Insurance Company’s Reservation of Rights Letter Negates its Interest in the Litigation
November 12, 2019 —
Frank Ingham - Colorado Construction LitigationThe Colorado Court of Appeals held that an insurance company, which issues a reservation of rights letter to its insured, loses its interest in the litigation, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 24(a)(2), when the insured settles the claims and assigns the bad faith action against the insurance company to the plaintiff. Bolt Factory Lofts Owners Association, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company, 2019WL 3483901(Colo. App. 2019).
In a 2016 lawsuit in Denver District Court, 2016CV3360, the Bolt Factory Loft Owners Association, Inc. (“Association”) asserted construction defect claims against six contractors. Two of those contractors then asserted claims against other subcontractors, including Sierra Glass Co., Inc. (“Sierra Glass”). After multiple settlements, the only remaining claims were those the Association, as assignee of the two contractors, asserted against Sierra Glass.
Auto-Owners Insurance Company (“AOIC”) issued policies to Sierra Glass and defended it under a reservation of rights. The policy afforded AOIC the right to defend Sierra Glass, and it required Sierra Glass to cooperate in the defense of the legal action. The Association presented a settlement demand of $1.9 million to Sierra Glass, which AOIC refused to pay. To protect itself from an excess judgment that AOIC might not have paid, Sierra Glass entered into an agreement with the Association whereby Sierra Glass would refrain from offering a defense at trial and assign its bad faith claim against AOIC to the Association in exchange for the Association’s promise that it would not pursue recovery against Sierra Glass of any judgment entered against it at trial. Such agreements, known as Bashor or Nunn Agreements, are allowed in Colorado. Nunn v. Mid-Century Insurance Co., 244 P.3d 116 (Colo. 2010). Therefore, Sierra Glass was entitled to protect itself in the face of AOIC’s potential denial of coverage and refusal to settle. Bolt Factory Lofts, at ¶ 15.
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Frank Ingham, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCMr. Ingham may be contacted at
ingham@hhmrlaw.com
Why Do Construction Companies Fail?
February 14, 2023 —
The Hartford Staff - The Hartford InsightsIf a construction company takes on a lot of work, it’s a good thing, right? Not exactly. In fact, overextension is one of the primary reasons why contractors fail. And it’s something that contractors should consider as a priority for their risk management plan.
Of the 43,277 construction businesses that started in March 2011, only 37.6% of companies survived 10 years later.
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“The construction industry has a high rate of failure,” explains Tim Holicky, senior executive underwriter in The Hartford’s construction central bond team. “And more often than not, it’s because of too much work, rather than too little of it. The key to a contractor’s long-term survival is knowing when to say no.”
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The Hartford Staff, The Hartford Insights
Everyone’s Working From Home Due to the Coronavirus – Is There Insurance Coverage for a Data Breach?
May 18, 2020 —
Heather Whitehead & Jeff Dennis - Newmeyer DillionMost organizations are now requiring that their employees work from home (“WFH”) with the ongoing COVID-19 (commonly referred to as the Coronavirus) pandemic. These remote working arrangements provide new opportunities for hackers to infiltrate computer systems, and not surprisingly, attempted cyber attacks are on the rise. Given the rapid deployment of employees being forced to work from home, many employees are using their personal laptops, tablets and other devices to complete their work. The use of such personal devices increases the risk to network systems, including a potential breach or data loss.
However, in the event of a breach or other incident, there may be limitations in your cyber liability insurance policy based upon the type of hardware being used. Businesses need to be proactive to protect themselves from attacks by practicing vigilant cyber safety, and also reviewing their insurance policies in detail for coverage considerations prior to the occurrence of any cyber incident.
Reprinted courtesy of
Heather H. Whitehead, Newmeyer Dillion and
Jeffrey M. Dennis, Newmeyer Dillion
Ms. Whitehead may be contacted at heather.whitehead@ndlf.com
Mr. Dennis may be contacted at jeff.dennis@ndlf.com
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Homeowner Protection Act of 2007 Not Just for Individual Homeowners Anymore?
March 22, 2017 —
Maggie Stewart - Colorado Construction Litigation On March 9, 2017, the Colorado Court of Appeals announced its decision in Broomfield Senior Living Owner, LLC v. R.G. Brinkmann Company, No. 16CA0101, 2017 COA 31 (Colo. App. Mar. 9, 2017). As a matter of first impression, the Court evaluated whether a senior living facility constitutes “residential property” protected by the Homeowner Protection Act of 2007 ("HPA") provision of the Construction Defect Reform Act (CDARA).
