Affirmed
June 22, 2016 —
Wally Zimolong – Supplemental ConditionsToday, in a precedential opinion, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of a complaint against my client that alleged that a multi-family building was constructed in violation of the Federal Housing Administration’s (FHA) design and accessibility requirements for disabled persons. A copy of the Opinion can be found here (
Opinion of 3rd Circuit . ) An adverse decision would have meant that my client could have been exposed to making several million dollars in alterations to its building.
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Wally Zimolong, Supplemental ConditionsMr. Zimolong may be contacted at
wally@zimolonglaw.com
Defenses Raised Three-Years Too Late Estop Insurer’s Coverage Denial
February 21, 2022 —
Michael S. Levine & Yaniel Abreu - Hunton Insurance Recovery BlogLiability insurance typically affords broad defense coverage. But insurers sometimes reserve their right to challenge the insured’s right to a defense, or even outright terminate the defense. When this occurs after the insurer has been in exclusive control of the defense, some courts recognize that the consequences can be catastrophic for the insured defendant. Insurers, therefore, may be estopped from denying coverage where doing so will prejudice the insured. This is exactly what transpired in RLI Ins. Co. v. AST Engineering Corp., No. 20-214 (2d Cir. Jan. 12, 2022), where the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision that an insurer’s attempt to withdraw the defense it had provided to its insured for three years would prejudice the insured.
In AST Engineering, RLI sought a declaration that it did not have to defend the insured, AST, in two underlying cases in which AST was sued as a third-party defendant. The underlying cases concerned a construction project in New York City for which AST provided engineering drawings on October 28, 2012.
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Michael S. Levine, Hunton Andrews Kurth and
Yaniel Abreu, Hunton Andrews Kurth
Mr. Levine may be contacted at mlevine@HuntonAK.com
Mr. Abreu may be contacted at yabreu@HuntonAK.com
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Yet ANOTHER Reason not to Contract without a License
October 25, 2021 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsRemember when I stated that you cannot lawfully perform construction work in Virginia without a contractor’s license? Remember when I said that you risk non-payment if you do so? If you needed another reason, a relatively recent Virginia Court of Appeals decision upholding a criminal conviction for performing construction work without a license should be that reason.
In Riddel v. Commonwealth, the Court took up an appeal from the conviction of Jeff Riddel where Mr. Riddel was verbally asked by homeowners to inspect and then repair their septic system. Mr. Riddel then contracted with Fairfax Suburban Septic to pump out and repair the system. Mr. Riddel then delivered the homeowners an invoice from Fairfax Suburban Septic and instructed the homeowners to pay Fairfax Suburban Septic directly. After payment, the homeowners became aware that the work was not completed and that neither Mr. Riddel nor his subcontractor was licensed to perform septic work in Virginia.
During the trial, Mr. Riddel argued on a Motion to Strike the Commonwealth’s evidence that (1) he merely arranged for licensed contractors to perform the repairs to the septic system, arguing that Virginia Code §§
54.2-801 to 802 permitted Riddel to arrange the work without a contractor’s license and (2) no written contract to perform a septic inspection or repairs existed. The Circuit Court denied the motion and Mr. Riddel was convicted under Va. Code 54.1-111 for performing the work without a license. Needless to say, he appealed.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
They Say Nothing Lasts Forever, but What If Decommissioning Does?
June 10, 2019 —
Stella Pulman - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law BlogThe looming decommissioning liabilities of offshore energy producers have been a focus of the federal government in recent years. One recent case out of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, Taylor Energy v. United States, highlights the tension between the federal government’s desire to maintain financial security for decommissioning activities, and that of an operator whose security is tied up indefinitely while the government awaits technological advances to allow for safe decommissioning.
The case relates to a trust agreement between Taylor Energy and the United States, established to secure Taylor’s decommissioning liabilities for 28 wells in the Gulf of Mexico. Taylor completed certain decommissioning work for which it was reimbursed by the trust. However, with over $400 million remaining in the trust, Taylor and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) concluded that the ecological benefits of further decommissioning would be outweighed by the ecological risks. But despite recognizing that the limitations of current technology made the environmental impacts of further decommissioning work unjustifiable, the BSEE declined to release Taylor from its decommissioning obligations and instead decided to await “changes in technology and a better understanding of the undersea environment.” Because Taylor’s decommissioning obligations remained in place, the U.S. refused to release the remaining funds in the trust.
Taylor claimed that the United States should release the remaining funds in the trust because “decommissioning the remaining wells is not ‘currently technologically feasible.’” Taylor asserted that Louisiana law applied to the trust agreement, and that under Louisiana law every contract must be completed within an ascertainable term. By holding the trust funds until decommissioning was complete, Taylor argued that the government was essentially holding the funds in perpetuity given the technological infeasibility of completing decommissioning. Taylor also asserted that the agreement was premised on an impossibility (the full decommissioning of the wells), and/or a mutual mistake of the parties (that the wells could be decommissioned).
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Stella Pulman, PillsburyMs. Pulman may be contacted at
stella.pulman@pillsburylaw.com
Dear Engineer: Has your insurer issued a “Reservation of Rights” letter? (law note)
April 20, 2017 —
Melissa Dewey Brumback - Construction Law in North CarolinaIn my previous post, I made reference to getting a “Reservation of Rights” letter. I noted that the carrier may decide to defend you under a Reservation of Rights (i.e., hire your lawyer) but may not, necessarily, accept the responsibility for paying the claim. Does this mean that the insurance company has denied your claim, or will never pay? No.
