Fairfield Connecticut Building Expert Directory

Mechanics Lien Release Bond – What Happens Now? What exactly is a Mechanics Lien and Why Might it Need to be Released?

January 04, 2021 — William L. Porter - Porter Law Group
Mechanics Lien Release Bond – What Happens Now? What exactly is a Mechanics Lien and Why Might it Need to be Released? California law entitles unpaid contractors, subcontractors, and material suppliers to record a mechanics lien on property where they performed work or supplied materials. The mechanics lien attaches to the real property as a legal interest and secures the right to payment for the work performed and materials supplied. If payment is not forthcoming the mechanics lien allows the property where the work was performed and materials supplied to be sold under court order to satisfy the debt. It is a powerful remedy against owners and their agents who do not pay for work performed and materials supplied to improve the owner’s property. A Mechanics Lien Release Bond Frees Property from a Mechanics Lien Owners typically do not wish to have their property sold out from under them. Fortunately for owners, there is a method by which a mechanics lien can be substituted for another interest and sale of the property thereby avoided. This method is through the use of a mechanics lien release bond. California Civil Code §8424 allows a property owner or contractor effected by a mechanics lien to record a mechanics lien release bond equal to 125 percent of the lien amount with the County Recorder where the mechanics lien has been recorded. The effect of this is to substitute the mechanics lien release bond for the mechanics lien itself, thereby relieving the property from the possibility of that property being sold to satisfy the debt. Instead, any payment made will come from the release bond. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of William L. Porter, Porter Law Group
Mr. Porter may be contacted at bporter@porterlaw.com

Construction Litigation Roundup: “Indeed, You Just Design ‘Em”

April 29, 2024 — Daniel Lund III - Lexology
Seeking to be extracted from personal injury litigation initiated by a laborer on a project in New Orleans, an architect sued for negligence filed a motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff had “testified in his deposition that after demolishing most of one of the side walls of the vault and a smaller section of the front wall, he was instructed to stand on top of the vault's concrete ceiling in order to demolish it with a hydraulic jackhammer.” One court noted that: “Shortly after beginning that task, the entire vault structure collapsed.” Claims against the architect included assertions of “failure to monitor and supervise the execution of the plans to ensure safety at the jobsite.” The architect urged in support of its MSJ that it did not owe a duty to oversee, supervise, or maintain the construction site, or have any responsibility for the plaintiff’s safety. Summary judgment was granted to the architect by the trial court, and an appeal ensued, whereupon the appellate court reversed. That intermediate court found that potential intervening knowledge of the architect of a potentially unsafe demolition practice created an issue of material fact. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Daniel Lund III, Phelps
Mr. Lund may be contacted at daniel.lund@phelps.com

Colorado Supreme Court to Hear Colorado Pool Systems, Inc. v. Scottsdale Insurance Company, et al.

October 10, 2013 — David M. McLain — Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
The Colorado Pool case has been featured in two past blog entries, including: “An Arapahoe County District Court Refuses to Apply HB 10-1394 Retrospectively,” which discussed the case at the trial court level, and “Colorado Court of Appeals Finds Damages to Non-Defective Property Arising From Defective Construction Covered Under Commercial General Liability Policy,” which discussed the case at the Court of Appeals level. In both instances, the courts held that retroactively applying C.R.S. C.R.S. § 13-20-808 to policies in effect prior to the date of the statute’s enactment would be impermissibly retrospective because it would change the coverage under the policy for which the parties had originally bargained. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of David M. McLain
David M. McLain can be contacted at mclain@hhmrlaw.com

Hawaii Supreme Court Finds Climate Change Lawsuit Barred by “Pollution Exclusion”

November 05, 2024 — Jason Taylor - Traub Lieberman Insurance Law Blog
On October 7, 2024, the Hawaii Supreme Court answered the question of whether an “accident” includes an insured’s reckless conduct in emitting harmful greenhouse gases (“GHGs”) and whether such emissions are “pollutants” as defined in a general liability policy’s pollution exclusion. In Aloha Petro., Ltd. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pitt., PA, No., 2024 Haw. LEXIS 179 (Oct. 7, 2024), the Hawaii Supreme Court answered in the affirmative as to both certified questions from the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii, holding that an insured’s reckless conduct can be an “accident” and that GHGs are “pollutants” under the policies’ pollution exclusions. In the underlying case, the County of Honolulu and the County of Maui (the “Counties”) sued Aloha Petroleum, Ltd. (“Aloha”) and several other fossil fuel companies for climate change-related harms. Namely, the Counties alleged that the fossil fuel industry knew that its products would cause catastrophic climate change, and rather than mitigating their emissions, defendants concealed such knowledge, promoted climate science denial, and increased their production of fossil fuels. Aloha was allegedly on notice that its products caused harmful climate change through its former parent company, Phillips 66, and its current parent company, Sunoco. Given this knowledge, the District Court determined that the Counties allegations constituted reckless conduct by Aloha. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Jason Taylor, Traub Lieberman
Mr. Taylor may be contacted at jtaylor@tlsslaw.com

Background Owner of Property Cannot Be Compelled to Arbitrate Construction Defects

