Who Will Pay for San Francisco's $750 Million Tilting Tower?
February 02, 2017 —
James Tarmy & Kartikay Mehrotra – BloombergNina Agabian, a retired director of research in global health science at the University of California, bought a 29th-floor apartment in San Francisco’s Millennium Tower in 2010. “It was supposed to be a wonderful building,” she said in January, sitting in a leather chair in the building’s vast, low-lit, owner's-club level. “For many of us, who left our business lives to start our older years, this had become a nice, comfortable place.”
The building, which opened in 2008 and was touted as the most luxurious tower in San Francisco, became a beacon of the city’s burgeoning wealth, attracting tech millionaires, venture capitalists, and even the San Francisco 49ers retired quarterback Joe Montana.
The 58-story tower's shine faded on May 10, 2016, when Agabian attended a homeowners association meeting and was informed that the building had sunk 16 inches into the earth and tilted over 15 inches at its tip and 2 inches at the base, according to suits filed by residents and the city of San Francisco. “You can imagine how distressed we were to know that, for one, our lifetime investment and savings are at risk,” she said. “And we have no idea whether or not there’s a fix to it, and if there is a fix to it, what it will entail.”
Reprinted courtesy of
James Tarmy, Bloomberg and
Kartikay Mehrotra, Bloomberg
Mr. Tarmy may be followed on Twitter @jstarmy
Mr. Mehrotra may be followed on Twitter @kartikaym
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Arkansas: Avoiding the "Made Whole" Doctrine Through Dépeçage
April 09, 2014 —
Robert M. Caplan – White and Williams LLPIn Arkansas, a workers’ compensation carrier’s subrogated recovery is subject to a determination of whether the injured worker—or, as the case may be, the worker’s surviving beneficiaries—has been “made whole” by the worker’s recovery against the third party tortfeasor. See, e.g., Yancey v. B & B Supply, 213 S.W.3d 657, 659 (Ark. App. 2005) (“An insured’s right to be made whole takes precedence over an insurer’s right to subrogation, and an insured must be fully compensated before the insurer's right to subrogation arises.”) [1] More often than not, a “made whole” determination will completely eradicate the carrier’s lien.
But under the right circumstances, a workers’ compensation carrier may be able to avoid the harsh outcome of “made whole” by intervening in a pending third party action and subsequently filing a motion for dépeçage—i.e., the conflict of laws principle requiring the court to conduct a separate choice of law analysis for discrete issues in a given case. A motion for dépeçage, in this sense, would demand that the court conduct a choice of law analysis to determine what state’s workers’ compensation subrogation law will apply on reimbursing a carrier’s lien.
We recently exploited this often underutilized tactic—to avoid Arkansas’ made whole doctrine—in a case involving a fatal plane crash in Louisiana. In that case, the deceased worker and his beneficiaries were residents of Louisiana; the accident took place in Louisiana; the worker was officially employed in Louisiana; and the workers’ compensation insurance policy was governed by, and benefits were paid under, Louisiana law. The only “contact” with Arkansas [2], meanwhile, was that Arkansas was the defendant’s domicile.
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Robert M. Caplan, White and Williams LLPMr. Caplan may be contacted at
caplanr@whiteandwilliams.com
Alabama Supreme Court Finds No Coverage for Construction Defect to Contractor's own Product
October 21, 2013 —
Tred Eyerly — Insurance Law HawaiiThe Alabama Supreme Court followed prior precedent and found that the contractor's faulty workmanship causing damage to his own product did not arise from an occurrence. Owners Ins. Co. v. Jim Carr Homebuilder, LLC, 2013 Ala. LEXIS 122 (Ala. Sept. 20, 2013).
The plaintiffs contracted with Carr to construct a new home. After completion of the home and taking occupancy, the plaintiffs noted several problems with the house related to water leaking through the roof, walls and floors, resulting in water damage to various areas of the house. The plaintiffs sued Carr and the case eventually went to arbitration. The arbitrator entered an award in favor of plaintiffs for $600,000.
Owners filed an action against Carr for a declaratory judgment seeking to establish there was no coverage because the property damage did not arise from an occurrence. The trial court granted summary judgment to Carr.
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Tred EyerlyTred Eyerly can be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Duty to Defend Bodily Injury Evolving Over Many Policy Periods Prorated in Louisiana
November 17, 2016 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe Louisiana Supreme Court held that the duty to defend in long latency disease cases should be prorated between the insurer and insured when the policies cover for only a portion of the time in which the exposure occurred. Arceneaux v. Amstar Corp., 2016 La. LEXIS 1675 (La. Sept. 7, 2016).
