Render Unto Caesar: Considerations for Returning Withheld Sums
January 18, 2021 —
William E. Underwood Partner, Jones Walker LLP - ConsensusDocsWithholding sums during a dispute can be an effective and perfectly legitimate means to protect against the harms caused by another party’s breach. However, withholding too much money during a dispute can turn a position of strength into one of weakness.
“Why should I fund the other side’s litigation war chest?” and “Isn’t this just a display of weakness?” are common questions raised by contractors when this issue is discussed. Often, the contractor is well within its contractual or legal rights to withhold money from a breaching subcontractor (another topic for another day). But it may not always be in a contractor’s best interest to withhold every single penny available.
This article addresses some of the long-term implications for failing to return withheld sums, including the potential to recover attorneys’ fees, possible bad faith, accruing interest, and overall litigation costs. Admittedly, it can be hard to give money back in the middle of a dispute. But sometimes it can positively impact the overall outcome of the case.
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William E. Underwood, Jones Walker LLP (ConsensusDocs)Mr. Underwood may be contacted at
wunderwood@joneswalker.com
Is Settling a Bond Claim in the Face of a Seemingly Clear Statute of Limitations Defense Bad Faith?
October 11, 2021 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsWe have often discussed payment and performance bonds here at Construction Law Musings, most often in the context of payment bond claims relating to federal and state-owned. construction projects. A late 2020 case out of the Eastern District of Virginia federal court examined what happens after such a claim, in this case, based upon a developer’s subdivision bonds, is made and negotiations commence between the surety and the claimant. Specifically, Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Ransgate Corp., et. al. looked at claims for indemnity by a surety and the principal/indemnitors in the event that the Surety settled such a claim.
In the Ramsgate case, Surety provided two separate subdivision subcontract bonds to Ramsgate. Pursuant to those bonds and the indemnity clause of its indemnity agreement, the Surety sought reimbursement of its $80,000.00 settlement payment to the local building authority that it paid to resolve what was originally a claim for over $420,000.00 by the City. The project was started in 2002 and after many years of failures to complete (according to the City of Suffolk), the City made its claim for expenses in 2017. Ramsgate claimed that it completed the subdivisions in 2003.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Substituting Materials and Failure to Comply with Contractual Requirements
November 19, 2021 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesIt is important to remember that if you are going to substitute materials from those specified, you need to make sure there is proper approval in doing so–make sure to comply with the contractual requirements to substitute materials. Otherwise, you could be in a situation where you are contractually required to remove the installed substituted materials and replace with the correct specified materials. This is not the situation you want to find yourself in because this is oftentimes a costly endeavor. This was the situation in Appeal-of-Sauer, Inc., discussed below, on a federal project. The best thing that you can do is comply with the contractual requirements if you want to substitute materials. If you are in the situation where it is too late, i.e., you already installed incorrect materials, you want to demonstrate the substituted materials are functionally equivalent to the specified materials and/or come up with an engineering solution, as required, that could be less costly then ripping out the installed material and replacing with the correct material. Even doing so, however, is not a “get out of jail free card” and does not necessarily mean there is not a strong basis to require you to install the correct specified material.
In Appeal of- Sauer, Inc., ASBCA 61847, 2021 WL 4888192 (ASBCA September 29, 2021), a federal project’s engineering requirements required cast iron piping for the above ground sanitary system. However, the prime contractor installed PVC piping instead of cast iron piping. The prime contractor believed it had the appropriate approval through its submittal. The government, through its contracting officer, directed the prime contractor to remove installed PVC piping to replace with cast iron. The government did not believe PVC piping was the functional equivalent of cast iron piping for the above ground sanitary system due to its concern with the noise level of waste materials flowing through the piping. The prime contractor submitted a claim for its removal and replacement costs which was denied by the contracting officer. On appeal with the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, the Board agreed with the contracting officer explaining: “While we agree that a design change could be approved by the designer of record and brought to the attention of the government before being incorporated into the design documents, the [prime contractor’s] task order required that such a design change meet the minimum requirements of the solicitation and accepted proposal. The plumbing submittal [the prime contractor] issued here, showing the use of PVC instead of cast iron for the above ground waste piping, did not meet the minimum requirements of the solicitation.” Appeal of-Sauer, Inc., supra.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Philadelphia Enacts Commercial Property Assessed Clean Energy (C-PACE) Program
October 21, 2019 —
Timothy Davis & Willliam Johnston - White and Williams LLPOn August 14, 2019, Mayor Jim Kenney signed a bill authorizing, through C-PACE loans, the financing of clean energy, alternative energy and water conservation projects for eligible commercial properties in Philadelphia. Philadelphia City Council unanimously voted to approve the C-PACE program on June 20, 2019. The program will be administered by the Philadelphia Energy Authority. Third-party capital providers (not the Philadelphia Energy Authority) will originate C-PACE financings for qualified projects.
C-PACE “assessments” will encumber the applicable property in a first lien position akin to a real estate tax. Documentation among the property owner, the City of Philadelphia, and the third party capital provider (identified in the ordinance as the “financial institution”) will provide, among other things, that the assessments will be payable and fully amortize over the term of the financing (i.e., 30 years) and will not be accelerated during its term. Importantly, before a C-PACE financing can be originated and the underlying property assessed, notice of the property owner’s desire to secure C-PACE financing under the program must be provided to the holder of a mortgage on the subject property and the holder of the mortgage must provide the property owner and the City of Philadelphia with its written consent. Without the mortgage lender’s consent, the C-PACE financing cannot be consummated.
Reprinted courtesy of
Timothy Davis, White and Williams LLP and
William Johnston, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Davis may be contacted at davist@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Johnston may be contacted at johnstonw@whiteandwilliams.com
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Is the Event You Are Claiming as Unforeseeable Delay Really Unforeseeable?
