Prospective Additional Insureds May Be Obligated to Arbitrate Coverage Disputes
September 07, 2020 —
Danielle S. Ward - Balestreri Potocki & HolmesThe Court of Appeal closed out 2019 by ruling that an additional insured can be bound to the arbitration clause in a policy when a coverage dispute arises between that additional insured and the carrier. (Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co. v. SMG Holdings, Inc. (2019) 44 Cal. App. 5th 834, 837.)
In 2009, Future Farmers of America (“Future Farmers”) entered into a license agreement with SMG Holdings Incorporated (“SMG”) to use the Fresno Convention Center. As part of the agreement, Future Farmers was required to secure comprehensive general liability (“CGL”) coverage and name SMG and the City of Fresno as additional insureds (“AI”) on its policies.
Future Farmers purchased a general liability policy from Plaintiff Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company (“Philadelphia”). Neither SMG nor the City of Fresno were added as AIs, but the policy contained a “deluxe endorsement” which extended coverage to lessors of premises for “liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of that part of the premises leased or rented” to the named insured. The policy also contained an endorsement that extended coverage where required by a written contract for liability due to the negligence of the named insured. Philadelphia’s policy also stated that if the insurance company and insured “do not agree whether coverage is provided . . . for a claim made against the insured, then either party may make a written demand for arbitration.”
A patron to Future Farmer’s event at the Fresno Convention Center was seriously injured after he tripped over a pothole in the parking lot and hit his head. He sued both Fresno and SMG. In turn, Fresno and SMG tendered their defense to Philadelphia. Philadelphia denied coverage finding that the incident did not arise out of Future Farmer’s negligence, and that SMG had the sole responsibility for maintaining the parking lot. Consequently, Philadelphia concluded that neither Fresno nor SMG qualified “as an additional insured under the policy” for the injury in the parking lot.
The coverage dispute continued, and in 2016, Philadelphia issued a demand for arbitration which was rejected by SMG. Philadelphia then petitioned the state court to compel arbitration arguing that SMG could not avoid the burdens of the policy while seeking to obtain policy benefits. SMG used Philadelphia’s conclusion that it did not qualify as an AI under the policy to argue that Philadelphia was “estopped from demanding arbitration”. In other words, SMG argued that it could not be held to the burdens of the policy without being provided with the benefits of the policy.
The trial court sided with SMG finding that there was no arbitration agreement between the parties. The court noted that while third party beneficiaries can be compelled to arbitration there was no evidence that applied here, and Philadelphia could not maintain its inconsistent positions on the policy as its respects SMG.
Disagreeing with the trial court, the Court of Appeal concluded that SMG was a third-party beneficiary of the policy. The AI obligations in the license agreement and the deluxe endorsement in the Philadelphia policy collectively establish an intended beneficiary status. The Court saw SMG’s tender to Philadelphia as an acknowledgement of that status.
Relatedly, the Court found that SMG’s tender to Philadelphia – its demand for policy benefits – equitably estopped them from avoiding the burdens of the policy. The Court stated it defied logic to require a named insured to arbitrate coverage disputes but free an unnamed insured demanding policy coverage from the same requirement. Conversely, the Court found no inconsistency in Philadelphia’s denial of coverage to SMG and its subsequent demand for arbitration. Philadelphia did not outright reject SMG’s status as a potential insured, but rather concluded that there was no coverage because the injury occurred in the parking lot. In other words, the coverage determination turned on the circumstances of the injury not SMG’s status under the policy.
In short, the Court concluded that the potential insured takes the good with the bad. If one seeks to claim coverage as an additional insured, they can be subject to the restrictions of the policy including arbitration clauses even if they did not purchase the policy.
Securing additional insurance has become increasingly more difficult and limited over the years, and this holding presents yet another hurdle to attaining AI coverage. For those seeking coverage, it is important to note that the Court’s ruling may have turned out differently had the carrier outright denied SMG’s AI status, rather than concluding that the injury was not covered.
Your insurance scenario may vary from the case discussed above. Please contact legal counsel before making any decisions. BPH’s attorneys can be reached via email to answer your questions.
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Danielle S. Ward, Balestreri Potocki & HolmesMs. Ward may be contacted at
dward@bph-law.com
Washington’s Court of Appeals Protects Contracting Parties’ Rights to Define the Terms of their Indemnity Agreements
March 19, 2024 —
Margarita Kutsin - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCIt has long been the law in Washington that contracting parties are free to draft contractual indemnity agreements to allocate risk arising from performance of the work, and Courts will generally enforce those agreements as written. This well-settled principle was recently reaffirmed in King County v. CPM Development Corp., dba ICON Materials[1] a decision from Division I of the Washington Court of Appeals, wherein one party to an indemnity agreement attempted to evade its contractual obligations by arguing that certain common law indemnity principles supersede the written terms. This appeal followed a multi-week jury trial from which the client and Ahlers Cressman and Sleight legal team, including Lindsay Watkins, Klien Hilliard, and Christina Granquist, obtained a seven-figure judgment in the client’s favor, including an award of all attorneys’ fees and costs.
