$24 Million Verdict Against Material Supplier Overturned Where Plaintiff Failed to Prove Supplier’s Negligence or Breach of Contract Caused an SB800 Violation
March 16, 2017 —
Jon A. Turigliatto, Esq. & Chelsea L. Zwart, Esq. – Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger BulletinAcqua Vista Homeowners Assoc. v. MWL Inc. (2017) 2017 WL 371379
COURT OF APPEAL EXTENDS GREYSTONE HOMES, INC. v. MIDTEC, INC., HOLDING THAT CIVIL CODE §936 CREATES A NEGLIGENCE STANDARD FOR CLAIMS AGAINST MATERIAL SUPPLIERS BROUGHT UNDER SB800.
The Fourth District California Court of Appeal recently published its decision Acqua Vista Homeowners Assoc. v. MWI, Inc. (2017) 2017 WL 371379, holding that claims against a material supplier under SB800 (Civil Code §895 and §936) require proof that the SB800 violation was caused by the supplier's negligence or breach of contract.
Civil Code §936 states in relevant part, that it applies "to general contractors, subcontractors, material suppliers, individual product manufacturers, and design professionals to the extent that the general contractors, subcontractors, material suppliers, individual product manufacturers, and design professionals caused, in whole or in part, a violation of a particular standard as the result of a negligent act or omission or a breach of contract .... [T]he negligence standard in this section does not apply to any general contractor, subcontractor, material supplier, individual product manufacturer, or design professional with respect to claims for which strict liability would apply."
Acqua Vista Homeowners Association (the "HOA") sued MWI, a supplier of Chinese pipe used in the construction of the Acqua Vista condominium development. The HOA's complaint asserted a single cause of action for violation of SB800 standards, and alleged that defective cast iron pipe was used throughout the building. After trial, the trial court entered a judgment against MWI in the amount of $23,955,796.28, reflecting the jury's finding that MWI was 92% responsible for the HOA's damages.
MWI filed a motion for a directed verdict and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the grounds that the HOA had failed to present any evidence that MWI had caused an SB800 violation as a result of its negligence or breach of contract, and had therefore failed to prove negligence and causation as required by SB800, citing to Greystone Homes, Inc. v. Midtec, Inc.(2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1194. The trial court denied both motions, relying on the last sentence of Civil Code §936, which states in part, "[T]he negligence standard in this section does not apply to any ... material supplier ... with respect to claims for which strict liability would apply."
The Court of Appeal reversed and ordered the trial court to enter judgment in favor of MWI. The Court of Appeal relied on the legislative history of S8800 and Greystone, which held that the first sentence of Civil Code §936 contains an "explicit adoption of a negligence standard" for S8800 claims against product manufacturers. The Court of Appeal reasoned that since §936 treats product manufacturers and material suppliers identically, the holding of Greystone must equally apply to material suppliers.
Because the complaint did not state a common law cause of action for strict liability, the HOA was required to prove that the damages were caused by MWI' s negligence or breach of contract. Although, the Court of Appeal found that while the HOA's evidence may have supported a finding that the manufacturer of the leaking pipes was negligent, the HOA had not provided any evidence that MWI, the supplier, had failed to supply the type of pipe ordered, acted unreasonably in failing to detect any manufacturing defects present in the pipe, or damaged it during transportation. Accordingly, the HOA could not prove that the alleged S8800 violation was caused, in whole or in part, by MWI' s negligence, omission, or breach of contract.
In light of the decision, homeowner and associations that allege only violations of SB800 standards without asserting a common law cause of action for strict liability cannot prevail by simply producing evidence of a violation, and are required to prove that violation was caused by the negligent act or omission, or breach of contract, of the defendant contractor, material supplier, and/or product manufacturer.
Reprinted courtesy of
Jon A. Turigliatto, Esq, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger and
Chelsea L. Zwart, Esq., Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger
Mr. Turigliatto may be contacted at jturigliatto@cgdrblaw.com
Ms. Zwart may be contacted at czwart@cgdrblaw.com
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Toronto Contractor Bondfield Wins Court Protection as Project Woes Mount
May 27, 2019 —
Scott Van Voorhis - Engineering News-RecordA Toronto area contractor at the center of a series of delays to major projects in Ontario, including a $139-million hospital expansion, has won court protection from its creditors. The Ontario Superior Court earlier this month granted Bondfield Construction Co.’s application for protection, court records show.
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Scott Van Voorhis, ENR
Subcontractors Have Remedies, Even if “Pay-if-Paid” Provisions are Enforced
February 19, 2019 —
John P. Ahlers - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCIn a recent case in Kentucky[1], a sub-tier subcontractor sued the general contractor and owner for failure to pay for extra work. At the trial, the court held the subcontractor was entitled to recover under the theories of implied contracts and unjust enrichment, even though the subcontract contained a “pay-if-paid” clause. All parties appealed. In particular, the general contractor asserted that the pay-if-paid provision in the subcontract precluded recovery by the subcontractor. The issue was petitioned to the Supreme Court of Kentucky.
The question to be resolved by the Supreme Court of Kentucky was whether a pay-if-paid provision was enforceable as between a general contractor and subcontractor, and if so, whether the subcontractor could nevertheless pursue the owner directly for payment notwithstanding a lack of privity between the owner and subcontractor.
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John P. Ahlers, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCMr. Ahlers may be contacted at
john.ahlers@acslawyers.com
Maryland Legislation Prohibits Condominium Developers from Shortening Statute of Limitations to Defeat Unit Owner Construction Defect Claims
May 16, 2018 —
Nicholas D. Cowie - Maryland Condo Construction Defect Law BlogNew Maryland legislation prevents developers from shortening the time period within which condominium associations and their unit owner members can assert claims for hidden construction defects in newly constructed condominium communities. The legislation known as HB 77 and SB 258 passed both houses of the Maryland General Assembly and was signed into law by Governor Lawrence J. Hogan on April 24, 2018 (see photo above). Nicholas D. Cowie, Esq. is the author of the legislation, which will be codified as Section 11-134.1 of the Maryland Condominium Act, effective October 1, 2018.
