Gru Was Wrong About the Money: Court Concludes that Lender Owes Contractor “Contractually, Factually and Practically”
November 07, 2022 —
Matthew DeVries - Best Practices Construction LawThis weekend was all about
The Rise of Gru. I love Gru so much that when my children ask for money, my best Gru-like voice belts back: “Now, I know there have been some rumors going around that the bank is no longer funding us….In terms of money, we have no money.” And that’s precisely what many lenders say on distressed projects when the owner fails to make final payment and the contractor looks to the bank for funding: “We have no money for you contractor!”
In
BCD Associates., LLC v. Crown Bank, CA No. N15c-11-062 (Super. Ct. Del, May 2, 2022), the trial court found that when a bank pays a contractor directly, it can create a legally binding relationship subject to the terms of the construction loan agreements with the owner.
The project involved a $13m construction loan between the lender and the owner to renovate a hotel. The owner and contractor entered into an AIA Contract for the construction management services. During construction the contractor would submit payment applications to the lender, who would review and approve the invoices for payment. The lender then would pay 90% of the approved payment application and hold back the remaining 10% as retainage. The contractor was supposed to be paid the final retainage upon completion, which it did not receive in accordance with the terms of the AIA Contract.
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Matthew DeVries, Burr & Forman LLPMr. DeVries may be contacted at
mdevries@burr.com
Congress Relaxes Several PPP Loan Requirements
June 15, 2020 —
Greg Tross & Michael Krueger – Newmeyer DillionOn June 3, 2020, Congress passed the Paycheck Protection Program Flexibility Act ("Act") which does exactly what it means to do: provide flexibility for PPP loan recipients. President Trump is expected to sign the bill into law within the week.
The Act extends the "covered period" for Paycheck Protection Program ("PPP") loans from the original eight weeks to 24 weeks or December 31, 2020, whichever is earlier. This extension provides much needed reprieve to small businesses who can utilize these funds to weather the economic effects of the Coronavirus Pandemic through 2020.
The Act also revises the limitations on how small businesses utilize their PPP loans. While the CARES Act originally required 75% of the PPP loan to be used for payroll costs, this number has now been reduced to 60%. This means that up to 40% of the PPP loan can be used to cover mortgage obligations, rent, and other covered utility payments.
The PPP loan payment deferral period has also been extended to align with the date on which the PPP loan's forgiveness amount is remitted to the lender. This should provide more certainty to small businesses on their payback obligations, if any.
Recently, the Small Business Administration also released loan forgiveness applications to assist a business in calculating their loan forgiveness. While the SBA will likely revise it with the Act's passing, small businesses should look at the application's framework to prepare for submitting their loan forgiveness requests in the future.
Newmeyer Dillion continues to follow COVID-19 and its impact on your business and our communities. Feel free to reach out to us at NDcovid19response@ndlf.com or visit us at www.newmeyerdillion.com/covid-19-multidisciplinary-task-force/.
Reprinted courtesy of
Greg Tross, Newmeyer Dillion and
Michael Krueger, Newmeyer Dillion
Mr. Tross may be contacted at greg.tross@ndlf.com
Mr. Krueger may be contacted at michael.krueger@ndlf.com
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Labor Shortage Confirmed Through AGC Poll
November 26, 2014 —
Craig Martin – Construction Contractor AdvisorOver 1,000 contractors participated in Associated General Contractors’ (“AGC”) survey asking whether they were facing a labor shortage. AGC crunched the numbers and provided an Analysis of its survey.
The survey revealed that 83% of construction firms were having trouble finding qualified workers. This survey certainly confirmed comments from construction firms in and around Omaha.
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Craig Martin, Lamson, Dugan and Murray, LLPMr. Martin may be contacted at
cmartin@ldmlaw.com
New Megablimp to Deliver to Remote Alaskan Construction Sites
January 13, 2017 —
Ryan W. Sternoff - Ahlers & Cressman PLLC BlogFor nearly 20 years, Lockheed Martin has been working on developing a “Hybrid Airship” that may transform the ability to construct facilities in remote project locations.[i]
On September 13, 2016, the Daily Journal of Commerce reported that the first of these “Hybrid Airships,” which can land in snow, ice, gravel, and water, are set to deliver from a facility operated by PRL Logistics in Kenai, Alaska, beginning in 2019.[ii] PRL will be operating the blimps in partnership with UK-based Straightline Aviation who placed the first order for the airships this year. According to PRL, the hope is that the airships will provide low cost solutions for moving freight in Alaska, where runways and roads are not always available. The helium-lifted behemoth blimps have space for 47,000 pounds of cargo and 18 passengers and cost about $40 million dollars.