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Design Immunity Does Not Shield Public Entity From Claim That it Failed to Warn of a Dangerous Condition
May 17, 2021 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogReaders of this blog are familiar with the concept of the design immunity defense.
Codified at Government Code section 830.6, it provides in pertinent that a public entity is not liable for an injury caused by a plan or design of a public improvement where the plan or design has been “approved in advance . . . by the legislative body of the public entity or by some other body or employee exercising discretionary authority to give such approval or where such plan or design is prepared in conformity with standards previously so approved” if the trial or appellate court finds that there “is any substantial evidence upon the basis of which (a) a reasonable public employee could have adopted the plan or design or the standards therefor or (b) a reasonable legislative body or other body or employee could have approved the plan or design or the standards therefor.”
In the next case, Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, Case No. B293670 (January 29, 2021), the 2nd District Court of Appeal examined whether the design immunity defense also serves as a defense to a claim that a public entity has a duty to warn of a dangerous condition on public property.
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Garret Murai, Nomos LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@nomosllp.com
Flint Water Suits Against Engineers Will Go to Trial, Judge Says
March 14, 2022 —
James Leggate - Engineering News-RecordA federal judge in Michigan declined on Feb. 7 to accept the contention of engineer Lockwood, Andrews and Newnam Inc. that claims against it for professional negligence in its advisory role to Flint, Mich. ahead of the city's drinking water crisis should not go to trial. The civil case, set for trial on Feb. 15, was brought on behalf of four children who say they suffered neurocognitive harm from exposure to lead in the water supply.
Reprinted courtesy of
James Leggate, Engineering News-Record
Mr. Leggate may be contacted at leggatej@enr.com
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Not Everything is a Pollutant: A Summary of Recent Cases Supporting a Common Sense and Narrow Interpretation of the CGL's Pollution Exclusion
October 26, 2020 —
Philip B. Wilusz & Jeffrey J. Vita - Saxe Doernberger & VitaThose of us who suffered through law school are familiar with the argument that there are fundamental rules applicable to contract interpretation and that a certain contract language interpretation would “swallow the rule.” However, insurance companies have long advocated for an interpretation of the CGL policy’s pollution exclusion that would “swallow the coverage” that the insureds thought they were purchasing. Insurers have successfully argued in several states that the pollution exclusion’s definition of “pollutant” should be read literally, and be applied to any “solid, liquid, gaseous, or thermal irritant or contaminant including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals, and waste.” As anyone with children can attest to, the range of items and substances that can be considered an “irritant” is limitless. The logical extent of the insurer’s interpretation brings to mind the high school student who, for his science fair project, convinced his fellow students to ban “dihydrogen monoxide.”1 Citing evidence such as the fact that everyone who has ever died was found to have consumed “dihydrogen monoxide,” he convinced them of the dangers of . . . water. Similarly, an overly expansive reading of the definition of “pollutant” could lead to the absurd result of even applying it to ubiquitous harmless substances such as water. The pollution exclusion, therefore, has run amok in many states and has allowed insurers to avoid liability for otherwise covered claims.
Fortunately, insureds in many states have successfully argued that the pollution exclusion is subject to a more limited interpretation based on several different theories. For example, some courts have agreed that the pollution exclusion, as initially introduced by the insurance industry, should be limited to instances of traditional environmental pollution. Others have held that the exclusion is ambiguous as to its interpretation. The reasonable expectations of the insureds do not support a broad reading of the defined term “pollutant.” Below, this article addresses a number of recent decisions that have adopted a pro policyholder interpretation of the pollution exclusion. As with most insurance coverage issues, choice of law clearly matters.
Reprinted courtesy of
Philip B. Wilusz, Saxe Doernberger & Vita and
Jeffrey J. Vita, Saxe Doernberger & Vita
Mr. Wilusz may be contacted at pbw@sdvlaw.com
Mr. Vita may be contacted at jjv@sdvlaw.com
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DoD Testing New Roofing System that Saves Energy and Water
October 08, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFBuilder reported that the Department of Defense (DoD) is hosting a new “dynamic roofing system, installed at the Security Forces Building at Goodfellow Air Force Base in San Angelo, Texas,” which “uses a combination of technologies that heat and cool air and water, produce electricity, and collect rainwater.” If the project is successful, it “could be replicated at thousands of DoD buildings throughout the country in the near future.”
Builder described the process: “A retrofitted metal roof is installed over the existing roof, which creates a cavity between the existing and new roofs. Within that cavity insulation, solar thermal heating systems and cooling of air and water for the building can be installed. The roofing, insulation, hydronic solar thermal systems, engineered air pathways, and photovoltaic cells are designed to work symbiotically.”
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