November 07, 2012 — CDJ STAFF
In Truppi v. Pasco Engineering, John Quattro sued Property Management Contractors, Inc. over construction defects in William Truppi’s home. All parties are named in the suit. The California Court of Appeals ruled that Property Management Contractors, Inc. (PMCI) could not compel Mr. Quattro to arbitration. The background of the case involves two houses built in Encinitas, California by PCMI: one for Mr. Truppi at 560 Neptune, and one for Mr. Quattro at 566 Neptune. Both contracts contained an arbitration provision. Mr. Quattro signed the contract for his residence and Mr. Truppi signed the other. Mr. Quattro then sued PCMI and its principal, William Gregory. Mr. Quattro claimed to be the true contracting party for the 560 Neptune residence and a third party beneficiary of the contract Mr. Truppi signed, and stated that PCMI was aware of this. PCMI in a demurrer stated that Quattro “had only a ‘prospective beneficial interest in the property upon its eventual sale or lease.’” Mr. Quattro amended his complaint to account for the issues raised by PCMI. The court rejected PCMI’s demurrer to the amended complaint. Finally, PCMI and Gregory asserted that Quattro was “not the real party in interest” and could not sue. PCMI continues to assert that Quattro lacks standing, but their attorney sent Quattro an e-mail stating, “While my client disputes that you are a party, and that you lack standing to assert the claim, to the extent you do so I believe you are obligated to proceed by way of arbitration.” The court did not cover the issue of Quattro’s standing in the case, only if he could be compelled to arbitration. The court affirmed the lower court’s finding that Quattro could not be compelled to arbitrate the construction defect claim as neither he nor Gregory signed the contract in an individual capacity. Further, the court noted that PCMI and Gregory “denied the existence of an agreement between themselves and Quattro on the 560 contract,” and cannot compel arbitration on a non-existent agreement. And while non-signatories can, in some situations be compelled to arbitrate, the court found that “these cases are inapplicable because here they seek to have the alleged third party beneficiary (Quattro) compelled by a nonsignatory (Gregory).” The arbitration clause in question “expressly limited its application to persons or entities that signed the 560 contract.” As Mr. Quattro was not a signatory to that agreement, the court found that he could not be held to its arbitration provision. Read the court decision
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A Guide to Evaluating Snow & Ice Cases

December 13, 2021 — Lewis Brisbois
New York, N.Y. (November 9, 2021) - As the winter season nears, defendant property owners are reminded that New York law imposes liability for sidewalk accidents resulting from slip and falls on snow and ice. Within the City of New York, Administrative Code § 7-210 imposes liability on the owners of real property (other than single-family dwellings) to maintain an abutting sidewalk in a reasonably safe condition, which includes the removal of snow and ice. Some of the most important issues in this area of the law were recently reaffirmed by New York’s Appellate Division in Zamora v. David Caccavo, LLC, 190 A.D.3d 895 (2d Dept. 2021). In particular, that the Court of Appeals made clear in 2019 that the statutory non-delegable duty to remove snow and ice from sidewalks extends even to out-of-possession landowners, who, although they may shift the work of maintaining the sidewalk to another, "cannot shift the duty, nor exposure and liability for injuries caused by negligent maintenance, imposed under [Administrative Code §] 7-210." Xiang Fu He v. Troon Mgt., Inc., 34 N.Y.3d 167, 174 (2019). In other words, even if the defendant leases the property to a tenant who is obligated under the lease to maintain the property in every way, including snow and ice on sidewalks, the defendant cannot escape liability by claiming the tenant is solely responsible for the plaintiff’s loss. On the other hand, property owners are not strictly liable for all personal injuries that occur on the abutting sidewalks, because the statute "adopts a duty and standard of care that accords with traditional tort principles of negligence and causation." Xiang Fu He v. Troon Mgt., Inc., 34 N.Y.3d at 171. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Lewis Brisbois

Will Maryland Beltway Developer's Exit Doom $7.6B P3 Project?

March 13, 2023 — Jim Parsons - Engineering News-Record
Maryland’s controversial $7.6-billion plan to build tolled express lanes along two Washington, DC-area interstates has suffered a potentially fatal blow with the departure of the private development consortium from the project. Reprinted courtesy of Jim Parsons, Engineering News-Record ENR may be contacted at enr@enr.com Read the full story... Read the court decision
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Insurer Rejecting Construction Defect Claim Must Share in Defense Costs

March 02, 2020 — Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii
One insurer, who accepted the tender of defense in a construction defect case, successfully moved for summary judgment against the second insurer, who denied the insured's tender. Interstate Fire & Cas. v. Aspen Ins. UK Ltd., 2019 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5800 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 25,2019). Standard Waterproofing Corporation was hired by the construction manager, G Builders, to perform waterproofing work as part of condominium conversion project. After the project was completed,the condominium occupants experienced water damage in their units. The Condominium Board retained an engineer who reported numerous issues of water infiltration relating to Standard's work. The Condominium Board filed suit against the construction manager, who filed a third party complaint against Standard. Standard tendered to four different insurers, including plaintiff Interstate and defendant Aspen. Interstate agreed to defend, while Aspen and the other two insurers declined. Aspen argued there were no allegations of an occurrence resulting in property damage during its policy periods. Interstate filed for declaratory relief against Aspen and Standard. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

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