Supreme Court of Wisconsin Applies Pro Rata Allocation Based on Policy Limits to Co-Insurance Dispute
February 18, 2019 —
Brian Margolies - TLSS Insurance Law BlogIn its recent decision in Steadfast Insurance Company v. Greenwich Insurance Company, 2019 WL 323702 (Wis. Jan. 25, 2019), the Supreme Court of Wisconsin addressed the issue of contribution rights as among co-insurers.
Steadfast and Greenwich issued pollution liability policies to different entities that performed sewer-related services for the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District (MMSD) at different times. MMSD sought coverage under both policies in connection with underlying claims involving pollution-related loss. Both insurers agreed that MMSD qualified as an additional insured under their respective policies, but Greenwich took the position that its coverage was excess over the coverage afforded under the Steadfast policy, at least for defense purposes, and that as such, it had no defense obligation.
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Brian Margolies, Traub LiebermanMr. Margolies may be contacted at
bmargolies@tlsslaw.com
Wilke Fleury ranked in Best Lawyers’ Best Law Firms!!
December 03, 2024 —
Wilke Fleury LLPWilke Fleury is pleased to announce its inclusion in the 2025 edition of ‘Best Law Firms’ ranked by Best Lawyers! Firms included in the 2025 “Best Law Firms” list are recognized for professional excellence with persistently impressive ratings from clients and peers. Achieving a tiered ranking signals a unique combination of quality law practice and breadth of legal expertise.
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Wilke Fleury LLP
New York’s Highest Court Weighs in on N.Y. Labor Law
September 23, 2024 —
Bill Wilson - Construction Law ZoneN.Y. Labor Law § 241(6) requires owners and contractors to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety to persons employed at or lawfully frequenting a construction site. If a worker is injured on a construction site and establishes a violation of a specific and applicable Industrial Code regulation, both the owner and contractor will be held vicariously liable for the worker’s injury, without regard to their fault and even in the absence of control or supervision of the worksite. The Court of Appeals of New York recently addressed the broad scope of the Labor Law in the context of slipping hazards.
In Bazdaric v. Almah Partners, LLC, 41 N.Y.3d 310 (2024), the plaintiff, an injured painter, slipped and fell on a plastic covering placed over an escalator in an area he was assigned to paint. The plaintiff claimed that the plastic covering was a foreign substance for purposes of Industrial Code 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d) because it was not part of the escalator. Industrial Code 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d) states:
Slipping hazards. Employers shall not suffer or permit any employee to use a floor, passageway, walkway, scaffold, platform or other elevated working surface which is in a slippery condition. Ice, snow, water, grease and any other foreign substance which may cause slippery footing shall be removed, sanded or covered to provide safe footing.
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Bill Wilson, Robinson & Cole LLPMr. Wilson may be contacted at
wwilson@rc.com
Client Alert: Michigan Insurance Company Not Subject to Personal Jurisdiction in California for Losses Suffered in Arkansas
February 05, 2015 —
R. Bryan Martin, Lawrence S. Zucker II, and Kristian B. Moriarty – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Greenwell v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. (No. C074546, Filed 1/27/2015) (“Greenwell”), the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, held a California resident could not establish specific personal jurisdiction over an insurance company, located in Michigan, which issued a policy of insurance to the California resident where the claimed loss occurred in Arkansas.
Plaintiff purchased a policy of insurance from defendant, Auto-Owners Ins. Co. (“Auto”), a Michigan corporation. The policy provided commercial property coverage for an apartment building owned by Plaintiff, located in Arkansas. The policy also provided commercial general liability coverage for plaintiff’s property ownership business, which plaintiff operated from California.
Both coverage provisions insured certain risks, losses, or damages that could have arisen in California. The dispute which arose between Plaintiff and Defendant, however, involved two fires that damaged the apartment building in Arkansas. As a result of coverage decisions that Auto made in the handling of the claim, plaintiff filed suit for breach of contract and bad faith.
Reprinted courtesy of Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP attorneys
R. Bryan Martin,
Lawrence S. Zucker II and
Kristian B. Moriarty
Mr. Martin may be contacted at bmartin@hbblaw.com;
Mr. Zucker may be contacted at lzucker@hbblaw.com;
and Mr. Moriarty may be contacted at kmoriarty@hbblaw.com
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Limitations: There is a Point of No Return
September 06, 2023 —
Amy Anderson - ConsensusDocsAfter nearly any event that causes inefficiency, delay, or extra cost on a project, there are some things you should always do: review the contract and document the inefficiency, delay, or cost. However, how you document the particular issue likely changes depending on what is in your contract, your position on the project, and the outcome you hope to reach. In reviewing the inefficiency, delay, or cost, one thing to always consider is how long you have to actually recoup damages you may incur if they were caused by another party on the project. In every jurisdiction (state or federal), there is likely to be some outer limit to when you can bring litigation or arbitration against an opposing party to recover damages another party causes to you. This is generally called a statute of limitations or statute of repose, although it goes by other names depending on your state.
The length of time will be specific to the locality. For example, in Texas, you have four years to bring a breach of contract claim but only two years to bring a negligence claim. Whether you fall under the two year or four year period may be highly fact intensive, depending on your claims. Do you have a contract directly with the party that is at fault? Is the claim based on your contract or some tort outside of the contract?
