Greystone on Remand Denies Insurer's Motion for Summary Judgment To Bar Coverage For Construction Defects
June 28, 2013 —
Tred EyerlyA prior post here discussed the Tenth Circuit's decision in Greystone Constr., Inc. v. National Union Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 661 F. 3d 1272 (10th Cir. 2011). The court found a duty to defend construction defect claims where damage caused by the faulty workmanship was unintentional. The Tenth Circuit remanded for a determination on whether any policy exclusions precluded a defense or indemnity for damage arising from faulty workmanship. On remand, the district court denied National Union's Motion for Summary Judgment, seeking to establish the policy exclusions precluded its duty to defend and to indemnify. See Greystone Constr., Inc. v. v. National Union Fire & Marine ins. Co., 2013 U. S. LEXIS 46707 (D. Colo. March 31, 2013).
Greystone was sued for construction defects in homes it built. The suit alleged that Greystone failed to recognize defects in the soil where the house was built. National Union refused to defend. The district court initially granted summary judgment to National Union because claims arising from construction defects were not covered. As noted above, the Tenth Circuit vacated because the damage in the underlying suit did not categorically fall outside coverage under the policy.
On remand, National Union first argued there was no duty to defend based upon an exclusion precluding coverage for damage arising out of work done by subcontractors unless the subcontractors agreed in writing to defend and indemnify the insured and carried insurance with coverage limits equal to or greater than that carried by the insured. The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument because National Union had to rely on facts outside of the underlying complaint.
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Tred EyerlyTred Eyerly can be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Colorado Court of Appeals to Rule on Arbitrability of an HOA's Construction Defect Claims
November 20, 2013 —
W. Berkeley Mann, Jr. — Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCOn October 24, 2013 the Colorado Court of Appeals granted a rare interlocutory appeal in a multi-family residential construction defect case. The Court of Appeals accepted the case ofTriple Crown at Observatory Village Association, Inc. v. Village Homes of Colorado, Inc.(2013 WL 5761028) as an interlocutory appeal after the parties briefed and obtained rulings from the trial court that compelled the case to binding arbitration in lieu of a jury trial on all issues. The appellate decision of October 24, 2013 did not decide the merits of the case, but discussed the issues to be decided in the eventual merits decision. The significance of the issues presented and the interlocutory nature of this appeal both make this case worth watching for further appellate proceedings.
The core issue in this appeal was the applicability of Colorado’s Uniform Arbitration Act (C.R.S. § 13-22-201, et seq.), based on recorded Declarations filed by the developer. The Declarations mandated that the HOA arbitrate any design/construction disputes with the developer. Immediately prior to suit, the Association sought to amend the Declarations in order to avoid the arbitration process for these claims. The interlocutory appellate issues resulted from the trial court’s order compelling the arbitration over the objections of the Association.
The trial court’s decision was based on a reading of the Colorado Revised Non-Profit Corporation Act (“CRNPC,” at C.R.S. § 7-127-107), which was found applicable to the Association.
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W. Berkeley Mann, Jr.W. Berkeley Mann, Jr. can be contacted at
mann@hhmrlaw.com
Negligent Misrepresentation Claim Does Not Allege Property Damage, Barring Coverage
December 20, 2017 —
Tred Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii The Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's determination that the seller's alleged negligent misrepresentation regarding the propensity of the property to flood was covered. Erie Ins. Exh. v. Maxwell, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 746 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2017).
The Chapmans purchased a residence from the Maxwells on March 7, 2014. Prior to the sale, the Maxwells completed a residential property disclosure in which they allegedly misrepresented the propensity of the property to flood. Five months after the purchase, the residence sustained damage as a result of two floods within three days. The Chapmans sued, alleging they relied on the Maxwells' representations regarding the propensity of the property to flood. The Chapmans further alleged that they sustained property damage as a result of the Maxwells' negligence and negligent misrepresentations.
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Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Staying the Course, Texas Supreme Court Rejects Insurer’s Argument for Exception to Eight-Corners Rule in Determining Duty to Defend
April 27, 2020 —
John C. Eichman, Sergio F. Oehninger, Grayson L. Linyard & Leah B. Nommensen - Hunton Insurance Recovery BlogIn responding to a certified question from the Fifth Circuit in Richards v. State Farm Lloyds, the Texas Supreme Court held that the “policy-language exception” to the eight-corners rule articulated by the federal district court is not a permissible exception under Texas law. See Richards v. State Farm Lloyds, 19-0802, 2020 WL 1313782, at *1 (Tex. Mar. 20, 2020). The eight-corners rule generally provides that Texas courts may only consider the four corners of the petition and the four corners of the applicable insurance policy when determining whether a duty to defend exists. State Farm argued that a “policy-language exception” prevents application of the eight-corners rule unless the insurance policy explicitly requires the insurer to defend “all actions against its insured no matter if the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent,” relying on B. Hall Contracting Inc. v. Evanston Ins. Co., 447 F. Supp. 2d 634, 645 (N.D. Tex. 2006). The Texas Supreme Court rejected the insurer’s argument, citing Texas’ long history of applying the eight-corners rule without regard for the presence or absence of a “groundless-claims” clause.