In 2007, Plaintiff Broomfield entered into a contract with Defendant Brinkmann for construction of a senior assisted and independent living facility. The contract contained warranty provisions related to the quality of construction and cautioned that Plaintiff’s failure to provide Defendant with prompt notice of any defects would result in waiver of any claim for breach. The contract also limited Defendant Brinkmann’s liability by identifying three separate accrual provisions that would determine the time period in which Plaintiff could bring a claim. The project was completed in 2009.
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Maggie Stewart, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCMs. Stewart may be contacted at
stewart@hhmrlaw.com
Construction Defect Case Not Over, Despite Summary Judgment
November 07, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFThe Supreme Court of Oregon has concluded in an en banc decision that a motion to reconsider a summary judgment is not a motion for a new trial. In coming to their conclusion the court overturned an earlier Oregon Supreme Court case, Carter v. U.S. National Bank. Although the decision does not bear on construction defects, the underlying case did. Due to the decision, these claims can now be evaluated in a trial.
The case, Association of Unit Owners of Timbercrest Condominiums v. Warren, came about after an apartment complex was converted into condominium units. The developers hired Big Al’s Construction for some of the remodeling work. The condominium association later sued the developer and the contractor over claims of construction defects. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court granted.
But that wasn’t the end of things. The plaintiff soon filed a “motion to reconsider,” noting that the summary judgment seemed to be in conflict with both law and other recent rulings, and additionally, the grounds for the decision were not in the order. The judge then notified the parties that the court had “pulled the trigger too quickly” and had seven questions for the parties to answer.
The court dismissed all claims against the defendants. The defendants filed their responses, objecting that that “‘there is no such thing’ as a motion for reconsideration.” Further, while “the rules do allow for post-judgment review of pre-judgment rulings through a motion for a new trial,” the plaintiffs had not filed for a new trial. But did they need one? They did file an appeal.
The judge in the case admitted that there was no such thing as a motion to reconsider, and felt bad about prematurely signing the judgment. The case was sent to the Court of Appeals to determine if the motion to reconsider was a request for a new trial. The Court of Appeals concurred.
In reviewing the decision, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that there were a maximum of three questions to address. Was the motion for reconsideration a motion for a new trial? If so, was the later notice of appeal premature? And if so, was the plaintiff required to file a new appeal? The court determined that the answer to the first question was no.
Prior decisions pointed to the conclusion “that a motion for reconsideration of a summary judgment amounts to a motion for a new trial,” but here the court concluded that “our prior cases erred,” and turned to the summary judgment rule for clarification. The court noted that “the rule contemplates that summary judgment and trial are separate and distinct events.” With this conclusion, the Oregon Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
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Ohio Court of Appeals Affirms Judgment in Landis v. Fannin Builders
April 20, 2011 —
Beverley BevenFlorez CDJ STAFFThe Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in Landis v. William Fannin Builders. Landis contracted Fannin Builders to build their home. The case involved staining problems on the T1-11 siding chosen by the plaintiffs.
After a year and a half of discussion on how to resolve the problem of uneven staining on the siding, Landis filed suit “against Fannin Builders, alleging claims for breach of contract, breach of the express limited warranty, and violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (“OCSPA”). Fannin Builders, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against 84 Lumber, alleging claims for breach of contract and indemnification. With the trial court’s leave, Fannin Builders also later amended its answer to add a counterclaim against appellees for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. In the counterclaim, Fannin Builders alleged that appellees still owed it $3,908.98 for the construction of appellees’ home.”
“In its decision, the trial court found in appellees’ favor on their breach of contract claim and against appellees on their claims for breach of the express limited warranty and violation of the OCSPA. Additionally, the trial court found in Fannin Builders’ favor on its counterclaim for breach of contract and against Fannin Builders on its third-party claims for breach of contract and indemnity. The trial court determined that appellees’ damages amounted to $66,906.24, and after setting off the $3,908.98 that appellees owed Fannin Builders under the construction contract, the trial court awarded appellees $62,997.26. The trial court reduced its decision to judgment on May 18, 2010.”
Fannin Builders appealed this judgment and assigned the following errors:
[1.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Concluding that Appellant Breached its Contract with Appellees when it provided a Semi-Transparent Oil-Based Stain that Simply did not Meet their Approval.
[a.] The Contract does not Contain a Satisfaction Clause.
[b.] Even if the Court Implies a Satisfaction Clause, the Court Should Apply an Objective Standard.
[2.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Failing to Consider Appellant’s Right to Cure.
[3.] The Trial Court committed Reversible Error by not Assessing Damages Using “Diminished Value Standard,” and by Creating a Remedy that Constitutes Economic Waste.
