A Survey of New Texas Environmental Laws
December 30, 2019 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelThis is a brief survey of many of the environmental and regulatory laws passed by the Texas Legislature and signed by the Governor in the 86th Regular Session of the Legislature, which ended in May 2019. Altogether, more than 1,300 laws were enacted in this session, including a surprising number of environmentally related bills. Most of these new laws take effect on September 1, 2019. This survey places them in the following broad categories: Air, Water; Waste; Disaster (principally because of the effects of Hurricane Harvey); and Miscellaneous.
(Special thanks to Jay Bowlby, a summer intern in our Houston office, who made a significant contribution to this survey.)
1.
Air
HB 1627—amends Section 386.001(2) of the Health and Safety Code to remove several counties from the list of counties with deteriorating air quality subject to the Texas Emissions Reductions Plan.
HB 1346—relates to the diesel emissions reductions incentives and gives the TCEQ flexibility in administering this program.
HB 2726—concerns amended air quality permit applications. The law provides that construction of a project may proceed, at the applicant’s own risk, after the TCEQ Executive Director has issued a draft permit including the permit amendment. However, this provision does not apply to a permit amendment affecting a concrete batch plant located within 888 yards of a residence.
HB 3725—creates the Texas Emissions Reduction Plan Trust Fund, which will be held by the Comptroller and administered by the TCEQ, which also administers the TERP program.
SB 698—authorizes the TCEQ to provide expedited processing of certain Texas Clean Air Act permit applications by increasing the agency’s permitting staff.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
Approaches in the Absence of a Differing Site Conditions Clause
April 10, 2019 —
Parker A. Lewton - Smith CurrieA contractor who has encountered unforeseen conditions will typically rely on the contract’s differing site conditions clause as a means to recovery. Most construction contracts address those issues directly. In ConsensusDocs Standard Agreement and General Conditions between Owner and Constructor, the starting point is § 3.16.2. But what if the contract does not contain a differing site conditions clause? Or, what if the contract does contain such a clause, but the contractor failed to provide adequate notice or satisfy other conditions or requirements of the contract? When reliance on a differing site conditions clause is impractical, a contractor still may seek recovery in certain instances under one or more of the following legal theories: misrepresentation; fraud; duty to disclose; breach of implied warranty; and mutual mistake.
Misrepresentation
Misrepresentation occurs when an owner “misleads a contractor by a negligently untrue representation of fact[.]” John Massman Contracting Co. v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 24, 31 (1991) (citing Morrison–Knudsen Co. v. United States, 170 Ct. Cl. 712, 718–19, 345 F.2d 535, 539 (1965)). A contractor may be able to recover extra costs incurred, under a theory of misrepresentation, if it can show that (1) the owner made an erroneous representation, (2) the erroneous representation went to a material fact, (3) the contractor honestly and reasonably relied on that representation, and (4) the contractor’s reliance on the erroneous representation was to the contractor’s detriment. See T. Brown Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 132 F.3d 724, 728–29 (Fed. Cir. 1997). These four requirements can be satisfied, for example, through the use of deposition testimony detailing the owner’s representations and the contractor’s reliance thereon. See, e.g., C & H Commercial Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 246, 256–57 (1996).
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Parker A. Lewton, Smith CurrieMr. Parker may be contacted at
palewton@smithcurrie.com
Texas Court of Appeals Conditionally Grant Petition for Writ of Mandamus to Anderson
April 25, 2011 —
Beverley BevenFlorez CDJ STAFFThe Texas Court of Appeals conditionally grant mandamus relief to Anderson Construction Company and Ronnie Anderson (collectively “Anderson”)… from the trial court in a construction defect lawsuit filed by Brent L. Mainwaring and Tatayana Mainwaring. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.001-.007 (West 2000 & Supp. 2010). Relators contend the trial court abused its discretion by compelling discovery while the case was abated by operation of law.
