Construction Contract Clauses Only a Grinch Would Love – Part 4
November 30, 2016 —
Garret Murai – California Construction Law BlogScope, time and cost provisions may be the most important clauses in your construction contract but they’re not the only ones which can impact your bottom line. The fourth and final part in a multi-part series, here are some other important construction contract clauses that can put a damper on your holidays.
Provision: Warranty Provisions
- Typical Provision: “Subcontractor warrants to Contractor that all materials and equipment furnished shall be new unless otherwise specified and that all Work performed shall be performed in a good and workmanlike manner, of good quality and free from defects, and in conformance with industry standards, manufacturer’s recommendations and the Contract Documents. All work not conforming to these requirements, including substitutions not properly approved, shall be considered defective. Subcontractor agrees to promptly make good any and all defects due to faulty workmanship, materials and/or equipment which may appear within the Contract Documents, and if no such period is stipulated in the Contract, then for a period of one year from the date of acceptance by the Owner. Nothing herein shall shorten or limit any applicable periods of limitations including, but not limited to, those set forth in Civil Code, Part 2, Title 2, Chapter 3.”
- What it Means: Warranty periods are subject to the agreement of the parties. However, warranties are different than limitations periods, such as California’s 4 year statute of repose for patent defects and 10 year statute of repose for latent defects (note: a statute of repose is different than a statute of limitation. A statute of repose sets a deadline based on an event. So, for example, under the 10 year statute of repose for latent defects a claimant must bring a latent defect claim within 10 years following substantial completion even if the latent defect wasn’t discovered until 10 years and 1 month following substantial completion. A statute of limitation, in contrast, sets a deadline based on the occurrence of an injury or damage. So, for example, California has a 2 year statute of limitation for personal injuries, which sets a deadline of 2 years from the date of injury to bring a personal injury claim). Warranty periods are also different from limitations periods because most warranties require work to be corrected at no cost, and because many contracts include attorney’s fee provisions, breach of a warranty can give rise to claim for attorney’s fees as well.
- What You Can Do: Lower-tiered parties should examine warranty provisions to see if they are reasonable, and if not reasonable, should seek to either eliminate or limit those provisions, such as by reducing the warranty period or providing different warranty periods for different components of work, etc.
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Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
Hawaii Federal District Court Compels Appraisal
December 03, 2024 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe Hawaii federal district court denied the insurers' motion to dismiss on forum non convenient grounds and granted the insured's motion to compel arbitration. BRE Hotels and Resorts LCC, et al. v. Ace Am Ins. Co., et al., 2024 U,.S. Dist. LEXIS 163852 (D. Haw. Sept. 11, 2024).
BRE Hotels & Resorts LLC (BRE) owned the Grand Wailea Resort on Maui and the Turtle Bay Resort on Oahu. Both hotels were damaged by a rainstorm on March 9, 2021. Estimated losses exceeded $55 million. BRE filed a claim with its sixteen insurers. BRE sought $46 million in four categories: business interruption losses at the Grand Wailea ($29.6 million); damaged tiles at the Grand Wailea ($8.3 million); furniture, fixtures, and equipment at Turtel Bay ($6.2 million); and an assortment of ancillary issues at both properties ($1.9 million).
The insurers investigated and took issued with BRE's estimates. The insurers contended that most of the tiles suffered from an independent defect and were not damaged by the storm, that the insurance policies did not cover the replacement of undamaged furniture, and that the claimed business interruption losses were too high. The insurers paid $4 million.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Cooperating With Your Insurance Carrier: Is It a Must?
January 02, 2024 —
Susana Arce - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.A majority of insurance policies require the insured to cooperate with the insurer. The cooperation clause generally states, “the insured agrees to Cooperate with us in the investigation, settlement or defense of the suit.”
The “cooperation clause” is often an afterthought because once litigation has ensued an insured is focused on other important considerations. However, insureds should not forget that complying with the cooperation clause can make the difference between the insurer covering or denying a claim.
