Significant Victory for the Building Industry: Liberty Mutual is Rejected Once Again, This Time by the Third Appellate District in Holding SB800 is the Exclusive Remedy
December 15, 2016 —
Richard H. Glucksman & Ravi R. Mehta – Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger Bulletin I. Elliott Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court (Certified for Publication, Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2016
The California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District recently elaborated on the scope of the Right to Repair Act, commonly known as SB-800 (“Act”). In
Elliott Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court of Sacramento County (Kevin Hicks, et al.) (certified for publication, Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2016), the Court considered whether the Act (and specifically the Act’s pre-litigation procedure) applies, when homeowners plead construction defect claims based only on common law causes of action, as opposed to violations of the building standards set forth in the Act (
Civil Code §896). The Court answered this question affirmatively.
The homeowners of seventeen (17) single-family homes filed a Complaint against the builder of their homes, Elliott Homes, Inc. (“Elliott”), alleging common law causes of action for construction defects. Elliott filed a motion to stay the litigation on the ground that the homeowners failed to comply with the pre-litigation procedure set forth in the Act. The trial court denied the motion, agreeing with the homeowners that this pre-litigation procedure did not apply because the homeowners had not alleged a statutory violation of the Act. Elliott appealed. The Court of Appeal purely considered the question of whether the Act, including its pre-litigation procedure, applies when a homeowner pleads construction defect claims based on common law causes of action, and not on statutory violations of the Act’s building standards.
To answer this question, the Court analyzed a recent case decided by the Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District:
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove, LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 98. In this subrogation case, a builder’s insurer asserted common law causes of action (but not statutory building standard violations) alleging construction defects against the builder to recover amounts paid to the homeowner after a sprinkler system failure caused extensive damage to the subject property. The trial court sustained the builder’s demurrer to the Complaint on the ground that it was time-barred under the Act. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order, holding that common law construction defect claims arising from actual damages are not covered by the Act because “the Act does not provide the exclusive remedy in cases where actual damage has occurred.” (
Liberty Mutual, 219 Cal.App.4th 98, 109).
The
Elliott Court declined to follow
Liberty Mutual, finding that that Court failed to properly analyze the language of the Act. The
Elliott Court analyzed both the statutory scheme and the legislative history of the Act to arrive at the conclusion that common law causes of action for construction defects do indeed fall within the purview of the Act.
According to the
Elliott Court, the Act “broadly applies to
any action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in…residential construction and in such an action, a homeowner’s claims or causes of action shall be limited to violation of the standards set forth in the Act, except as specified.” Further, the Act expressly provides that “no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under Section 944 is allowed.”
Civil Code §943(a). In turn,
Civil Code §944 allows for a recovery for the cost of repairing a building standard violation, or for the cost of repairing any damage caused by such a violation, among other things.
The limited exceptions to the Act’s applicability concern the enforcement of a contract, or any action for fraud, personal injury, or violation of a statute. Civil Code §943(a). Additionally, the Act does not apply to condominium conversions. Civil Code §896.
The Elliott Court explains that apart from these exceptions, the Legislature intended the Act to apply to all construction defect claims (regardless of damage) relating to the construction of residential properties whose sales contracts are signed after January 1, 2003. There is no exception in the Act, express or implied, for common law causes of action.
Next, the Court turns to the Act’s legislative history to buttress this conclusion. This history makes clear that the Act is a legislative response to the California Supreme Court’s holding in
Aas v. Superior Court (2000) 24 Cal.4th 627, that construction defects in residential properties are only actionable in tort when actual property damage manifests. Senate Judiciary Committee hearings indicate that the Act was the product of protracted negotiations between varying interested parties, including construction industry trade groups and consumer protection groups. The Legislature intended (1) to promulgate building standards, violations of which would be actionable, even without damage, and (2) to allow homeowners to recover for actual damage caused by construction defects not covered by the building standards. In other words, the Act was intended to provide homeowners redress regardless of whether damage had manifested.
