
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Apartment Construction Ominously Nears 25-Year High
August 27, 2014 —
Karen Weise – BloombergIf you live in a major U.S. city and look out over the skyline, chances are good you’ll see construction cranes. Lots of them. Only twice in the past 25 years have new apartment buildings been going up as fast as they are right now. That’s not necessarily a good omen. The first time, in February 2000, was right before the dot-com bubble burst. The second time, January 2006, came right before the housing bubble burst. Now we learn that builders broke ground on 423,000 new multifamily units in July, right before … who knows what?
Monthly building data released earlier this week by the Census Bureau and the Department of Housing and Urban Development showed that new home construction overall posted strong gains in July, with the highest number of new home starts in eight months. The comeback largely manifested in an uptick in apartment buildings with five or more units, which saw an almost 50 percent increase in new starts in July over a year earlier. By comparison, starts on single-family homes were up only about 10 percent over the same period.
That’s part of the reason that the Northeast, with its large, dense cities, saw the biggest monthly increase, up 44 percent from June. That matches the analysis by Trulia (TRLA) Chief Economist Jed Kolko, who found that among metro areas, Boston and New York are building more than in the past.
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Karen Weise, BloombergMs. Weise may be contacted at
kweise@bloomberg.net
Virginia Chinese Drywall “property damage” caused by an “occurrence” and number of “occurrences”
August 04, 2011 —
CDCoverage.comIn Dragas Management Corp. v. Hanover Insurance Co., No. 2:10cv547 (E.D. Va. July 21, 2011), claimant residential home general contractor and developer DMC filed for arbitration against insured drywall supply and install subcontractor Porter-Blaine seeking damages for (1) the replacement of defective Chinese drywall, and (2) the repair of resulting property to other components of the DMC homes and homeowners’ personal property in seventy-four homes. Porter-Blaine’s CGL insurer Citizens and excess insurer Hanover defended Porter-Blaine in the DMC arbitration.
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
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Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Balestreri, Potocki, & Holmes
