Seattle Washington Building Expert Directory

Blackstone to Buy Cosmopolitan Resort for $1.73 Billion

May 19, 2014 — Hui-yong Yu – Bloomberg
Deutsche Bank AG (DBK) agreed to sell the Cosmopolitan of Las Vegas hotel and casino to Blackstone Group LP (BX) for $1.73 billion in cash, ending a six-year money-losing venture into casino development. “The bank is committed to reducing its non-core legacy positions in a capital-efficient manner which benefits shareholders,” Pius Sprenger, head of the Frankfurt-based lender’s non-core operations unit, said in a statement today. The division is selling and winding down assets that Deutsche Bank doesn’t consider to be central to its business. Germany’s largest lender foreclosed on the Cosmopolitan after developer Ian Bruce Eichner defaulted on a construction loan in January 2008, and has labeled it a temporary investment. The company was seeking more than $2 billion for the property, a person familiar with the situation said last month. Two others said it was valued at closer to $1.5 billion. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Hui-yong Yu, Bloomberg
Hui-yong Yu may be contacted at hyu@bloomberg.net

Breaking News: Connecticut Supreme Court Decides Significant Coverage Issues in R.T. Vanderbilt

December 16, 2019 — Patricia B. Santelle & Ciaran B. Way - White and Williams LLP
On October 4, 2019 (almost two years after granting certification), the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court’s rulings on four key coverage issues in R.T. Vanderbilt Company v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, et al. The coverage dispute in Vanderbilt concerns underlying actions alleging that talc and silica mined and sold by the insured contained asbestos and/or caused asbestos-related disease. The case has been proceeding in phases, two of which have been tried to date, resulting in the matter on appeal. (1) “Continuous Trigger” Theory of Coverage Applies: The Court affirmed and adopted the Appellate Court’s opinion applying a “continuous trigger” for the underlying claims at issue, and agreed that the trial court properly excluded testimony from medical experts the insurers had proffered to prove that the asbestos disease process did not support a continuous trigger. (2) The “Unavailability of Insurance” Exception to Time-on-Risk Pro Rata Allocation Applies: The Court affirmed and adopted the Appellate Court’s ruling that (a) damages and defense costs should not be allocated to any period in which insurance was “unavailable” in the market, (b) the insurers bear the burden of proving that coverage for asbestos liabilities was available to the policyholder after the date asbestos exclusions were added to the policies and (c) the insured bears the burden of proving that it was unable to obtain asbestos coverage prior to 1986 (when such insurance was generally available). The Appellate Court recognized that, in certain circumstances, there could be an “equitable exception” to the unavailability rule if the insured continued to manufacture products containing asbestos after 1986 with the knowledge that such products were hazardous and uninsurable (circumstances which the court found were not present in this case). Reprinted courtesy of Patricia B. Santelle, White and Williams LLP and Ciaran B. Way, White and Williams LLP Ms. Santelle may be contacted at santellep@whiteandwilliams.com Ms. Way may be contacted at wayc@whiteandwilliams.com Read the court decision
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Illinois Appellate Court Address the Scope of the Term “Resident” in Homeowners Policy

April 11, 2022 — James M. Eastham - Traub Lieberman
In Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Cheekati, 2022 IL App (4th) 210023, the 4th District Court of Appeals for the State of Illinois addressed whether the term “resident” in a homeowners policy included a tenant leasing the insured premises. The Insureds owned property which was insured through Farmers under a homeowner’s policy. Unable to sell the property, the Insureds entered into a two-year lease agreement with a tenant. Several months after entering into the lease agreement, the tenant allegedly sustained physical injuries inside of the rented premises when a staircase collapsed. The tenant sued the Insureds and the matter was tendered to Farmers. Thereafter, Farmers denied coverage based on an exclusionary provision in the homeowner’s policy. Specifically, the policy contained a "Liability Exclusions" section, which provided:

"Coverage E (Personal Liability) *** and personal injury coverage, if covered under this policy, do not apply to: Any insured or other residents of the residence premises. We do not cover bodily injury or personal injury to: (a) any insured; or (b) any resident of the residence premises, whether resident in the dwelling or a separate structure." (Emphases in original.)

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Reprinted courtesy of James M. Eastham, Traub Lieberman
Mr. Eastham may be contacted at jeastham@tlsslaw.com