[4.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Concluding that Appellant is Barred from Seeking Indemnification When 84 [Lumber] Never Fulfilled its Obligations Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement Entered on August 2, 2005.
In response to the first assigned error, the Court of Appeals stated: “Because the failure to provide siding of a uniform color, not appellees’ displeasure, breached the contract, we reject Fannin Builders’ contention that the trial court implied a satisfaction clause into the contract and found a breach of that clause. Accordingly, we overrule Fannin Builders’ first assignment of error.”
The Court of Appeals overruled the second assignment of error and provided the following reasoning: “Although Fannin Builders depends upon a term of the limited warranty for its right to cure, the trial court concluded that no breach of the limited warranty occurred. Fannin Builders breached the duty of workmanlike conduct implicit in the construction contract, not the limited warranty requiring it to satisfy the BIA’s Quality Standards. Consequently, the limited warranty does not apply to this case, and thus, it does not prevent appellees’ recovery of damages.”
The Appeals Court found “the trial court’s award of damages” was “both reasonable and supported by competent, credible evidence,” and therefore concluded “that the trial court did not err in setting appellees’ damages at $62,997.26.” The Fannin Builders third assignment of error was overruled.
The fourth and final assignment of error was also overruled by the Court of Appeals. “While Fannin Builders correctly asserts that 84 Lumber never installed the replacement siding, it ignores the fact that it ordered 84 Lumber to remove the replacement siding from appellees’ property. Thus, Fannin Builders precluded 84 Lumber from completely performing under the August 2, 2005 letter agreement. […] Consequently, Fannin Builders cannot now claim that the letter agreement is unenforceable or that it is entitled to indemnification from 84 Lumber. Because Fannin Builders assumed all liability for the defective siding in the letter agreement, it is responsible for appellees’ damages.”
James A. Zitesman, Columbus, Ohio Business Attorney, compared the case to Jones v. Centex (Ohio App. 2010), which had a different verdict:
“The common thread is the implied warranty of good workmanship. In the Jones case, the Court found that the buyers had in fact waived all implied warranties, including the implied warranty of good workmanship. In the contract between Jones and Centex, the builder stated that it “…would not sell the property to Purchasers without this waiver.” Probably should have been a sign to the buyers.
In the Landis case, the Court stated, “Contracts for the future construction of a residence include a duty, implied by law, that the builder must perform its work in a workmanlike manner.” The Court gave significant weight to the concept of the implied warranty of good workmanship. The builder relied upon the BIA Warranty which limits builders’ liability and exposure to legal issues. The trial court concluded there was no breach of the limited warranty, rather the builder “breached the duty of workmanlike conduct implicit in the construction contract, not the limited warranty requiring it to satisfy the BIAs Quality Standards.”
The Supreme Court of Ohio has accepted the Jones v. Centex Homes case for review.
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Does a Landlord’s Violation of the Arizona Residential Landlord-Tenant Act Constitute Negligence Per Se?
September 21, 2020 —
Kevin J. Parker - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogIn a recent Arizona Court of Appeals case, Ibarra v. Gastelum, 2020 WL 4218020 (7/23/20), the Court of Appeals addressed the question whether – in a tenant’s personal injury claim against the landlord – a landlord’s violation of the Arizona Landlord-Tenant Act constituted negligence per se. The tenant alleged he was injured by stubbing his toe on a crack in the floor. The tenant alleged that he had made repeated demands that the landlord repair the crack. The statute required the landlord to make all repairs and do whatever is necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition. The tenant argued that a violation of the statute constituted negligence per se, meaning that the violation of the statute satisfied (as a matter of law) the first two elements of a negligence claim – duty and breach of duty. The tenant requested a negligence per se jury instruction. The trial court declined that request and refused to give the requested instruction. The tenant lost the jury trial and appealed.
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Kevin J. Parker, Snell & Wilmer
Mr. Parker may be contacted at kparker@swlaw.com
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Where Did That Punch List Term Come From Anyway?
March 27, 2019 —
Duane Craig - Construction InformerI’ve often wondered just where the term “punch list” came from, and I’ve found a few sources that seem to make sense, while others not so much.
One person claims it came from the telephone installer process of “punching down” terminals on a block. That seems a bit of a stretch though. A blog writer said it had to do with the term ‘punch’ since it means to “punch something up” as in fix it.
Another blog writer thought it had something to do with a long forgotten practice. Apparently subcontractors used to each have their own hole punches that would punch a hole with a shape unique to them. They would use these punches to indicate they had corrected the deficiency that was their responsibility.
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Duane Craig, Construction Informer