The Court of Appeals opinion describes what led up to the proceedings: “The Mainwarings’ original petition identified certain defects in their Anderson-constructed home. Those defects concerned the roof trusses and framing, air conditioning, mortar and masonry, exterior doors and windows, and weep holes. With respect to the five areas of defects identified in their original petition, the Mainwarings gave Anderson the statutorily required notice on January 13, 2010. After implementing agreed extensions, Anderson made an offer of settlement for the defects the Mainwarings identified in their notice. Almost eight months later, the Mainwarings filed an amended petition adding defects they had not included in their original petition and notice. The additional defects the Mainwarings included in their amended petition had not been addressed by Anderson’s offer of settlement.”
Following these events, Anderson claimed the Mainwarings did not respond in writing to their settlement offer. “Anderson filed a verified plea in abatement on December 2, 2010. In the trial court, Anderson claimed that the Mainwarings failed to respond in writing to Anderson’s settlement offer, as required by Section 27.004(b) of the RCLA. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(b)(1). The Mainwarings moved to compel discovery responses from Anderson. The Mainwarings alleged that they rejected Anderson’s settlement offer, and that if their response was insufficient, they contend that Anderson’s offer was rejected by operation of law on the twenty-fifth day after the Mainwarings received it. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(i). The Mainwarings’ motion to compel was not supported by affidavit. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(d)(2). On January 13, 2011, Anderson filed a verified supplemental plea in abatement. Anderson alleged that the Mainwarings failed to provide written notice concerning the newly alleged defects and complained the Mainwarings were attempting to circumvent the inspection and resolution procedure of the RCLA. Over Anderson’s objection that the lawsuit had been abated, the trial court granted the Mainwarings’ motion to compel discovery.”
After listening to both sides, the Court of Appeals offered this reasoning for their opinion: “The parties do not dispute that Anderson inspected the property before the Mainwarings alleged the existence of additional defects in their amended pleading, nor do the Mainwarings claim that Anderson has been given an opportunity to inspect the additional defects the Mainwarings identified in their amended pleadings. We conclude the trial court did not have the discretion to deny or lift the abatement until the Mainwarings established their compliance with the statute. In other words, the Mainwarings are required to provide Anderson a reasonable opportunity to inspect the additional defects identified by their amended pleading, which will allow Anderson the opportunity to cure or settle with respect to the newly identified defects.”
The Court of Appeals spoke directly on the issue of mandamus relief: “The Mainwarings contend that mandamus relief is not available because the trial court’s ruling does not prevent Anderson from making settlement offers during the discovery process. ‘An appellate remedy is “adequate” when any benefits to mandamus review are outweighed by the detriments.’ In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004). The failure to abate a case is typically not subject to mandamus. See In re Allstate Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 193, 196 (Tex. 2002) (citing Abor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d 564, 567 (Tex. 1985)). In this case, however, the case was abated by operation of law. By ignoring the statutory abatement, the trial court interfered with the statutory procedure for developing and resolving construction defect claims. See In re Kimball Hill Homes Tex., Inc., 969 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, orig. proceeding) (An appeal provides an inadequate remedy for the trial court’s failure to observe automatic abatement pursuant to the RCLA.). The benefits of mandamus review are not outweighed by the detriments of mandamus review in this case.“
In conclusion, “The trial court had no discretion to compel discovery while the case was abated, and Anderson, who has been compelled to respond to discovery during a period the case was under an automatic abatement, has no adequate remedy on appeal. Accordingly, we conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus. The writ will issue only if the trial court fails to vacate its order of February 3, 2011, and fails to refrain from proceeding with the case until a motion to reinstate is filed that establishes compliance with the notice and inspection requirements of the Residential Construction Liability Act.”
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California Supreme Court Shifts Gears on “Reverse CEQA”
February 23, 2016 —
Garret Murai – California Construction Law BlogThe California Supreme Court has shifted gears on so-called “reverse CEQA” under the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”).
