Sometimes a Reminder is in Order. . .
June 21, 2021 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsRecently, I was talking with my friend Matt Hundley about a recent case he had in the Charlottesville, VA Circuit Court. It was a relatively straightforward (or so he and I would have thought) breach of contract matter involving a fixed price contract between his (and an associate of his Laura Hooe) client James River Stucco and the Montecello Overlook Owners’ Association. I believe that you will see the reason for the title of the post once you hear the facts and read the opinion.
In James River Stucco, Inc. v. Monticello Overlook Owners’ Ass’n, the Court considered Janes River Stucco’s Motion for Summary Judgment countering two arguments made by the Association. The first Association argument was that the word “employ” in the contract meant that James River Stucco was required to use its own forces (as opposed to subcontractors) to perform the work. The second argument was that James River overcharged for the work. This second argument was made without any allegation of fraud or that the work was not 100% performed.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Killer Subcontract Provisions
January 20, 2020 —
Patrick McNamara - Porter Law GroupWe are frequently requested by subcontractor clients to review the subcontract that has been prepared by the prime contractor, before our client signs it. While no two agreements are identical, there are a number of problematic contract provisions that appear in many agreements. Here is a list of ten such provisions (and their variations) that are potential “deal breakers”:
- PAY IF/WHEN PAID (e.g. “Contractor shall have the right to exhaust all legal remedies, including appeals, prior to having an obligation to pay Subcontractor.”) “Pay-if-paid” provisions (“Receipt of payment from Owner shall be a condition precedent to Contractor’s duty to pay Subcontractor”) are illegal in California. However, the only legal limit on “Pay-When-Paid” provisions is that payment must be made “within a reasonable time.” The example above, as written, essentially affords the prime contractor a period of several years following completion of the project before that contractor has an independent duty to pay its subcontractors – not a “reasonable” amount of time, to those waiting to be paid. A compromise is to provide a time limit, such as 6 months or one year following substantial completion of the project.
- CROSS-PROJECT SET-OFF (e.g. “In the event of disputes or default by Subcontractor, Contractor shall have the right to withhold sums due Subcontractor on this Project and on any other project on which Subcontractor is performing work for Contractor.”) Such provisions are problematic and likely unenforceable, as they potentially bar subcontractors’ lien rights. Such provisions should be deleted.
- CONTRACTOR/SUBCONTRACTOR RESPONSIBILITY FOR DESIGN QUALITY (e.g. “Subcontractor warrants that the Work shall comply with all applicable laws, codes, statutes, standards, and ordinances.”) Unless a subcontractor’s scope of work expressly includes design work, this provision should either be deleted or modified, with the addition of the following phrase: “Subcontractor shall not be responsible for conformance of the design of its work to applicable laws, codes, statutes, standards, and ordinances.”
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Patrick McNamara, Porter Law GroupMr. McNamara may be contacted at
pmcnamara@porterlaw.com
Fourth Circuit Finds Insurer Reservation of Rights Letters Inadequate to Preserve Coverage Defenses Under South Carolina Law
January 17, 2023 —
Jason Taylor - Traub Lieberman Insurance Law BlogIn Stoneledge at Lake Keowee Owners Ass'n v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 34292 (D.S.C. Dec. 13, 2022), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the adequacy of reservation of rights letters issued by Builders Mutual Insurance Company (“Builders Mutual”) and Cincinnati Insurance Company (“Cincinnati”) to their insureds, Marick Home Builders, LLC (“Marick”) and Rick Thoennes (“Thoennes”), Marick’s managing member, for an underlying construction defect lawsuit. In short, the Fourth Circuit found that the reservation letters were inadequate to preserve the insurers’ coverage defenses because they did not sufficiently explain the basis of the carriers’ position.
Stoneledge, a homeowners association, managed a community of 80 townhomes on South Carolina’s Lake Keowee. In 2009, Stoneledge brought suit against Marick and Thoennes, among other defendants, alleging construction defects in the townhomes that resulted in water intrusion and other physical damage. Marick and Thoennes held commercial general-liability policies through Cincinnati and Builders Mutual covering, in relevant part, “property damage” as defined by the policies. Builders Mutual issued policies covering the period from January 2004 to October 2007, and Cincinnati issued policies covering the period from April 2008 to April 2012. After Marick notified the insurers of the underlying action, Builders Mutual sent Marick two reservation of rights letters, one in May 2009 and one in July 2009. Cincinnati sent Marick one reservation of rights letter in March 2010.
