Traub Lieberman Partner Colleen Hastie and Associate Jeffrey George Successfully Oppose Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate Dismissal
September 11, 2023 —
Colleen E. Hastie & Jeffrey George - Traub LiebermanTraub Lieberman Partner Colleen Hastie and Associate Jeffrey George successfully opposed Plaintiff’s motion to vacate a prior dismissal of plaintiff’s medical malpractice action brought before the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Bronx County.
The lawsuit, commenced by Plaintiff in 2015, alleged medical malpractice stemming from treatment Plaintiff received at a New York medical facility after falling out of a window at a rental property owned by Traub Lieberman’s client (“Property Owner”). Property Owner moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint or preclude Plaintiff from offering evidence in support of its claims, or in the alternative, compel plaintiff to produce all outstanding discovery. The Medical Facility cross-moved for the same relief. Defendants agreed to adjourn the motion until after plaintiff’s deposition, but plaintiff made no effort to secure an adjournment with the court and plaintiff filed no opposition to the motion, allowing the motion to be granted on default. Plaintiff waited nearly a year to file a motion to vacate the default judgment, despite receiving notification of the default from defense counsel. Property Owner, in opposing plaintiff’s motion, pointed to plaintiff’s long history of dilatory conduct and failure to comply with discovery orders in support of its position that plaintiff failed to show any good cause for its default on the motion to dismiss.
Reprinted courtesy of
Colleen E. Hastie, Traub Lieberman and
Jeffrey George, Traub Lieberman
Ms. Hastie may be contacted at chastie@tlsslaw.com
Mr. George may be contacted at jgeorge@tlsslaw.com
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Insurer's Bad Faith is Actionable Tort for Purposes of Choice of Law Analysis
January 08, 2024 —
Janeen M. Thomas - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.When an insurer handles a claim in violation of its duty to act in good faith, policyholders are often eager to sue the insurer for bad faith, seeking extra contractual damages. Before filing suit, however, it is critical that policyholders consider what state’s law applies to the bad faith claim.
In the recent case of Scott Fetzer Co. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., Inc.1, the Ohio Supreme Court held that Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws, § 145 (“Section 145"), governed the choice of law dispute, which meant that the insured would be able to obtain discovery of Travelers’ claims-handling procedures, guidelines, internal documents, and communications relating to the claim.2 The insured, Scott Fetzer, argued that the materials were discoverable because documents evidencing an insurer’s bad faith are not protected by attorney-client privilege in Ohio. In response, Travelers argued that the laws of either Indiana (the place where the parties entered into the insurance contract), or Michigan (the location of the insured risk) governed the discovery dispute because Restatement (Second) § 193 (“Section 193”) governs the choice of law analysis for claims that “arise out of insurance contracts.”3 The laws of either Indiana or Michigan were more favorable for Travelers because Indiana does not allow discovery of materials covered by attorney-client privilege, and Michigan does not even recognize a cause of action for bad faith.
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Janeen M. Thomas, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Mr. Thomas may be contacted at
JThomas@sdvlaw.com
Awarding Insurer Summary Judgment Before Discovery Completed Reversed
August 29, 2022 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe Florida Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's awarding of summary judgment to the insurer because discovery was not completed. Sacramento v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 2022 Fla. App. LEXIS 4292 (Fla. Ct. App. June 22, 2022).
The insured filed a claim under the all-risk policy for water damage caused by Hurricane Irma. Citizens denied the claim based upon a policy exclusion. The insured filed suit on March 8, 2019.
On April 24, 2020, Citizens moved for summary judgment. A hearing was set for August 10, 2020. Citizens filed a notice for a deposition of a Mitigation Company representative scheduled to occur on December 1, 2020. On August 14, 2020, the insured filed an opposition to the summary judgment motion arguing that it would be premature to grant the motion because there were still pending depositions. The insured specifically requested that the trial court not enter summary judgment until the mitigation company's representative was deposed because he was a key witness who would be testifying regarding the cause of loss.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
N.J. Appellate Court Applies Continuous Trigger Theory in Property Damage Case and Determines “Last Pull” for Coverage
November 15, 2017 —
K. Alexandra Byrd – Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, published an important decision addressing several fundamental issues regarding how a commercial general liability (CGL) policy applies to long-term property damage. The court held that: (1) a continuous trigger theory of coverage may be applied to third-party liability claims involving progressive property damage caused by an insured’s allegedly defective work; (2) the “last pull” (i.e., the cutoff point) of the continuous trigger is when the “essential nature and scope” of the property damage first becomes known or could reasonably be known; and (3) the “last pull” is not when the property damage is “attributed” to the insured’s faulty work.
