Nomos LLP Partner Garret Murai Recognized by Super Lawyers
September 05, 2023 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogNomos LLP Partner Garret Murai has been selected to the 2023 Northern California Super Lawyers list in the area of Construction Litigation. This is the tenth consecutive year that he has been recognized by Super Lawyers.
Garret was also also featured in this year’s Northern California Super Lawyer’s magazine’s 20th anniversary cover story “Built Different” where he talks a bit about his practice and changes he has seen over the past 20 years as a construction lawyer. The following is an excerpt from the article:
“The New Reality of Work”
Garret Murai, whose father was an architect, is a founding partner of Nomos LLP, an Oakland-based construction law firm. Concentrating in both commercial and public works, Murai’s clients run the gamut from contractors and subcontractors to owners and developers.
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Garret Murai, Nomos LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@nomosllp.com
Ohio Court of Appeals Affirms Judgment in Landis v. Fannin Builders
April 20, 2011 —
Beverley BevenFlorez CDJ STAFFThe Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in Landis v. William Fannin Builders. Landis contracted Fannin Builders to build their home. The case involved staining problems on the T1-11 siding chosen by the plaintiffs.
After a year and a half of discussion on how to resolve the problem of uneven staining on the siding, Landis filed suit “against Fannin Builders, alleging claims for breach of contract, breach of the express limited warranty, and violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (“OCSPA”). Fannin Builders, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against 84 Lumber, alleging claims for breach of contract and indemnification. With the trial court’s leave, Fannin Builders also later amended its answer to add a counterclaim against appellees for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. In the counterclaim, Fannin Builders alleged that appellees still owed it $3,908.98 for the construction of appellees’ home.”
“In its decision, the trial court found in appellees’ favor on their breach of contract claim and against appellees on their claims for breach of the express limited warranty and violation of the OCSPA. Additionally, the trial court found in Fannin Builders’ favor on its counterclaim for breach of contract and against Fannin Builders on its third-party claims for breach of contract and indemnity. The trial court determined that appellees’ damages amounted to $66,906.24, and after setting off the $3,908.98 that appellees owed Fannin Builders under the construction contract, the trial court awarded appellees $62,997.26. The trial court reduced its decision to judgment on May 18, 2010.”
Fannin Builders appealed this judgment and assigned the following errors:
[1.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Concluding that Appellant Breached its Contract with Appellees when it provided a Semi-Transparent Oil-Based Stain that Simply did not Meet their Approval.
[a.] The Contract does not Contain a Satisfaction Clause.
[b.] Even if the Court Implies a Satisfaction Clause, the Court Should Apply an Objective Standard.
[2.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Failing to Consider Appellant’s Right to Cure.
[3.] The Trial Court committed Reversible Error by not Assessing Damages Using “Diminished Value Standard,” and by Creating a Remedy that Constitutes Economic Waste.
[4.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Concluding that Appellant is Barred from Seeking Indemnification When 84 [Lumber] Never Fulfilled its Obligations Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement Entered on August 2, 2005.
In response to the first assigned error, the Court of Appeals stated: “Because the failure to provide siding of a uniform color, not appellees’ displeasure, breached the contract, we reject Fannin Builders’ contention that the trial court implied a satisfaction clause into the contract and found a breach of that clause. Accordingly, we overrule Fannin Builders’ first assignment of error.”
The Court of Appeals overruled the second assignment of error and provided the following reasoning: “Although Fannin Builders depends upon a term of the limited warranty for its right to cure, the trial court concluded that no breach of the limited warranty occurred. Fannin Builders breached the duty of workmanlike conduct implicit in the construction contract, not the limited warranty requiring it to satisfy the BIA’s Quality Standards. Consequently, the limited warranty does not apply to this case, and thus, it does not prevent appellees’ recovery of damages.”
The Appeals Court found “the trial court’s award of damages” was “both reasonable and supported by competent, credible evidence,” and therefore concluded “that the trial court did not err in setting appellees’ damages at $62,997.26.” The Fannin Builders third assignment of error was overruled.
The fourth and final assignment of error was also overruled by the Court of Appeals. “While Fannin Builders correctly asserts that 84 Lumber never installed the replacement siding, it ignores the fact that it ordered 84 Lumber to remove the replacement siding from appellees’ property. Thus, Fannin Builders precluded 84 Lumber from completely performing under the August 2, 2005 letter agreement. […] Consequently, Fannin Builders cannot now claim that the letter agreement is unenforceable or that it is entitled to indemnification from 84 Lumber. Because Fannin Builders assumed all liability for the defective siding in the letter agreement, it is responsible for appellees’ damages.”
