“Slow and Steady Doesn’t Always Win the Race” – Applicability of a Statute of Repose on Indemnity/Contribution Claims in New Hampshire
November 24, 2019 —
Rahul Gogineni - The Subrogation StrategistIn Rankin v. South Street Downtown Holdings, Inc., 2019 N.H. LEXIS 165, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire considered, pursuant to a question transferred by the trial court, whether RSA 508:4-b, the statute of repose for improvements to real property, applies to indemnity and contribution claims. The court concluded that based upon the plain reading of the statute, it applies to indemnity and contribution claims. As noted by the court, a holding to the contrary would violate the intent of a statute of repose, which is to establish a time limit for when a party is exposed to liability.
In Rankin, after falling and injuring himself while leaving a building, John Rankin and his wife brought an action against the property owner, South Street Downtown Holding, Inc. (South Street) in 2017. South Street subsequently filed a third-party complaint against multiple parties including an architectural company, Wagner Hodgson, Inc. (Wagner), who was involved in a renovation project at the property. The project was substantially complete in 2009. Wagner responded by moving to dismiss the action, arguing that South Street’s indemnification and contribution claims were barred by the applicable statute of repose.
RSA 508:4-b specifically states,
Except as otherwise provided in this section, all actions to recover damages for injury to property, injury to the person, wrongful death or economic loss arising out of any deficiency in the creation of an improvement to real property, including without limitation the design, labor, materials, engineering, planning, surveying, construction, observation, supervision or inspection of that improvement, shall be brought within 8 years from the date of substantial completion of the improvement, and not thereafter. (Emphasis added).
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Rahul Gogineni, White and Williams LLPMr. Gogineni may be contacted at
goginenir@whiteandwilliams.com
Duty to Defend Affirmed in Connecticut Construction Defect Case
August 13, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFAccording to an article by Matthew Vocci of Ober | Kaler in JD Supra, the Supreme Court of Conneticut affirmed in Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Netherlands Ins. “that allegations of years-long, continuing and progressive water intrusion caused by alleged construction defects triggered a duty to defend under CGL coverage language.”
Vocci stated that the result demonstrated “the importance of the wording of the allegations relating to construction defects, resulting damage and when the parties were on notice of the issues. For property owners, contractors/builders/developers and their insurers, the allegations in the complaint guide what can be a difficult and contentious determination regarding whether the insured is provided with a defense from its CGL carrier.”
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Common Construction Contract Provisions: Indemnity Provisions
January 19, 2017 —
David R. Cook Jr. - Autry, Hanrahan, Hall & Cook, LLP BlogUpcoming blog posts will focus on common contract provisions found in construction contracts. Such provisions are not solely limited to construction contracts and can be found in many other types of business contracts as well. This post will highlight indemnity clauses.
An indemnity clause is a common contract provision used to allocate risk between parties to a contract. The clause obligates one party (the Indemnitor) to protect the other party (the Indemnitee) from certain losses, typically arising from claims of third parties. It may require the Indemnitor to reimburse the Indemnitee for losses or expenses, or satisfy judgments, or even defend the Indemnitee in a lawsuit.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
David R. Cook Jr., Autry, Hanrahan, Hall & Cook, LLPMr. Cook may be contacted at
cook@ahclaw.com
Contractors Liable For Their Subcontractor’s Failure To Pay Its Employees’ Wages And Benefits
November 01, 2022 —
Edward O. Pacer & David J. Scriven-Young - ConsensusDocsRecently, Illinois Governor J.B. Pritzker signed two House Bills that amend the Illinois Wage Payment & Collections Act, 820 ILCS 115 et. seq. (“Wage Act”), to provide greater protection for individuals working in the construction trades against wage theft in a defined class of projects. Pursuant to this new law, every general contractor, construction manager, or “primary contractor,” working on the projects included in the Bill’s purview will be liable for wages that have not been paid by a subcontractor or lower-tier subcontractor on any contract entered into after July 1, 2022, together with unpaid fringe benefits plus attorneys’ fees and costs that are incurred by the employee in bringing an action under the Wage Act. This new wage theft law follows several other states that have considered and passed similar legislation.
These amendments to the Wage Act apply to a primary contractor engaged in “erection, construction, alteration, or repair of a building structure, or other private work.” However, there are important limitations to the amendment’s applicability. The amendment does not apply to projects under contract with state or local government, or to general contractors that are parties to a collective bargaining agreement on a project where the work is being performed. Additionally, the amendment does not apply to primary contractors who are doing work with a value of less than $20,000, or work that involves only the altering or repairing of an existing single-family dwelling or single residential unit in a multi-unit building.
Reprinted courtesy of
Edward O. Pacer, Peckar & Abramson, P.C. (ConsensusDocs) and
David J. Scriven-Young, Peckar & Abramson, P.C. (ConsensusDocs)
Mr. Pacer may be contacted at epacer@pecklaw.com
Mr. Scriven-Young may be contacted at dscriven-young@pecklaw.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Drawing the Line: In Tennessee, the Economic Loss Doctrine Does Not Apply to Contracts for Services
December 11, 2023 —
Gus Sara - The Subrogation StrategistIn Commercial Painting Co. v. Weitz Co. LLC, No. W2019-02089-SC-R11-CV, 2023 Tenn. LEXIS 39 (Weitz), the Supreme Court of Tennessee (Supreme Court) considered whether the economic loss doctrine barred the plaintiff’s claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation and punitive damages arising out of a contract with the defendant for construction services. The court held that the economic loss doctrine only applies to product liability cases and does not apply to claims arising from contracts for services. This case establishes that, in Tennessee, the economic loss doctrine does not bar tort claims in disputes arising from service contracts.