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Ryan W. Sternoff, Ahlers & Cressman PLLCMr. Sternoff may be contacted at
rsternoff@ac-lawyers.com
Court Rules Planned Development of Banning Ranch May Proceed
June 10, 2015 —
Kristian B. Moriarty and Lawrence S. Zucker II – Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLPIn Banning Ranch Conservancy v. City of Newport Beach (filed 5/20/2015, No. G049691), the California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held the Environmental Impact Report prepared by the City of Newport Beach for the partial development of Banning Ranch complied with California environmental protection statutes and local ordinances.
Under the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”), a city desiring to approve or carry out a project that may have significant effect on the environment must prepare an environmental impact report (“EIR”) designed to provide the public with detailed information about the effect which a proposed project will have on the environment. The California Coastal Act of 1976 provides for heightened protection of environmentally sensitive habitat areas (“ESHA”) defined as any “area in which plant or animal life or their habitats are either rare or especially valuable because of their special nature or role in an ecosystem and which could be easily disturbed or degraded by human activities and developments.”
In 2006, the City of Newport Beach adopted a General Plan for the physical development of the city. The plan specifically identifies Banning Ranch as having significant value as a wildlife habitat and open space resource for citizens. The general plan includes a primary goal of complete preservation of Banning Ranch as open space. To the extent the primary goal cannot be achieved, the plan identifies a secondary goal allowing limited development of Banning Ranch “to fund preservation of the majority of the property as open space.” The plan also requires the City to coordinate any development with the state and federal agencies.
Reprinted courtesy of
Kristian B. Moriarty, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Lawrence S. Zucker II, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Moriarty may be contacted at kmoriarty@hbblaw.com; Mr. Zucker may be contacted at lzucker@hbblaw.com
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Damages in First Trial Establishing Liability of Tortfeasor Binding in Bad Faith Trial Against Insurer
October 22, 2014 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe court considered whether, in a second trial for bad faith, the insured was required to again prove her damages, instead of relying on the jury's damage determination in the first trial where the tortfeasor's liability was established. Geico Gen. Ins. Co. v. Paton, 2014 Fla. Ct. App. LEXIS 14362 (Fla. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2014).
The insured was injured in a car accident caused by the negligence of the underinsured driver. Geico paid the insured the $10,000 policy limit under her policy. The insured's mother also had uninsured/underinsured coverage with Geico, with policy limits of $100,000. When the insured demanded the $100,000 policy limits from her mother's policy, Geico offered $1,000. Later, Geico offered $5,000, but returned to the $1,000 offer after the insured refused to settle. When the insured reduced her demand to $22,500, Geico did not respond.
The insured sued and the case went to trial. The jury awarded $10,000 for past pain and suffering, and $350,000 for future pain and suffering. The verdict set the insured's total damages at $469,247. Geico did not file a motion for new trial nor did it appeal. Judgment was entered in favor of the insured, but was limited to the $100,000 UM policy limits.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Limiting Plaintiffs’ Claims to a Cause of Action for Violation of SB-800
November 18, 2011 —
Samir R. Patel, Esq., Lorber, Greenfield, & Polito, LLPThere has been a fair share of publicity about the SB-800 amendments to the Civil Code (Civil Code section 896, et seq.) that codified construction defect litigation in 2002. Most of the publicity is geared toward the pre-litigation standards allowing a builder the right to repair before litigation is commenced by a homeowner. Less focus and attention has been given to the fact that violation of the SB-800 performance standards is being used by plaintiff’s counsel as an additional tool in the plaintiff’s pleading tool box against builders. Closer scrutiny to SB-800 reveals that those provisions should in fact act as a limitation to the pleading tools available to plaintiffs and an additional tool for builders in the defense of cases governed by SB-800.
The typical construction defect complaint contains the boiler plate versions of numerous causes of action. These causes of action include Strict Liability, Negligence, Negligence Per Se, Breach of Contract, Breach of Contract – Third-Party Beneficiary, Breach of Express Warranties, Breach of Implied Warranties, among others. The wide array of causes of action leave a defendant “pinned to the wall” because they require a complex defense on a multitude of contract and tort related causes of action. Furthermore, the statutes of limitations as to these claims widely differ depending upon if the particular defect is considered latent or patent. The truth of the matter remains, no matter what the circumstances, if a construction defect matter ultimately goes to trial, it is inevitable that plaintiffs will obtain a judgment on at least one of these causes of action.