Understanding Liability Insurer’s Two Duties: To Defend and to Indemnify

December 26, 2022 — David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates
A liability insurer has two duties that are the crux of a liability policy: the duty to defend the insured in legal actions and the duty to indemnify the insured from losses covered under the policy. Many times, policyholders (insureds) do not fully understand or appreciate these two important duties. They need to and this is why having private counsel assist with coverage-related considerations is an absolute must. An insurers’ duty to defend is separate from its duty to indemnify. A recent opinion out of the Middle District of Florida in Progressive Express Ins. Co. v. Tate Transport Corp., 2022 WL 16963815 (M.D.Fla. 2022) clarifies the distinction between these duties with a focus on an insurer’s initial duty — the duty to defend. Please read below so you can have more of an appreciation of these duties. The court does a good job discussing Florida law with the emphasis on when an insurer’s initial duty to defend kicks-in: Duty to Defend Under Florida law, “an insurer’s duty to defend its insured against a legal action arises when the complaint alleges facts that fairly and potentially bring the suit within policy coverage.” The duty to defend is a broad one, broader than the duty to indemnify, and “[t]he merits of the underlying suit are irrelevant.” We determine whether an insurer has a duty to defend its insured based only on “the eight corners of the complaint and the policy,” and only as the complaint’s alleged facts are “fairly read[.]” The “facts” we consider in evaluating the duty to defend come solely from the complaint, regardless of the actual facts of the case and regardless of any later developed and contradictory factual record. “Any doubts regarding Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dma@kirwinnorris.com

“I Didn’t Sign That!” – Applicability of Waivers of Subrogation to Non-Signatory Third Parties

September 30, 2019 — Rahul Gogineni - The Subrogation Strategist
In Gables Construction v. Red Coats, 2019 Md. App. LEXIS 419, Maryland’s Court of Special Appeals considered whether a contractual waiver of subrogation in the prime contract for a construction project barred a third party – a fire watch vendor hired to guard the worksite – from pursuing a contribution claim against the general contractor. The court concluded that the general contractor could not rely on the waiver of subrogation clause to defeat the contribution claim of the vendor, who was not a party to the prime contract. As noted by the court, holding that a waiver of subrogation clause bars the contribution claims of an entity that was not a party to the contract would violate the intent of the Maryland Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA). When dealing with claims involving construction projects, there may exist multiple contracts between various parties that contain waivers of subrogation. The enforceability of such waivers can be limited by several factors, including the jurisdiction of the loss, the language of the waiver and the parties to the contract. In Gables Construction, Upper Rock, Inc. (Upper Rock), the owner, contracted with a general contractor, Gables Construction (GCI) (hereinafter referred to as the “prime contract”), to construct an apartment complex. After someone stole a bobcat tractor from the jobsite, Gables Residential Services Incorporated (GRSI), GCI’s parent company, signed a vendor services agreement (VSA) with Red Coats to provide a fire watch and other security services for the project. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Rahul Gogineni, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Gogineni may be contacted at goginenir@whiteandwilliams.com

No Coverage for Foundation Collapse

November 08, 2017 — Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii
Coverage for the collapse of a foundation was not covered under the contractor's builder's risk policy. Taja Investments LLC v. Peerless Ins. Co., 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 19855 (4th Cir. Oct. 11, 2017). Taja Construction LLC was renovating a row house owned by Taja Investments LLC when the east wall of the property collapsed. Taja submitted a claim for repair costs in the amount of $400,000. Peerless denied coverage because the collapse was caused by Taja's failure to support the building's foundation properly while excavating the basement. The policy excluded coverage for defects in construction or workmanship. The claim was also denied under the earth movement exclusion. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

When is a Contract not a Contract?

January 21, 2019 — Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law Musings
As I’ve stated numerous times here at Musings, in Virginia the contract is king. The courts of Virginia will read a contract as written and where there is a contract (read as foreshadowing), the courts will assume the parties knew what they were doing and enforce it by its terms. However, there has to be a contract in the first place. When can something look like a contract but still not be a contract? When there isn’t mutual assent according to the case of Knox Energy, LLC v. Gasco Drilling, Inc. In the Knox case, along with a ruling on discovery abuse that is a topic of other blogs, considered a jury instruction on mutual assent given by the district court in a case where Knox contended that it inadvertently sent an unexecuted drilling contract form to Gasco and then inadvertently executed it when Gasco returned it. While this would not normally cause this series of events to be a non-contract, Knox also contended that Gasco knew that Knox had no intention to enter into the drilling contract and that Gasco jumped at the deal. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of The Law Office of Christopher G. Hill
Mr. Hill may be contacted at chrisghill@constructionlawva.com

Contract’s Definition of “Substantial Completion” Does Not Apply to Third Party for Purposes of SOL, Holds Court of Appeal

June 15, 2020 — Garret Murai - California Construction Law Blog
Those of you in the construction industry know that the two primary statutes of limitation are the 4-year year statute of limitations for patent defects and 10-year statute of limitations for latent defects. Both statutes begin to run on “substantial completion.” In Hensel Phelps Construction Co. v. Superior Court of San Diego, Case No. D076264 (January 22, 2020), the 4th District Court of Appeal examined whether the term “substantial completion,” as used in Civil Code section 941, which applies to residential construction, can be defined by the parties’ contract and applied to third-parties. The Hensel Phelps Case Hensel Phelps Construction Co. entered into a prime construction contract with the owner and developer of a mixed-use project in San Diego. Hensel Phelps was the general contractor on the project. The project included a residential condominium tower which would eventually be managed and maintained by Smart Corner Owners Association. Smart Corners was not a party to the contract. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Garret Murai, Nomos LLP
Mr. Murai may be contacted at gmurai@nomosllp.com

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