Therefore, the Court concluded that common law causes of action for construction defects, regardless of damage, are subject to the pre-litigation procedure set forth in the Act. The Court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its earlier order, and to enter a new order granting Elliott’s motion to stay the litigation until the homeowners (and Elliott) have satisfied the pre-litigation procedure of the Act.
II. McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1132
Similar to the Third Appellate District Court’s ruling in
Elliott, the Fifth Appellate District Court also rejected the holding of
Liberty Mutual in a matter now pending before the California Supreme Court:
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1132 (review granted and opinion superseded sub nom.
Albany v. Superior Court 360 P.3d 1022). Also similar to
Elliott, in
McMillin a group of homeowners filed common law construction defect claims against the builder of their homes. The builder,
McMillin, moved to stay the litigation pending compliance with the Act’s pre-litigation procedure. The trial court denied the motion, holding that the Act does not apply because the homeowners have not asserted statutory building standard violations contained within the Act.
In reasoning substantially similar to that of
Elliott, the
McMillin Court rejected Liberty Mutual’s holding that the Act is not the exclusive remedy for pursuing construction defect claims, with or without damage. Thus, the
McMillin Court issued a writ of mandate to vacate the trial court’s earlier order and to enter a new order granting McMillin’s motion to stay.
On November 24, 2015, the California Supreme Court granted the homeowners’ petition for review. In August of 2016, briefing was completed and the matter is now awaiting the scheduling of arguments. CGDRB will continue to closely monitor the pending appeal of this matter to the California Supreme Court, as well as all related developments.
Reprinted courtesy of
Richard H. Glucksman, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger and
Ravi R. Mehta, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger
Mr. Glucksman may be contacted at rglucksman@cgdrblaw.com
Mr. Mehta may be contacted at rmehta@cgdrblaw.com
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Carin Ramirez and David McLain recognized among the Best Lawyers in America© for 2021
March 15, 2021 —
Colorado Construction Litigation BlogHiggins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell is pleased to announce that Carin Ramirez and David McLain were recently selected by their peers for inclusion in The Best Lawyers in America© for 2021. Carin Ramirez has been recognized for her work in insurance litigation and David McLain has been recognized for his work in construction law.
Carin Ramirez has over 11 years of experience in civil defense litigation with an emphasis on the defense of construction defect lawsuits on behalf of developers, general contractors, and other construction professionals. She also practices in the areas of personal injury defense, premises liability, environmental torts, wrongful death, negligent design, property damage, subrogation claims, contract disputes, bad faith, and commercial litigation. David McLain has over 22 years of experience and is well known for his work in the defense of the construction industry, particularly in the area of construction defect litigation. He is a member of the Executive Committee of the CLM Claims College - School of Construction, which is the premier course for insurance, industry, and legal professionals.
HHMR is highly regarded for its expertise in construction law and the litigation of construction-related claims, including the defense of large and complex construction defect matters. Our attorneys provide exceptional service to individuals, business owners, Fortune 500 companies, and the insurance industry. The firm is experienced in providing legal support throughout trials and alternative dispute resolution such as mediations and arbitrations.
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Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell
Hydrogen Powers Its Way from Proof of Concept to Reality in Real Estate
May 10, 2021 —
Victoria Judd, Sidney L. Fowler & Robert G. Howard - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law BlogHydrogen is the new buzzword in every industry, and real estate is no exception. Hydrogen does not emit carbon dioxide when burnt and could therefore help reduce the climate impact of buildings, which in aggregate represent one of the biggest emitters of greenhouse gases after industry and surface transport. To the extent that hydrogen is to become an important power source globally, it will need to enter the domestic power market. The first step appears to be the development of pilot villages.