September 26, 2022 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesIs the item or event you are claiming as an unforeseeable, excusable delay really unforeseeable? This is not a trick question.
Just because your construction contract identifies items or events that constitute unforeseeable, excusable delay does not mean those items can be used as a blanket excuse or crutch for the contractor. That would be unfair.
For instance, it is not uncommon for a construction contract to list as unforeseeable, excusable delay the following events or items: “(i) acts of God or of the public enemy, (ii) act of the Government in either its sovereign or contractual capacity, (iii) acts of another Contractor in the performance of a contract with the Government, (iv) fires, (v) floods, (vi) epidemics, (vii) quarantine restrictions, (viii) strikes, (ix) freight embargoes, (x) unusually severe weather, or (xi) delays of subcontractors or suppliers at any tier arising from unforeseeable causes beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of both the Contractor and the subcontractors or suppliers.” See, e.g., F.A.R. 52.249-10(b)(1). While the itemization of excusable delay may be worded differently, the point is there may be a listing as to what items or events constitute excusable delay. An excusable delay would justify additional time and, potentially, compensation to the contractor.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Study Finds Mansion Tax Reduced Sales in New York and New Jersey
May 13, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFA study by two Columbia University economists demonstrated that “the extra 1% ‘mansion’ tax New York state and New Jersey impose on home sales above $1 million actually reduce[d] the number of total real estate transactions, in addition” it pushed “home sales that might have taken place for above $1 million to below that threshold,” Forbes reported.
The “mansion” tax only occurs when the residential sale is above $1 million, “meaning a buyer who pays $999,999 for a house, condo or coop would owe no mansion tax.”
The study showed a “dramatic” gap “in sales of homes for between $1 million and $1,040,000 (with more sales missing in that range than bunched just below $1 million).” The economists’ concluded that “the mansion tax causes an ‘unraveling’ effect, actually disrupting some sales of properties that would otherwise have taken place.”
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Don’t Waive Too Much In Your Mechanic’s Lien Waiver
December 22, 2019 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsIn the past few years, the Virginia General Assembly has, with certain caveats, precluded pre-furnishing waiver of mechanic’s lien rights. While this essentially outlawed the types of mechanic’s lien waiver clauses that pervaded construction contracts in Virginia, the key to the previous sentence is “pre-furnishing.” What the General Assembly left intact were the usual waivers of mechanic’s lien rights typically required to be provided to Owners and others in the payment chain in exchange for payment.
These lien waivers come in a few “flavors” from conditional to unconditional, partial to full. Their terms usually include an acknowledgement of receipt of payment (we’ll get to this later), and a statement that the one seeking payment knows of no possible claims by lower tier subcontractors and then waives all mechanic’s lien rights against the property for work performed and included in the request for payment. Often over my years as a Virginia construction attorney, I have noticed that these waivers are often signed without comment or review. They are just part of the process and more often than not are not even an issue for most projects. Of course, if they are an issue they can be a big one, and their terms can come back to bite a claimant that has not properly vetted them.
The first potential issue is waiving lien rights while acknowledging receipt prior to actual receipt of the check or wire. Many of the waiver forms that are out there list a payment amount, or possibly simply state that the waiver is in exchange for some small payment, and then state “receipt of which is acknolwedged” or something similar. The issue here is that receipt may not have happened yet because these lien waivers are submitted as part of the payment package in order to get paid in the first place. In short, should you sign the waiver prior to payment, you may have acknowledged a non-event and in the event of non-payment have a written document stating that you waived your claim to a lien for that money. What a court would do with this, I am unsure, but why risk it? My advice, be sure your waiver is contingent on actual clearance of payment as well as receipt.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Professional Liability Alert: California Appellate Courts In Conflict Regarding Statute of Limitations for Malicious Prosecution Suits Against Attorneys
April 28, 2014 —
David W. Evans & Stephen J. Squillario – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn conflict with an earlier decision by a different division within the same District, and with a prior decision of another District which followed the earlier case, Division Three of the Second Appellate District has concluded, contrary to established precedent, that the general two-year limitations period set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1 (“Section 335.1”) applies to malicious prosecution claims against attorneys, rather than the specific one-year statute of limitations for claims against attorneys codified in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6 (“Section 340.6”).
In Roger Cleveland Golf Co., Inc. v. Krane & Smith, APC (filed April 15, 2014, Case No. B237424, consolidated with Case No. B239375), Roger Cleveland Golf Co., Inc. (“Cleveland Golf”), filed a malicious prosecution action against Krane & Smith (“the Attorneys”), who had unsuccessfully prosecuted the underlying breach of contract matter for their client against Cleveland Golf. In that action, on April 26, 2010, the trial court entered its order granting a motion for nonsuit and dismissing the complaint in favor of Cleveland Golf. On May 24, 2011, or approximately 13 months after the trial court had dismissed the underlying complaint, Cleveland Golf commenced a malicious prosecution action against the Attorneys. In the interim, the Attorneys initiated an appeal of the underlying judgment, which was eventually dismissed approximately seven months later. In response to the complaint, the Attorneys filed a special motion to strike, commonly referred to as an anti-SLAPP motion, which included the argument that the malicious prosecution claim was time-barred under the one-year limitations period of Section 340.6. The trial court granted the Attorneys’ motion based on the statute of limitations (and Cleveland Golf’s failure to demonstrate a probability of success on the merits) and dismissed the case. Cleveland Golf’s appeal followed.
Reprinted courtesy of
David W. Evans, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Stephen J. Squillario, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Evans may be contacted at devans@hbblaw.com, Mr. Squillario may be contacted at ssquillario@hbblaw.com
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