In March 2014, Stoneledge brought a declaratory-judgment action against Cincinnati seeking coverage for a judgment entered in the underlying action. The insurers removed the case to federal court, and in September 2016, Stoneledge amended its complaint, adding Builders Mutual as a defendant and seeking coverage for additional damages pursuant to a settlement agreement entered into by Stoneledge, Marick, Thoennes. The district court granted Stoneledge's motion for summary judgment, primarily on the ground that the insurers failed to reserve the right to contest coverage. The insurers appealed to the Fourth Circuit, which affirmed.
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Jason Taylor, Traub LiebermanMr. Taylor may be contacted at
jtaylor@tlsslaw.com
Rather Than Limit Decision to "That Particular Part" of Developer's Policy Necessary to Bar Coverage, 10th Circuit Renders Questionable Decision on Exclusion j(6)
September 06, 2021 —
William S. Bennett - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C. The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Colorado law, recently extended Colorado’s broad application of the phrase “arising out of” in insurance interpretation, barring an insured real estate developer from receiving a defense to a suit alleging liability for construction of a defective retaining wall and associated resulting damage.1 The decision also included a questionable analysis of the commercial general liability (“CGL”) policy’s exclusion j(6), contradicting both the plain meaning of the exclusion as well as existing 10th Circuit case law.
The underlying dispute concerned a land developer, HT Services, LLC, who was sued by the homeowner’s association (“HOA”) of one of its developments. The HOA alleged that HT Services negligently designed and constructed a retaining wall in the community. HT Services had CGL policies from Western Heritage Insurance Company in place from 2010 to 2013 that insured it for liability associated with four acres of land that the community was built upon.
HT Services tendered the HOA’s lawsuit to Western Heritage, which declined to defend and indemnify HT Services. After that matter settled, HT Services sued Western Heritage, alleging breach of contract and bad faith. Western Heritage moved for summary judgment, asserting two exclusions, and the District Court granted the motion in Western Heritage’s favor. In upholding the District Court’s decision, the 10th Circuit discussed two exclusions that the District Court determined precluded coverage.
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William S. Bennett, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Mr. Bennett may be contacted at
wsb@sdvlaw.com
Kahana Feld LLP Senior Attorney Rachael Marvin and Partner Dominic Donato Obtain Complete Dismissal of Plaintiff’s Labor Law Claims on Summary Judgment
August 19, 2024 —
Rachel Marvin - Kahana FeldKahana Feld attorneys Rachael Marvin and Dominic Donato secured summary judgment dismissal of plaintiff’s Labor Law §§ 240(1), 241(6), and 200 claims asserted against their client, a general contractor of a housing project in Orange County, New York. The case involved a construction accident in which plaintiff fell while traversing a ramp, which was placed across an eight-foot-deep excavation trench.
Plaintiff was employed by a subcontractor and was part of a crew performing the framing work on the project. The accident occurred when he exited his work area by walking across a ramp that was placed across the excavated trench, when the ramp gave way and plaintiff fell into the excavation.
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Rachel Marvin, Kahana FeldMs. Marvin may be contacted at
rmarvin@kahanafeld.com
Does a No-Damage-for-Delay Clause Also Preclude Acceleration Damages?
January 27, 2020 —
Ted R. Gropman & Christine Z. Fan - ConsensusDocsConstruction contracts often include a “no damage for delay” clause that denies a contractor the right to recover delay-related costs and limits the contractor’s remedy to an extension of time for noncontractor-caused delays to a project’s completion date. Depending on the nature of the delay and the jurisdiction where the project is located, the contractual prohibition against delay damages may well be enforceable. This article will explore whether an enforceable no-damage-for-delay clause is also a bar to recovery of “acceleration” damages, i.e., the costs incurred by the contractor in its attempt to overcome delays to the project’s completion date.