The Cooperation Clause in Action
The Court in
HDI Glob. Specialty SE v. PF Holdings, LLC,1 highlighted the importance of cooperating with an insurance carrier. In the underlying litigation, residents of an apartment complex sued four entities, all insured by the same insurance policy: two were named insureds and two were additional insureds. The primary insurer provided a defense for the named insureds.
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Susana Arce, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Ms. Arce may be contacted at
SArce@sdvlaw.com
Insurers Get “Floored” by Court of Appeals Regarding the Presumptive Measure of Damages in Consent Judgments
May 13, 2014 —
Mark Scheer and Brent Williams-Ruth – Scheer & Zehnder LLPCASE: Miller v. Kenny, 68594-5-I, 2014 WL 1672946 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2014).
Snapshot Synopsis: $21 million bad faith consent judgment verdict upheld. $4.15 million underlying stipulated consent judgment was the “floor,” and additional damages allowed.
ISSUES:
1. Can a jury award damages for an insurer’s bad faith in excess of the amount of the stipulated covenant judgment? YES
2. Can a trial court admit evidence of insurance liability reserves in a bad faith action? YES
3. *Note: Other evidentiary and procedural issues were addressed by the court in its decision but not analyzed in this summary*
FACTS: This appeal arose out of an automobile accident on August 23, 2000. Patrick Kenny was driving a 1994 Volkswagen Passat owned by one of the passengers, when he rear-ended a cement truck. The accident severely injured his three passengers: Ryan Miller, Ashley Bethards, and Cassandra Peterson. Kenny was covered for liability under the insurance policy issued to Peterson's parents by Safeco Insurance Company. Safeco defended Kenny without a reservation of rights.
Reprinted courtesy of
Mark Scheer, Scheer & Zehnder LLP and
Brent Williams-Ruth, Scheer & Zehnder LLP
Mr. Scheer may be contacted at mscheer@scheerlaw.com; Mr. Williams-Ruth may be contacted at bwilliamsruth@scheerlaw.com
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“Since You Asked. . .”
October 15, 2024 —
Daniel Lund III - Lexology… you must now pay.
So said a California appellate court, affirming the trial court’s decision against a subcontractor suing for unpaid subcontract sums. Instead of being awarded those unpaid amounts, the subcontractor lost the case and was tagged with a $1.55 million attorney’s fees award and $270,000 costs award in favor of the defendants.
What went wrong?
California law requires a licensed contractor to maintain at all times proper workers’ compensation insurance coverage. The failure to maintain the coverage and have the certificate of coverage on file with the California Contractors State License Board results in “automatic and immediate suspension” of the contractor license. Retroactive reinstatement of the license may occur only if the contractor provides proof of the insurance within 90 days of the effective date of the insurance certificate – unless the contractor can show that failure to have the certificate on file was “due to circumstances beyond the control of the licensee.”
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Daniel Lund III, PhelpsMr. Lund may be contacted at
daniel.lund@phelps.com
Appellate Court reverses district court’s finding of alter ego in Sedgwick Properties Development Corporation v. Christopher Hinds (2019WL2865935)
August 13, 2019 —
Frank Ingham - Colorado Construction LitigationDivision V of the Colorado Court of Appeals addressed, for the first time, corporate veil-piercing in the context of a single-member, single-purpose LLC that is managed under a contract by another company. On July 3, 2019, the Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Honorable Ross B. Buchannan, Denver District Court Judge (17CA2102), who held that Plaintiff/Appellee Christopher Hinds satisfied the elements required to pierce the corporate veil of Sedgwick Properties Development Corporation (“Sedgwick”).
Background
Defendant 1950 Logan, LLC (“1950 Logan”) was the developer of a building located at 1950 Logan Street, in Denver, called The Tower on the Park (“Project”), which contained 141 individually owned condominium units. The Project was completed in 2006. 1950 Logan was a single-purpose entity created for the construction of the Project, which is a common practice in the construction industry. After the units were sold in 2006, the LLC wrapped up operations.
