Buy America/Buy American, a Primer For Contractors
March 23, 2020 —
John P. Ahlers - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCPresident Trump has promoted his campaign agenda—bringing manufacturing jobs back to the United States (especially jobs relating or pertaining to the steel industry.) To do this, he has strengthened domestic preferences through the Buy America and Buy American Acts.[1]
1. Buy America Act:
The Buy America Act refers to a collection of domestic contract restrictions pertaining to the U.S. Department of Transportation/Federal Highway Administration projects (highway, mass transit and other transportation projects). The USDOT grants provided to state and local governments prohibit the federal government from obligating funds unless the steel, iron and manufactured products used in the projects are produced in the U.S. Generally, Buy America applies to projects where USDOT provides part of the funding, applies to steel, iron and manufactured products, and requires that “all manufacturing processes, including application of a coating, for these materials…occur in the United States.”
- Buy American:
Buy American is critical for construction contractors because FAR 52.225-9 requires that all federal construction contracts under approximately $7 million[2] contain a clause which mandates that contractors use “only domestic construction material in performing [the] contract.” [Note: This requirement is not limited to steel and steel products, as the Buy America Act is.]
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
John P. Ahlers, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCMr. Ahlers may be contacted at
john.ahlers@acslawyers.com
Lien Waivers Should Be Fair — And Efficient
February 18, 2015 —
Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law MusingsThis week for our Guest Post Friday here at Construction Law Musings, we welcome back my good friend Scott Wolfe. Scott, a thought leader in the construction industry, combines his construction background, tech experience, entrepreneurial spirit, and legal education to bring a unique perspective to the industry’s construction payment problem. Scott is the founder of zlien, a venture-backed construction payment platform. A licensed attorney in six states, his writing has appeared in the New York Times, CFMA’s Building Profits, Supply House Times, Construction Executive, and tED Magazine. He has been a Keynote Speaker for the American Subcontractors Association annual conference, and spoken at CFMA events.
Lien waivers are perhaps the most legally and practically complicated documents exchanged in the construction industry. Unfortunately, this results in huge corporate inefficiencies, and worse, provides an opportunity for some parties to exert undue leverage over others.
Lien waivers — or lien releases, as they are commonly (but mistakenly) called — aren’t supposed to be complicated, though. They are designed to make the complex construction payment process easy and fair.
This article will address why that is, how it works, and where things have gone awry.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Christopher G. Hill, Law Office of Christopher G. Hill, PCMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Examination of the Product Does Not Stop a Pennsylvania Court From Applying the Malfunction Theory
June 28, 2021 —
Gus Sara - The Subrogation StrategistPennsylvania recognizes the malfunction theory in product liability cases. This theory allows a plaintiff to circumstantially prove that a product is defective by showing evidence of a malfunction and eliminating abnormal use or reasonable, secondary causes for the malfunction. The malfunction theory is available to plaintiffs as an alternative to proving a traditional strict product liability case in those circumstances where direct evidence of a product defect is not found. In Pa. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sam’s East, Inc., 727 MDA 2020, 2021 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 752, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania (Superior Court) considered whether the plaintiffs could avail themselves to the malfunction theory if the plaintiffs’ expert was able to examine the product.
The Sam’s East, Inc. case arose from a February 2015 fire at the residence of Gerald and Michelle Thompson (the Thompsons). The fire caused injuries to the Thompsons, as well as significant damage to their residence. Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Company (Insurer) provided homeowners insurance coverage for the property and made payments to the Thompsons as a result of the fire. Insurer retained a fire investigator to investigate the origin and cause of the fire. The fire investigator determined that the fire originated at an electric space heater that was purchased from defendant Sam’s East, Inc. (Sam’s East) in December 2011. Insurer and the Thompsons filed a lawsuit against Sam’s East in early 2017 for their respective damages.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Gus Sara, White and WilliamsMr. Sara may be contacted at
sarag@whiteandwilliams.com
Floating Crane on Job in NYC's East River Has a Storied Past of Cold War Intrigue
January 04, 2018 —
Nadine M. Post - Engineering News-RecordOriginally Published by CDJ on March 22, 2017
The complex maneuver of lifting heavy prefabricated modules out of New York City's East River to build a university laboratory took careful planning and the work of one particular floating crane with a complicated past.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Nadine M. Post, ENRMs. Post may be contacted at
postn@enr.com
Significant Victory for the Building Industry: Liberty Mutual is Rejected Once Again, This Time by the Third Appellate District in Holding SB800 is the Exclusive Remedy
December 15, 2016 —
Richard H. Glucksman & Ravi R. Mehta – Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger Bulletin I. Elliott Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court (Certified for Publication, Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2016
The California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District recently elaborated on the scope of the Right to Repair Act, commonly known as SB-800 (“Act”). In
Elliott Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court of Sacramento County (Kevin Hicks, et al.) (certified for publication, Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2016), the Court considered whether the Act (and specifically the Act’s pre-litigation procedure) applies, when homeowners plead construction defect claims based only on common law causes of action, as opposed to violations of the building standards set forth in the Act (
Civil Code §896). The Court answered this question affirmatively.
