Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Balestreri, Potocki, & Holmes
Affordable Housing should not be Filled with Defects
November 26, 2014 —
Jesse Howard Witt – Acerbic WittPrime Time for Condos: Today’s Denver Business Journal presents a feature on Colorado’s hot market for condominiums and other forms of affordable housing. In several stories, reporter Molly Armbrister discusses how high demand for apartments and low construction of new condominium projects have put a premium on existing property.
Addressing the argument that lawsuits have made builders reluctant to develop multifamily housing, she quotes The Witt Law Firm’s Jesse Witt, who said that both homeowner and builder advocates would like to see changes to Colorado’s existing statutes. Current laws do little to prevent defective work and often leave consumers no choice but to pursue claims in court or binding arbitration if they want a builder to correct code violations and other mistakes.
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Jesse Howard Witt, The Witt Law FirmMr. Witt welcomes comments at www.wittlawfirm.net
Home Prices Up, Inventory Down
February 04, 2013 —
CDJ STAFF"Housing is clearly recovering," David Blitzer of Standard & Poor told USA Today. Standard & Poor issued their Case-Shiller Index of home sale prices for November. In their review of twenty metropolitan areas, prices rose in all but one area. In the report for October, housing overall saw a 0.1% decline with gains only in ten cities.
The article attributes this in part to that the inventory of unsold homes was 4.4 months, which was the lowest since May 2005. "Any new listings are getting eaten up right away," said E. J. Bowlds, a broker at Coldwell Banker Bain. He is seeing six to ten competing offers on homes in his area of Washington State.
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Colorado Springs may be Next Colorado City to Add Construction Defects Ordinance
October 28, 2015 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFThe Gazette reported that Colorado Springs city councilwoman Jill Gaebler stated that “she would bring a proposal to the council next month that would address the construction defects issue.”
Gaebler told The Gazette: “We have gone back and forth with how best to address this issue. It is a statewide concern, so how do we bring forward something that is meaningful to our community without stepping on the toes of our legislators?”
The state of Colorado has tried and failed to pass construction defects legislation three years in a row, according to The Gazette. If Colorado Springs adopts an ordinance, it will become the ninth city to pass construction defects laws.
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Texas Mechanic’s Lien Law Update: New Law Brings a Little Relief for Subcontractors and a Lot of Relief for Design Professionals
June 07, 2021 —
Tracey L. Williams - Peckar & Abramson, P.C.After several recent failed attempts to amend Chapter 53 of the Texas Property Code (the “Texas Mechanic’s Lien Statute”), it appears that long awaited relief may, at least in part, be on the horizon for subcontractors in Texas. Additionally, architects, engineers, and surveyors also appear to be significant benefactors of House Bill 2237 (“HB 2237”). Under existing law, many subcontractors often fail to perfect their mechanic’s liens under the Texas Mechanic’s Lien Statute because of complex notice requirements which must be sent for every month in which labor or material are furnished. And architects, engineers and surveyors currently have no lien rights unless they have a direct contractual relationship with the owner of the project. Effective January 1, 2022, HB 2237 amends the Texas Mechanic’s Lien Statute in several significant respects.
Subcontractor Impacts
HB 2237 impacts subcontractors in the following ways:
- Establishes uniformity in the notice requirements by imposing the same notice obligation on all subcontractors regardless of with whom they have contracted. Rather than sending one notice to the owner and one to the general contractor, the single notice now required must be sent to both simultaneously. Additionally, HB 2237 prescribes the form of the notice to be given under both Section 53.056 (notice of derivative claimant) and 53.057 (notice of contractual retainage).
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Tracey L. Williams, Peckar & Abramson, P.C.Ms. Williams may be contacted at
twilliams@pecklaw.com
David M. McLain named Law Week Colorado’s 2015 Barrister’s Best Construction Defects Lawyer for Defendants
September 17, 2015 —
Sheri Roswell – Colorado Construction LitigationIt is my sincere pleasure to announce Law Week Colorado named my friend and partner, Dave McLain, as the 2015 Barrister’s Best Construction Defects Lawyer for Defendants. Law Week Colorado’s summary of David’s accomplishments includes the following recognition:
David McLain has set himself apart in the heated area of construction defects litigation as a founding member of his firm and as a member of several associations that serve developers. As one of the most connected and most vocal members of this area of law, we certainly know whom to go to when the construction defects issue inevitably bubbles up again.
I can say with pride and certainty, that there is no one more deserving of such recognition in the legal and construction community than David. I have had the honor of working side by side with David since he began practicing law. Together, fourteen years ago, we founded Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC with a vision of serving the construction industry at the highest level. Our firm’s Mission Statement states that “HHMR exists to embody and exemplify the principles of service and stewardship. In everything we do, we focus on serving our clients selflessly and to the best of our ability.” David lives our values each and every day.
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Sheri Roswell, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCMs. Roswell may be contacted at
roswell@hhmrlaw.com
Wisconsin Supreme Court Upholds Asbestos Exclusion in Alleged Failure to Disclose Case
January 22, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFIn the case Phillips v. Parmelee, the Wisconsin Supreme court ruled “that an asbestos exclusion in a liability policy barred a duty to defend and indemnify a building seller for claims that the seller failed to disclose that the building contained asbestos,” according to an article in Mondaq by Ruth S. Kochenderfer and Deanna P. Cook, both from Steptoe & Johnson LLP. The policyholder received a building report stating that the “heating ducts likely contained asbestos,” however, the buyers alleged that the policyholder never provided them the report. After the buyers purchased the property, contractors “cut through the heating ducts, unknowingly dispersing asbestos throughout the building.”
According to Kochenderfer and Cook’s article, “The insurer intervened in the buyers' suit and sought summary judgment against the policyholder and buyers, arguing that an asbestos exclusion precluded coverage for the buyers' suit against the policyholder.” The buyers took the case to the Wisconsin Supreme court and “attacked the asbestos exclusion,” but the court rejected every argument.
Kochenderfer and Cook stated that the “decision is significant because three courts, including Wisconsin's highest court, squarely rejected attempts to narrow a broad, clearly-worded asbestos exclusion. Further, it confirms that such an asbestos exclusion will apply to all causes of action, including an alleged failure to disclose the presence of asbestos.”
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Playing Hot Potato: Indemnity Strikes Again
September 17, 2015 —
Garret Murai – California Construction Law BlogIndemnity can be like playing hot potato (for those of you closer to the Minecraft generation, in the game of hot potato, a metaphoric “hot potato” is tossed between (ahem amongst) players while music is playing, and when the music stops, the player holding the hot potato is out. It’s a barrel of monkeys, trust me.).
Anyway, like hot potato, with indemnity an owner typically requires its general contractor to indemnify the owner (sometimes the property owner in TI projects and occasionally design professionals) from and against any and all claims arising out of, related to . . . blah, blah, blah . . . the general contractor’s scope of work . A general contractor in turn will usually require indemnity from its subcontractors. And subcontractors will require indemnity from their sub-subcontractors. And down the line it goes with each party pointing their finger at the next party down the proverbial “food chain.”
But it doesn’t always happen that way as the next case, American Title Insurance Company v. Spanish Inn, Case No D067137, California Court of Appeals for the Fourth District (August 14, 2015), illustrates.
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Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
