North Carolina Exclusion j(6) “That Particular Part”
February 10, 2012 —
CDCoverage.comIn Alliance Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dove, 714 S.E.2d 782 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011), claimant Murphy-Brown hired insured Dove to repair a broken elevator belt in a grain elevator in Murphy-Brown’s feed mill. The elevator was inside a metal duct and, to access the broken belt, Dove had to cut out a section of the duct. After replacing the belt, Dove welded the metal section back to the duct. Immediately after Dove completed the welding, dust inside the duct ignited, causing an explosion in the elevator, resulting in property damage to the elevator and other property. Murphy-Brown sued Dove for negligence seeking damages for the repair and replacement of the elevator, repair and replacement of the other property, increased grain handling costs during the repairs, and loss of use.
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Wait, You Want An HOA?! Restricting Implied Common-Interest Communities
September 17, 2018 —
Neil McConomy - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogWhile the butt of many jokes and a thorn in the side of some property owners, homeowners associations (“HOAs”) serve the vital function of collecting and disbursing funds to care for and maintain common areas of residential developments. Without HOAs, neighborhood open spaces, parks, and other amenities risk falling into disrepair through a type of tragedy of the commons, wherein residents use such amenities but refuse to subsidize care and maintenance for these common areas believing someone else will pony-up the funds. HOAs, when properly organized and managed, avoid this problem by ensuring everyone pays their fair shares for the common areas. Colorado’s Common Interest Ownership Act (“CCIOA”), C.R.S. § 38-33.3-101 et seq., sets forth the manner in which such common-interest communities, and their related associations, must be established.
Earlier this summer, the Colorado Supreme Court issued an opinion limiting the application of previous case law that allowed for the establishment of common-interest communities (and their related HOAs) by implication. See McMullin v. Hauer, 420 P.3d 271 (Colo. 2018). Prior to McMullin, Colorado courts had been increasing the number of factual scenarios implying the creation of common-interest communities under CCIOA. See e.g., Evergreen Highlands Assoc. v. West, 73 P.3d 1 (Colo. 2003) (finding an implied obligation of landowners to fund a pre-existing HOA’s obligations); DeJean v. Grosz, 412 P.3d 733 (Colo. App. 2015) (finding an implied right of a homeowner to found an HOA after the developer filed a declaration expressing an intent to form one but ultimately failed to do so); and Hiwan Homeowners Assoc. v. Knotts, 215 P.3d 1271 (Colo. App. 2009) (finding the existence of an HOA despite no common property existing within the development). The McMullin opinion highlights the importance of strict compliance with CCIOA to preserve common areas in a development, ensure the ability to fund maintenance of such areas, and avoid future litigation.
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Neil McConomy, Snell & WilmerMr. McConomy may be contacted at
nmcconomy@swlaw.com
Insurers Subrogating in Arkansas Must Expend Energy to Prove That Their Insureds Have Been Made Whole
August 06, 2019 —
Michael J. Ciamaichelo - The Subrogation StrategistArkansas employs the “made whole” doctrine, which requires an insured to be fully compensated for damages (i.e., to be “made whole”) before the insurer is entitled to recover in subrogation.[1] As the Riley court established, an insurer cannot unilaterally determine that its insured has been made whole (in order to establish a right of subrogation). Rather, in Arkansas, an insurer must establish that the insured has been made whole in one of two ways. First, the insurer and insured can reach an agreement that the insured has been made whole. Second, if the insurer and insured disagree on the issue, the insurer can ask a court to make a legal determination that the insured has been made whole.[2] If an insured has been made whole, the insurer is the real party in interest and must file the subrogation action in its own name.[3] However, when both the insured and an insurer have claims against the same tortfeasor (i.e., when there are both uninsured damages and subrogation damages), the insured is the real party in interest.[4]
In EMC Ins. Cos. v. Entergy Ark., Inc., 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 14251 (8th Cir. May 14, 2019), EMC Insurance Companies (EMC) filed a subrogation action in the District Court for the Western District of Arkansas alleging that its insureds’ home was damaged by a fire caused by an electric company’s equipment. EMC never obtained an agreement from the insureds or a judicial determination that its insureds had been made whole. In addition, EMC did not allege in the complaint that its insureds had been made whole and did not present any evidence or testimony at trial that its insureds had been made whole. After EMC presented its case-in-chief, the District Court ruled that EMC lacked standing to pursue its subrogation claim because “EMC failed to obtain a legal determination that its insureds had been made whole . . . prior to initiating this subrogation action.” Thus, the District Court granted Entergy Ark., Inc.’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and EMC appealed the decision.
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Michael J. Ciamaichelo, White and Williams LLPMr. Ciamaichelo may be contacted at
ciamaichelom@whiteandwilliams.com
Structural Defects in Thousands of Bridges in America
November 06, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFWriting under the pseudonym “Babbage,” a technology blogger at The Economist takes note of some of the depressing facts about America’s infrastructure. Babbage notes that most of the United States’ transportation infrastructure was “built in a furious burst of road construction during the 1950s and 1960s.” Citing a report from the American Society of Civil Engineers, President Obama recently warned that “we’ve got about $2 trillion of deferred maintenance.”