The homeowners of seventeen (17) single-family homes filed a Complaint against the builder of their homes, Elliott Homes, Inc. (“Elliott”), alleging common law causes of action for construction defects. Elliott filed a motion to stay the litigation on the ground that the homeowners failed to comply with the pre-litigation procedure set forth in the Act. The trial court denied the motion, agreeing with the homeowners that this pre-litigation procedure did not apply because the homeowners had not alleged a statutory violation of the Act. Elliott appealed. The Court of Appeal purely considered the question of whether the Act, including its pre-litigation procedure, applies when a homeowner pleads construction defect claims based on common law causes of action, and not on statutory violations of the Act’s building standards.
To answer this question, the Court analyzed a recent case decided by the Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District:
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove, LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 98. In this subrogation case, a builder’s insurer asserted common law causes of action (but not statutory building standard violations) alleging construction defects against the builder to recover amounts paid to the homeowner after a sprinkler system failure caused extensive damage to the subject property. The trial court sustained the builder’s demurrer to the Complaint on the ground that it was time-barred under the Act. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order, holding that common law construction defect claims arising from actual damages are not covered by the Act because “the Act does not provide the exclusive remedy in cases where actual damage has occurred.” (
Liberty Mutual, 219 Cal.App.4th 98, 109).
The
Elliott Court declined to follow
Liberty Mutual, finding that that Court failed to properly analyze the language of the Act. The
Elliott Court analyzed both the statutory scheme and the legislative history of the Act to arrive at the conclusion that common law causes of action for construction defects do indeed fall within the purview of the Act.
According to the
Elliott Court, the Act “broadly applies to
any action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in…residential construction and in such an action, a homeowner’s claims or causes of action shall be limited to violation of the standards set forth in the Act, except as specified.” Further, the Act expressly provides that “no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under Section 944 is allowed.”
Civil Code §943(a). In turn,
Civil Code §944 allows for a recovery for the cost of repairing a building standard violation, or for the cost of repairing any damage caused by such a violation, among other things.
The limited exceptions to the Act’s applicability concern the enforcement of a contract, or any action for fraud, personal injury, or violation of a statute. Civil Code §943(a). Additionally, the Act does not apply to condominium conversions. Civil Code §896.
The Elliott Court explains that apart from these exceptions, the Legislature intended the Act to apply to all construction defect claims (regardless of damage) relating to the construction of residential properties whose sales contracts are signed after January 1, 2003. There is no exception in the Act, express or implied, for common law causes of action.
Next, the Court turns to the Act’s legislative history to buttress this conclusion. This history makes clear that the Act is a legislative response to the California Supreme Court’s holding in
Aas v. Superior Court (2000) 24 Cal.4th 627, that construction defects in residential properties are only actionable in tort when actual property damage manifests. Senate Judiciary Committee hearings indicate that the Act was the product of protracted negotiations between varying interested parties, including construction industry trade groups and consumer protection groups. The Legislature intended (1) to promulgate building standards, violations of which would be actionable, even without damage, and (2) to allow homeowners to recover for actual damage caused by construction defects not covered by the building standards. In other words, the Act was intended to provide homeowners redress regardless of whether damage had manifested.
Therefore, the Court concluded that common law causes of action for construction defects, regardless of damage, are subject to the pre-litigation procedure set forth in the Act. The Court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its earlier order, and to enter a new order granting Elliott’s motion to stay the litigation until the homeowners (and Elliott) have satisfied the pre-litigation procedure of the Act.
II. McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1132
Similar to the Third Appellate District Court’s ruling in
Elliott, the Fifth Appellate District Court also rejected the holding of
Liberty Mutual in a matter now pending before the California Supreme Court:
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1132 (review granted and opinion superseded sub nom.
Albany v. Superior Court 360 P.3d 1022). Also similar to
Elliott, in
McMillin a group of homeowners filed common law construction defect claims against the builder of their homes. The builder,
McMillin, moved to stay the litigation pending compliance with the Act’s pre-litigation procedure. The trial court denied the motion, holding that the Act does not apply because the homeowners have not asserted statutory building standard violations contained within the Act.
In reasoning substantially similar to that of
Elliott, the
McMillin Court rejected Liberty Mutual’s holding that the Act is not the exclusive remedy for pursuing construction defect claims, with or without damage. Thus, the
McMillin Court issued a writ of mandate to vacate the trial court’s earlier order and to enter a new order granting McMillin’s motion to stay.
On November 24, 2015, the California Supreme Court granted the homeowners’ petition for review. In August of 2016, briefing was completed and the matter is now awaiting the scheduling of arguments. CGDRB will continue to closely monitor the pending appeal of this matter to the California Supreme Court, as well as all related developments.
Reprinted courtesy of
Richard H. Glucksman, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger and
Ravi R. Mehta, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger
Mr. Glucksman may be contacted at rglucksman@cgdrblaw.com
Mr. Mehta may be contacted at rmehta@cgdrblaw.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Best Lawyers Recognizes Twelve White and Williams Lawyers
September 15, 2016 —
White and Williams LLPThe 2017 Best Lawyers in America list includes twelve White and Williams lawyers. Inclusion in Best Lawyers is based entirely on peer-review. The methodology is designed to capture, as accurately as possible, the consensus opinion of leading lawyers about the professional abilities of their colleagues within the same geographical area and legal practice area. Best Lawyers employs a sophisticated, conscientious, rational, and transparent survey process designed to elicit meaningful and substantive evaluations of quality legal services.
2017 Best Lawyers
- Frank Bruno, Patent Law
- Richard Campbell, Product Liability Litigation – Defendants
- James Coffey, Mergers and Acquisitions Law
- Timothy Davis, Real Estate Law
- William Hussey, Tax Law; Trusts and Estates
- Michael Kraemer, Employment Law - Management; Labor Law - Management; Litigation - Labor and Employment
- Randy Maniloff, Insurance Law
- John Orlando, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants
- Thomas Rogers, Real Estate Law
- Joan Rosoff, Real Estate Law
- Craig Stewart, Insurance Law; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants
- William Taylor, Construction Law
Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of White and Williams LLP
Insurers Subrogating in Arkansas Must Expend Energy to Prove That Their Insureds Have Been Made Whole
July 30, 2019 — Michael J. Ciamaichelo - The Subrogation Strategist
Arkansas employs the “made whole” doctrine, which requires an insured to be fully compensated for damages (i.e., to be “made whole”) before the insurer is entitled to recover in subrogation.[1] As the Riley court established, an insurer cannot unilaterally determine that its insured has been made whole (in order to establish a right of subrogation). Rather, in Arkansas, an insurer must establish that the insured has been made whole in one of two ways. First, the insurer and insured can reach an agreement that the insured has been made whole. Second, if the insurer and insured disagree on the issue, the insurer can ask a court to make a legal determination that the insured has been made whole.[2] If an insured has been made whole, the insurer is the real party in interest and must file the subrogation action in its own name.[3] However, when both the insured and an insurer have claims against the same tortfeasor (i.e., when there are both uninsured damages and subrogation damages), the insured is the real party in interest.[4]
In EMC Ins. Cos. v. Entergy Ark., Inc., 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 14251 (8th Cir. May 14, 2019), EMC Insurance Companies (EMC) filed a subrogation action in the District Court for the Western District of Arkansas alleging that its insureds’ home was damaged by a fire caused by an electric company’s equipment. EMC never obtained an agreement from the insureds or a judicial determination that its insureds had been made whole. In addition, EMC did not allege in the complaint that its insureds had been made whole and did not present any evidence or testimony at trial that its insureds had been made whole. After EMC presented its case-in-chief, the District Court ruled that EMC lacked standing to pursue its subrogation claim because “EMC failed to obtain a legal determination that its insureds had been made whole . . . prior to initiating this subrogation action.” Thus, the District Court granted Entergy Ark., Inc.’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and EMC appealed the decision. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Michael J. Ciamaichelo, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Ciamaichelo may be contacted at ciamaichelom@whiteandwilliams.com
Wait! Don’t Sign Yet: Reviewing Contract Protections During the COVID Pandemic
April 13, 2020 — Danielle S. Ward - Balestreri Potocki & Holmes
As the circumstances of the COVID pandemic change day by day, and we all rush to keep business moving where and when we can, companies should consider hitting the “pause button” before renewing or executing any new contracts. Developing contracts often takes considerable time and expense, and companies are not in the habit of reworking them often. A change in law may prompt a company to revisit their contract terms, but otherwise business is often carried out with a standard form contract for a period of years. With the COVID pandemic affecting nearly every business and industry, life is not business as usual, and companies should make sure their contracts consider what previously seemed like an unforeseeable event.
