Seattle Washington Building Expert Directory

The Preservation Maze

June 12, 2023 — Sofya Uvaydov - Kahana & Feld LLP
To appropriately preserve an issue for appeal is frankly confusing to many attorneys due to differing rules depending on the issue or procedural posture (presumably why appellate attorneys are more commonly used during trial). On May 25th, the US Supreme Court handed down Dupree v. Younger, 598 U.S. __ (2023) clarifying preservation requirements from denied summary judgment orders. When a federal court denies summary judgment on sufficiency of evidence grounds, a party must raise the argument again post-trial to preserve it for appeal as per the Court’s prior ruling in Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180 (2011). When a court denies summary judgment on a purely legal issue, the Court unanimously held that the issue is preserved in an appeal from a final judgment without having to raise it again post-trial. The Supreme Court distinguished this from their prior rule in Ortiz by explaining that sufficiency or factual issues which were previously denied at summary judgment must be evaluated based on the totality of the evidence adduced at trial. A purely legal issue decided on summary judgment is not changed by factual evidence at trial. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Sofya Uvaydov, Kahana & Feld LLP
Ms. Uvaydov may be contacted at suvaydov@kahanafeld.com

Balancing Cybersecurity Threats in Smart Cities: Is the Potential Convenience of “Smart” Intersections Worth the Risk?

September 02, 2024 — James P. Bobotek & Brian E. Finch - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law Blog
The term “smart cities” has become popular parlance for municipalities’ attempts to enhance delivery of urban services and infrastructure through information and communications technology. While they may conjure images of neon-lit high rises or streetscapes populated by sleek, hovering vehicles, a bit like the 1960s-era The Jetsons cartoon envisioned our high-tech future, the reality of smart cities has begun to emerge in more subtle, less glamourous forms. Cities tend to focus on wastewater monitoring, traffic control and energy distribution technologies in their efforts to become incrementally “smarter.” Smart cities lean heavily on automation, internet connectivity and the Internet of Things (IoT)—including smartphones, connected cars and a host of web-based appliances and utilities—to boost the delivery and quality of essential urban services and infrastructure like transit, sanitation, water, energy, emergency response and more. Successful smart cities need infrastructure that supports such connectivity, and they pull data from hundreds, or even thousands, of sensors that can be used to analyze and shepherd the direction of resources. Reprinted courtesy of James P. Bobotek, Pillsbury and Brian E. Finch, Pillsbury Mr. Bobotek may be contacted at james.bobotek@pillsburylaw.com Mr. Finch may be contacted at brian.finch@pillsburylaw.com Read the court decision
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Hawaii Appellate Court Finds Agent May Be Liable for Failing to Submit Claim

November 01, 2022 — Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii
After the agent informed the insured there was no coverage and submitting a claim would be a useless effort, the Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's dismissal of the insured's suit against the agent. Pflueger, Inc. v. AIG Holdings, Inc., 2022 Haw. App. LEXIS 279 (Haw. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2022). In May 2008, Pflueger notified its agent, Noguchi & Associates, Inc., that it had received federal grand jury subpoenas. Noguchi informed Pflueger that the subpoenas did not qualify as a "claim" under two policies issued by National Union. Consequently, Noguchi did not forward a claim or the subpoenas to National Union and did not seek clarification as to whether the grand jury subpoenas were covered under the policies. Pflueger relied upon Noguchi's representations and took no further action until its attorney submitted a demand letter tendering Pflueger's defense to Nation Union nine months later, in February 2009. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

MBIA Seeks Data in $1 Billion Credit Suisse Mortgage Suit

June 26, 2014 — Chris Dolmetsch and Jody Shenn – Bloomberg
MBIA Inc. (MBI) asked a judge to order Credit Suisse Group AG (CSGN) to turn over internal records that the bond insurer says bolster its contention the bank lied about how it processed loans packaged into mortgage-backed securities. MBIA said in a court filing today that Credit Suisse has withheld evidence about how the bank’s actual practices diverged from its representations -- including documents identified as exhibits in other lawsuits based on the same allegations. The bond insurer asked Justice Shirley Werner Kornreich in New York State Supreme Court in Manhattan to force the bank to search documents and e-mails on its policies and practices including those related to loan underwriting and origination, due diligence and post-acquisition quality-control review. Mr. Dolmetsch may be contacted at cdolmetsch@bloomberg.net; Ms. Shenn may be contacted at jshenn@bloomberg.net Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Chris Dolmetsch and Jody Shenn, Bloomberg

Making the Construction Dispute Resolution Process More Efficient and Less Expensive, Part 2

July 16, 2014 — Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFF
John P. Ahler, on the Ahlers & Cressman PLLC blog, has posted the second part of his two-part series on Ways to Make the Construction Dispute Resolution Process More Efficient and Less Expensive. In this post, Ahler discussed “tips on how lawyers and stakeholders can make things move quicker in arbitration.” For example, Ahler looked at the arbitration clause in the initial contract, various options for arbitration, evidence decisions, and others. Read the court decision
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President Trump’s Infrastructure Plan Requires a Viable Statutory Framework (PPP Statutes)[i]