Some of this deferred maintenance can cost lives. The 2007 collapse of the I-35W bridge in Minneapolis killed 13 people and injured 145 others. The cost of fixing structural defects in the nation’s bridges was estimated at $32 billion in 2004. In that year, about 66,500 bridges were deemed structurally defective. Another 84,000 were termed “structurally obsolete,” meaning they could be used, but with restrictions on vehicle weight and speed.
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Rescission of Policy for Misrepresentation in Application Reversed
August 17, 2017 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's issuance of summary judgment to the insurer, finding that the insured did not make misrepresentations when applying for a policy to cover rental property. Duarte v. Pacific Spec. Ins. Co., 13 Cal. App. 5th 45 (2017).
Duarte rented his house to Jennifer Pleasants. Duarte gave her a 45-day notice to quit in February 2012, but she did not leave. Two months later, Duarte applied for landlord-tenant coverage with Pacific. The application was submitted electronically and Pacific issued a policy to Durate the same day.
In June 2012, Pleasants filed a lawsuit against Duarte, alleging ten causes of action arising from habitability defects which began in 2009. The suit claimed Pleasants had notified Duarte about the defects, she had suffered emotional distress and physical injury, and over paid rent, and had out-of-pocket expenses.
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Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
CDJ’s #5 Topic of the Year: Beacon Residential Community Association v. Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, et al.
December 31, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFSteven M. Cvitanovic and Whitney L. Stefko of Haight Brown & Bonesteel analyzed the Beacon decision, and discussed how it affects developers and general contractors: “On July 3, 2014, the California Supreme Court (the “Court”) came out with its decision in Beacon Residential Community Association v. Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, et al. The Beacon decision settled a long-standing dispute in California about whether design professionals such as architects and engineers owe a duty to non-client third parties. In finding that the plaintiffs in Beacon could state a claim against the architects of the Beacon project, the Court also sowed the seeds of change in the way contracts are structured between developers, architects, engineers, and even general contractors.”
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Electronic Signatures On Contracts: Are They Truly Compliant?
April 10, 2023 —
Rebecca S. Glos - ConsensusDocsElectronic Signatures On Contracts: Are They Truly Compliant
As companies move to work-from-home situations in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the issue of whether electronic signatures are legally recognized becomes more relevant. For many platforms, an electronic signature merely requires logging in, clicking a button, or typing your name. This process, which replaces the mighty pen and quill, is so effortless that oftentimes an electronic signature may feel like it does not carry the same weight as a handwritten signature. Thus, the question that we should be asking ourselves is whether the law recognizes this type of signature as being valid? Additionally, if electronic signatures are, indeed, valid, are there exceptions on whether they can be used?
Difference Between “Electronic” And “Digital” Signatures
Before delving into this issue, an understanding of some related terms may be helpful. In basic terms, an electronic signature (or “e-signature”) is any signature created or captured through a computer or other electronic device. Electronic signatures can include touch-sensitive screens where you use your finger or a stylus to sign your name as you would on a paper document. Electronic signatures can also include forms where you merely type in your name and perhaps other identifying information, then check a box stating that you intend to sign the document. They cover the full range of technologies and solutions to create signatures electronically such as:
- Clicking “I Agree” on a website;
- Signing with your finger on a mobile device;
- Typing your name or PIN into an online form; or
- Using e-signature software
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Rebecca S. Glos, Watt, Tieder, Hoffar, & Fitzgerald, LLP (ConsensusDocs)Ms. Glos may be contacted at
rglos@watttieder.com
Illinois Insureds are Contesting One Carrier's Universal Denial to Covid-19 Losses
May 11, 2020 —
Anna M. Perry - Saxe Doernberger & VitaIn response to the large number of COVID-19-related losses that businesses are experiencing, insurers have begun issuing statements informing their insureds of whether their policies will respond to the losses, and if so, what coverage will be afforded. Insurers cannot take a “one-size-fits-all” approach to the COVID-19 losses because, besides factual differences, the losses are occurring within all fifty states which means 50 different state law interpretations will apply.
Recently, on March 27, 2020, a number of restaurants and movie theaters located in and around Chicago (the “Insureds”) filed a declaratory judgement action, titled Big Onion Tavern Group, LLC et al. v. Society Insurance, Inc., against their property insurance carrier, Society Insurance, Inc. (“Society”), seeking coverage for business interruption resulting from the shutdown order issued by the governor of Illinois. The suit alleges that Society improperly denied their business interruption claims by using a boiler plate denial. The denial issued by Society is allegedly used for all COVID-19 losses regardless of the applicable jurisdiction’s interpretation of the policy language and the specific coverage purchased by the insured. Further, in its denial, Society takes the position that any loss related to a government-issued closure order is uncovered, even though the Insureds specifically purchased business interruption coverage and their policies did not contain an exclusion for losses caused by viruses.
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Anna M. Perry, Saxe Doernberger & VitaMs. Perry may be contacted at
amp@sdvlaw.com