In Weitz, defendant, Weitz Co. LLC (Weitz), was the general contractor for a construction project and hired plaintiff Commercial Painting Co. (Commercial) as a drywall subcontractor. Weitz refused to pay Commercial for several of its payment applications, claiming that the applications were submitted untimely and contained improper change order requests. Commercial filed a lawsuit against Weitz seeking over $1.9 million in damages, alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, enforcement of a mechanic’s lien, and interest and attorney’s fees under the Prompt Pay Act of 1991. Weitz filed a counterclaim for $500,000 for costs allegedly incurred due to Commercial’s delay and defective workmanship. In response, Commercial amended its complaint to add claims for fraud, intentional and negligent misrepresentation, rescission of the contract and $10 million in punitive damages. Commercial alleged that Weitz received an extension of the construction schedule but fraudulently withheld this information from Commercial and continued to impose unrealistic deadlines.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Gus Sara, White and WilliamsMr. Sara may be contacted at
sarag@whiteandwilliams.com
California Court of Appeal: Inserting The Phrase “Ongoing Operations” In An Additional Endorsement Is Not Enough to Preclude Coverage for Completed Operations
September 14, 2017 —
Gary Barrera - California Construction Law BlogIn a victory for additional insureds, a California appeals court held, in Pulte Home Corp. v. American Safety Indemnity Co., Cal.Ct.App. (4th Dist.), Docket No. D070478 (filed 8/30/17), that an insurer’s denial of coverage for completed operations based on the inclusion of the phrase “ongoing operations” in an additional insured endorsement, was improper. Additionally, an insurer wishing to limit coverage under an additional insured endorsement to ongoing operations must do so via clear and explicit language.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Gary Barrera, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLPMr. Barrera may be contacted at
gbarrera@wendel.com
Appeals Court Upholds Decision by Referee in Trial Court for Antagan v Shea Homes
May 10, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFIn the case Antangan v. Shea Homes Ltd. Partnership (Cal. App., 2012), Plaintiffs appealed “an order vacating a judgment and entering a modified judgment in their construction defect action against defendants Shea Homes, Inc. and Shea Homes Limited Partnership,” while the Defendant, Shea Homes Limited Partnership (Shea Homes) appealed “an order of the judicial referee denying its motion to strike and tax costs.”
On the Antagon issue, the appeals court concluded that “the trial court did not err by vacating and modifying its judgment so that the cost of referee’s fees would be equally divided by the parties and consistent with a prior stipulation they filed in court.”
On the Shea Homes issue, the appeals court concluded: “1) the judicial referee did not err by ruling that plaintiffs’ offers to compromise (§ 998) were validly served on Shea Homes’ counsel, 2) the offers substantially complied with statutory requirements, 3) the offers were not required to be apportioned, and 4) the referee’s award of $5,000 as costs for a person assisting plaintiffs’ counsel was not an abuse of discretion.” The appeals court affirmed the judgment.
Here is a brief history of the trial case: “Plaintiffs Chito Antangan, Jimmy Alcova and other homeowners brought an action against defendants Shea Homes, Inc. and Shea Homes Limited Partnership for damages alleging that the properties they purchased from these ‘developer defendants’ were defective. Plaintiffs claimed numerous construction defects required them ‘to incur expenses’ for ‘restoration and repairs’ and the value of their homes had been diminished.”
In response, Shea Homes filed a motion for an order to appoint a judicial referee. The motion was granted and it was ruled that “a referee would ‘try all issues’ and ‘report a statement of decision to this court.’”
On May 10, 2010 the judicial referee (Thompson) “awarded plaintiffs damages and various costs, and ruled that ‘Shea Homes shall bear all of the Referee’s fees.’” The latter ruling would become a matter for contention later on.
In July of 2010, the plaintiffs “sought, among other things, $54,409.90 for expert fees, and $14,812.50 for the services of Melissa Fox for ‘exhibit preparation & trial presentation.’ Shea Homes filed a motion to strike and/or tax costs claiming: 1) Fox was a paralegal, 2) plaintiffs were not entitled to attorney’s fees, and 3) the fees for Fox’s services were an indirect and improper method to obtain attorney’s fees. The referee disagreed and awarded $5,000 for Fox’s services. The referee also ruled that plaintiffs had properly served valid offers to compromise (§ 998) on Shea Homes’ counsel in 2009. He said those offers to defendants in the case at that time did not have to be apportioned.”
“Antangan contends the trial court erred when it vacated and modified its original judgment, which ordered Shea Homes to pay all the referee’s fees. We disagree.”
Antagon contended that the trial court erred when it vacated and modified its original judgment regarding Shea Homes paying the referee’s fees. The appeals court disagreed: “A trial court has inherent authority to vacate or correct a judgment that is void on its face, incorrect, or entered by mistake. (§ 473; Rochin v. Pat Johnson Manufacturing Co. (1998),67 Cal.App.4th 1228; Olivera
Read the court’s decision…
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Congratulations to Wilke Fleury’s 2024 Super Lawyers and Rising Stars!!
July 15, 2024 —
Wilke Fleury LLPWilke Fleury is extremely proud that several of its incredible attorneys have been selected as 2024 Northern California Super Lawyers or Rising Stars! Super Lawyers rates attorneys in each state using a patented selection process and publishes a yearly magazine issue that produces award-winning features on selected attorneys. Congratulations to this talented group:
2024 Super Lawyers:
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Wilke Fleury LLP