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Amy Anderson, Jones Walker LLP (ConsensusDocs)Ms. Anderson may be contacted at
aanderson@joneswalker.com
GRSM Team Wins Summary Judgment in Million-Dollar HOA Dispute
December 17, 2024 —
Robert A. Bragalone & B. Ryan Fellman - Gordon Rees Scully MansukhaniGordon Rees Scully Mansukhani Partner Bob Bragalone and Senior Counsel Ryan Fellman won a complete summary judgment on behalf of five board members who had been added to an HOA dispute by the defendant homeowners. The GRSM team resolved the matter within just 60 days of taking over the case, bringing an end to a legal battle that had lasted more than four years.
The dispute began when the HOA, as plaintiff, filed suit against the homeowners in Denton County District Court. The HOA alleged that the homeowners had violated the HOA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions by constructing a non-conforming carport and sought a declaratory judgment to resolve the issue. In response, the homeowners filed a counterclaim and third-party petition, adding the individual HOA board members to the lawsuit. They accused the board members—who were serving in a voluntary capacity—of mishandling the dispute and filed claims against them for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and gross negligence.
Reprinted courtesy of
Robert A. Bragalone, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani and
B. Ryan Fellman, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani
Mr. Bragalone may be contacted at bbragalone@grsm.com
Mr. Fellman may be contacted at rfellman@grsm.com
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A Landlord’s Guide to the Center for Disease Control’s Eviction Moratorium
October 05, 2020 —
Colton Addy - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogThe Center for Disease Control and Prevention (the “CDC”) and the Department of Health and Human Services (the “HHS”) has issued an order to temporarily halt a landlord’s right to evict certain residential tenants to prevent the further spread of COVID-19 (the “CDC Order”).
The CDC Order is effective through December 31, 2020.
Applicability of the CDC Order. The CDC Order does not apply in jurisdictions that have a moratorium on residential evictions in effect that provides the same or greater level of protection than the CDC Order, and the CDC Order permits local jurisdictions to continue to pass more restrictive eviction moratoriums. To invoke the protection provided by the CDC Order, a landlord’s tenants must deliver an executed declaration (a “CDC Declaration”) form to the landlord that includes the following statements: (i) the tenant has used best efforts to obtain all available government assistance for rent or housing; (ii) expects to earn no more than $99,000 in annual income in 2020 (or $198,000 if filing joint tax returns), was not required to report income in 2019, or received an Economic Impact Payment under the CARES Act; (iii) the tenant is unable to pay the full rent due to substantial loss of household income, loss of work or wages, or extraordinary out-of-pocket medical expenses; (iv) the tenant is using best efforts to make partial payments that are as close to the full rental payments as the tenant’s circumstances permit; and (v) the eviction would likely render the individual homeless or force the individual to move into and live in close quarters or shared living space.
Effect of the CDC Order The CDC Order prevents landlords from evicting tenants for the non-payment of rent or similar housing-related payments that have sent their landlord a CDC Declaration. The CDC Order does not relieve tenants of the obligation to pay rent or other charges owed under their leases and does not preclude a landlord from charging late fees, penalties, or interest for missed payments.
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Colton Addy, Snell & WilmerMr. Addy may be contacted at
caddy@swlaw.com
The Montrose Language Interpreted: How Many Policies Are Implicated By A Construction Defect That Later Causes a Flood?
March 17, 2011 —
Shaun McParland BaldwinThe Court of Appeals of Indiana recently addressed the “Montrose” language added to the CGL ISO form in 2001 in the context of a construction defect claim where a fractured storm drain caused significant flooding a year after the drain was damaged. The insuring agreement requires that “bodily injury or “property damage” be caused by an occurrence and that the “bodily injury or “property damage” occur during the policy period. The Montrose language adds that the insurance applies only if, prior to the policy period, no insured knew that the “bodily injury or “property damage” had occurred in whole or in part. Significantly, it also states that any “bodily injury” or “property damage” which occurs during the policy period and was not, prior to the policy period known to have occurred, includes a continuation, change or resumption of that “bodily injury” or “property damage” after the end of the policy period.
In Grange Mutual Cas. Co. v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., No. 29D04-0706-PL-1112 (Ct. App. IN March 15, 2011), http://www.ai.org/judiciary/opinions/pdf/03151109ehf.pdf, Sullivan was the General Contractor for a school construction project. Its subcontractor, McCurdy, installed the storm drain pipes. One of the storm pipes was fractured in 2005 while McCurdy was doing its installation work. More than a year later, the school experienced significant water damage due to flooding. It was later discovered that the flooding was due to the fractured storm drain. Sullivanrsquo;s insurer paid $146,403 for the water damage. That insurer brought a subrogation claim against McCurdy and its two insurers: West Bend and Grange. West Bend had issued CGL coverage to McCurdy while the construction was ongoing, including the date in which the storm pipe was fractured. Grange issued CGL coverage to McCurdy at the time of the flooding. Those two carriers jointly settled the subrogation claim and then litigated which insurer actually owed coverage for the loss. Significantly, the loss that was paid included only damages from the flooding, not any damages for the cost of repairing the pipe.
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Reprinted courtesy of Shaun McParland Baldwin of Tressler LLP. Ms Baldwin can be contacted at sbaldwin@tresslerllp.com
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