Reservation of Rights (ROR) letters are sent for a variety of reasons- most notably, when some portion of the construction lawsuit against you is not covered under your E&O policy. The letter must state the reason(s) that the ROR is being issued.
With the ROR, the insurance company is telling you that it reserves the right to withdraw from your defense and/or deny payment of damages at a later date, depending upon how facts in the case develop. The notice is intended to let you know that there *may* be issues later, and to put you notice that you have the right to hire your own lawyer (at your own expense) to protect yourself from that future potential risk.
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Melissa Dewey Brumback, Ragsdale Liggett PLLCMs. Brumback may be contacted at
mbrumback@rl-law.com
The Power of Planning: Four Key Themes for Mitigating Risk in Construction
November 09, 2020 —
Zac Hays - Construction ExecutiveConstruction is, and always has been, known as a relatively risky business. Whether it is dealing with factors that can be controlled or beyond control, proactively managing risk has proven to be of the most critical factors in delivering quality projects faster, more efficiently and with wider margins.
Many people assume on-site activities introduce the greatest amount of uncertainty and potential risk. But many mistakes in construction originate in the planning phase – meaning preconstruction is ripe with opportunity to be the most effective place for mitigating risk, saving money and ultimately broadening margins. There are many ways to mitigate risk before projects even start, but four key themes emerge to be clear, repeatable opportunities for success.
DIGITIZE THE PLANNING PHASE
Preconstruction is where ideas are brought to life by translating architectural designs into a real, constructible plan. Decisions made at this stage can determine the project’s success and profitability – but it’s far from straightforward. Estimating, scheduling and planning are highly complex activities that depend on constantly changing details and are all areas where missed information or miscommunication can lead to costly rework down the line.
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Zac Hays, Construction Executive, a publication of Associated Builders and Contractors. All rights reserved.
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Arizona Court of Appeals Decision in $8.475 Million Construction Defect Class Action Suit
May 09, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFIn the case of Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011), which involved an $8.475 million settlement in a construction defect class action suit, the question put forth to the Appeals court was “whether an insured and an insurer can join in a Morris agreement that avoids the primary insurer’s obligation to pay policy limits and passes liability in excess of those limits on to other insurers.” The Appeals court provided several reasons for their decision to affirm the validity of the settlement agreement as to the Non-Participatory Insurers (NPIs) and to vacate and remand the attorney fee awards.
First, the Appeals court stated, “The settlement agreement is not a compliant Morris agreement and provides no basis for claims against the NPIs.” They conclude, “Appellants attempt to avoid the doctrinal underpinnings of Morris by arguing that ‘the cooperation clause did not prohibit Hancock from assigning its rights to anyone, including Appellants.’ This narrow reading of the cooperation clause ignores the fact that Hancock did not merely assign its rights — it assigned its rights after stipulating to an $8.475 million judgment that neither it nor its Direct Insurers could ever be liable to pay. Neither Morris nor any other case defines such conduct as actual ‘cooperation’—rather, Morris simply defines limited circumstances in which an insured is relieved of its duty to cooperate. Because Morris agreements are fraught with risk of abuse, a settlement that mimics Morris in form but does not find support in the legal and economic realities that gave rise to that decision is both unenforceable and offensive to the policy’s cooperation clause.”
The Appeals court further concluded that “even if the agreement had qualified under Morris, plaintiffs did not provide the required notice to the NPIs.” The court continued, “Because an insurer who defends under a reservation of rights is always aware of the possibility of a Morris agreement, the mere threat of Morris in the course of settlement negotiations does not constitute sufficient notice. Instead, the insurer must be made aware that it may waive its reservation of rights and provide an unqualified defense, or defend solely on coverage and reasonableness grounds against the judgment resulting from the Morris agreement. The NPIs were not given the protections of this choice before the agreement was entered, and therefore can face no liability for the resulting stipulated judgment.”
Next, the Appeals court declared that “the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under A.R.S § 12-341.” The Appeals court reasoned, “In this case, the NPIs prevailed in their attack on the settlement. But the litigation did not test the merits of their coverage defenses or the reasonableness of the settlement amount. And Plaintiffs never sued the NPIs, either in their own right or as the assignees of Hancock. Rather, the NPIs intervened to test the conceptual validity of the settlement agreement (to which they were not parties) before such an action could commence. In these circumstances, though it might be appropriate to offset a fee award against some future recovery by the Plaintiff Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011) class, the purposes of A.R.S. § 12-341.01 would not be served by an award of fees against them jointly and severally. We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees against Plaintiffs ‘jointly and severally.’”
The Appeals court made the following conclusion: “we affirm the judgment of the trial court concerning the validity of the settlement agreement as to the NPIs. We vacate and remand the award of attorney’s fees. In our discretion, we decline to award the NPIs the attorney’s fees they have requested on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A).”
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Former NJ Army Base $2B Makeover is 'Buzzsaw' of Activity
June 14, 2021 —
Tom Stabile - Engineering News-RecordTake a developed property the size of New York City’s Central Park with 5 million sq ft of building area, program in new construction or renovation over 20 years and across three dozen parcels for 1,600 housing units, 300,000 sq ft of civic or government space, 500,000 sq ft for retail and 2 million sq ft of offices, and you have a pretty ambitious undertaking. The $2-billion effort to redevelop Fort Monmouth, a decommissioned former U.S. Army base in the thick of New Jersey’s suburban sprawl, is all kinds of ambitious.
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Tom Stabile, Engineering News-Record
ENR may be contacted at ENR.com@bnpmedia.com
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