Force Majeure clauses are included in many contracts to excuse contract performance when made impossible by some unforeseen circumstance. These clauses typically fall under two categories: general and specific. General force majeure clauses excuse performance if performance is prevented by circumstances outside the parties’ control. By contrast, specific force majeure clauses detail the exhaustive list of circumstances (acts of god, extreme weather, war, riot, terrorism, embargoes) which would excuse contract performance. Force majeure clauses are typically interpreted narrowly. If your contract has a specific clause and pandemic or virus is not one of the listed circumstances it may not apply. Whether a particular existing contract covers the ongoing COVID pandemic will vary depending on the language of the contract.
Force majeure clauses previously made headlines when the great economic recession hit in 2008. A number of courts held that simple economic hardship was not enough to invoke force majeure. The inability to pay or lack of desire to pay for the contracted goods or services did not qualify as force majeure. In California, impossibility turns on the nature of the contractual performance, and not in the inability of the obligor to do it. (Kennedy v. Reece (1964) 225 Cal. App. 2d 717, 725.) In other words, the task is objectively impossible not merely impossible or more burdensome to the specific contracting party.
California has codified “force majeure” protection where the parties haven’t included any language or the circumstances in the clause don’t apply to the situation at hand. Civil Code section 1511 excuses performance when “prevented or delayed by an irresistible, superhuman cause, or by the act of public enemies of this state or of the United States, unless the parties have expressly agreed to the contrary.” (Civ. Code § 1511.) What qualifies as a “superhuman cause”? In California, the test is whether under the particular circumstances there was such an insuperable interference occurring without the party's intervention as could not have been prevented by the exercise of prudence, diligence and care. (Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v. C. S. T., Ltd. (1946) 29 Cal.2d 228, 238.)
If you find yourself in an existing contract without a force majeure clause, or the statute does not apply, you may consider the doctrine of frustration of purpose. This doctrine is applied narrowly where performance remains possible, but the fundamental reason the parties entered into the contract has been severely or substantially frustrated by an unanticipated supervening circumstance, thus destroying substantially the value of the contract. (Cutter Laboratories, Inc. v. Twining (1963) 221 Cal. App. 2d 302, 314-15.) In other words, performance is still possible but valueless. Note this defense is not likely to apply where the contract has simply become less profitable for one party.
Now that COVID is no longer an unforeseeable event, but rather a current and grave reality, a party executing a contract today without adequate protections may have a difficult time proving unforeseeability. Scientists are not sure whether warm weather will suppress the spread of the virus, as it does with the seasonal flu, but to the extent we get a reprieve during the summer we may see a resurgence of cases this Fall or Winter. Companies should take care in reviewing force majeure clauses, and other clauses tied to timely performance such as delay and liquidated damages before renewing or executing new contracts.
Your contract scenario may vary from the summary provided above. Please contact legal counsel before making any decisions. During this critical time, BPH’s attorneys can be reached via email to answer your questions.
Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Danielle S. Ward, Balestreri Potocki & Holmes
Ms. Ward may be contacted at dward@bph-law.com
