What a Difference a Day Makes: Mississippi’s Discovery Rule
November 16, 2023 —
William L. Doerler - The Subrogation StrategistThe discovery rule applies to latent injuries, such that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff knows of or should have known of the injury. In Western World Ins. Group v. KC Welding, LLC, No. 2022-CA-00527-SCT, 2023 Miss. LEXIS 278 (KC Welding), a majority of the justices on the Supreme Court of Mississippi (Supreme Court) affirmed the trial court’s ruling that Western World Insurance Group (Insurer) filed its lawsuit one day late. Thus, the statute of limitations barred Insurer’s lawsuit.
In KC Welding, on July 12, 2018, KC Welding, LLC (KC Welding) sent an employee to Sunbelt Shavings, LLC (Sunbelt) to repair the door of a box containing wood chips. Sunbelt’s employees discovered that KC Welding employees were welding a storage bin that had not been emptied of wood chips and Sunbelt’s employees asked KC Welding’s employees to leave. After that, Sunbelt’s employees attempted to soak the area with water. Later than night, a fire started on Sunbelt’s property, apparently as the result of smoldering wood shavings, a fire that was extinguished on July 13, 2018.
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William L. Doerler, White and Williams LLPMr. Doerler may be contacted at
doerlerw@whiteandwilliams.com
Illinois Court Addresses Rip-And-Tear Coverage And Existence Of An “Occurrence” In Defective Product Suit
September 04, 2018 —
Brian Bassett - TLSS Insurance Law BlogIn Lexington Ins. Co. v. Chi. Flameproof & Wood Specialties Corp., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135871, 2018 WL 3819109 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2018), the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found that rip-and-tear costs could qualify as covered “property damage,” but the court rejected coverage for claims that the insured intentionally sold a noncompliant product as the suit did not allege an “occurrence.”
Lexington Insurance Company (“Lexington”) issued a CGL policy to Chicago Flameproof & Wood Specialties Corp. (“Flameproof”). During the policy period, a third party ordered fire-retardant-treated lumber from Flameproof for construction in Minnesota. Flameproof instead sent materials that were not tested, certified, or labeled as compliant. The third party installed the materials, discovered the non-compliance, and then removed the materials. Removing the materials allegedly damaged other portions of the building on the project. The third party then sued Flameproof, alleging costs associated with replacing the lumber as well as property damage to the other materials from the removal of the lumber. Flameproof tendered the claim to Lexington seeking a defense. Lexington filed a declaratory action in the Northern District of Illinois.
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Brian Bassett, Traub Lieberman Strauss & Shrewsberry LLPMr. Bassett may be contacted at
bbassett@tlsslaw.com
Are Proprietary Specifications Illegal?
April 11, 2018 —
Wally Zimolong – Supplemental Conditions A friend came to me with a question regarding a case he was working: “can a public owner require that bidders use a specific brand name product?” “Of course not,” I said “proprietary specifications are illegal.” Or, at least that’s what I assumed. To my surprise, the law in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is not as clear as it is in other jurisdictions.
What is a proprietary specification?
A proprietary specification lists a product by brand name, make, model and/model that a contractor must (shall) utilize in construction. A basic example of a proprietary specification would state:
“Air Handlers shall be “Turbo Max” as manufactured by Chiller Corp.”
There are two problems with a proprietary specification (other than potentially being illegal): (a) they limit competition, and (b) invite steered contract awards. They limit competition because it limits the type of material that can be used on the project. In the example above, there could be equivalent air handlers available at a better price but the contractor could not use that lower priced product in its bid. Thus, the taxpayers end up paying more for tile. Also, contractors may not be able to secure a certain brand name product because of exclusive distribution agreements. Again, using the example above, contractor A’s competitor may have the exclusive distribution agreement with Chiller Corp.
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Wally Zimolong, Zimolong LLCMr. Zimolong may be contacted at
wally@zimolonglaw.com
$24 Million Verdict Against Material Supplier Overturned Where Plaintiff Failed To Prove Supplier’s Negligence Or Breach Of Contract Caused A SB800 Violation
June 05, 2017 —
Jon A. Turigliatto & Chelsea L. Zwart - CGDRB News & PublicationsThe Fourth District California Court of Appeal published its decision, Acqua Vista Homeowners Assoc. v. MWI, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1129, holding that claims against a material supplier under SB800 (Civil Code §895, et. seq.) require proof that the SB800 violation was caused by the supplier’s negligence or breach of contract.
In this case, Acqua Vista Homeowners Association (“the HOA”) sued MWI, a supplier of Chinese pipe used in the construction of the Acqua Vista condominium development. The HOA’s complaint asserted a single cause of action for violation of SB800 standards, and alleged that defective cast iron pipe was used throughout the building. At trial, the HOA presented evidence that the pipes supplied by MWI contained manufacturing defects, that they leaked, and that the leaks had caused damage to various parts of the condominium development. The jury returned a special verdict against MWI, and the trial court entered a judgment against MWI in the amount of $23,955,796.28, reflecting the jury’s finding that MWI was 92% responsible for the HOA’s damages.
MWI filed a motion for a directed verdict prior to the jury’s verdict and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict following the entry of judgment, both on the grounds that the HOA had failed to present any evidence that MWI had caused a SB800 violation as a result of its negligence or breach of contract, and had therefore failed to prove negligence and causation as required by SB800. MWI relied on the Fourth District’s prior decision in Greystone Homes, Inc. v. Midtec, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1194, and its interpretation therein of Civil Code §936, which states, in relevant part, that the statute applies “to general contractors, subcontractors, material suppliers, individual product manufacturers, and design professionals to the extent that the general contractors, subcontractors, material suppliers, individual product manufacturers, and design professionals caused, in whole or in part, a violation of a particular standard as the result of a negligent act or omission or a breach of contract….” (emphasis added.) However, the trial court denied both motions, relying on the last sentence of Civil Code §936, which states in part, “[T]he negligence standard in this section does not apply to any…material supplier…with respect to claims for which strict liability would apply.”
