Sales of New Homes in U.S. Increased 5.4% in July to 507,000
August 26, 2015 —
Shobhana Chandra – BloombergPurchases of new homes in the U.S. rebounded in July, bolstering signs the real-estate market is picking up.
Sales climbed 5.4 percent, the biggest gain this year, to a 507,000 annualized pace from a 481,000 rate in the prior month, a Commerce Department report showed Tuesday in Washington. The median forecast of 75 economists surveyed by Bloomberg called for 510,000. Demand had declined 7.7 percent in June.
Demand for new properties is likely to keep expanding amid strong employment, low borrowing costs and a lack of available existing homes from which to choose. The improving outlook may spur more residential construction, contributing to the economic expansion in the second half of the year.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
The Dog Ate My Exclusion! – Georgia Federal Court: No Reformation to Add Pollution Exclusion
September 28, 2017 —
Philip M. Brown-Wilusz - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.While schoolchildren know that the classic “the dog ate my homework” excuse doesn’t work, insurance companies are willing to try a variation of that excuse. Ace American Insurance Company (Ace), sold a property policy (the Policy) to Exide Technologies, Inc. (Exide). Exide sought coverage under the Policy for acid damage at its former battery factory. Ace denied coverage, citing to the pollution exclusion. The only problem? The Policy contained no pollution exclusion!
Exide had procured policies from other insurers for several years prior to the inception of the Policy, all of which contained pollution exclusions. Exide instructed Marsh USA Inc. (Marsh), its broker, to procure insurance “on the same or better terms and conditions.” The resulting policy contained no pollution exclusion, and Exide sought coverage under the Policy for pollution-related losses.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Philip M. Brown-Wilusz, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Mr. Brown-Wilusz may be contacted at
pbw@sdvlaw.com
Jean Nouvel’s NYC ‘Vision Machine’ Sued Over Construction Defects
December 10, 2015 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFThe Telegraph reported that the developers of famed architect Jean Nouvel’s futuristic building are being sued over alleged window pane defects. The building contains a customized, “curving curtain wall of different sized panes of colorless glass—each set in a unique angle and torque,” according to Nouvel’s firm. However, some residents reported “wind whistling through the panes of glass, and water seeping in.” Furthermore, “[t]he draft is so severe in some places that hydronic heating pipes have frozen and burst, according to court papers.”
Attorney for the developer told the Telegraph, “Our clients will be vigorously defending this matter and we believe we will prevail in the case.”
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Traub Lieberman Attorneys Lisa Rolle and Christopher Acosta Win Motion to Dismiss in Bronx County Trip and Fall
May 22, 2023 —
Lisa M. Rolle & Christopher D. Acosta - Traub LiebermanTraub Lieberman Partner Lisa Rolle and Associate Christopher Acosta won a motion to dismiss in a trip and fall accident complaint and cross-claim brought before the New York Supreme Court, Bronx County. The underlying accident allegedly occurred on the sidewalk abutting the subject premises, which is owned by the Property Owner and was leased to a Pest Control Company. The Property Owner brought a cross-claim against the Pest Control Company as a result of the initial complaint.
Reprinted courtesy of
Lisa M. Rolle, Traub Lieberman and
Christopher D. Acosta, Traub Lieberman
Ms. Rolle may be contacted at lrolle@tlsslaw.com
Mr. Acosta may be contacted at cacosta@tlsslaw.com
Read the full story... Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Balestreri, Potocki, & Holmes
LaGuardia Airport Is a Mess. An Engineer-Turned-Fund Manager Has a Fix
May 26, 2019 —
Sree Vidya Bhaktavatsalam - BloombergThierry Déau’s engineering training in France led him early in his career to building government-funded infrastructure. But it was his entrepreneur father back home in Martinique who inspired him to strike out on his own in 2005. He started Paris-based Meridiam to finance, build, and manage long-term projects. Now, with €7 billion ($7.83 billion) in seven funds and nine offices across Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and North America, Meridiam is playing a key role in high-profile projects such as the upgrade of New York’s LaGuardia Airport and a road tunnel under the Port of Miami. Déau describes Meridiam’s investment approach in an interview with Bloomberg Markets.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Sree Vidya Bhaktavatsalam, Bloomberg
Contract Change #9: Owner’s Right to Carry Out the Work (law note)
March 28, 2018 —
Melissa Dewey Brumback - Construction Law in North CarolinaIn prior versions of the General Conditions, if a contractor defaulted and the Owner (after giving notice) opted to cure by carrying out the work itself, an appropriate Change Order would be issued. However,
a Change Order is a contract that requires an agreement by both the Owner and Contractor, and, obviously, Contractors were reluctant to agree that they were in default and responsible for a deductive change order.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Melissa Dewey Brumback, Construction Law in North Carolina
Foreclosure Deficiency: Construction Loan vs. Home Improvement Loan
November 12, 2019 —
Kevin J. Parker - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogIn a recent Arizona Court of Appeals case, Helvetica Servicing, Inc., v. Pasquan, 2019 WL 3820015, (8/15/19), the Court of Appeals addressed the distinction between (1) a construction loan (or refinance of same) and (2) a home improvement loan (or refinance of same), as it relates to Arizona’s anti-deficiency statute, A.R.S. §33-729(A).
In general, an anti-deficiency statute provides that although a purchase-money lender or a construction lender can – in appropriate circumstances – foreclose on their loan and cause a sale of the property to pay the loan, the lender cannot (if the statutory criteria are met) force the homeowner/borrower to pay the remaining balance still owed on the loan following the foreclosure (known as the deficiency). In other words, if the anti-deficiency rule applies, the lender’s sole remedy to collect on the loan is a foreclosure sale of the property; and the homeowner/borrower’s downside risk is loss of the property in foreclosure; the homeowner/borrower does not have any personal liability to pay the remaining unpaid balance of the loan post-foreclosure. In effect, the homeowner/borrower can simply walk away and not have to repay the loan.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Kevin J. Parker, Snell & WilmerMr. Parker may be contacted at
kparker@swlaw.com