Courts are split as to whether damages for a contractor’s “acceleration” efforts are distinguishable from “delay” damages such that they may be recovered under an enforceable no-damage-for-delay clause. See, e.g., Siefford v. Hous. Auth. of Humboldt, 223 N.W.2d 816 (Neb. 1974) (disallowing the recovery of acceleration damages under a no-damage-for-delay clause); but see Watson Elec. Constr. Co. v. Winston-Salem, 109 N.C. App. 194 (1993) (allowing the recovery of acceleration damages despite a no-damage-for-delay clause). The scope and effect of a no-damage-for-delay clause depend on the specific laws of the jurisdiction and the factual circumstances involved.
There are a few ways for a contractor to circumvent an enforceable no-damage-for-delay clause to recover acceleration damages. First, the contractor may invoke one of the state’s enumerated exceptions to the enforceability of the clause. It is helpful to keep in mind that most jurisdictions strictly construe a no-damage-for-delay clause to limit its application. This means that, regardless of delay or acceleration, courts will nonetheless permit the contractor to recover damages if the delay is, for example, of a kind not contemplated by the parties, due to an unreasonable delay, or a result of the owner’s fraud, bad faith, gross negligence, active interference or abandonment of the contract. See Tricon Kent Co. v. Lafarge N. Am., Inc., 186 P.3d 155, 160 (Colo. App. 2008); United States Steel Corp. v. Mo. P. R. Co., 668 F.2d 435, 438 (8th Cir. 1982); Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co. v. Iowa S. Utils. Co., 355 F. Supp. 376, 396 (S.D. Iowa 1973).
Reprinted courtesy of
Ted R. Gropman, Pepper Hamilton LLP and Christine Z. Fan, Pepper Hamilton LLP
Mr. Gropman may be contacted at gropmant@pepperlaw.com
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Professional Liability Alert: Joint Client Can't Claim Privilege For Communications With Attorney Sued By Another Joint Client
February 05, 2015 —
David W. Evans and Stephen J. Squillario – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Anten v. Superior Court (No. B258437 – Filed 1/30/2015), the Second Appellate District held that when joint clients do not sue each other, but one of them sues their former attorney, the nonsuing client cannot prevent the parties to the malpractice suit from discovering or introducing otherwise privileged attorney-client communications made in the course of the joint representation.
Under California Evidence Code §958, in lawsuits between an attorney and a client based on an alleged breach of a duty arising from their attorney-client relationship, communications relevant to the alleged breach are not protected by the attorney-client privilege. Similarly, Evidence Code §962 provides that if multiple clients retain or consult with an attorney on a matter of common interest and the joint clients later sue each other, then the communications between either client and the attorney made in the course of that relationship are not privileged in the suit between the clients.
Reprinted courtesy of
David W. Evans, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Stephen J. Squillario, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Evans may be contacted at devans@hbblaw.com; Mr. Squillario may be contacted at ssquillario@hbblaw.com
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Florida Supreme Court: Notice of Right to Repair is a CGL “Suit,” SDV Amicus Brief Supports Decision
January 10, 2018 —
Gregory Podolak & Brian Clifford - SD&V Case AlertConstruction policyholders in Florida have been given substantial ammunition to compel general liability insurers to provide a defense against pre-suit accusations of defective work. Florida is one of approximately thirty (30) states that require property owners to serve contractors with notice and an opportunity to repair construction defects before filing suit. Only a few states have addressed whether a CGL policy should provide a defense for similar processes. Altman Contractors, Inc. v. Crum & Forster Specialty Ins. Co., decided late in December by the Florida Supreme Court, acknowledged that the 558 process is a “suit,” thus impeding insurers from refusing a defense during this notice period.
Section 558.004(1), Florida Statutes (2012) requires a property owner alleging construction defects to serve a written notice to repair on the contractor before filing an action in court. Altman Contractors built a condominium in Broward County, Florida. In 2012, the condominium owners alleged defects in accordance with Section 558. Altman demanded that its general liability carrier, Crum & Forster, defend and indemnify it against the 558 notices. Crum & Forster denied coverage, claiming that 558 notices are not a “suit” as defined by the policy.
Reprinted courtesy of
Gregory Podolak, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C. and
Brian Clifford, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.
Mr. Podolak may be contacted at gdp@sdvlaw.com
Mr. Clifford may be contacted at bjc@sdvlaw.com
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