The underlying action in Air Master & Cooling Inc. v. Selective Ins. Co., et al. 1 concerned property damage arising out of the construction of a seven-story, 101-unit condominium building in Montclair, New Jersey. The project’s construction manager hired Air Master & Cooling, Inc. (Air Master) to perform HVAC work on the project, including installing individual HVAC equipment in each resident’s unit from 2005 to 2008. In early 2008, unit owners began complaining about water infiltration and damage to their windows, ceilings, and other portions of their units. The general contractor and developer began assessing the damage and making repairs. Eventually, in April 2010, an expert consultant performed a moisture survey of the roof and discovered 111 areas that were damaged by water infiltration. The expert report indicated that “it [was] impossible to determine when [the] moisture infiltration occurred.”
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K. Alexandra Byrd, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Ms. Byrd may be contacted at
kab@sdvlaw.com
Coronavirus and Contract Obligations
March 30, 2020 —
David R. Cook - AHC Construction and Procurement BlogThe Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has caused a global disruption to businesses, causing many to temporarily close and lay off employees. As businesses assess the short– and long–term economic impact of COVID-19, they should also evaluate what contractual obligations and remedies are available under various agreements (e.g., leases, vendor agreements, and supply agreements). When performance may be delayed or may not occur altogether, businesses should consider their force majeure clauses, if any, and the doctrines of impossibility, impracticability, and frustration of purpose.
Force Majeure
Generally, unless a contract provides that performance will be suspended or relieved when certain events occur (e.g., “acts of God,” government regulation, acts of war or terror, strikes), each party is obligated to perform. However, when there is an express force majeure provision, certain events or acts may excuse non-performance or delayed performance. But depending on the jurisdiction, courts may construe force majeure provisions narrowly and excuse performance only for those events expressly listed in the clause. Nonetheless, if the force majeure provision includes pandemic, epidemic, quarantine, government act, disease, or similar terms, then the COVID-19 pandemic may excuse performance or allow delayed performance.
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David R. Cook, Autry, Hall & Cook, LLPMr. Cook may be contacted at
cook@ahclaw.com
Triple Points to the English Court of Appeal for Clarifying the Law on LDs
July 01, 2019 —
Vincent C. Zabielski & Julia Kalinina Belcher - Gravel2GavelCan an employer recover liquidated damages (LDs) from a contractor if the contract terminates before the contractor completes the work?
Surprisingly, heretofore, English law provided no clear answer to this seemingly straightforward question, and inconsistent case law over the past century has left a trail of confusion. Given the widespread use of English law in international construction contracts, this uncertainty had gone on far too long.
The good news is that drafters of construction contracts throughout the world can now have a well-deserved good night’s sleep courtesy of the English Court of Appeal’s March 2019 decision in Triple Point Technology, Inc. v PTT Public Company Ltd [2019] EWCA Civ 230.
The Triple Point case concerned the delayed supply by Triple Point (the “Contractor”) of a new software system to employer PTT. The contract provided for payments upon achievement of milestones, however order forms incorporated into the contract set out the calendar dates on which fixed amounts were payable by PTT, resulting in an apparently contradictory requirements on when payment was due. Triple Point achieved completion (149 days late) of a portion of the work milestones, and were paid for that work. Triple Point then sought payment for the work which was not yet completed, relying on the calendar dates in the order forms rather than achievement of milestone payments. Things got progressively worse as PTT refused payment, Triple Point suspended the work for PTT’s failure to pay, PTT terminated the contract and then appointed a new contractor to complete the work.
Reprinted courtesy of
Vincent C. Zabielski, Pillsbury and
Julia Kalinina Belcher, Pillsbury
Mr. Zabielski may be contacted at vincent.zabielski@pillsburylaw.com
Ms. Belcher may be contacted at julia.belcher@pillsburylaw.com
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Keeping Detailed Records: The Best Defense to Constructive Eviction
October 24, 2023 —
Ben T. Welch & Ken Brown - Snell & WilmerInevitably, commercial property owners and managers will be faced with a claim by a tenant of constructive eviction. This article is intended to describe what constructive eviction is and to suggest what owners and managers can do to prepare for, and ward off, such claims.