On its own, the Strict Liability cause of action can be a thorn in a defendant’s side. A builder is obviously placing a product into the stream of commerce and strict liability is a tough standard to defend against, particularly when it concerns intricate homes comprised of multiple components that originally sold for hundreds of thousands of dollars. A Negligence cause of action can also be difficult to defend because the duty of care for a builder is what a “reasonable” builder would have done under the circumstances. An interpretation of this duty of care can easily sway a jury that will almost always consist of sympathetic homeowners. A Negligence Per Se cause of action can also leave a defendant vulnerable to accusations that a builder violated the Uniform Building Code or a multitude of other obscure municipal construction-related code provisions during the construction of the home. Lastly, the Breach of Contract cause of action leaves a builder relying on dense and intricate purchase and sale agreements with dozens of addenda which leave the skeptical jurors turned off by what they view as one-side, boilerplate provisions. Ultimately, when a matter is about to go to trial, the complexity of these complaints can benefit a plaintiff and increase a plaintiff’s bargaining power against a defendant who is attempting to avoid a potentially large judgment.
Enter the SB-800 statutes. The SB-800 statutes apply to all homes sold after January 1, 2003. Civil Code section 938 specifically states that “[t]his title applies only to new residential units where the purchase agreements with the buyer was signed by the seller on or after January 1, 2003.” (Civil Code §, 938.) As time progresses, more residential construction defect cases will exclusively fall under the purview of SB-800. Slowly but surely more SB-800 governed litigation is being filed, and its exclusive application is looming on the horizon.
On its surface, this “right to repair” regime has left builders with a lot to be desired despite the fact that it is supposed to allow the builder the opportunity to cure any deficiencies in their product before litigation can be filed by potential plaintiffs. However, the application of the time line for repair has shown to be impractical for anything but the most minor problems involving only small numbers of residential units. Moreover, the fact that the fruits of the builder’s investigation into the claimed defects in the pre-litigation context can freely be used as evidence against it in litigation makes builders proceed with trepidation in responding with a repair. For these reasons, more SB-800 litigation can be expected to result due to the shortcomings of the pre-litigation procedures, and savvy defense counsel should anticipate the issues to be dealt with in presenting the defense of such cases at trial.
This fact should not necessarily be met with fear or disdain. Within the SB-800 statutes, the legislature made it clear that they were creating a new cause of action for construction defect claims, but it further made it clear that this cause of action is a plaintiff’s exclusive remedy. The legislature giveth, but at the same time, the legislature taketh away. Throughout numerous provisions within the SB-800 statutes, the Civil Code states that claims for construction defects as to residential construction are exclusively governed by the Civil Code, and that the Civil Code governs any and all litigation arising under breaches of these provisions. Civil Code section 896 specifically states:
In any action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction … the claimant’s claims or causes of action shall be limited to violation of, the following standards, except as specifically set forth in this title. (Civil Code §, 896.)
Civil Code section 896 then provides approximately fifty-plus standards by which a construction defect claim is assessed under that provision. Civil Code section 896 covers everything from plumbing to windows, and from foundations to decks, and in several instances expressly dictates statutes of limitations as to specific areas of construction that severely truncate the 10-year latent damage limitations period. As for any construction deficiencies that are not enumerated within Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 explicitly defines the intent of the standards and provides a method to assess deficiencies that are not addressed in Civil Code section 896. Civil Code section 897 states:
Intent of Standards
The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure. To the extent that a function or component of a structure is not addressed by these standards, it shall be actionable if it causes damage. (Civil Code §, 897.)
Therefore, Civil Code section 897 acts as a catch-all by which defects that are not covered within Civil Code section 896 can be evaluated on a damage standard mirroring the Aas case (damages must be present and actual). The result of sections 896 and 897 being read in combination is a comprehensive, all-inclusive set of performance standards by which any defect raised by Plaintiffs can be evaluated and resolved under a single SB-800 based cause of action.
Civil Code section 943 makes clear that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 performance standards is a plaintiff’s sole remedy for a residential construction defect action. Specifically, Civil Code section 943 states:
Except as provided in this title, no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under 944 is allowed. In addition to the rights under this title, this title does not apply to any action by a claimant to enforce a contract or express contractual provision, or any action for fraud, personal injury, or violation of a statute. (Civil Code §, 943.)
Civil Code section 944 provides the method for computing damages within a construction defect action, as follows:
If a claim for damages is made under this title, the homeowner is only entitled to damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title, [and] the reasonable cost of repairing any damages caused by the repair efforts… . (Civil Code §, 944.)
A cursory review of these statutes yields the conclusion that the legislature was attempting to create an exclusive cause of action that trumps all other causes of action where SB-800 applies. The remedy available to plaintiffs is limited to that allowed by the Civil Code. As noted above, “[n]o other cause of action for a claim covered by this title…is allowed.” (Civil Code §, 943.) Therefore, Civil Code sections 896, 897, 943, and 944 specifically prohibit the contract-based and tort-based causes of action typically pled by plaintiffs.
