Restaurant Wants SCOTUS to Dust Off Eleventh Circuit’s “Physical Loss” Ruling
February 01, 2021 —
Michael S. Levine & Geoffrey B. Fehling - Hunton Insurance Recovery BlogA South Florida restaurant has asked the US Supreme Court to overturn a federal district court’s ruling that the restaurant is not entitled to coverage under an “all risk” commercial property insurance policy for lost income and extra expenses resulting from nearby road construction. In the underlying coverage action, the policyholder, Mama Jo’s (operating as Berries in the Grove), sought coverage under its all-risk policy for business income losses and expenses caused by construction dust and debris that migrated into the restaurant. Should the Supreme Court grant certiorari, the case will be closely watched by insurers and policyholders alike as an indicator of the scope of coverage available under all-risk policies and whether the principles pertinent to construction dust and debris (at issue in Mama Jo’s claim) have any application to the thousands of pending claims for COVID-19-related business interruption losses pending in the state and federal court systems.
As previously discussed on this blog, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision deviates from Florida precedent on the issue of “direct physical loss” and even its own understanding of that term as described in the August 18, 2020 decision now at issue before the Supreme Court. Mama Jo’s points to this in its petition along with several other errors arguing, for example, that the appellate court’s ruling renders entire areas of coverage nonexistent by requiring “tangible destruction” of property under all-risk policies that expressly afford coverage for types of clean-up costs required to remove debris from covered property.
Reprinted courtesy of
Michael S. Levine, Hunton Andrews Kurth and
Geoffrey B. Fehling, Hunton Andrews Kurth
Mr. Levine may be contacted at mlevine@HuntonAK.com
Mr. Fehling may be contacted at gfehling@HuntonAK.com
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Court Makes an Unsettling Inference to Find that the Statute of Limitations Bars Claims Arising from a 1997 Northridge Earthquake Settlement
April 15, 2015 —
David W. Evans and Stephen J. Squillario – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Britton v. Girardi (No. B249232 – Filed 4/1/2015), the Second Appellate District upheld the trial court’s dismissal due to the statute of limitations based on an inference it drew from a letter attached to the complaint, while reaffirming its prior application of the limitations period in Probate Code section 16460 for fraud claims in the related case of Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack (2/27/2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1105.
In Britton, just as in Prakashpalan, the plaintiffs sued the attorneys who had represented them in connection with claims against their insurer arising out of the Northridge earthquake. In 1997, the attorneys had settled that litigation for more than $100 million. The plaintiffs allege that the attorneys breached their fiduciary duty by (1) failing to provide an accounting for the settlement, (2) failing to obtain their informed consent to the settlement, and (3) concealing their misappropriation of the settlement funds. They claim that they did not discover this wrongdoing until nearly fifteen years later, in 2012, when the Prakashpalans contacted them about their settlement. Significantly, the plaintiffs attached as an exhibit to the complaint a page of the November 3, 1997 letter to the Prakashpalans (rather than the plaintiffs), which stated that a retired judge who presided over the settlement had determined the allocations and the attorneys could not distribute the proceeds until the plaintiffs signed the “Master Settlement Agreement” by which the plaintiffs agreed to its terms and to give up all claims against the insurer.
Reprinted courtesy of
David W. Evans, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Stephen J. Squillario, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Evans may be contacted at devans@hbblaw.com
Mr. Squillario may be contacted at ssquillario@hbblaw.com
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Look Out! Texas Building Shedding Marble Panels
November 13, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFThe streets around the Omni Building in Lubbock, Texas have been barricaded for an indefinite period, since the marble panels have been falling off the building. The panels weight about 300 pounds each.
The building’s owners attempted to remedy the problem by replacing the marble with stucco, but that too came loose in the wind and fell to the ground. The city issued a stop work order preventing the installation of any more stucco. The city “told them that all needed to come down, both the old and the new,” according to Steve O’Neil, the city’s chief building official.
The city has filed a lawsuit to compel the owners to fix the building. Glen Robertson, Lubbock’s mayor, sees another possible solution, “or demolish it because, as it stands right now, it is truly a health and safety hazard to our citizens.
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Construction Litigation Roundup: “A Fastball Right to the Bean!”
May 06, 2024 —
Daniel Lund III - LexologyThe Metropolitan Municipality of Lima, Peru, filed suit in federal court in Washington DC to vacate two separate arbitration awards rendered against the city in international arbitration proceedings subject to the Federal Arbitration Act.
The city had contracted to build, improve, and maintain various highways in and around the city. To pay for this infrastructure, Lima agreed that the contractor would “receive revenues from existing and new toll booths.”
Apparently, the City of Lima forgot how much citizens of the area loathed tolls, and, according to the court, the local public officials “quickly truckled” (how apropos for a road project!) to the pressure. As a result, revenues promised to the contractor were not forthcoming, and the city did nothing about it.
The contractor initiated arbitration, and the city countered by arguing that the contractor had bribed its way into the contract. The city lost and was held in breach.