James A. Zitesman, Columbus, Ohio Business Attorney, compared the case to Jones v. Centex (Ohio App. 2010), which had a different verdict:
“The common thread is the implied warranty of good workmanship. In the Jones case, the Court found that the buyers had in fact waived all implied warranties, including the implied warranty of good workmanship. In the contract between Jones and Centex, the builder stated that it “…would not sell the property to Purchasers without this waiver.” Probably should have been a sign to the buyers.
In the Landis case, the Court stated, “Contracts for the future construction of a residence include a duty, implied by law, that the builder must perform its work in a workmanlike manner.” The Court gave significant weight to the concept of the implied warranty of good workmanship. The builder relied upon the BIA Warranty which limits builders’ liability and exposure to legal issues. The trial court concluded there was no breach of the limited warranty, rather the builder “breached the duty of workmanlike conduct implicit in the construction contract, not the limited warranty requiring it to satisfy the BIAs Quality Standards.”
The Supreme Court of Ohio has accepted the Jones v. Centex Homes case for review.
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Supreme Judicial Court of Maine Addresses Earth Movement Exclusion
March 01, 2021 —
James M. Eastham - Traub LiebermanIn Bibeau v. Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co., 2021 WL 243867, 2021 ME 4, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine addressed an earth movement exclusion contained in a residential homeowners policy. In 2017, the insured submitted a claim to Concord for damage to the insured’s home which included foundation cracks and settlement resulting in interior damage to the home. The insured contended that the damage was the result of a 2006 water line leak. Concord denied the claim based on the Earth Movement exclusion contained in it’s policy which precluded coverage for losses caused by earthquakes, landslides, mudslides, mudflow, subsidence, sinkholes or “[a]ny other earth movement including earth sinking, rising or shifting; caused by or resulting from human or animal forces or any act of nature”.
The insured filed suit asserting a breach of the policy and unfair claims settlement practices. According to the insured’s expert, the damage was caused by a 2006 water line leak -- which in turn caused the foundation to settle. Concord's expert, however, concluded that the settling was caused by the house being built on “unprepared or uncontrolled fill” which allowed the house to settle at different rates. Despite the disagreement regarding the cause of the settling, the parties ultimately agreed that the damage was the result of earth moving under the house's foundation. Concord moved for summary judgment and the trial court entered summary judgment for Concord, reasoning that because there was no genuine dispute that the losses were caused by “subsurface soils being undermined and earth movement,” the Earth Movement exclusion precluded coverage. The trial court further concluded that the disagreement over the cause of the settlement was not material because regardless of the cause of the earth movement, the losses were clearly excluded by the policy's Earth Movement exclusion.
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James M. Eastham, Traub LiebermanMr. Eastham may be contacted at
jeastham@tlsslaw.com
English High Court Finds That Business-Interruption Insurance Can Cover COVID-19 Losses
November 02, 2020 —
Lorelie S. Masters, Scott P. DeVries, Patrick M. McDermott & Jorge R. Aviles - Hunton Insurance Recovery BlogIn a decision that will influence how policyholders and insurers around the world address business-interruption coverage for COVID-19 losses, the English High Court recently handed down its much-anticipated judgment in the “Test Case,” The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) v. Arch et al. The High Court’s comprehensive analysis will likely serve as an additional tool in policyholders’ arsenal in the ongoing battles over COVID-19 coverage.
The Panel, composed of two well-respected judges, one from the High Court (the UK’s trial court) and the other from the English Court of Appeal, analyzed 21 sample policy wordings in coverage extensions for business-interruption losses due to disease or the issuance of public authority orders. (Many of these wordings are also found in policies sold to US policyholders.) The High Court found that the COVID-19 pandemic and ensuing government actions fell within the coverage provided by the sample policy wordings.