Constructive eviction occurs where a tenant’s “right of possession and enjoyment” of the leasehold is disrupted by the landlord in a manner that renders the premises “unsuitable for the purposes intended.”i Put another way, it is interference that is so “substantial nature and so injurious as to deprive the tenant of the beneficial enjoyment of a part or the whole of the demised premises.”ii Although easy to describe in theory, constructive eviction can be devilishly difficult to determine in the real world. In litigation, determining when interference crosses over the line to constructive eviction is intensely fact-sensitive and resists sweeping generalizations.iii
For instance, Utah courts have held that tenants have been constructively evicted when they have been subjected to continual harassment or insults by the landlord or the landlord’s agent,iv prevented or impaired in their access to the leased premises during operating hours,v or when a landlord fails to provide an operable elevator (or other essential commercial amenities) necessary for a tenant’s business operations.vi By contrast, claims of “discomfort” or “inconvenience” have been rejected as a basis for constructive eviction.vii The same goes for claims that a landlord wrongfully served a three-day notice to pay or quit.viii
Generally, constructive eviction is an affirmative defense made in response to a landlord’s lawsuit for nonpayment of rent.ix It is not, as is commonly supposed, a basis for a tenant’s premature abandonment of the premises. In other words, the defense is raised after the tenant has vacated as a result of being effectively “evicted.”x Further, the defense requires the tenant to actually abandon the premises and do so within a “reasonable time” after the alleged interference.xi A tenant cannot stay in possession and simply refuse to pay rent on the basis of constructive eviction.xii
The key consideration in preparing for, and responding to, a claim of constructive eviction is keeping good records. A tenant claiming constructive evicting likely must prove that the issue was raised in a timely manner and, despite multiple entreaties, was never resolved.xiii As such, it is critical that landlords acknowledge tenant complaints as well as document in writing their efforts to ameliorate those complaints. While a landlord does not carry the burden of proof for constructive eviction, detailed documentation can thwart a tenant’s claim that a landlord has been inattentive or unwilling to address the tenant’s concerns.
Detailed records are also useful in disputes where a tenant claims substantial interference. “The whole point of constructive eviction is that the landlord basically drove the tenant out through the landlord’s action or inaction.”xiv As such, a landlord that is unable to document the steps taken in response to complaints will be grossly disadvantaged whereas the tenant, which had control and knowledge of the premises, will have a much easier time describing how the alleged interference deprived them of enjoying the premises.
Even with meticulous records, however, owners and managers may still face claims of construction eviction. In such instances, counsel should be retained to properly advise on compiling, preserving, and employing the evidence necessary to refute the tenant’s claims.
i Gray v. Oxford Worldwide Grp., Inc., 139 P.3d 267, 269 (Utah Ct. App. 2006).
ii Gray, 139 P.3d at 270 (citing Neslen, 254 P.2d at 850) (internal formatting omitted).
iii See Gray, 139 P.3d at 269–70 (citing Thirteenth & Washington Sts. Corp. v. Neslen, 254 P.2d 847, 850 (Utah 1953)); Brugger v. Fonoti, 645 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1982).
iv See Gray, 139 P.3d at 270–71.
v Thirteenth & Washington Sts. Corp. v. Neslen, 254 P.2d 847 (Utah 1953).
vi See Richard Barton Enterprises, Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 375, 378 (Utah 1996) (citing Union City Union Suit Co. v. Miller, 162 A.D.2d 101, 556 N.Y.S.2d 864 (1990)).
vii See Myrah v. Campbell, 163 P.3d 679, 682–84 (Utah Ct. App. 2007).
viii Barton v. MTB Enterprises, 889 P.2d 476, 477 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); see also Brugger, 645 P.2d at 648 (stating that the tenant’s complaints revolved around standard problems commonly associated with building maintenance and did not rise to the level of substantial interference); viv Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 898–900 (Utah 1989) (upholding trial court’s findings of fact concerning insufficiency of disruption so as to justify claim for constructive eviction).
ix See Kenyon v. Regan, 826 P.2d 140, 142 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
x See Kenyon, 826 P.2d at 142.
xi See Kenyon, 826 P.2d at 142; see also Barton v. MTB Enterprises, Inc., 889 P.2d 476, 477 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Brugger, 645 P.2d at 648.
xii See Kenyon, 826 P.2d at 142 (citing Fernandez v. Purdue, 518 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah 1974)).
xiii See Brugger, 645 P.2d at 648 (noting that while the tenant had raised legitimate issues concerning state of the premises, the landorld had taken steps to remedy the problems within a reasonable time) (citing 49 Am.Jur.2d, Landlord and Tenant, § 617).
xiv Barton, 889 P.2d at 477.
Reprinted courtesy of
Ben T. Welch, Snell & Wilmer and
Ken Brown, Snell & Wilmer
Mr. Welch may be contacted at bwelch@swlaw.com
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BofA Said to Near Mortgage Deal for Up to $17 Billion
August 06, 2014 —
Tom Schoenberg – BloombergBank of America Corp. is nearing a $16 billion to $17 billion settlement with the U.S. Justice Department to resolve probes into sales of mortgage-backed bonds in the run-up to the financial crisis, a person familiar with the matter said.
Under the proposed terms, the bank would pay about $9 billion in cash and the rest in consumer relief to settle federal and state claims, according to the person, who asked not to be named because the negotiations are private. Details of the proposed accord, such as the relief and a statement of facts, are still being negotiated, the person said.
The outlines of the deal were reached last week after a phone call between Attorney General Eric Holder and Bank of America Chief Executive Officer Brian T. Moynihan, the person said. During the July 30 call, Holder said that the government was ready to file a lawsuit in New Jersey if the bank didn’t offer an amount closer to the department’s demand of about $17 billion, according to the person.
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Tom Schoenberg, BloombergMr. Schoenberg may be contacted at
tschoenberg@bloomberg.net
