Application of Frye Test to Determine Admissibility of Expert
April 03, 2019 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesFlorida went back to the Frye test/standard, instead of the Daubert test utilized in federal court, to determine the admissibility of expert testimony. The Frye test is more favorable to plaintiffs because it applies when an expert renders an opinion based on new or novel scientific principles. See D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Heron’s Landing Condominium Ass’n of Jacksonville, Inc., 44 Fla.L.Weekly D109b (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (“The supreme court has described the Frye test as one in which the results of mechanical or scientific testing are not admissible unless the testing has developed or improved to the point where the experts in the field widely share the view that the results are scientifically reliable as accurate. Stated differently, under Frye, the proponent of the evidence has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence with the general acceptance of the underlying scientific principles and methodology. However, as stated, the Frye standard only applies when an expert attempts to render an opinion that is based upon new or novel scientific principles.”).
In D.R. Horton, Inc., a condominium association sued the developer and general contractor (same entity) for construction defects that included claims in negligence, violation of building code, and breach of statutory warranties. The developer/general contractor moved in limine / to strike the association’s experts under, at the time, a Daubert analysis, but which became a Frye analysis during the pendency of the appeal. The expert opined as to construction defects and damage and the appropriate repairs – really, no different than any construction defect dispute, from what it appeared. The trial court denied the motion and during trial the experts testified and a sizable damages judgment was entered against the developer/contractor prompting the appeal. One issue on appeal was the admissibility of the expert’s opinion. The appellate court noted that a Frye analysis is not necessary because the experts used a scientifically reliable and peer-reviewed methodology.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin NorrisMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Notice of Claim Sufficient to Invoke Coverage
August 06, 2014 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiIndirect notice to the insurer was sufficient to trigger coverage for the additional insured under a liability policy. Spoleta Constr., LLC v. Aspen Ins. UK Ltd., 2014 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5174 (N.Y. App. Div. July 11, 2014).
An employee of the subcontractor was injured at the construction project on October 20, 2008. The general contractor was named as an additional insured on the subcontractor's CGL policy with Aspen. Under the subcontract, the subcontractor also agreed to defend and indemnify the general contractor for all claims arising out of the subcontractor's work.
The general contractor did not receive notice of the accident until late December 2009 in a letter from the injured employee's attorney. On January 27, 2010, the general contractor's liability carrier sent a letter to the subcontractor giving notice of the employee's claim and requesting that the subcontractor put its carrier on notice. On February 9, 2010, the subcontractor sent to Aspen a claim form with the January 2010 letter attached.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Las Vegas Student Housing Developer Will Name Replacement Contractor
February 15, 2018 —
John Guzzon – ENRMore than four months after construction abruptly stopped on a $76-million student housing project for the University of Nevada at Las Vegas, the developer is seeking a new contractor.
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John Guzzon, Engineering News- RecordMr. Guzzon may be contacted at
ENRSouthWestEditor@enr.com
New Hampshire Applies Crete/Sutton Doctrine to Bar Subrogation Against College Dormitory Residents
May 17, 2021 —
Kyle Rice - The Subrogation SpecialistPursuant to the Sutton Doctrine, first announced in Sutton v. Jondahl, 532 P.2d 478 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975), some jurisdictions consider a tenant a coinsured of its landlord absent an express agreement to the contrary. In Ro v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2019-0620, 2021 N.H. LEXIS 34 (Mar. 10, 2021), the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that the Sutton Doctrine, adopted by New Hampshire in Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Crete, 846 A.2d 521 (N.H. 2004), extends to resident students in a college dormitory. Thus, absent specific language to the contrary, a student is an implied coinsured under the fire insurance policy issued for his or her dormitory.
In 2016, two students at Dartmouth College, Daniel Ro and Sebastian Lim, set up a charcoal grill on a platform outside of a fourth-floor window in the Morton Hall dormitory. The grill started a fire on the platform that ultimately spread to the roof of the dormitory. During fire suppression efforts, all four floors of the dormitory sustained significant water damage. Following the loss, the building’s insurer, Factory Mutual Insurance Company (Insurer), paid $4,544,313.55 to the Trustees of Dartmouth College for the damages.
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Kyle Rice, White and WilliamsMr. Rice may be contacted at
ricek@whiteandwilliams.com
Appraiser Declarations Inadmissible When Offered to Challenge the Merits of an Appraisal Award
March 14, 2018 —
Valerie Moore and Christopher Kendrick - Publications & InsightsIn
Khorsand v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co. (No. B280273, filed 2/27/18), a California appeals court affirmed an appraisal award favorable to a homeowners insurer, ruling that it was improper to admit as evidence in opposition to a petition to confirm the award a declaration from the policyholders’ appraiser, except for the limited purpose of showing improprieties in the appraisal, bias, partiality or other improper conduct.
