When is a “Notice of Completion” on a California Private Works Construction Project Valid? Why Does It Matter for My Collection Rights?
January 27, 2020 —
William L. Porter - Porter Law GroupWhat is a Notice of Completion?
A “notice of completion” is a document recorded by the owner of property where construction work was performed. Specifically, it is recorded at the Office of the County Recorder in the County where the work was performed. The notice of completion tells the world at large that the construction project is complete. It also triggers the deadlines for those who have not been paid to make their claims for payment.
Is an Owner of a California Private Works Project Required to Record a Notice of Completion?
No, there is no requirement that an owner of a California private works construction project record a Notice of Completion. However, there are consequences which depend on whether an Owner elects to record the notice or not.
For My Collection Rights, Why Does it Matter Whether a Notice of Completion Has Been Recorded?
The date of recording of a valid notice of completion sets the deadline for those who have not been paid for work performed and materials supplied to a California construction project to pursue such important collection remedies as the “mechanics lien”, the “stop payment notice” and the “payment bond claim.” These are very powerful collection remedies for those who have not been paid. If the deadline to pursue these remedies is missed by a claimant, then the claimant’s right to pursue these remedies is also missed. One of these remedies, the mechanics lien, will enable the claimant to sell the owner’s property where the work was performed in order to get paid.
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William L. Porter, Porter Law GroupMr. Porter may be contacted at
bporter@porterlaw.com
How the Cumulative Impact Theory has been Defined
November 30, 2020 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesLargely in the federal contract arena, there is a theory referred to as “cumulative impacts” used by a contractor to recover unforeseeable costs associated with a multitude of changes that have an overwhelming ripple effect on its efficiency, particularly efficiency dealing with its original, base contract work. In other words, by dealing with extensive changes, there is an unforeseeable impact imposed on the contractor relative to its unchanged or base contract work. Under this theory, the contractor oftentimes prices its cumulative impact under a total cost approach with an examination on its cost overrun. However, this is not an easy theory to prevail on because there needs to be a focus on the sheer number of changes, causation supporting the impact, and whether there were concurrent impacts or delays that played a role in the ripple effect. See, e.g., Appeals of J.A. Jones Const. Co., ENGBCA No. 6348, 00-2 BCA P 31000 (July 7, 2000) (“However, in the vast majority of cases such claims are routinely denied because there were an insufficient number of changes, contractor-caused concurrent delays, disruptions and inefficiencies and/or a general absence of evidence of causation and impact.”).
To best articulate how the cumulative impact theory has been defined, I want to include language directly from courts and board of contract appeals that have dealt with this theory. This way the contractor knows how to best work with their experts with this definition in mind–and, yes, experts will be needed–to persuasively package and establish causation and damages stemming from the multitude of changes. While many of these definitions are worded differently, you will see they have the same focus dealing with the unforeseeable ripple effect of the extensive changes.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Liability Insurer’s Duty To Defend Insured Is Broader Than Its Duty To Indemnify
June 03, 2019 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesWhen it comes to liability insurance, an insurer’s duty to defend its insured from a third-party claim is much broader than its duty to indemnify. This broad duty to defend an insured is very important and, as an insured, you need to know this. “A liability insurer’s obligation, with respect to its duty to defend, is not determined by the insured’s actual liability but rather by whether the alleged basis of the action against the insurer falls within the policy’s coverage.” Advanced Systems, Inc. v. Gotham Ins. Co., 44 Fla. L. Weekly D996b (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (internal quotation omitted). This means:
Even where the complaint alleges facts partially within and partially outside the coverage of a policy, the insurer is nonetheless obligated to defend the entire suit, even if the facts later demonstrate that no coverage actually exists. And, the insurer must defend even if the allegations in the complaint are factually incorrect or meritless. As such, an insurer is obligated to defend a claim even if it is uncertain whether coverage exists under the policy. Furthermore, once a court finds that there is a duty to defend, the duty will continue even though it is ultimately determined that the alleged cause of action is groundless and no liability is found within the policy provisions defining coverage.
Advanced Systems, supra(internal citations and quotations omitted).
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Structural Engineer Found Liable for Defects that Rendered a Condominium Dangerously Unsafe
June 22, 2016 —
Paul R. Cressman, Jr. – Ahlers & Cressman Construction Law BlogOn May 3, 2016, the Washington State Court of Appeals affirmed a jury’s verdict in favor of a condominium HOA against a structural engineer for $1,149,332 in damages.[1]
The project in question was The Pointe, an upscale condominium building in Westport, Washington. The developer was Dodson-Duus, LLC. The architect was Elkins Architects (“Elkins”). The structural engineer was Engineers Northwest, Inc. (“ENW”). ENW contracted with Elkins for the structural engineering work.
Birds flying past 3 construction cranesBoth the design and construction of the building suffered from defects. In particular, the lateral force resistance system was insufficient to withstand a large seismic event. The defects included improperly nailed shear walls, weak connections between shear walls and floor joists, improperly-sized floor sheathing, a weak second-floor diaphragm, and omitted hold-downs connecting shear walls to a steel beam. The use of gypsum sheathing also created a risk of corrosion to the building’s steel structure. Evidence tied each of these defects to some aspect of ENW’s structural calculations and designs. Evidence also tied omission of the hold-downs to the contractor’s construction decisions.
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Paul R. Cressman, Jr., Ahlers & Cressman PLLC Mr. Cressman may be contacted at
pcressman@ac-lawyers.com
DC Circuit Upholds EPA’s Latest RCRA Recycling Rule
September 23, 2019 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelOn July 2, 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit decided the case of California Communities Against Toxics, et al. v. EPA. In this decision, the court rejected the latest petition to strike or vacate EPA’s 2018 revisions to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) hazardous waste recycling rules. In 1985, EPA promulgated a new regulatory definition of “solid waste,” which is the linchpin of the agency’s very stringent hazardous waste management rules. (See the rules located at 40 CFR Sections 260-268.) Unless a material is a “solid waste” as defined by the rules, it cannot also be a hazardous waste.