Plaintiff’s counsel has seized upon the language of section 943 to advance the argument that SB-800 still allows a plaintiff to advance typical contract and tort based causes of action. On the surface, this argument may seem compelling, but a minimum of scrutiny of the express language of section 943 dispels this notion. Section 943 says that it provides rights “[i]n addition” to those under the SB-800 Civil Code provisions. Clearly, the language in section 943 is intended to expressly underscore the fact that a plaintiff is not precluded from seeking relief in addition to that allowed under SB-800 for damages not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards or for damages in addition to those recoverable under Section 944. This language does not provide an unfettered license to bring a Strict Liability, Negligence or other cause of action against a builder where SB-800 applies.
In fact, this language only keeps the door open for plaintiffs to pursue such causes of action not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards should there be such supporting allegations. For example, if a plaintiff alleges that a builder breached an “express contractual provision” related to the timing of the completion of the home and close of escrow, and the contract specifies damages in this regard, a plaintiff may have a viable separate cause of action for Breach of Contract for recovery of those damages precisely because that is not an issue expressly dealt with in SB-800 in the performance standards under sections 896 and 897, or in the damage recovery terms under 944. As it stands, the vast majority of complaints are seeking redress for violation of the same primary right; that is, defects specifically outlined in Section 896 and 897 or which result in damages as stated in Section 944.
So, how does a builder defend against a complaint that contains multiple causes of action regarding construction defects for a home sold after January 1, 2003? There are numerous ways to approach this. First and foremost, these superfluous and improper causes of action can be attacked by demurrer seeking dismissal of all causes of action other than the cause of action alleging violation of SB-800. If the the time period within which to file a demurrer has passed already, a motion for judgment on the pleadings can be utilized to attack the improper causes of action in the same way as a demurrer can be used for this purpose.
The limitation to a demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings is that the judge is restricted to viewing only the four corners of the pleading when making a ruling. It is typical for plaintiffs’ counsel to cleverly (or one might even say, disingenuously) leave the complaint purposely vague to avoid a successful defense attack on the pleadings by not including the original date the residence was sold. In that instance, a motion for summary adjudication can be used to attack a plaintiff’s complaint. By simply providing evidence that the homes were originally sold after January 1, 2003, the improper causes of action should be subject to dismissal by summary adjudication. If the plaintiff is a subsequent purchaser, the builder still has recourse to enforce the pleading limitations under SB-800. Civil Code section 945 states that “[t]he provisions, standards, rights, and obligations set forth in this title are binding upon all original purchasers and their successors-in-interest.” (Civil Code §, 945.)
Attacking a plaintiff’s complaint to eliminate multiple causes of action can have numerous benefits. The practical result is that a plaintiff will only have one viable cause of action. The advantage is that the SB-800 performance standards include the defined performance standards and shortened statutes of limitations periods with regard to specific issues. Furthermore, as to defects which are not specifically provided for in Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 requires a proof of actual damages. Therefore, a plaintiff must provide evidence of current damages and not simply conditions that may potentially cause damage in the future.
The Appellate Courts have yet to directly address and interpret these SB-800 provisions. The time for that is undoubtedly drawing near. For now, however, plaintiffs will have to find ways to accurately plead construction defect claims within the confines of one cause of action for breach of the performance standards enumerated within the Civil Code.
Printed courtesy of Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP. Mr. Patel can be contacted at spatel@lorberlaw.com and Mr. Verbick at tverbick@lorberlaw.com.
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Someone Who Hires an Independent Contractor May Still Be Liable, But Not in This Case
April 18, 2023 —
Katherine Dempsey - The Subrogation StrategistIn Allstate Veh. & Prop. Ins. Co. v. Glitz Constr. Corp., 2023 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1180, 2023 NY Slip Op 01171, the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Second Department (Appellate Court), considered whether a contractor could be found liable for its subcontractor’s alleged negligence in causing injury to a homeowner’s property. The homeowner’s insurer, as subrogee of the homeowner, sought to recover damages from the contractor despite an allegation that the subcontractor – an independent contractor – caused the injury to the homeowner’s property. Finding that there was no evidence that any of the exceptions to the non-liability rule related to hiring independent contractors applied, the Appellate Court affirmed the lower court’s decision granting judgment in favor of the contractor.
In this case, the homeowner hired the contractor (defendant) to convert her garage area into a bedroom and an office. The defendant later hired a subcontractor to perform the electrical rough-in work. At trial, the homeowner’s insurer (plaintiff) presented evidence that the subcontractor, who damaged an existing wire with a drill bit, caused an electrical failure that resulted in a fire. The defendant argued that it could not be held liable for the subcontractor’s alleged negligence because the subcontractor was an independent contractor and, on appeal, the Appellate Court agreed.
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Katherine Dempsey, White and Williams LLPMs. Dempsey may be contacted at
dempseyk@whiteandwilliams.com