In the UK, there are several hydrogen trials in uninhabited properties or in closed private networks. There are some uninhabited houses on a Royal Air Force base in Cumbria that are exclusively heated with hydrogen and also a private gas network at Keele University which uses 20 percent hydrogen blended with natural gas. In addition, there is a small village near Newcastle that is being used as a test case: for a period of 10 months starting in spring 2021, up to 20 percent hydrogen will be blended into the natural gas network so that more than 650 homes can be partially heated by hydrogen. It is expected that a small number of additional villages will be able to heat their homes with 100 percent hydrogen as soon as 2022, with a scale up to have a hydrogen town by 2030.
Reprinted courtesy of
Victoria Judd, Pillsbury,
Sidney L. Fowler, Pillsbury and
Robert G. Howard, Pillsbury
Ms. Judd may be contacted at victoria.judd@pillsburylaw.com
Mr. Fowler may be contacted at sidney.fowler@pillsburylaw.com
Mr. Howard may be contacted at robert.howard@pillsburylaw.com
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Florida’s Construction Defect Statute of Repose
August 24, 2017 —
David Suggs – Bert L. Howe & Associates, Inc.Butler Weihmuller of Katz Craig LLP discussed Florida’s 10-year statute of repose law: “Under § 95.11(3)(c), the action must commence within 10 years after the date of actual possession by the owner, the date of the issuance of a certificate of occupancy, the date of abandonment of construction if not completed, or the date of completion or termination of the contract between the professional engineer, registered architect, or licensed contractor and his or her employer, whichever date is latest.”
However, Weihmuller explains that parties may disagree on the specific date For instance, in Busch v. Lennar Homes, LLC, Florida’s 5th DCA recently “reversed a trial court’s dismissal of a homeowner’s construction defect claim that was filed just beyond 10 years after the closing date on the property.” The previous decision had been based on the notion that the contract had been completed upon the date of closing. The 5th DCA declared that “a contract is not completed until both sides of a contract have been performed” and “pointed to the ‘inspection and punch-list clause’ of the contract.” The clause indicated that “[a]ny remaining items that Seller has agreed to correct will be corrected by Seller at Seller’s sole cost and expense prior to closing or at Seller’s option within a reasonable time after closing.” Since not all punch-list items had been completed prior to closing, the 5th DCA held that the contract had not been completed at closing, and therefore the statute of repose did not begin until the punch-items had been accomplished.
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Anchoring Abuse: Evolution & Eradication
October 09, 2023 —
Tim Capowski & Chris Theobalt - Kahana FeldOver the past few years, the plaintiff bar has expanded its use of improper anchoring tactics. Historically, improper anchoring was seen as a risky tactic in which a plaintiff’s counsel would suggest an outrageous figure for pain and suffering during summation in the hope that the lay jury would either award it or split the difference (cut the suggested figure by half) and, either way, return an excessive or runaway verdict. Plaintiff counsel deployed the tactic infrequently through the turn of the century for fear of alienating the jury by appearing greedy.
Two interrelated factors happened to change this dynamic. First, the plaintiff bar worked extremely hard in the intervening years with great success to shed its “ambulance chaser” stereotype by marketing itself as the “protector of the vulnerable”. Second, with the rise in Reptile and punitive tactics spawned in part by the publication of the Reptile handbook, the plaintiff bar also discovered that juries were not alienated by outrageous anchors as long as they were preceded by Reptile commentary essentially to “prime” the jury to punish the defendant rather than compensate the plaintiff with its award.
This is not speculation. I recall sitting outside a courtroom with one of New York’s top plaintiff attorneys in 2006 during deliberations on a catastrophic personal injury trial, during which he conceded to me that he was worried he had asked the jury for too large a figure (it was not even eight figures). A decade later in 2016, that same attorney felt no trepidation in requesting nearly $100 million for a comparable injury. He fed the jurors a steady diet of Reptile tactics from start to finish and they dutifully awarded the requested figure. Our research confirms that this two-step strategy (Reptile + improper anchor) preceded every New York nuclear verdict returned from 2010-2022. The same is almost certainly true of most nuclear verdicts in other jurisdictions.