The 1985 rules grappled with the challenges posed by recycling practices, and attempted to distinguish between legitimate recycling which is not subject to hazardous waste regulation, and other more suspect forms of recycling. The rules are complex and replete with nuance. In doing so, EPA was adhering to RCRA’s statutory mandate that it develop appropriate rules to govern the treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous waste, while also promoting “properly conducted recycling and reuse.” The DC Circuit reviewed the 1985 rules in the seminal case of American Mining Congress v EPA, 824 F.2d 1177 (1987), (AMC) and stressed that only those materials that were truly discarded could be regulated as solid waste; for instance, those materials that were destined for immediate recycling or recovery in an ongoing production process were not discarded and hence were not solid waste. Over the years, the court has struggled to clarify the basic holding of AMC in numerous cases while EPA has frequently revised and amended the RCRA rules, and in particular the definition of solid waste, in an attempt to balance the policies mandated by the statute.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
#7 CDJ Topic: Truck Ins. Exchange v. O'Mailia
December 30, 2015 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFAccording to attorney
Tred R. Eyerly on a post on his
Insurance Law Hawaii blog, “The Montana Supreme Court determined there was no coverage for the insured due to a lack of property damage during the policy period.” Eyerly concluded, “Even if exposure to excessively high temperatures created a harmful condition during the policy period, the existence of that condition did not result in property damage to the water heater occurring during the policy period, and thus did not constitute an ‘occurrence’ as defined by the policy.”
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The U.S. Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals Rules on Greystone
November 18, 2011 —
Derek J. Lindenschmidt, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCOn November 1, 2011, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on the certified question of whether property damage caused by a subcontractor’s faulty workmanship is an “occurrence” for purposes of a commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy. In Greystone Const., Inc. v. National Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 09-1412 (10th Cir. Nov. 1, 2011), the Tenth Circuit determined that because damage to property caused by poor workmanship is generally neither expected nor intended, it may qualify under Colorado law as an occurrence and liability coverage should apply. Id. at 2.
The short history of the Greystone case is as follows. In Greystone Const., Inc. v. National Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 649 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (D. Colo. 2009), two contractors and one of their insurers brought an action against a second insurer after the second insurer refused to fund the contractors’ defense in construction defect actions brought by separate homeowners. Id. at 1215. The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, relying on General Sec. Indem. Co. of Arizona v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 205 P.3d 529 (Colo. App. 2009), granted summary judgment in favor of the second insurer on the basis that the homeowners’ complaints did not allege accidents that would trigger covered occurrences under the second insurer’s policies. Id. at 1220. Notably, the Greystone, General Security, and other similar decisions prompted the Colorado General Assembly to enact C.R.S. § 13-20-808, which was designed to provide guidance for courts interpreting perceived coverage conflicts between insurance policy provisions and exclusions. The statute requires courts to construe insurance policies to favor coverage if reasonably and objectively possible. C.R.S. § 13-20-808(5).
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis by determining whether C.R.S. § 13-20-808, which defines the term “accident” for purposes of Colorado insurance law, would have a retroactive effect, and thereby settle the question before the court. The Tenth Circuit gave consideration to several Colorado district court orders issued since the enactment of C.R.S. § 13-20-808 which have suggested that the statute does not apply retroactively, including Martinez v. Mike Wells Constr., No. 09cv227 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Mar. 1, 2011), and Colo. Pool. Sys., Inv. V. Scottsdale Ins. Co., No. 09cv836 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Oct. 4, 2010). The Tenth Circuit also attempted to ascertain the General Assembly’s intent behind the term “all insurance policies currently in existence...” Greystone, No. 09-1412, at 12. The Tenth Circuit determined that the General Assembly would have more clearly stated its intentions for the term if it was supposed to apply retroactively to expired policies, rather than those still running. Id. at 12-13. Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit decided that C.R.S. § 13-20-808 did not apply retroactively, but noted that “the retrospective application of the statute is not necessarily unconstitutional.” Id. at 9, 11-14. As such, the Tenth Circuit advised that it was required to decide the question presented in the appeal under the principles of Colorado insurance law. Id. at 15.
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Reprinted courtesy of Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Lindenschmidt can be contacted at lindenschmidt@hhmrlaw.com
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A New Statute of Limitations on Construction Claims by VA State Agencies?
March 27, 2019 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsI have discussed the Hensel Phelps case and the potential issues caused by both poorly drafted indemnity clauses and the lack of a statute of limitations applicable to the Commonwealth of Virginia and its agencies in 2017. New legislation (supported by various contractor groups including my friends at the AGC of Virginia) has been proposed for the 2019 General Assembly session that seeks to address at least part of this issue. While the indemnity provisions of your construction contracts can be addressed by careful drafting with the help of an experienced construction attorney, the proposed legislation (found in HB1667) seeks to address the statute of limitations issue.
The proposed legislation is described as follows:
Provides that no action may be brought by a public body on any construction contract, including construction management and design-build contracts, unless such action is brought within five years after substantial completion of the work on the project and that no action may be brought by a public body on a warranty or guarantee in such construction contract more than one year from the breach of that warranty, but in no event more than one year after the expiration of such warranty or guarantee. The bill also limits the time frame during which a public body, other than the Department of Transportation, may bring an action against a surety on a performance bond to within one year after substantial completion of the work on the project.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