April 13, 2017 — John P. Ahlers - Ahlers & Cressman PLLC
Although we live in a politically-divided nation, there is one issue on which there seems widespread agreement: our country requires a massive upgrade to its infrastructure. Rundown airports, crumbling highways, obsolete ports, and dangerous bridges are now endemic across the United States. By contrast, Asian airports and elegant European bridges and rails show that our country needs an upgrade, the cost of which will be enormous. President Trump promised to revitalize America’s aging roads, bridges, railways, and airports. He chose Wilbur Ross for Commerce Secretary and professor of Conservative Economics and Public Policy, Peter Navarro, to formulate an infrastructure plan. Navarro and Ross recommended that the government allocate $137 billion in tax credits for private investors who underwrite infrastructure projects. They estimate that over the next ten years, the credits could spur $1 trillion in investments. That is how much President Trump promised to spend on infrastructure, a key part of his job-creation plan. His plan involves building the infrastructure with private-money financing. Public Private Partnerships (“PPP”) are not a new concept and have been successful in Canada, Europe, and various U.S. states who have pioneered this method of procurement. Federal tax credits have been used to spur private investment in housing, resulting in tens of thousands of low-income housing developments over the years. The credits are sold to private entities such as banks and equity firms that invest anywhere from $.70 to $1.10 in housing developments for every dollar they receive in credits, a ratio that fluctuates with economic conditions. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of John P. Ahlers, Ahlers & Cressman PLLC
Mr. Ahlers may be contacted at jahlers@ac-lawyers.com

Not Everything is a Pollutant: A Summary of Recent Cases Supporting a Common Sense and Narrow Interpretation of the CGL's Pollution Exclusion

October 26, 2020 — Philip B. Wilusz & Jeffrey J. Vita - Saxe Doernberger & Vita
Those of us who suffered through law school are familiar with the argument that there are fundamental rules applicable to contract interpretation and that a certain contract language interpretation would “swallow the rule.” However, insurance companies have long advocated for an interpretation of the CGL policy’s pollution exclusion that would “swallow the coverage” that the insureds thought they were purchasing. Insurers have successfully argued in several states that the pollution exclusion’s definition of “pollutant” should be read literally, and be applied to any “solid, liquid, gaseous, or thermal irritant or contaminant including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals, and waste.” As anyone with children can attest to, the range of items and substances that can be considered an “irritant” is limitless. The logical extent of the insurer’s interpretation brings to mind the high school student who, for his science fair project, convinced his fellow students to ban “dihydrogen monoxide.”1 Citing evidence such as the fact that everyone who has ever died was found to have consumed “dihydrogen monoxide,” he convinced them of the dangers of . . . water. Similarly, an overly expansive reading of the definition of “pollutant” could lead to the absurd result of even applying it to ubiquitous harmless substances such as water. The pollution exclusion, therefore, has run amok in many states and has allowed insurers to avoid liability for otherwise covered claims. Fortunately, insureds in many states have successfully argued that the pollution exclusion is subject to a more limited interpretation based on several different theories. For example, some courts have agreed that the pollution exclusion, as initially introduced by the insurance industry, should be limited to instances of traditional environmental pollution. Others have held that the exclusion is ambiguous as to its interpretation. The reasonable expectations of the insureds do not support a broad reading of the defined term “pollutant.” Below, this article addresses a number of recent decisions that have adopted a pro policyholder interpretation of the pollution exclusion. As with most insurance coverage issues, choice of law clearly matters. Reprinted courtesy of Philip B. Wilusz, Saxe Doernberger & Vita and Jeffrey J. Vita, Saxe Doernberger & Vita Mr. Wilusz may be contacted at pbw@sdvlaw.com Mr. Vita may be contacted at jjv@sdvlaw.com Read the court decision
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CA Supreme Court Expands Scope of Lawyers’ Statute of Limitations to Non-Legal Malpractice Claims – Confusion Predicted for Law and Motion Judges

August 26, 2015 — David W. Evans & Stephen J. Squillario – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
In Lee v. Hanley (S220775 – Filed 8/20/2015), the California Supreme Court clarified the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6 by holding that its limitations period applies to claims against attorneys “whose merits necessarily depend on proof that an attorney violated a professional obligation in the course of providing professional services.” Although it resolved a district split by finding that the statute governs for non-legal malpractice claims against attorneys including those of non-clients, by having the statute’s applicability “turn on the conduct alleged and ultimately proven, not on the way the complaint was styled,” this 5-2 decision also increased the specter of creative pleading and lengthy litigation. In Lee, the client had advanced $120,000 to cover attorney’s fees, costs and expert witness fees for the underlying litigation. After the case settled, the attorney advised the client that she had a credit balance of approximately $46,000. In response to her demand for a refund, the attorney then advised the client that she did not have a credit balance. More than one year later, the client filed suit to recover the $46,000, plus interest. The trial court sustained the attorney’s demurrer based on the one-year statute of limitations in section 340.6. The appellate court, however, reversed, reasoning that the client’s claim could be construed as one for conversion, in which case section 340.6 would not apply. Reprinted courtesy of David W. Evans, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and Stephen J. Squillario, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP Mr. Evans may be contacted at devans@hbblaw.com Mr. Squillario may be contacted at ssquillario@hbblaw.com Read the court decision
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