Reprinted courtesy of
Lorelie S. Masters, Hunton Andrews Kurth,
Scott P. DeVries, Hunton Andrews Kurth,
Patrick M. McDermott, Hunton Andrews Kurth and
Jorge R. Aviles, Hunton Andrews Kurth
Ms. Masters may be contacted at lmasters@HuntonAK.com
Mr. DeVries may be contacted at sdevries@HuntonAK.com
Mr. McDermott may be contacted at pmcdermott@HuntonAK.com
Mr. Aviles may be contacted at javiles@HuntonAK.com
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Arbitration Denied: Third Appellate District Holds Arbitration Clause Procedurally and Substantively Unconscionable
February 15, 2021 —
Stephen M. Tye & Lawrence S. Zucker II - Haight Brown & BonesteelIn Cabatit v Sunnova Energy Corporation, the Third Appellate District held that an arbitration clause in a solar power lease agreement was unenforceable because it was procedurally and substantively unconscionable.
In Cabatit, Mr. and Ms. Cabitat entered into a solar power lease agreement (the “Agreement”) with Sunnova Energy Corporation (“Sunnova”). Ms. Cabitat, who signed the agreement, speaks English but does not understand complicated or technical terms. The salesperson scrolled through the agreement language and Ms. Cabatit initialed where the salesperson indicated, even though she did not understand most of what he was saying. The salesperson did not explain anything about the arbitration clause nor did he provide Ms. Cabatit with a copy of the Agreement.
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Stephen M. Tye, Haight Brown & Bonesteel and
Lawrence S. Zucker II, Haight Brown & Bonesteel
Mr. Tye may be contacted at stye@hbblaw.com
Mr. Zucker may be contacted at lzucker@hbblaw.com
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Contractor's Agreement to Perform Does Not Preclude Coverage Under Contractual Liability Exclusion
January 31, 2014 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiIn a much anticipated decision, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that a general contractor who agrees to perform its work in a good and workmanlike manner does not "assume liability" for damages arising out of its defective work so as to trigger the Contractual Liability Exclusion. Ewing Constr. Co., Inc. v. Amerisure Ins. Co., 2014 Tex. LEXIS 39 (Tex. Jan.17, 2014).
Ewing signed an agreement with the School District to serve as general contractor to renovate and build additions to a school, including tennis courts. After construction was completed, the tennis courts started flaking, crumbling, and cracking. The School District filed suit, alleging breach of contract and negligence.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
David M. McLain to Speak at the CLM Claims College - School of Construction - Scholarships Available
July 28, 2016 —
David M. McLain – Colorado Construction LitigationI am happy to have been asked to serve as an instructor at this year's CLM Claims College – School of Construction, to be held at the Marriott Baltimore Waterfront in Baltimore, Maryland on Wednesday, September 7, 2016 through Saturday, September 10, 2016.
Overview of the 2016 School of Construction
Construction claims present myriad complexities in claim handling. Construction defect lawsuits are often multi-party cases with cross claims and third-party claims between and among the numerous defendants. Insurance coverage is intertwined and complex due to the interplay of primary, excess, wrap, and additional insurers for the numerous defendants. All this is further complicated by statutes and regulations, inconsistent case law and procedural peculiarities throughout the United States. The economic stakes are high as the damages claims can be in the multi-millions.
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David M. McLain, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCMr. McLain may be contacted at
mclain@hhmrlaw.com
Amazon Can be Held Strictly Liable as a Product Seller in New Jersey
August 07, 2022 —
Michael L. DeBona - The Subrogation StrategistOn June 29, 2022, in N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Grp. a/s/o Angela Sigismondi v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115826 (Sigismondi), the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey held that Amazon.com, Inc. (Amazon) is a “seller” under New Jersey’s product liability statute and can thus face strict liability for damages caused by products sold on its platform. Although the analysis is state-specific, Sigismondi may serve as an important decision for allowing product defect claims to proceed against Amazon when so often the third-party vendor that lists the product is unlocatable, insolvent, or not subject to the jurisdiction of United States courts.
In recent years, Amazon has been fighting product liability claims across the country. Amazon argues it is not a “seller” under states’ product liability laws but is merely an online marketplace that facilitates the sale of products by third-party vendors. What constitutes a “seller” in a particular state must be evaluated state-by-state, but various courts have accepted Amazon’s argument that it is not a “seller.” These decisions are based on Amazon’s level of control in the product sale and often focus on a finding that Amazon did not convey possession of the product or transfer its title.
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Michael L. DeBona, White and WilliamsMr. DeBona may be contacted at
debonam@whiteandwilliams.com