This article discusses how this new legislation ends the practice by which some condominium developers attempted to use condominium documents to shorten the normal statute of limitations in order to prevent condominium associations and their unit owner members from having a fair opportunity to assert their warranty and other legal claims for latent construction defects.
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Nicholas D. Cowie, Esq., Cowie & MottMr. Cowie may be contacted at
ndc@cowiemott.com
California Supreme Court Holds “Notice-Prejudice” Rule is “Fundamental Public Policy” of California, May Override Choice of Law Provisions in Policies
November 12, 2019 —
Anthony L. Miscioscia & Timothy A. Carroll - White and Williams LLPOn August 29, 2019, in Pitzer College v. Indian Harbor Insurance Company, 2019 Cal. LEXIS 6240, the California Supreme Court held that, in the insurance context, the common law “notice-prejudice” rule is a “fundamental public policy” of the State of California for purposes of choice of law analysis. Thus, even though the policy in Pitzer had a choice of law provision requiring application of New York law – which does not require an insurer to prove prejudice for late notice of claims under policies delivered outside of New York – that provision can be overridden by California’s public policy of requiring insurers to prove prejudice after late notice of a claim. The Supreme Court in Pitzer also held that the notice-prejudice rule “generally applies to consent provisions in the context of first party liability policy coverage,” but not to consent provisions in the third-party liability policy context.
The Pitzer case arose from a discovery of polluted soil at Pitzer College during a dormitory construction project. Facing pressure to finish the project by the start of the next school term, Pitzer officials took steps to remediate the polluted soil at a cost of $2 million. When Pitzer notified its insurer of the remediation, and made a claim for the attendant costs, the insurer “denied coverage based on Pitzer’s failure to give notice as soon as practicable and its failure to obtain [the insurer’s] consent before commencing the remediation process.” The Supreme Court observed that Pitzer did not inform its insurer of the remediation until “three months after it completed remediation and six months after it discovered the darkened soils.” In response to the denial of coverage, Pitzer sued the insurer in California state court, the insurer removed the action to federal court and the insurer moved for summary judgment “claiming that it had no obligation to indemnify Pitzer for remediation costs because Pitzer had violated the Policy’s notice and consent provisions.”
Reprinted courtesy of
Timothy Carroll, White and Williams and
Anthony Miscioscia, White and Williams
Mr. Carroll may be contacted at carrollt@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Miscioscia may be contacted at misciosciaa@whiteandwilliams.com
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Insurer's Summary Judgment Motion to Reject Claim for Construction Defects Upheld
August 15, 2018 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe Third Circuit upheld the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the insurer on a claim seeking coverage for construction defects. Lenick Constr. v. Selective Way Ins. Co., 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 15197 (3d Cir. June 6, 2018).
Westrum was the general contractor for a 92 unit development, and it subcontracted with Lenick to perform rough and finish carpentry and to install paneling, windows, and doors provided by the developer. After the project was completed, it was discovered that some units experienced water infiltration, leaks and cracked drywall.
The condominium development sued Westrum, alleging contract and warranty claims. Westrum impleaded Lenick, asserting claims for breach of contract and indemnification. Lenick sought a defense from its insurer, Selective. Selective defended under a reservation of rights.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Improper Classification Under Davis Bacon Can Be Costly
April 01, 2015 —
Craig Martin – Construction Contractor AdvisorThe Department of Labor announced late last year that it had recovered nearly $2 million in back wages and fringe benefits from a subcontractor that provided constructions services at the federally funded Crescent Dunes Solar Energy Project in the Nevada desert. This was not a failure to pay Davis Bacon wages, but a failure to properly classify laborers on the project. The DOL determined that the laborers should have been paid as skilled trade steelworkers, not general laborers. As the subcontractor found out, this proved very costly.
The subcontractor submitted its bid, classifying its laborers as general laborers and designating their wage at $30.00. The laborers were to assemble billboard sized mirrors on the project. There is some indication that the Department of Energy agreed with the classification, even though the Department of Labor has the final say on classifications. The Department of Labor’s investigation revealed that the laborers routinely performed duties in skilled trades, such as ironworking, electrical work, painting or bridge crane operation. Based on these activities, the Department of Labor concluded that the laborers should have been paid $60.00 per hour plus fringe benefits.
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Craig Martin, Lamson, Dugan and Murray, LLPMr. Martin may be contacted at
cmartin@ldmlaw.com
Five "Boilerplate" Terms to Negotiate in Your Next Subcontract
November 08, 2017 —
James R. Lynch - Ahlers & Cressman PLLCWhether you negotiate your own subcontracts or rely on your lawyer to do the heavy lifting at contract time, a savvy subcontractor should understand the basic purpose of common subcontract provisions, and be prepared to negotiate for fair and commercially reasonable terms. While most sophisticated subcontractors are skilled at negotiating the core terms of a subcontract—scope of work, price, and time—a few simple but less obvious tweaks to common subcontract terms and conditions can go a long way to protect a subcontractor from unfair results when a dispute arises.
From the desk of an experienced construction lawyer, below are the first three of the top five “boilerplate” provisions that subcontractors too often overlook during contract negotiations, along with tips on language to include and to avoid.
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James R. Lynch, Ahlers & Cressman PLLCMr. Lynch may be contacted at
jlynch@ac-lawyers.com