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Daniel Lund III, PhelpsMr. Lund may be contacted at
daniel.lund@phelps.com
Construction Contract Basics: No Damages for Delay
May 06, 2024 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsAfter WAY too long a hiatus, I am back with another in my series of “Construction Contract Basics” posts. In past posts, I’ve covered venue provisions, attorney fee provisions, and indemnity clauses. In this post, I’ll share a few thoughts (or “musings”) on the topic of so-called “no damages for delay” clauses. These clauses essentially state that a subcontractor’s only remedy for a delay caused by any factor beyond its control (including the fault of the general contractor), after proper notice to the owner or general contractor, is an extension of time to complete the work.
These types of clauses generally make it impossible for a subcontractor (if found in a Subcontract) or Contractor (if found in a Prime Contract) that is delayed through no fault of its own to recover any damages relating to the expenses that are inevitably caused by such delays. Such expenses/damages could include additional supervisory time (including more high-dollar superintendent payments), acceleration costs, demobilization/mobilization costs, and other related expenses. These can add up to real money. Couple that with the inevitable liquidated damages or delay damages that will occur should a contractor or subcontractor cause any delay, and this becomes a very one-sided proposition.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
The Contributors to This Blog Are Pleased to Announce That….
November 02, 2017 —
Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogSnell & Wilmer’s Real Estate Litigation Group, which provides the content for The Real Estate Litigation Blog, is pleased to announce that it has been recognized in both the national and metropolitan rankings by U.S. News Media Group and Best Lawyers for the 2018 edition of “Best Law Firms.” We achieved the following rankings:
- National Tier 1: Litigation – Real Estate
- Phoenix (AZ) Tier 1: Litigation – Real Estate
- Utah Tier 1: Litigation – Real Estate
- Colorado Tier 1: Litigation – Real Estate
- Reno (NV) Tier 1: Litigation – Real Estate
- Tucson (AZ) Tier 1: Litigation – Real Estate
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Update: Amazon Can (Still) Be Liable in Louisiana
December 31, 2024 —
Michael Ciamaichelo - The Subrogation StrategistOn November 25, 2024, in Pickard v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 5:20-cv-01448, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 215377, the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana (District Court) ruled that Amazon.com, Inc. (Amazon) could be liable for manufacturer-seller liability under the Louisiana Products Liability Act (LPLA) for a defective product sold by a third-party seller through the “Fulfillment by Amazon” program (FBA). The court also dismissed two tort claims against Amazon as follows: (i) Amazon does not qualify as a “seller” for purposes of non-manufacturer seller liability (because passing title is required for that claim); and (ii) there is insufficient evidence to prove the decedent, Archie Pickard (Pickard), relied on Amazon’s safety practices when purchasing the defective product, precluding a claim for negligent undertaking.
Background
Pickard died from injuries sustained in a house fire allegedly caused by a defective battery charger he purchased on Amazon. Jisell, a Chinese company and a third-party seller, manufactured and sold the charger. Amazon never took title to the charger but stored it in its warehouse and delivered it to Pickard through the FBA. Pickard’s children filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Amazon alleging three claims: (i) manufacturer-seller liability under the LPLA; and tort-based claims of (ii) non-manufacturer seller liability and (iii) negligent undertaking. After Amazon moved for summary judgment on all claims, the District Court certified questions to the Supreme Court of Louisiana (Supreme Court) seeking guidance as there was minimal guidance regarding the application of products claims to online marketplaces.
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Michael Ciamaichelo, White and Williams LLPMr. Ciamaichelo may be contacted at
ciamaichelom@whiteandwilliams.com
HOA Foreclosure Excess Sale Proceeds Go to Owner
August 15, 2022 —
Ben Reeves - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogOver the last few years, the Arizona Court of Appeals wrestled with the question of who should receive the excess proceeds from a foreclosure sale. We’ve blogged about some these past unreported decisions
here and
here. Those decisions, somewhat inexplicably, required excess sale proceeds to be paid to senior creditors. As we noted at the time, these unreported (and non-precedential) decisions did not seem to make much sense in the context of debtor/creditor rights. Thankfully, a reported opinion finally sets the record straight. Excess sale proceeds should be paid downstream.
In
Tortosa Homeowners Assoc. v. Garcia, et al., No. 2 CA-CV 2021-0114 (Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2022), the Court of Appeals held that after the foreclosing lienholder is paid in full, then the excess sale proceeds should be paid to claimants in the order of their priority after the foreclosing lienholder. In other words, if a junior lienholder forecloses, then any creditors behind (i.e., junior to) the foreclosing creditor should be paid, and if all such creditors are paid, then the rest should be given to the owner. Creditors senior to the foreclosing creditor should not be paid anything from the foreclosure sale. This makes sense from a policy perspective, because the senior creditor retains its lien against the property and the bidder presumably took the presence of the senior lien into account when it made its bid for the foreclosed property.
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Ben Reeves, Snell & WilmerMr. Reeves may be contacted at
breeves@swlaw.com