The homeowners had a pipe leak and submitted a claim. The insurer responded to an estimate from the owners’ adjuster by retaining an expert and paying an undisputed amount that was significantly less. Eleven months later the owners had upper deck damage and submitted another claim. Relying on the same expert, the insurer paid another undisputed amount significantly less than the owner’s estimate. The owners requested appraisal but the insurer denied the request, contending that the dispute was over coverage and outside the scope of appraisal.
The owners’ petition for appraisal was granted, with the court ordering separate listing of items the insurer disputed regarding coverage or causation. The appraisal panel issued an award stating that total damage was $132,293, of which $96,530 was contested by the insurer. The insurer filed a petition to confirm the award, which was granted despite the fact that the owners’ appraiser had refused to sign it.
Reprinted courtesy of
Valerie Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Christopher Kendrick, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com
Mr. Kendrick may be contacted at ckendrick@hbblaw.com
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The New York Lien Law - Top Ten Things You Ought to Know
December 23, 2023 —
Ralph E. Arpajian - White and Williams LLPOver the course of my career, I have had the privilege of working with and representing numerous construction lenders (and borrowers/developers) in the financing of some of the largest commercial projects in the United States.
A number of these projects have been in New York, where one encounters the New York Lien Law (the “Lien Law”). Many of my clients, particularly those lenders, borrowers, and their counsel, located outside of New York, are often perplexed by my advice regarding the Lien Law and the loan structuring requirements which result. In the hope that it would be helpful (especially for non-New York counsel), I have compiled a “top ten” list outlining, in my view, the most critical (and most perplexing) aspects of structuring New York construction loans under the Lien Law.
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Ralph E. Arpajian, White and Williams LLPMr. Arpajian may be contacted at
arpajianr@whiteandwilliams.com
NY Appellate Court Holds Common Interest Privilege Applies to Parties to a Merger
January 07, 2015 —
Jay Shapiro, Lori S. Smith and Brittney Edwards – White and Williams LLPThe common interest privilege is a doctrine that operates to maintain the confidentiality of communications between parties and counsel that have aligned interests. It is designed to encourage the free flow of information between these parties, and has historically been utilized primarily in the context of litigation. However, in Ambac Assurance Corp., et al. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., et al., the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department recently expanded the common interest privilege by holding that it is applicable in transactional contexts. 2014 WL 6803006, No. 651612/10 (1st Dep’t 2014). The Ambac court defined the common interest doctrine as “a limited exception to waiver of the attorney-client privilege” when a third party is present during a communication between an attorney and his or her client. The doctrine shields such communications from disclosure when they are (1) protected by the attorney client privilege and (2) “made for the purpose of furthering a legal interest or strategy common to the parties.”
Until Ambac, New York courts touched on, but never squarely addressed, whether a third requirement must be satisfied before the common interest doctrine can be invoked: “that the communication must affect pending or reasonably anticipated litigation.” The Ambac court addressed and rejected this purported third requirement while reversing the decision of the trial court which found that defendant Bank of America failed “to cite any New York case that applied the common-interest doctrine outside of either joint-representation of two parties by one attorney, or where parties reasonably anticipated litigation.”
Reprinted courtesy of Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP attorneys
Jay Shapiro,
Lori S. Smith and
Brittney Edwards
Mr. Shapiro may be contacted at shapiroj@whiteandwilliams.com
Ms. Smith may be contacted at smithl@whiteandwilliams.com
Ms. Edwards may be contacted at edwardsb@whiteandwilliams.com
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Express Warranty Trumping Spearin’s Implied Warranty
March 06, 2022 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesBe mindful of that express warranty provision in your contract. It could result in an outcome that you did not consider or factor when submitting your proposal or agreeing to your contract amount.
An express warranty could have the effect of eviscerating the argument that you performed your scope of work pursuant to the plans and specifications. In other words, the applicability of the Spearin doctrine could be rendered moot based on express warranty language in your contract that is fully within your control because you do not have to agree to that language.
Under the Spearin doctrine:
[W]hen a ‘contractor is bound to build according to plans and specifications prepared by the owner, the contractor will not be responsible for the consequences of defects in the plans and specification.’ Spearin and its progeny set forth a default rule of fundamental fairness that when a general contractor requires a subcontractor to follow certain plans and specifications, the general contractor impliedly warrants that those plans and specifications are ‘free from design defects.’ Put simply, Spearin protects subcontractors from liability for simply following the general contractor’s direction and requirements.
However, the implied warranty set forth in Spearin and its progeny may be overcome by express agreement. Where a general contractor and subcontractor expressly agree to allocate the risk of a defective product to the subcontractor, that express agreement must prevail over Spearin’s implied warranty.
Lighting Retrofit International, LLC v. Consellation NewEnergy, Inc., 2022 WL 541156 (D. Md. 2022) (internal citations omitted).
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