Reprinted courtesy of
Tim Capowski, Kahana Feld and
Chris Theobalt, Kahana Feld
Mr. Capowski may be contacted at tcapowski@kahanafeld.com
Mr. Theobalt may be contacted at ctheobalt@kahanafeld.com
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Quick Note: Subcontractor Payment Bond = Common Law Payment Bond
February 16, 2017 —
David Adelstein – Florida Construction Legal UpdatesWhat is a common law payment bond? A common law payment bond is a bond not required or governed by a statute. For example, if a prime contractor provides the owner a payment bond, that bond will be a statutory payment bond. On the other hand, if a subcontractor provides the general contractor with a payment bond, that bond will be a common law payment bond. Why? Because there is not a statute that specifically governs the requirements of a subcontractor’s payment bond given to a general contractor. The subcontractor’s payment bond is aimed at protecting the general contractor (and the general contractor’s payment bond) in the event the subcontractor fails to pay its own subcontractors and suppliers. The subcontractor’s payment bond will generally identify that claimants, as defined by the bond, are those subcontractors and suppliers the subcontractor has failed to pay. This common law payment bond is not recorded in the public records so sometimes it can be challenging for a claimant (anyone unpaid working under the subcontractor that furnished the bond) to obtain a copy of the bond. With that said, an unpaid claimant should consider pursuing a copy of this bond in certain situations, particularly if it may not have preserved a claim against the general contractor’s statutory payment bond.
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David Adelstein, Florida Construction Legal UpdatesMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dadelstein@gmail.com
Do We Really Want Courts Deciding if Our Construction Contracts are Fair?
March 19, 2015 —
Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law MusingsAs I posted recently, the Virginia General Assembly has passed, and I can see no reason why the governor won’t sign, a bill that would
essentially invalidate preemptive contractual waivers of lien rights as they relate to subcontractors and material suppliers. It does not apply to General Contractors, but it is a step in what many (including those attorneys that represent subcontractors and suppliers) believe is the right direction.
Of course, as soon as I posted last week, my friend and colleague
Scott Wolfe (@scottwolfejr) commented on that post and then
gave his two cents worth at his Zlien blog. The gist of the comments here at Musings and the post over at his blog was essentially that these contractual provisions were inherently unfair and therefore should be abolished because of both a relative disparity in leverage between the Owner or GC and the Subcontractor when it comes to negotiations and the fact that subcontractors often don’t read their contracts or
discuss them with a construction attorney prior to signing them. I hear this first of his arguments often when I am reviewing a contract after the fact and a client or potential client acts surprised that a provision will be enforced and the courts of the Commonwealth of Virginia will actually enforce them. As to Scott’s second reason, I have always warned here at Musings that
you should read your contracts carefully because they will be the law of your business relationship in the future.
The first of his two points is more interesting and in some ways more easily supported. However, where we are speaking of contracts between businesses where both sides are bound by the terms of the contract, it begs the question of whether in seeking to make contracts more “fair” we could add a layer of uncertainty that could cause more problems than it solves. Do we really want courts stepping in after the fact to renegotiate the terms of a deal that was struck months or possibly years before because one judge believes that the deal was too one sided? Do we really need such “Monday morning quarterbacking?” Is one person’s idea of “fair” better than another’s when both parties to the contract had the full ability to read, negotiate and possibly reject the deal long ago? Personally, I think that the answer to these questions is, in all but the most egregious cases or where the legislatures have stepped in adding certainty (whether to the good or bad), “No.”
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Christopher G. Hill, Law Office of Christopher G. Hill, PCMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Hawaii Federal District Court Rejects Bad Faith Claim
November 30, 2016 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe federal district court for the district of Hawaii rejected the insured's argument that the insurer acted in bad faith because the insured had to contribute to a settlement of the underlying case. Hanover Ins. Co. v. Anova Food, LLC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146114 (D. Haw. Oct. 21, 2016).
After a prior round of briefing, the court determined that Hanover had a duty to defend, but rejected Anova's claim for pre-tender fees.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