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Frank Ingham, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCMr. Ingham may be contacted at
ingham@hhmrlaw.com
Pulte Home Corp. v. CBR Electric, Inc.
August 24, 2020 —
Michael Velladao - Lewis BrisboisIn Pulte Home Corp. v. CBR Electric, Inc., 50 Cal.App.5th 216 (June 10, 2020), the California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s entry of judgment in favor of six subcontractors with respect to an equitable subrogation lawsuit filed by St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company (“St. Paul”). St. Paul filed the lawsuit after defending Pulte Home Corp. (“Pulte”) against two construction defect lawsuits. The lawsuit contended that St. Paul was entitled to seek recovery of defense costs incurred on behalf of Pulte based on equitable subrogation. St. Paul relied on the indemnity clauses in each of the subcontracts, and argued that the subcontractors had breached their contracts with Pulte. As such, each subcontractor was obligated to pay an equitable share of the defense of the construction defect lawsuits relating to their work on the homes at issue in such lawsuits. The trial court ruled against St. Paul and held that the subcontractors’ failure to pay defense costs did not “cause” the homeowners’ claims, such that there was no causal connection supporting a claim for equitable subrogation. In addition, the trial court found that “equitable subrogation was an all-or-nothing claim, meaning it required a shifting of the entire amount of defense costs to the subcontractors on a joint and several basis and did not allow for an apportionment of costs among the defendant subcontractors.”
In reversing the trial court’s decision, the Court of Appeal reasoned that St. Paul stood in the shoes of Pulte and was limited to pursuing recovery from the subcontractors based on the same rights as afforded to Pulte under the subcontracts. The Court of Appeal noted that St. Paul was seeking reimbursement of defense costs from the subcontractors based on the theory that they were contractually liable for paying an equitable share of defense costs. The Court of Appeal also noted that St. Paul’s claim was not premised on the contention that the subcontractors’ failure to pay defense costs caused the homeowners’ claims. Rather, St. Paul’s claim was premised on the subcontractors’ breach of their defense duty owed to Pulte under the indemnity clauses in their subcontracts.
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Michael Velladao, Lewis BrisboisMr. Velladao may be contacted at
Michael.Velladao@lewisbrisbois.com
Texas Supreme Court Rules That Subsequent Purchaser of Home Is Bound by Original Homeowner’s Arbitration Agreement With Builder
May 29, 2023 —
Kim Altsuler - Peckar & Abramson, P.C.In a new opinion
Lennar Homes of Texas Land and Construction, Ltd., et al. v. Kara Whiteley, Cause No. 21-0783, 66 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 8740, issued May 12, 2023, the Texas Supreme Court partially reversed two lower court decisions and held that an arbitration provision contained in the original homeowner’s contract with the builder was binding on a subsequent homeowner. In the decision, the court found that Kara Whiteley—the second owner of the home in Galveston, Texas—was bound to arbitrate her construction defect claims with Lennar by virtue of the doctrine of “direct-benefits estoppel.” The rationale was based on the fact that Whitely was seeking benefits emanating from Lennar’s contract with the original homeowner.
The residence in question was first purchased from Lennar in May 2014. Whiteley purchased the home in July 2015. The original contract documents included several arbitration provisions—one in the Purchase and Sale Agreement, one in the Limited Warranty issued by Lennar, and one in the general warranty deed. Whiteley sued Lennar in Galveston County District Court alleging mold growth and other defects at the property. Lennar moved for arbitration and its motion was granted. The parties arbitrated the case and Lennar received an award in its favor. Lennar then moved the District Court to confirm the arbitration award, and Whiteley filed a cross-motion to vacate the award, arguing that Lennar’s original motion to compel arbitration should not have been granted. The District Court agreed with Whiteley, vacating the arbitration award. Lennar appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s vacatur, and Lennar appealed to the Texas Supreme Court.
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Kim Altsuler - Peckar & Abramson, P.C.Ms. Altsuler may be contacted at
kaltsuler@pecklaw.com