ICON was the general contractor on a Vashon Island Highway Pavement project for King County. Part of the work on the project involved hauling away and disposing of ground milled asphalt (the “millings”) at King County-approved sites. ICON and D&R Excavating Inc., (“D&R”) executed a subcontract for D&R to perform that work. The subcontract incorporated the contract between ICON and King County, including the obligation to stockpile millings only at approved sites. D&R, however, did not obtain the requisite approvals from King County, and placed the millings at various sites on the Island, including locations that King County explicitly rejected.
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Margarita Kutsin, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCMs. Kutsin may be contacted at
margarita.kutsin@acslawyers.com
Anchoring Abuse: Evolution & Eradication
October 09, 2023 —
Tim Capowski & Chris Theobalt - Kahana FeldOver the past few years, the plaintiff bar has expanded its use of improper anchoring tactics. Historically, improper anchoring was seen as a risky tactic in which a plaintiff’s counsel would suggest an outrageous figure for pain and suffering during summation in the hope that the lay jury would either award it or split the difference (cut the suggested figure by half) and, either way, return an excessive or runaway verdict. Plaintiff counsel deployed the tactic infrequently through the turn of the century for fear of alienating the jury by appearing greedy.
Two interrelated factors happened to change this dynamic. First, the plaintiff bar worked extremely hard in the intervening years with great success to shed its “ambulance chaser” stereotype by marketing itself as the “protector of the vulnerable”. Second, with the rise in Reptile and punitive tactics spawned in part by the publication of the Reptile handbook, the plaintiff bar also discovered that juries were not alienated by outrageous anchors as long as they were preceded by Reptile commentary essentially to “prime” the jury to punish the defendant rather than compensate the plaintiff with its award.
This is not speculation. I recall sitting outside a courtroom with one of New York’s top plaintiff attorneys in 2006 during deliberations on a catastrophic personal injury trial, during which he conceded to me that he was worried he had asked the jury for too large a figure (it was not even eight figures). A decade later in 2016, that same attorney felt no trepidation in requesting nearly $100 million for a comparable injury. He fed the jurors a steady diet of Reptile tactics from start to finish and they dutifully awarded the requested figure. Our research confirms that this two-step strategy (Reptile + improper anchor) preceded every New York nuclear verdict returned from 2010-2022. The same is almost certainly true of most nuclear verdicts in other jurisdictions.
Reprinted courtesy of
Tim Capowski, Kahana Feld and
Chris Theobalt, Kahana Feld
Mr. Capowski may be contacted at tcapowski@kahanafeld.com
Mr. Theobalt may be contacted at ctheobalt@kahanafeld.com
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Insured's Experts Excluded, But Insurer's Motion for Summary Judgment Denied
October 26, 2020 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiDespite barring the insured's expert witnesses from testifying as to the cause of the loss, lay witnesses were still available, making the district court's award of summary judgment to the insurer improper. Greater Hall Temple Church of God v. Southern Mut. Church Ins. Co., 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 21934 (11th Cir. July 15, 2020).
Hurricane Matthew damaged the Greater Hall Temple Church of God's (Church) roof. Leaks occurred, causing water damage to the Church's interior. A claim was submitted to Southern Mutual. The policy did not cover loss caused by water. Nor did it cover loss to the interior of buildings unless the rain entered through openings made by a specified peril. An independent adjuster found that the damage was caused not by wind, but by pre-exisiting structural issues. Southern Mutual denied the claim.
The Church filed suit. Southern Mutual moved for summary judgment and also moved to strike three of the Church's expert witnesses. The district court agreed that none of the witnesses could qualify as experts. Two of the witnesses did not have the requisite experience nor had they used a sufficiently reliable methodology formulating their opinions. A third expert was barred because his expert opinion had not been timely disclosed. Thereafter, Southern Mutual's motion for summary judgment was granted because the Church had not provided admissible evidence that damage to the Church's roof was caused by Hurricane Matthew.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Federal Arbitration Act Preempts Pennsylvania Payment Act
June 15, 2020 —
Wally Zimolong - Supplemental ConditionsI am back. It feels like an entirety since I last posted. But a hellacious trial schedule got me off the blogosphere for some time. Plus, there was nothing to write about.