Reprinted courtesy of
Jon A. Turigliatto, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger and
Chelsea L. Zwart, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger
Mr. Turigliatto may be contacted at jturigliatto@cgdrblaw.com
Ms. Zwart may be contacted at czwart@cgdrblaw.com
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Constructive Suspension (Suspension Outside of an Express Order)
December 13, 2022 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesIn the federal procurement arena, there is a concept known as “constructive suspension.” Constructive suspension, while known in the federal arena, should reasonably apply to all projects when work is stopped outside of an express order to stop the work based on the law below. An unreasonable suspension is an unreasonable suspension and an express order to stop the work does not negate the effects of what really amounts to a suspension.
“Constructive suspension occurs when work is stopped absent an express order by the contracting officer and the government is found to be responsible for the work stoppage.” P.R. Burke Corp. v. U.S., 277 F.3d 1346, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The government delay must be unreasonable to support a constructive acceleration claim. Id.
“To demonstrate such a constructive suspension of work, the contractor must show that the delay (1) was for an ‘unreasonable length of time,’ (2) was proximately caused by the government’s actions, and (3) resulted in some injury to the contractor.” Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. U.S., 2001 WL 36415627, *6 (Fed.Cl. 2001) (citation omitted). “Relative to proving that the delay was directly caused by the government, the contractor must concomitantly show that it was not delayed by any concurrent cause that would have independently generated the delay during the same time period even if it does not predominate over the government’s action as the cause of the delay.” Beauchamp Const. Co. v. U.S., 14 Cl.Ct. 430, 437 (Cl.Ct. 1988).
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Portions of Policyholder's Expert's Opinions Excluded
November 13, 2023 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe federal district court granted, in part, the insurer's motion to exclude portions of expert testimony. Tundra M. Holdings, LLC v. Markel Ins. Co., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139952 (D. Alaska Aug. 10, 2023).
Plaintiff alleged a building it owned suffered damages consisting of building roof failure due to snow load. Plaintiff submitted a claim to Markel for its loss.
Plaintiff hired an engineering firm to conduct an inspection. The recommendation was to install snow guards and that 28 rafters be replaced with new beams. The evaluation did not state that the recommendation was required by law or ordinance. Nor did the evaluation make mention of replacing the metal roof on the building or anything about the water system or sprinkler system. Plaintiff then obtained an estimate of $687,500 for roof repair/replacement, store front repair, a sprinkler system installer and a water system upgrade.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Federal Court Asks South Dakota Supreme Court to Decide Whether Injunction Costs Are “Damages,” Adopts Restatement’s Position on Providing “Inadequate” Defense
August 13, 2019 —
Anthony L. Miscioscia & Timothy A. Carroll - White and Williams LLPDo costs associated with complying with an injunction constitute covered “damages?” The U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota recently certified that question to the South Dakota Supreme Court, in Sapienza v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, No. 3:18-CV-03015-RAL, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84973 (D.S.D. May 17, 2019). If the South Dakota Supreme Court takes on the question, it will become one of the few highest state courts to do so.[1] The Sapienza case is also notable because the court adopted § 12 of the Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance (Restatement) regarding an insurer’s potential liability for providing an “inadequate” defense. In doing so, the Sapienza court joins a growing list of courts to rely upon or cite to the Restatement.
The Sapienza case arose out of an underlying dispute between residential neighbors over the size and location of the Sapienzas’ new house they built in a historic district in Sioux Falls, SD. The newly-built house allegedly prevented the neighbors from using their fireplace, blocked natural light the neighbors previously enjoyed, and decreased the value of the neighbors’ house. The neighbors sought a permanent injunction requiring the Sapienzas to modify or relocate the house. The Sapienzas’ homeowners’ insurer provided them with defense counsel, but the insurer instructed the Sapienzas that it would not cover any costs associated with an injunction as such costs did not constitute covered “damages.”
Reprinted courtesy of
Timothy Carroll, White and Williams LLP and
Anthony Miscioscia, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Schulman may be contacted at carrollt@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Anderson may be contacted at misciosciaa@whiteandwilliams.com
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Velazquez Framing, LLC v. Cascadia Homes, Inc. (Take 2) – Pre-lien Notice for Labor Unambiguously Not Required
May 13, 2024 —
Travis Colburn - Ahlers Cressman & SleightPre-lien Notice for Labor Unambiguously Not Required.
In January 2024, almost a year after Division 2 of the Washington Court of Appeals decided Velazquez Framing, LLC v. Cascadia Homes, Inc.,1 the Washington Supreme Court, sitting en banc, reversed and remanded the matter for further proceedings.2
The relevant background facts are that Cascadia Homes, Inc. (“Cascadia”), was a general contractor and also owned the property that was the subject matter of the underlying dispute. Cascadia wished to construct a new home on the property. Cascadia hired High End Construction, LLC (“High End”) – a framing subcontractor – to provide framing for the new home. High End, in turn, hired Velazquez Framing, LLC (“Velazquez”). Velazquez did not provide Cascadia – the owner – with notice of its statutory right to claim a lien.
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Travis Colburn, Ahlers Cressman & SleightMr. Colburn may be contacted at
travis.colburn@acslawyers.com