The Supreme Court, in a much-anticipated decision, in California Building Industry Association v. Bay Area Air Quality Management District, Case No. S213478 (December 17, 2015), held that public agencies subject to CEQA are not required to analyze whether existing environmental conditions may impact a proposed project’s future users or residents – also known as “reverse CEQA” or “CEQA in reverse” – as opposed to the more traditional analysis of a proposed project’s impact on the environment, unless:
1. The proposed project risks exacerbating existing environmental hazards – in which case, it is the proposed project’s impact on the environment not the environment’s impact on the proposed project, which compels the evaluation; or
2. A reverse CEQA analysis is already required under statute, for example, on certain airport, school and housing projects.
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Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
Measure of Damages in Negligent Procurement of Surety Bonds / Insurance
September 04, 2018 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesMy broker procured the wrong insurance and I am exposed to a loss. My broker failed to procure proper insurance and I am exposed to a loss. “Where the parties enter into an agreement to procure insurance and there is a negligent failure to do so, an insurance broker may be liable for damages.” The Lexington Club Community Association, Inc. v. Love Madison, Inc., 43 Fla.L.Weekly D1860a (Fla. 4th DCA 2018). The proper measure of damages in a negligent procurement of insurance claim is “what would have been covered had the insurance been properly obtained.” Id. quoting Gelsomino v. ACE Am. Ins. Co., 207 So.3d 288, 292 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). This measure of damages in a negligent procurement of insurance claim is important because it is the measure of damages that dictates recoverable damages under this claim.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin NorrisMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Insurance Lawyers Recognized by JD Supra 2020 Readers' Choice Awards
June 29, 2020 —
Timothy Carroll, Anthony Miscioscia & Gus Sara - White and WilliamsCongratulations to Anthony Miscioscia, partner and Co-Chair of the Insurance Coverage and Bad Faith Group, and associate Timothy Carroll who have been recognized as top authors in Insurance in the 2020 JD Supra Readers' Choice Awards.
The Readers’ Choice Awards recognize top authors and firms for their thought leadership in key topics read by C-suite executives, in-house counsel, media, and other professionals across the JD Supra platform during 2019.
Additionally, JD Supra recognized Subrogation counsel, Gus Sara’s alert "New Hampshire's Statute of Repose for Improvements to Real Property Does Not Apply to Product Manufacturers" as one of the most popular product liability articles in 2019.
The Readers’ Choice Awards reflect a deep dive into JD Supra 2019 reader data, in which they studied total visibility and engagement among readers across many industries interested in certain defining topics. Along with a top firm in each category, JD Supra also features additional reader data, including the top five most-read articles, popular related topics, total number of authors, and other category-specific information.
Reprinted courtesy of White and Williams LLP attorneys
Timothy Carroll,
Anthony Miscioscia and
Gus Sara
Mr. Carroll may be contacted at carrollt@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Miscioscia may be contacted at misciosciaa@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Sara may be contacted at sarag@whiteandwilliams.com
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World’s Biggest Crane Gets to Work at British Nuclear Plant
October 07, 2019 —
Jeremy Hodges - BloombergThe world’s largest crane is getting ready to hoist more than 700 of the heaviest pieces of the first new nuclear plant being built in Britain in decades.
The machine, affectionately known as “Big Carl” after an executive at Belgian owner Sarens NV, is in place at Electricite de France SA’s 19.6 billion-pound ($24.1 billion) Hinkley Point C project in southwest England. It can carry as much as 5,000 tons, or the same weight as 1,600 cars, in a single lift and arrived on 280 truck loads from Belgium. It has taken about three months to build.
Nuclear power makes up about a fifth of Britain’s electricity. Most of those plants are near the end of their lives and will close in the next decade. Replacing them won’t be easy—as the scale of the project shows.
Earlier this year, EDF poured 9,000 cubic meters of cement, the biggest single biggest pour of concrete ever recorded in Britain. It was reinforced by 5,000 tons of steel built into a nest 4 meters high that’ll serve as the base of the first new reactor in the U.K. since 1995.
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Jeremy Hodges, Bloomberg
Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Balestreri, Potocki, & Holmes