But I am back with a bang thanks to a decision from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania concerning the interplay of a forum selection clause appearing in an arbitration clause in a construction contract and the Pennsylvania Contractor and Subcontractor Payment Act. In Bauguess Electrical Services, Inc. v. Hospitality Builders, Inc., the federal court (Judge Joyner) ruled that the federal arbitration act preempted the Payment Act’s prohibition on forum selection clauses and held that an arbitration must proceed in South Dakota even though the construction project were the work was performed was located in Pennsylvania.
The Payment Act applies to all commercial construction projects performed in Pennsylvania. As some you might know, Section 514 of the Payment Act, 73 P.S. 514, prohibits choice of law and forum selection clauses. It states “[m]aking a contract subject to the laws of another state or requiring that any litigation, arbitration or other dispute resolution process on the contract occur in another state, shall be unenforceable.” Therefore, if a construction contract is for a project located in Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania law must apply and all disputes must be adjudicated in Pennsylvania.
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Wally Zimolong, Zimolong LLCMr. Zimolong may be contacted at
wally@zimolonglaw.com
A New AAA Study Confirms that Arbitration is Faster to Resolution Than Court – And the Difference Can be Assessed Monetarily
June 05, 2017 —
John P. Ahlers - Ahlers & Cressman PLLCThere has been a perception among some litigators that arbitration is more expensive than court due to several factors. Among them:
- The “upfront” costs are higher in that filing fees for arbitration exceed those in court. Arbitrators are paid, whether hourly or a flat rate, and the three arbitration panels can become very expensive.
- Some arbitration clauses preserve statutory discovery rights, basically defeating the advantage of a simplified arbitration process. Discovery wars are extremely expensive. Depositions are the most costly of discovery, and in arbitration, as opposed to court, depositions are limited or do not exist.
- Some arbitration clauses integrate the statutory rules of civil procedure, making arbitration almost equivalent to litigation. These types of clauses do the parties no favors.
These notions are all dispelled in a recent American Arbitration Association (AAA) study comparing the length of time in court, based on published federal court statistics, to the length of time in arbitration, based on data from the AAA. The study demonstrates that federal courts take much longer to resolve cases by trial and appeal than arbitration by AAA.
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John P. Ahlers, Ahlers & Cressman PLLCMr. Ahlers may be contacted at
jahlers@ac-lawyers.com
Follow Up on Continental Western v. Shay Construction
March 28, 2012 —
Brady Iandiorio, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCWriting in Construction Law Colorado, Brady Iandiorio revisits the case Continental Western v. Shay Construction. He promises to continue to follow cases dealing with Colorado HB 10-1394.
Recently the Court ruled on two Motions to Reconsider filed by Defendants Milender White and Shay Construction.
Procedurally, the Motions to Reconsider were ruled on by the Honorable William J. Martinez, because the day after the motions were filed the action was reassigned to Judge Martinez. In the short analysis of the Motion to Reconsider, the court leaned on Judge Walker D. Miller’s ruling on the summary judgment and his analysis of the (j)(5) and (j)(6) exclusions.
As a quick refresher regarding the grant of summary judgment, Judge Miller agreed with Continental Western’s argument that the asserted claims were excluded under the “damage to property” exclusion. The policy’s exclusions state: “(j) Damage to Property . . . (5) that particular part of real property on which you or any contractors or subcontractors working directly or indirectly on your behalf are performing operations, if the ‘property damage’ arises out of those operations; or (6) that particular part of any property that must be restored, repaired or replaced because ‘your work’ was incorrectly performed on it.” Judge Miller found that both exclusions (j)(5) and (6) applied to both Shay’s allegedly defective work.
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Reprinted courtesy of Brady Iandiorio of Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Iandiorio can be contacted at iandiorio@hhmrlaw.com.
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Apartment Projects Fuel 13% Jump in U.S. Housing Starts
May 19, 2014 —
Michelle Jamrisko and Hui-yong Yu – BloombergA surge in construction of multifamily dwellings in April propelled U.S. housing starts to the highest level in five months, helping overcome slack demand for single-family homes.
Housing starts climbed 13.2 percent to a 1.07 million annualized rate following March’s 947,000 pace, according to figures released today by the Commerce Department in Washington. Another report showed a measure of consumer confidence unexpectedly declined from a nine-month high.
An almost 40 percent increase in construction starts on projects such as condominiums and apartment buildings accounted for almost all of the April gain, as single-family activity was held back by declining affordability. The report highlights a shift in demand for housing in the wake of the financial crisis, which left many Americans wary of taking on new debts.
Michelle Jamrisko may be contacted at mjamrisko@bloomberg.net; Hui-yong Yu may be contacted at hyu@bloomberg.net
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Michelle Jamrisko and Hui-yong Yu, Bloomberg