The underlying dispute in Richards concerned whether State Farm must defend its insureds, Janet and Melvin Richards, against claims of negligent failure to supervise and instruct after their 10-year old grandson died in an ATV accident. The Richardses asked State Farm to provide a defense to the lawsuit by their grandson’s mother and, if necessary, to indemnify them against any damages. To support its argument that no coverage under the policy existed, and in turn, it had no duty to defend, State Farm relied on: (1) a police report to prove the location of the accident occurred off the insured property; and (2) a court order detailing the custody arrangement of the deceased child to prove the child was an insured under the policy. The federal district court held that the eight-corners rule did not apply, and thus extrinsic evidence could be considered regarding the duty to defend, because the policy did not contain a statement that the insurer would defend “groundless, false, or fraudulent” claims. In light of the extrinsic police report and extrinsic custody order, the district court granted summary judgment to State Farm.
Reprinted courtesy of Hunton Andrews Kurth attorneys
John C. Eichman,
Sergio F. Oehninger,
Grayson L. Linyard and
Leah B. Nommensen
Mr. Oehninger may be contacted at soehninger@HuntonAK.com
Mr. Linyard may be contacted at glinyard@HuntonAK.com
Ms. Nommensen may be contacted at leahnommensen@HuntonAK.com
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Suspend the Work, but Don’t Get Fired
May 20, 2015 —
Craig Martin – Construction Contractor AdvisorGetting paid for your work is often times one of the hardest parts of a project. If you find yourself working without getting paid, it’s easy to think, “I’ll just stop working until I get paid.” While the law may support you in that decision, the contract may not and you may be found in breach of the contract if you walk off the job.
Nebraska Law
Nebraska courts have held that a contractor or subcontractor may stop working on a project if the owner or upstream contractor is in material breach. This, of course, raises the question of “What is a material breach?” The facts of the particular circumstance will control. But, the risk is significant. If the unpaid contractor is wrong, in that the breach is not material, he will face the claim by the upstream party for all costs necessary to finish the contractor’s work. If the upstream party is in material breach, he will face a claim for profit on the remaining portion of the project.
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Craig Martin, Lamson, Dugan and Murray, LLPMr. Martin may be contacted at
cmartin@ldmlaw.com
Panel Declares Colorado Construction Defect Laws Reason for Lack of Multifamily Developments
January 22, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFDennis Huspeni writing for the Denver Business Journal provided reactions from panelists at a ULI Colorado event on January 9th at the Embassy Suites Denver – Downtown/Convention Center hotel regarding a report on “Emerging Trends in Real Estate.” According to Huspeni’s article, panelists discussed “the lack of for-sale multifamily development and attributed it to Colorado’s construction defect laws.”
John Beeble, chairman and CEO of Saunders Construction, one of the panelists, said that Saunders does not build condos because of Denver’s construction defect laws: “We’ve been in business for 42 years and never been sued for construction defects,” Beeble said, according to the Denver Business Journal. “But the odds are close to 100 percent that we’d be in court defending ourselves if we did condos.”
Jeff Hawks, principal at ARA Colorado, claimed, “Colorado has some of the worst construction defect laws in the country. It’s stupid to try and build a condo development until that changes,” as reported by the Denver Business Journal.
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Deference Given To Procuring Public Agency Regarding Material Deviation
April 10, 2019 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesDeference will be given to a procuring public agency in a bid protest, particularly when the issue involves whether a bid is non-responsive and constitutes a material deviation from the solicitation. You do not believe me? Perhaps you will after this holding in Biscayne Marine Partners, LLC v. City of Miami, Florida, 44 Fla.L.Weekly D467a (Fla. 3d DCA 2019):
Consequently, no principle of law is clearly established…as to any obligation of the trial court (and, by analogy, an administrative hearing officer) [in a bid protest] to decide or to defer [whether a bid constitutes a material deviation from the solicitation]. If anything, the existing and clearly established principle of law inclines toward judicial deference in public agency competitive bidding disputes when the agency has exercised it discretion absent illegality, fraud, oppression or misconduct.
I do not know about you, but that last underlined sentence is pretty strong language regarding judicial deference!
In this case, Miami (the procuring public agency) issued a Request for Proposals (RFP) for the redevelopment and lease of waterfront property, for the operation of a marina, boatyard, restaurant, wet slips, and a dry storage facility on the property. Miami issued five addenda to the RFP. There were three bidders.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin NorrisMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Can a Contractor be Liable to Second Buyers of Homes for Construction Defects?
November 05, 2014 —
Craig Martin - Construction Contractor AdvisorWhether a contractor will be liable to a second purchaser, even though the contractor never contracted with the second purchaser, varies state to state. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Conway v. The Cutler Group, is the latest court to rule that a subsequent purchaser lacks privity and cannot pursue an action against the builder.
In that case, the Conways purchased a home from the original owner. After living in the home for about two years, the Conways discovered water leaking around the windows. The Conways sued the builder, alleging breach of the implied warranty of habitability.
The builder defended the claim, asserting that it had not contracted with the Conways and thus had not provided any warranties to the Conways. The trial court agreed and dismissed the claim. The first level of appellate court reversed the trial court, holding that the warranty of habitability was intended to level the playing field between the builder and purchaser of a home and it should be extended to subsequent purchasers. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court disagreed and refused to extend any warranties to subsequent purchasers.
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Craig Martin, Lamson, Dugan and Murray, LLPMr. Martin may be contacted at
cmartin@ldmlaw.com